THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN PEARSE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-14-0051
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT
Order filed June 22, 2016
2016 IL App (2d) 140051-U
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Spence concurred in the judgment. Justice Hutchinson dissented.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County. No. 12-CF-22 Honorable C. Robert Tobin III, Judge, Presiding.
¶ 1 Held: Defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating section 3 of the Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to report a change of address after returning to a previously registered address.
¶ 2 After a jury trial, defendant, Brian Pearse, was convicted of failing to register his address in accordance with section 3 of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) (
“(a) A sex offender *** shall, within the time period prescribed in subsections (b) and (c), register in person and provide accurate information as required by the Department of State Police. *** The sex offender *** shall register:
(1) with the chief of police in the municipality in which he or she resides or is temporarily domiciled for a period of time of 3 or more days ***.
* * *
For purposes of this Article, the place of residence or temporary domicile is defined as any and all places where the sex offender resides for an aggregate period of time of 3 or more days during any calendar year. ***
* * *
(b) Any sex offender ***, regardless of any initial, prior, or other registration, shall, within 3 days of *** establishing a residence, place of employment, or temporary domicile in any county, register in person as set forth in subsection (a) ***.”
730 ILCS 150/3(a)(1) ,(b) (West 2012).
As originally phrased, the indictment alleged that defendant “knowingly failed to register a change of his address *** with the Chief of Police, or his designee, of the City of Belvidere, Boone County, Illinois, within three days of moving from his registered [sic].”
¶ 4 Defendant demanded a bill of particulars, seeking specific descriptions of his “registered address” on February 2, 2012, and “the address the State intend[ed] to prove as the ‘change of address’ as alleged.” The State responded that the address at which defendant last registered
¶ 5 At a hearing on September 10, 2013, the prosecutor explained that he had provided only the first requested particular. He believed that the State need not prove defendant‘s actual address on February 2, 2012, but only that he was residing somewhere other than the hospital and had not registered any new address within three days after leaving the hospital. The judge stated that the change of address and how long defendant had been there as of February 2, 2012, appeared to be “elements of the offense.” The prosecutor responded that, however long defendant had resided at his new address after he left the hospital, the State needed to prove only that, at least three days after he left the hospital, he had not registered his current address. He added that the indictment was consistent with this theory. Defendant‘s attorney noted that the indictment “sa[id] address change, it [did not say] residence. The statute has different types of residences that are different types of addresses that you have to prove.” She had demanded a bill of particulars so as to know which of several possible theories the State had elected.
¶ 6 The judge suggested that, had defendant moved from his home, where he had previously been registered, then to the hospital, where he registered next, and then back to his home, he would have had to “reregister that place.” The prosecutor contended that, under the Act and the indictment, the State need prove only that, more than three days after defendant left the hospital (where he had duly registered), he had resided elsewhere and had “never registered any change of address.” The judge suggested that proving a violation of section 3 might require proof that defendant had established a new fixed residence or temporary domicile (a place where he had resided “for at least three or five days aggregate during any calendar year“) that he had not registered. The hearing on the bill of particulars was continued.
¶ 8 The cause proceeded to trial. The State‘s first witness, Forest Park police officer Jason Keeling, testified as follows. On January 5, 2012, he was assigned to Riveredge Hospital in Forest Park, where he had defendant read and sign a sex-offender registration form. The form, admitted into evidence as People‘s exhibit No. 1, contained several subheadings on the first line. Each had a box that could be checked. The subheading “Initial Registration” was checked. The subheading “Change of Address” was not checked. Thus, January 5, 2013, was defendant‘s annual registration date, not his “change of address” date.
¶ 9 Julie Grubar, a Belvidere police officer, testified as follows. On October 18, 2011, well before defendant entered the hospital, she had visited 1123 South State Street, a two-story house, to make sure that defendant was there. That day, she filled out a form stating that defendant lived at 1123 South State. The form went to the dispatch department, and a LEADS report was created and entered into the database. The form was admitted into evidence.
