118 Misc. 403 | New York County Courts | 1922
The defendant was convicted in the Traffic Court as a third offender under the general speed ordinance. The sentence included a recommendation for a revocation of his operator’s license. He appeals upon the ground that the offense having occurred on the Williamsburgh bridge, the bridge ordinance rather than the general speed ordinance applies. The alleged rate of speed was twenty-seven miles per hour. The question here involved is whether or not the bridge ordinance is the only ordinance applicable to the operation of motor vehicles on public bridges in the city of New York. The question is one of legislative intent. The practical test in determining that intent, in the absence of repeal verbiage, is two-fold: Firstly, are the two ordinances reconcilable, and secondly, if reconcilable, would the exclusive application of the last enacted ordinance lead to ineffective, or absurd results. The general speed ordinance was enacted in 1913. The bridge ordinance was enacted two years later. Until passage of the bridge ordinance the general speed ordinance governed traffic on bridges, under the provision making it applicable to any “ public place.” It prohibits reckless or endangering speed, and provides that any speed exceeding fifteen miles per hour shall be prima 'facie evidence of violation. It also establishes an absolute speed limit of twenty miles per hour in built-up sections. The bridge ordinance contains no reference to the general ordinance, nor does it either expressly or by fair implication vary any of its terms. It provides: “ No
Judgment of conviction affirmed.