Opinion
Jоhn E. Phelps appeals his conviction for hit and run causing injury, 1 contending the trial court erred by ordering restitution for future medical expenses. We affirm.
Phelps crashed the car he had stolеn into a station wagon in which seven-year-old Trent McGee was riding, paralyzing Trent from the neck down. At sentencing on the hit-and-run conviction, the trial court ordered restitution pursuant to Government Code section 13967 2 in the amount of $150,000, $29,000 for past medical expenses and $121,000 for future medical expenses.
Phelps argues the plain language of section 13967 prohibits the court from ordеring restitution for future medical expenses. The statute provides, in pertinent part: “In cases in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, ... thе court shall order restitution to be paid to the victim. . . . [Restitution shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined. The court shall order full restitution unless it finds clear and compelling reаsons for not doing so, and states them on the record. . . . [^D Restitution ordered pursuant to this subdivision shall, to the extent possible, be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim, or victims, for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” (§ 13967, subd. (c).)
*949 Phelps claims the section’s language compels the conclusion that restitution is limited to mоnies expended when the court orders restitution. He notes the statute requires direct restitution where a victim “has suffered” economic loss as the result of a defendant’s criminal conduсt, and directs the court to order restitution for all economic losses “incurred.” Phelps reasons the use of past tense mandates his interpretation of the statute.
“A fundamental rule оf statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In construing a statute, our first task is to look to the language of the statute itself. [Citation.] When the language is clear and there is no uncertainty as to the legislative intent, we look no further and simply enforce the statute accоrding to its terms. [Citations.]”
(DuBois
v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1993)
Here, it is unclear whether the term “economic loss” is intended to encompass all expenses necessary to treat an injury (those that have arisen and those yet to arise), or only those that have arisen by the date of sentencing. The former interpretation is supported by the language of the statute requiring restitution “be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim, or victims, for
all determined economic losses
incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” (§ 13967.) This language, requiring restitution for
all
economic losses, suggests the statute contemplates past аnd prospective economic losses. “[T]he various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering [a] particular clause or section in the context of thе statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.]”
(Moyer
v.
Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1973)
Furthermore, it is unclear whether, as Phelps contends, the word “incurred” is meant to limit recovery to expenses arising before sentencing, or to include all economic losses that will be “incurred.”
3
Faced with this ambiguity, we must ascertain the lawmakers’ intent to give the statute’s language its intended effect.
(People
v.
Jones
(1993)
The statute was enacted pursuant tо a constitutional scheme adopted by the voters in 1982 as part of Proposition 8. “In the case of a constitutional
*950
provision adopted by the voters, their intent governs. [Citations.]”
(People
v.
Jones
(1993)
The intent оf the voters is plain: every victim who suffers a loss shall have the right to restitution from those convicted of the crime giving rise to that loss. Nothing in the language of the Constitution suggests an intent to limit the right to restitutiоn for financial losses occurring within a particular time frame, or restitution to expenses incurred before sentencing. In fact, the language manifests a contrary intent. The Constitution speaks of “comprehensive provisions and laws,” “restitution ... for financial losses,” and “[restitution . . . from the convicted persons in every case.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The only qualification is that the loss must be “the result of criminal activity.” (Ibid.)
California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (b) does not qualify “loss” with the word “economic,” as does the statute. Although it can plausibly be argued that the victim’s future mediсal expenses are not an “economic loss” (since they are not yet due), it cannot be said that Phelps’s victim (who has lost all feeling and movement from the neck down) has not yet suffered a “loss.” Since the word “loss” must be construed broadly and liberally to uphold the voters’ intent
(People
v.
Nguyen
(1994)
The use of the word
restitution
in the Constitution and section 13679 also supports this construction. “ ‘ “If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” [Citation.] . . . “When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.” [Citations.] . . .’ ”
(DuBois
v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd, supra,
Phelps’s proposed interpretation of the statute stands in direct conflict with the constitutional language requiring restitution for an injury. “ ‘ “[I]t is а settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend. [Citation.]” ’ ”
(People
v.
King
(1993)
Phelps argues that even if the statute is ambiguous and subject to two interpretatiоns, the doctrine of lenity requires that we adopt the construction most favorable to him. Lenity is “the policy of this state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute. [Citation.]”
(Keeler
v.
Superior Court
(1970)
Here, the intеnt of the voters has unequivocally resolved any possible ambiguity in favor of Phelps’s victim. The two possible interpretations do not stand in equipoise and the rule of lenity is inapplicable.
*952
Phelps claims allowing victim restitution for prospective medical expenses would cause massive problems within the criminal court system. That is not true. Layperson jurors are regularly аsked to award damages for future medical expenses based on input from experts. (See
Schiernbeck
v.
Haight
(1992)
The judgment is affirmed.
Crosby, Acting P. J., and Rylaarsdam, J., concurred.
Appellant’s рetition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 27, 1996.
Notes
He was convicted of other charges not pertinent to the appeal.
All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted.
An alternate construction would be that the “loss” is incurred at the time of the injury even though money would not be paid for treatment until later.
It is unlikely, of course, that full restitution will ever be made. But setting restitution cannot be premised on that factor.
Phelps stipulated to the amount of future medical expenses, so we are not called upon to resolve any issues in that regard.