¶ 10 Grubar testified that, on January 27, 2012, while on patrol, she received a call about defendant and proceeded to 1123 South State. Grubar knocked on the front door but got no response. On February 2, 2012, she returned. She noticed that the house had an upper apartment with the address 1123½ South State. Grubar went there and spoke to defendant. He told her that he had been out of the hospital about two weeks; in that period, he had been residing at 1123½
¶ 11 Pollock testified on direct examination as follows. Each sex offender for whom he was responsible had a separate file. He identified a standard sex-offender registration form that the department used. It had separate lines for the sex offender‘s “Resident Address” and “Secondary Address.” The resident address was the one that the Illinois State Police database (LEADS) listed as the “current address.” On February 2, 2012, Pollock read Grubar‘s report and checked LEADS, which showed that defendant‘s current address was not in Belvidere.
¶ 12 Pollock testified on cross-examination as follows. A LEADS search will disclose a sex offender‘s “resident address,” as listed on his registration form, but not his “secondary address.” In response to Grubar‘s request, Pollock searched LEADS but did not look at People‘s exhibit No. 1, which had listed the Belvidere house as defendant‘s secondary address.
¶ 13 A form, identified by Pollock and admitted into evidence as defendant‘s exhibit No. 2, was dated April 6, 2011, and signed by defendant and the registering officer. On the first line, the subheading “Change of Address” was the only one checked. The form gave defendant‘s “Resident Address” as “1123 South State Street” in Belvidere. It did not give a secondary address. It gave defendant‘s annual registration date as April 6, 2012.
¶ 14 Pollock next identified defendant‘s exhibit No. 3 as one page of a form that defendant filled out and signed on April 6, 2011. The form stated that defendant was required to report in person for address changes. Pollock testified that, were defendant to continue to reside at 1123 South State but add a secondary address, he would have to report in person and fill out the line marked “Secondary Address” on defendant‘s exhibit No. 2.
¶ 16 The State rested. The parties stipulated that defendant was a sex offender.
¶ 17 Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that, according to the State‘s evidence, he had been registered at his Belvidere address before, during, and after his time in the hospital, and he had never stopped “residing” there. The form that he filled out at the hospital gave his Belvidere home as his secondary address. Thus, defendant reasoned, he had not violated section 3 of the Act; he had reported his addresses at both locations.
¶ 18 The State responded that defendant had violated the Act by failing to reregister his Belvidere address within three days of leaving the hospital in Forest Park.1 The judge denied
¶ 19 Defendant‘s father, Arnold Pearse, testified as follows. He had lived at 1123 South State for approximately 35 years. The upstairs apartment‘s address is 1123½ South State. In April 2011, defendant resided there; he still did on January 1, 2012, when a deputy visited and asked his whereabouts. In January 2012, defendant entered the hospital for less than a week. He paid rent every month, including for February 2012.
¶ 20 At the instructions conference, the judge commented that, although the indictment alleged that defendant had violated section 3 of the Act by failing to register at 1123 South State after having established (or reestablished) an address there in January 2012, the evidence had made it “sound[] like the State is real [sic] proceeding under 150/6, failure to register a change of his residence address as opposed to establishing a residence. [Section 3] indicates that he would have to [register] within three days of establishing a residence.” We note that, as pertinent here, section 6 of the Act reads, “If any *** person required to register under this Article changes his or her residence address ***, he or she shall report in person, to the law enforcement agency with whom he or she last registered, his or her new address ***.”
¶ 21 The judge explained, “[T]he difference I would guess is that under [section 3] *** every lily pad that you establish on the pond, every time you establish a new one might fall in under [section 3] because it uses the word ‘establish’ a residence; whereas if you already have lily pads out there that you are just bouncing back and forth amongst, you have an obligation to notify
¶ 22 The judge and the parties then discussed the impact of section 3(b), under which any sex offender, “regardless of any initial, prior, or other registration, shall, within 3 days of *** establishing a residence *** or temporary domicile in any county, register in person as set forth in subsection (a) or (a-5).” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 24 The judge ruled for the State, explaining, “[O]nce you establish a place and register it as one of these places, if you are going to bounce back and forth amongst the lily pads, one that meets the statutory requirement of more than three days or five days [for a temporary domicile or fixed residence], I think you have an obligation to let everybody know where you are at. Otherwise one can establish conceivably in any 12[-]month period 30 places and bounce back and forth amongst those 30 places never staying at one longer than another in which case nobody would ever really know where you live.” He explained that, in his view, the legislature‘s intent was to enable people in a municipality to know that a sex offender was actually living there. The judge conceded that section 3(b) does refer to “establishing a residence[,] which would lead one to believe that that would be the first time that one actually identifies that location as a residence; however, that is inconsistent with the earlier phrase in that sentence, [‘]regardless of any prior registration.[‘] ” Thus, the indictment and the proofs were consistent with the theory that defendant had violated section 3(b) by failing to register his Belvidere address within three days after moving back there from Forest Park.
