People v. PilgrimPeople v. Pilgrim
— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Harrington, J.), rendered December 5, 1983, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (four counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Following the reversal of his judgment of conviction rendered June 29, 1977 (Lockman, J.) (see, People v Pilgrim,
There is no merit to the defendant’s contention that he was prejudiced by the admission into evidence of a transcript of an incriminating tape recording which had been played at the first trial but which had been lost in the intervening six years. Officer Giglio, who had made the transcription, and former Assistant District Attorney Nigro, who had compared it with the tape introduced into evidence at the first trial in the course of his work on a prior appeal, were satisfied with its accuracy, as was Judge Lockman who, following an audibility hearing conducted during the 1977 proceedings, found the transcript to be sufficiently reliable for distribution to the jury as an aid in listening to the tape (see, People v Tapia,
The defendant’s claim of error in the denial of his request to charge the affirmative defense of entrapment is also without merit. At the outset, it should be noted that the defendant requested this charge only as to 2 of the 6 sales set forth in the indictment, viz., those occurring on October 26, 1976, and November 10, 1976. Since the defendant did not claim entrapment as to the sales on October 19, 20, and 21, 1976, his conviction of four counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree would not be affected by the court’s refusal to charge entrapment (see, People v Navarro,
The undercover officer asked the defendant if he (the defendant) could "cop city quarters” to which the defendant replied "No problem”. Simply asking the defendant to commit the crime is not such inducement or encouragement as to constitute entrapment (see, United States v Berry, 362 F2d 756). The mere fact that the officer afforded the defendant the opportunity to commit the crime cannot be characterized as entrapment (see,
We have considered the issues raised in the defendant’s supplemental pro se brief and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.