181 Mich. App. 583 | Mich. Ct. App. | 1989
Defendant appeals his December 12, 1988, sentence imposed after he pled guilty to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, which he committed after an escape from jail. His twenty-five to forty-year prison sentence was made consecutive to the 1966 life sentence he was serving prior to his escape and to his 1986 sentences for other crimes which he committed while an escapee. We affirm.
In 1983, defendant escaped from the Lake County Jail
Defendant first claims that the lower court erred in making his sentence consecutive to the Kent County sentences, arguing that this was impermissibly stacking consecutive sentences and that there is no indication that the Legislature intended such a broad sweeping application. We disagree.
MCL 768.7a(1); MSA 28.1030(1)(1) provides:
A person who is incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution in this state, or who escapes from such an institution, and who commits a crime during that incarceration or escape which is punishable by imprisonment in a penal or reformatory institution in this state shall, upon conviction of that crime, be sentenced as provided by law. The term of imprisonment imposed for the crime shall begin to run at the expiration of the term or terms of imprisonment which the person is serving or has become liable to serve in a penal or reformatory institution in this state. [Emphasis added.]
The consecutive sentencing statutes should be construed liberally in order to achieve the deterrent effect intended by the Legislature. People v Kirkland, 172 Mich App 735, 737; 432 NW2d 422 (1988); People v Mandell, 166 Mich App 620, 622; 420 NW2d 834 (1987). The statute clearly provides that the sentence shall commence "at the expira
This Court has previously upheld the validity of cumulative consecutive sentences for escapees under the above statute. See People v McKee, 167 Mich App 258; 421 NW2d 655 (1988); Mandell, supra. We agree that the language of the act mandates such sentencing and that the deterrent effect intended by the Legislature is effectuated by such sentences. In the present case, defendant became "liable to serve” the Kent County sentences for crimes committed as an escapee prior to his conviction and sentence for the instant offense, and thus the cumulative, consecutive sentence was properly imposed.
Defendant also claims that his sentence violates the mandates of People v Moore, 432 Mich 311, 329; 439 NW2d 684 (1989), which held that an indeterminate sentence imposed for a crime must be something that is reasonably possible for a defendant to actually serve. Defendant argues that in adding up the minimum sentences imposed for defendant’s consecutive convictions, it is not reasonably possible for him to live long enough to serve the sentences and become eligible for parole. Defendant was forty-one at the time of sentencing.
In Moore, our Supreme Court interpreted the language which the Legislature had employed in the second-degree murder statute, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, as well as other statutes, which provided that the crime "shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of
MCL 768.7a(1); MSA 28.1030(1)(1) provides that a person who commits a crime while incarcerated or on escape status shall "be sentenced as provided by law.” It then provides that this term of imprisonment shall be consecutive to a term "which the person is serving or has become liable to serve.” In the present case, defendant was sentenced for the crime of second-degree murder for an indeterminate "term of years less than life” of twenty-five to forty years, "as provided by law,” specifically, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. That sentence is well within the mandate of Moore. The sentence was then properly made consecutive to his previously imposed sentences as mandated by MCL 768.7a(1); MSA 28.1030(1)(1), because defendant was an escapee at the time of this crime. The sentence does not violate Moore, and we find it was properly imposed.
Even if we were to add all of the consecutive minimum sentences together to determine whether it was reasonably possible for defendant to serve that time and become eligible for parole, as defendant would have us do, we would still find the sentence proper under Moore. Defendant would be in his mid-eighties at that time, even
Affirmed.
Apparently because of overcrowding in the state prison system, defendant had been transferred to the county jail because he had been a model prisoner.