¶ 25 The conference returned to the choice of jury instructions in light of the foregoing ruling. The judge decided to give People‘s instruction No. 11, which was Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 9.43F (4th ed. Supp. 2011) as modified, over defendant‘s objection.
¶ 26 The conference turned to the elements instruction. Noting his construction of the Act as not requiring a sex offender to register at a new address if he does not stay there the minimum period for a fixed residence or temporary domicile (see People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶¶ 22, 23 (construing section 6 of the Act)), the judge decided to issue People‘s instruction No. 13A:
“To sustain the charge of failure to register as a sex offender the State must prove the following propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant was a sex offender, and
Second Proposition: That the defendant established a fixed residence or temporary domicile different from his last place of registration, and
Third Proposition: That the defendant failed to report that address change within three days.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.”
Other instructions defined “fixed residence” and “temporary domicile.” The propriety of those instructions is not at issue.
¶ 28 On appeal, defendant contends first that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offense, violating section 3 of the Act by failing to report his change of address after he returned to 1123 South State in Belvidere. Defendant argues that (1) even had the evidence proved that he violated section 6 of the Act, the State never charged him under that section and thus could not obtain a conviction on that basis; and (2) although the evidence proved that he did not reregister with the Belvidere police after he returned from the hospital, that omission did not violate section 3, because that section did not require him to register an address that he had registered less than a year earlier.
¶ 29 Defendant contends second that the trial court erred in giving People‘s instruction Nos. 11 and 13A, because they did not apply to the charge of violating section 3 of the Act. Defendant‘s contention depends on his reasonable-doubt contention: in each, he argues that the law did not allow a finding of guilty under section 3 or a jury instruction that allowed (or directed) a guilty verdict under section 3.
¶ 30 We turn to reasonable doubt. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational fact finder could have found the elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 326 (1992). However, to the extent that our review involves the application of a legal standard (here, the pertinent provision(s) of the Act) to a given set of facts, we consider that issue de novo. City of Champaign v. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d 234, 241 (2005).
¶ 31 Defendant argues that, although the indictment (as amended and supplemented by the bill of particulars) alleged that he did not timely register his “change of address” from the hospital to
¶ 32 As he was charged only with violating section 3, defendant reasons that the basis of the charge was that, by returning to reside at 1123 South State without registering timely, he failed to register his “current address” with the chief of police “in the municipality in which he *** reside[d] or [was] temporarily domiciled for a period of time of 3 or more days.”
¶ 33 The State responds that, as the trial court held, subsection (b) of section 3 of the Act, read in conjunction with subsection (a), required defendant to register his Belvidere address a second time after he moved back there. The State observes that subsection (b) states that a sex offender, “regardless of any initial, prior, or other registration, shall, within 3 days of *** establishing a residence *** or temporary domicile in any county, register in person as set forth in subsection (a) or (a-5).” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 34 Defendant replies in part that subsection (b) speaks narrowly of “establishing” a residence or temporarily domicile (
¶ 35 To resolve the dispute over the meaning of the Act, we start with basic principles of statutory construction. On our de novo review, our primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416, 421 (2011). Our starting point is the language that the legislature chose. Id. To the extent that the language is ambiguous, a court ought to consider the statute as a whole, keeping in mind the subject that it addresses and the legislature‘s apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). Although the rule of lenity favors construing ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the accused, this preference is subordinate to the primary goal of effectuating the legislature‘s intent. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d at 427.
