2 Barb. 566 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1848
Gentlemen of the jury : The solemn duty of deciding upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar, now devolves upon you. The importance of your verdict to him, as well as its influence and effect upon the interests of society, requires at your hands a careful and thorough examination of the evidence. If he be innocent, let him go free. But if he be guilty, let him not escape the punishment due to his crime, by your want of firmness, nor by reason of your shrinking from the faithful discharge of your sworn duty. You are merely to answer to the question of guilt or innocence: you have nothing to do with the consequences of your decision. They rest with the legislature who made the law, and upon the head of those who violate it. Not, gentlemen, that I would intimate the slightest doubt of the wisdom and justice of the law which inflicts capital punishment for the crime of murder. On the contrary, we hold it to be an incontrovertible proposition, that society has the undoubted right to make such laws as are necessary for the protection of its members; that the same principle which will justify us in depriving the thief of his liberty, will justify us in depriving the murderer of life ; that the experience of civilized nations in all ages has demonstrated the wisdom and policy of the doctrine: that it accords with the principles of human nature, and the dictates of human reason; nay, more—that it is sanctioned by divine authority itself, in the declaration that “ whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.”
In the case before you, gentlemen, you are not embarrassed with those questions which usually most perplex juries in capital trials. There is no doubt that the prisoner perpetrated the
The case turns upon the defence of insanity set up on behalf of the accused. It is the duty of the court to lay before you the legal principles applicable to cases of insanity, in order that you may apply them to-the facts ; and it is your duty to take those principles as delivered to you, and so apply them. It is often said, and has been said in the progress of this trial, that the jury in criminal cases, are judges of the laio, as well as of the facts. If by this is meant that the jury are to assume the prerogative of the court as exercised in civil cases, adopt their own views of the law without regard to those entertained by the court, I am bound to say to you, that such is not the law of the land. This proposition is perfectly untenable, and has been distinctly repudiated on more than one occasion by the judges of the supreme court of the United States. If. however, by this expression is meant merely that whatever decision the jury make, whether of law or fact, in favor of the prisoner, is final and cannot be reviewed—then the declaration is true; This is all that can be properly understood by the phrase “ the jury are judges of the law as well as factand the re'as'on of this is, that the constitution does not permit a new trial in case of acquittal. But if the decision of the jury should be against a prisoner, contrary to the law as laid down by the court, a remedy can be applied. In this state the jury is presumed to receive the law from the court. The prisoner has the benefit of exceptions to the opinion of the court-; and if they are well founded, he can obtain a new trial. The jury, it is true, have the power to disregard the law, and to disregard their oaths— and to render a verdict contrary to both law and evidence; and in this respect they are the judges of the law; and if in so doing they acquit a prisoner when he is guilty, the public is without redress. But it can hardly be contended that the jury has the right to do all this. This question has recently been discussed and decided by the supreme court of the state of Massachusetts, in the case of the Commonwealth v. Porter, (Law Rep. for 1847, p. 455) In delivering thé opinion of the court,
The question of insanity, upon which this case tui'ns, always invokes difficult and intricate inquiries. It is a subject upon which much has been said and written, by way of theory and speculation, and it cannot be denied that the numerous adjudications are not altogether reconcilable. Without detaining you with technical terms, it will be sufficient to say that insanity assumes a variety of forms, and has many names. Among these are—1. General insanity; 2. Partial insanity; 3. Periodical insanity; 4. Moral insanity; . 5. Drunkén insanity. The first is insanity applied to objects generally. The second is applied to single objects. The third occurs at periods, with sane intervals. The fourth is a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, &c. and the fifth is that which results directly from intoxication. Now the rules applicable to crimes committed in any Of these degrees of insanity, are mainly those of sound reason. Thus it is conceded to be the law, that insanity occasioned directly by intoxication, is no excuse for a crime committed by one in that state. If it were otherwise, a man by drinking to excess could divest himself of legal responsibility and gratify his thirst for vengeance with impunity. In regard to the other kinds of insanity, the rule is laid down in great variety of terms. The English rule is thus stated in Bellingham’s case, by Chief Justice Mansfield—“ In order to support the defence of itisanity, it ought to be proved by the most distinct and únquestiohable evidence that the prisoner was incapable of judging Between right and wrong; that in fact it must be proved beyond all doubt that at the time he committed
In the case of Abner Rogers, tried in Massachusetts before Chief Justice Shaw, in 1844, he laid down the rule as follows : “ A man is not to be excused from responsibility if he has capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act he is then doing ; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and criminal, will subject him to punishment.” Although he may be laboring under partial insanity, if he still understand the nature and character of his act, and its consequences ; if he has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and a mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment; such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibility for criminal acts.”
