Opinion by
[ 1 Dеfendant, Eric Edward Pifer, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of one count of sexual assault on a child and three counts of enticement of a child. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support his convie-tions, the court acted within its discretion by denying a challenge for cause to a prospective juror, and the statute pursuant to which Pifer was sentenced was constitutional. Therefore, we affirm.
I. Background
12 AE., K.J., and M.S., all girls between the ages of nine and twelve years old, took Pifer's dog for a walk. When the girls returned the dog to Pifer, he asked if they wanted to come inside his apartment. The girls entered Pifer's apartment and started playing while he watched television. While they were playing, the girls knocked down a sheet that was hanging from the ceiling to separate the living room from the kitchen. Pifer then playfully chased the girls around the apartment with the sheet, tossing it over them and tickling them.
1 3 The girls alleged that, in the course of playing with them, Pifer individually and separately sexually assaulted each of them by touching their intimate parts over their clothing. Accordingly, the People charged Pifer with one count of sexual assault on a child and one count of enticement of a child for each of the three girls.
4 All three girls testified at trial. KJ. testified that Pifer touched her vaginal area over the sheet and her clothes. The jury found him guilty of sexually assaulting her. The jury found Pifer not guilty of sexually assaulting the other two girls, but found him
4 5 Pifer appeals.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
T6 Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction is a question we review de novo. See People v. Williams,
T7 We address whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Pifer's sexual assault and enticement of a child convictions seрarately.
A. Sexual Assault on a Child
T8 A conviction for sexual assault on a child requires proof that an actor subjected a victim to unlawful sexual contact. § 18-3-404(1), C.R.S.2018. Sexual contact includes the "knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's ... intimate parts." § 18-8-401(4), C.R.S.2018.
T9 Pifer concedes that there was sufficient evidence to establish that he touched K.J. over her clothes and the sheet. Yet he argues that because the sheet was not part of K.J.'s clothing, and the sheet was between his hand and K.J.'s clothing, he did not touch the "clothing covering the immediate area" of K.J.'s intimate parts. Thus, according to Pifer, there was insufficient evidence of sexual contact and sexual assault.
1 10 When interpreting a statute, we aim to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. See People v. Scoggins,
1111 We conclude that Pifer's conduct falls within the plain and ordinary meaning of "touching." Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "touch" as "to perceive or experience through the tactile senses." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2415 (2002); see People v. Voth,
{12 Furthermore, adopting Pifer's construction would mean that sexual contact could oecur only by skin to skin contact, or when the actor's bare skin touches clоthing that the victim is wearing. For instance, when, for the purpose of sexual arousal, abuse, or gratification, the actor wears a condom during a sexual act, touches the vie-tim's bare genitals with a gloved hand, or touches the victim's bare genitals with a bare hand over a blanket, sexual contact would not occur under Pifer's construction. It strikes us as unlikely that the General Assembly intended to draw such distinctions in enacting the sexual аssault statute. CJ. Vinson,
B. Enticement of a Child
T13 Enticement of a child occurs where the actor "invites or persuades" a child "to enter any ... building ... with the intent to commit sexual assault or unlawful sexual contact upon said child." § 18-8-805(1), C.R.S. 2018.
{14 Pifer argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish thаt he (1) invited the three girls inside and (2) did so with intent to sexually assault them. We disagree with both arguments.
15 Pifer does not dispute that A.E.'s testimony was sufficient and substantial evidence establishing that he asked the girls if they wanted to come inside his aрartment. Instead, he argues that this was not an invitation sufficient to support a conviction as there was no evidence that he enticed or persuaded the girls to enter the apartment.
{16 The statute requires that there be an invitation or persuasion, not both. § 18-8-305(1). . We fail to see how asking the three girls if they would like to come inside the apartment was not an invitation to do just that. See People v. Baer,
117 We also conclude that there was sufficient and substantial evidence that Pifer intended to sexuаlly assault the girls when he invited them inside. The People presented evidence that Pifer approached the girls outside of his apartment in his underwear with his penis partially visible, invited them into his apartment, and shortly after they came inside sexually assaulted K.J., touched M.S. in her groin area, and touched A.E. close to her breasts.
18 The jurors knew, because they asked during deliberations, that it was necessary to find that Pifer intended to sexually аssault each girl at the time he invited them into the apartment to convict him of enticement. Although there were some discrepancies in the respective testimony of the three girls on some facts, giving the Peоple "the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be fairly drawn from the evidence," we conclude that the evidence is not such that a reasonable juror would "necessarily have a rеasonable doubt" that Pifer intended to sexually assault the girls when he invited them inside. Clark v. People,
III. Challenge for Cause
119 Next, Pifer contends that the court erred by denying his challenge for cause to a prospective juror. (Pifer's counsel used a peremptory challenge to excuse the prosрective juror from service.) We review for an abuse of discretion, see Carrillo v. People,
120 A court must sustain a challenge for cause if the juror has "a state of mind ... evincing enmity or bias toward the defendant оr the state," but not if "the court is satisfied ... that [the juror] will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial." § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S.20183; accord Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X).
1 21 During voir dire, the prospective juror at issue did not indicаte that he would be unable to consider the evidence and apply the law as directed by the trial court, nor did he say that he would be unable to be fair and impartial. Rather, he expressed concern that he would become impatient and frustrated during jury deliberations, which might compel him to try to reach a verdict quickly just to end deliberations.
{22 Based on this expression of concern, Pifer's counsel challenged the prospective juror for cause. The court denied the challenge, ruling that potential frustration with the deliberation process was insufficient to
123 We conclude that the court acted within its discretion by denying the challenge for cаuse because the prospective juror gave no indication that he was biased against Pifer or would be unable or unwilling to render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence. Cf. Peoрle v. Montgomery,
IV. SOLSA
T 24 Finally, Pifer argues that the SOLSA, pursuаnt to which he was sentenced, is unconstitutional. Pifer acknowledges that "numerous divisions of this [eclourt have rejected the same or similar facial constitutional challenges to [SOLSA]." We follow the decisions of those divisions, and therefore reject Pifer's constitutional challenge. See, eg., People v. Lehmkuhl,
V. Conclusion
The judgment and sentence are affirmed.