People v Peterson

Aug 5, 2026
2019-06977
Versions:2026 NY Slip Op 04877

Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Sean H. Murray of counsel), for appellant.

Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Rahul K. Sukesh, Johnnette Traill, and Charles T. Pollak of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Stephanie L. Zaro, J.), rendered June 5, 2019, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, petit larceny (two counts), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder‘s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Where, like here, the conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence, this Court must also “satisfy itself that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” (People v Baque, 43 NY3d 26, 30 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of burglary in the second degree and two counts of petit larceny was not against the weight of the evidence (see id. at 29-30; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633). The recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is the thief (see People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374, 382-384; People v Galbo, 218 NY 283, 290; People v Quiles, 115 AD3d 680, 680-681). Here, there was no reasonable view of the evidence, which included admissions made by the defendant during a series of telephone calls that he left the complainants’ building with the stolen property, whereby the jury could have found that the defendant unlawfully possessed certain stolen property without also finding that he committed burglary and larceny.

“‘[T]he Constitutional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes [the] right to have [defense] counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in [defendant‘s] favor‘” (People v Mairena, 34 NY3d 473, 481-482, quoting Herring v New York, 422 US 853, 860). A closing argument is a basic element of a defense in a criminal trial (see People v Abrams, 231 AD3d 963, 964; People v Aponte, 204 AD3d 1031, 1034). However, “[t]he privilege of counsel to comment in summation on any matters of fact pertinent to questions that the jury must decide is not absolute” (People v Smith, 16 NY3d 786, 787-788). “In summation, defense counsel is not permitted to ‘call upon the jury to reach conclusions that are not fairly inferrable from the evidence‘” (People v Kennedy, 177 AD3d 628, 630 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Smith, 16 NY3d at 787). Thus, the trial court may preclude summation arguments that are speculative and unsupported by any evidence (see People v Kelson, 218 AD3d 491, 492; People v Kennedy, 177 AD3d at 630). Here, the Supreme Court properly limited the defendant from arguing, in summation, that a third party committed the burglary and larcenies of which the defendant was accused, since that argument was speculative and unsupported by the evidence (see People v Kelson, 218 AD3d at 492; People v Singh, 138 AD3d 767, 767-768).

A defendant‘s right to cross-examine witnesses is protected by the Federal and State Constitutions (see US Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; People v Kennedy, 177 AD3d at 630). However, an accused‘s right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute (see People v Williams, 81 NY2d 303, 313; People v Kennedy, 177 AD3d at 630). “The scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court[,] and it must weigh the probative value of such evidence against the possibility that it would confuse the main issue and mislead the jury . . . or create substantial danger of undue prejudice to one of the parties” (People v Hayes, 17 NY3d 46, 53 [internal citation and quotation marks omitted]). Contrary to the People‘s contention, the defendant‘s argument that the Supreme Court improperly limited his cross-examination of a police officer by refusing to allow defense counsel to refresh that witness‘s recollection is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]). Nonetheless, the court properly refused to allow the defendant to refresh the witness‘s recollection, as the witness did not indicate that he lacked memory on the subject (see People v Farrow, 216 AD3d 996, 997).

Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, the record does not show that the Supreme Court relied on materially incorrect or unreliable information in imposing the sentence (see People v Kaye, 209 AD3d 873, 874). Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

CHAMBERS, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VOUTSINAS and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court