Dеfendant appeals as of right from his conviction, following a jury trial, of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocainе, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2) (a)(iv). He was sentenced to a term of one to twenty years. We remand.
Defendant was stopped by the police for sрeeding on the freeway. A subsequent check of the Law Enforcement Information Network disclosed that he was driving while his driver’s license was suspended, MCL 257.904(2); MSA 9.2604(2), a misdemeanor. He was then arrested and his vehicle was impounded. Defendant’s passenger possessed no valid driver’s license.
On appeal, defendant argues that evidence of the address book and the drugs should have been suppressed because the police failed to inform him of his right to post interim bail, MCL 780.581; MSA 28.872(1), and therefore, the inventory search was illegal. We disagree.
At the time of defendant’s arrest in 1988, the release of misdemeanor prisoners act provided that a person arrested for committing a misdemeanor had to be taken, "without unnecessary delay, . . . beforе the most convenient magistrate of the county in which the offense was committed to answer the complaint.” MCL 780.581(1); MSA 28.872(1)(1). 1 The act further prоvided that, "if a magistrate is not available or immediate trial cannot be had, the person arrested may leave with the arresting оfficer or the direct supervisor of the arresting officer or department ... as a bond to guarantee his or her appearance, a sum of money . . . not to exceed the amount of the possible fine but not less than 20% of the amount of the minimum possible fine that may be imposed for the offense for which the person was arrested.” MCL 780.581(2); MSA 28.872(1)(2).
An arresting officer must inform the arrested person of the right tо post interim bail.
People v Dixon,
We find that the statute was not violated in this case by the officer’s failure to immediately inform defendant of his right to post interim bail.
People v Weston,
The legality of the inventory search that followed defendant’s arrеst depends in part on whether the car was lawfully impounded.
Krezen, supra
at 685. Here, the officer testified that it was department policy to imрound a vehicle "when a person is arrested and there is no one there that can take care of the car.” Becаuse defendant’s passenger had no valid driver’s license, the officer properly impounded the vehicle pursuant to depаrtment policy. See, e.g.,
People v Toohey,
Because the vehicle was lawfully impounded, the validity of the inventory search depends on whether there were standardized criteria, policies, or routines regulating how inventory searches were to be conducted.
Florida v Wells,
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the policy may allow an individual officer to exercise some discretion. Wells, supra at 3-4; Toohey, supra at 286-287. However, that discretion must not be "uncanalized.” Wells, supra at 4; Toohey, supra at 286-287.
Here, the offiсer did not produce the department’s policy and he did not testify concerning the department’s policy regarding closed containers. Although he testified that it was routine to open the trunk and check for a spare tire, he did not testify whether it was departmеnt policy to open all or some of the containers found in the trunk. We must therefore remand for further proceedings consistеnt with this opinion.
We stress that the only issue remaining is whether the police department had a standard practice that allowed thе procedure followed in this case. There are no issues remaining with regard to either the address book or the interim bail act.
Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.