There are cases in which the insanity consists in a delusion by which the prisoner has a real and firm belief of the existence of a fact wholly imaginary and unfounded. In regard to this, the English courts hold that it is no defence for a crime that the prisoner supposes he is redressing an injury or grievance. The Massachusetts rule is, that if the imaginary facts would, if true, justify the act, then he is excusable. As, when the prisoner supposed that the person was about to,kill him, and he slays the other in self defence. There must be an immediate apprehension of danger.
As to hereditary insanity, the evidence is admissible upon that principle of human nature by which the properties, temperaments and infirmities of the parents are sometimes transmitted to their children, and pass from generation to generation. It is not in any case evidence of the highest character. It would be obviously unsafe to acquit any prisoner on the sole ground that any of his ancestors were insane. It is a mere circumstance. But before any inference can be drawn from such a source, the fact of the ancestor’s insanity must be clearly established. It is endeavored to be shown from the following facts that the prisoner’s father was insane: 1. He appointed a time to die; 2. Was troubled in mind; 3. Committed suicide. But do these acts necessarily prove insanity? He seems to have been a “ high spirited” man, and possessing strong passions and religious feelings. He was unfortunate in his pecuniary affairs—his property about to be sold on execution. May not these facts account for his conduct ? Is every man who becomes possessed with the idea that he is about to die, insane ? Is suicide evidence of insanity ? Clearly not, alone. If you were now trying the question of Tilly Pine’s insanity, would the evidence authorize you to find in its favor ? If not, can you find any just inference in this case in favor of
How then stands the testimony as to his situation at the time of committing the act? On Friday he came to Poughkeepsie and bought the pistol, apparently sane. He returned to Pleasant Talley in the evening, apparently sane. On Saturday and Saturday evening he is proved to have been as sane as usual. On Sunday morning he was awakened by Sales, and cleaned the bar-room; sane yet. Took his breakfast as usual. Between 10 and 11 o’clock he and Mr. Holmes looked over the accounts and settled. About the same time he had a brief conversation with Mr. Bishop at the stable. Mr. Frear saw him about 12 o’clock, three-fourths of a mile from Russell’s, going north; exchanged a few words, and considered him sane. Mr. Doty saw him about one-fourth of a mile from Russell’s, and did not discover any signs of insanity. It is true that he drank several times; and one witness speaks of his having a wild eye, but the great mass of proof establishes him to be as sane as usual, nearly up to the time of the commission of the deed, and not excessively intoxicated. When, then, did he become insane ? Was it at the moment of the act? The act itself cannot be taken as evidence ; it must be proven otherwise. Can it be supposed that during all the preliminary arrangements of nearly three days he was sane, and then became insane just at the time of firing the pistol? Can you believe that at the time this act was committed, the prisoner was so insane that
It is for yon to say whether, under this testimony, you can find that this man was insane when he shot Mrs. Russell. His conduct here is an unsafe basis for a verdict of acquittal. You are to consider the case with care and patience, and if made out to your satisfaction, give him the benefit of it. But you are also to remember that you are administering criminal laws; laws made for the protection of society ; laws to which we must look for our safety. If this is a case of murder, it ought to be punished as such. The prisoner deserves it. The example to others is required. The deliberate murderer should never again be permitted to walk our streets, with an opportunity to
Upon the whole, gentlemen, it is for you to say whether this man committed the deed wilfully and understanding^—if not, he must be acquitted. Public justice does not require the punishment of an insane man. If you are satisfied of his insanity, whatever be the consequences, he must be discharged. But public justice does require that if this act was not committed in a state of insanity which will excuse, it should be punished. You are not the ministers of mercy and compassion, but of justice ; your feelings as men, must yield to your duty as jurors. To permit a man legally guilty of such an atrocious offence to go at large, would be an example of the most dangerous character and tendency, well calculated to impair public confidence in the virtue and efficiency of our courts of justice.
The case, gentlemen, is with you; and I trust your deliberations will be guided by that Wisdom which can never err.
Note. The jury found the defendant guilty; and he was pxecuted.