¶ 37 The purpose of the Act is to enhance public safety by enabling law-enforcement agencies to keep track of sex offenders. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 420 (2000); Lesher v. Trent, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1170, 1174 (2011). The State contends that its construction of section 3 of the Act serves this purpose by enabling the police to keep a closer bead on a sex offender such as defendant, who has moved from one municipality to another. Of course, defendant‘s situation is distinctive, as he moved back to the address from which he had departed, and he had already registered with the police department in the jurisdiction of his address of return. Had defendant moved from Forest Park to a third municipality, or even to an address in Belvidere other than 1123 South State, there would be no serious doubt that he would have had to register his new address. That way, and only that way, would the Belvidere police have his current address on file. Such, of course, is not the situation here. When defendant returned from Forest Park, his current address was the one at which he had registered with the Belvidere police less than a year earlier. The issue then is whether defendant was legally required to register again with the Belvidere police.
¶ 38 Subsection (a) of section 3 does not appear to impose any such requirement by itself. However, subsection (b) can be read to address defendant‘s circumstances. As the trial judge reasoned, if defendant‘s return to 1123 South State in Belvidere was an act of “establishing a residence,” then, “regardless of any initial, prior, or other registration,” he was required to register with the Belvidere police department. (
¶ 40 Were the dictionary definitions all that we had to work with, we might well favor applying the rule of lenity and holding that, in returning to his former residence, defendant was not “establishing” a residence and thus was not subject to section 3 of the Act. As noted, however, the rule of lenity must give way to the fundamental principle of effectuating the intent of the legislature in the event of a conflict between the two. And, as we have noted, one legitimate tool for ascertaining the intent of the legislature is to consider the apparent purpose of the Act and whether a given interpretation of statutory language tends to advance or to frustrate that purpose. Consideration of the Act‘s purpose, in light of the interaction of section 3 with section 6 of the Act, compels requiring reregistration in this case.
¶ 41 As we also noted earlier, section 6 requires a sex offender who changes his address to notify the police of the municipality from which he is departing that he is moving elsewhere, but section 6 does not require him to notify the municipality to which he is moving. See
¶ 42 We thus ask what the legislature intended in the following circumstances. A sex offender who is duly registered at an address in Municipality A moves to what becomes a residence in Municipality B. He reports to the police department of A that he has departed its jurisdiction, and he registers with the police department of B. He then moves back to A, resides at the prior address, and reports the move to the police in B. However, the police in A do not receive any word from the police in B that he is now within their jurisdiction.
¶ 43 We conclude that the legislative intent requires the offender to register again with A. The facts of this case illustrate the logic of this construction of the Act. As of defendant‘s return from Forest Park, and his physical presence at 1123 South State for the period necessary to trigger section 3‘s operation, the Belvidere police department was still on notice that, early in January, he had moved out of Belvidere and into the hospital in Forest Park (assuming that he had followed the law and reported under section 6 of the Act). However, the department was not on notice that, sometime later, defendant had returned from Forest Park and was now residing in Belvidere. The evidence at trial, particularly Pollock‘s testimony, showed that this danger was not merely hypothetical but actually manifested itself here.
¶ 44 We are compelled to note that in this case the Belvidere police apparently did not have great difficulty locating defendant once he had resided in Belvidere long enough to trigger the operation of section 3 (as we have construed it). Nonetheless, the value of construing the Act as
¶ 45 Given our construction of the Act, we hold that the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating the Act. Defendant‘s second claim of error thus falls as well, because his challenge to People‘s instruction Nos. 11 and 13A is that they incorrectly assumed that he “established” a residence at 1123 South State when he returned from Forest Park. Because defendant‘s challenges to the instructions depend wholly on a construction of the Act that we have rejected, we conclude that his challenges are necessarily without merit.
¶ 46 The dissent asserts that defendant‘s registration of his Belvidere residence as his “secondary address” on January 5, 2012, sufficed as a registration of that address upon his return to that residence. There are two problems with that assertion. The first is that defendant himself does not make it. Indeed, perhaps because, as the dissent acknowledges, the Act does not acknowledge such a thing as a “secondary address,” defendant does not attempt to ascribe any legal significance to it. Instead, he argues only that, “because defendant presented proof that he had registered his Belvidere apartment when he began living there in 2011, the State failed to prove defendant violated 150/3.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 47 The second problem, though, is that the dissent‘s assertion would thwart the purpose of the Act. As noted, the Act‘s purpose is to enable law enforcement to know where sex offenders are, not merely where they might be. That defendant‘s “secondary address” was his Belvidere residence on January 5, 2012, provided no assurance that, once defendant left Forest Park, he would actually be in Belvidere. We have no quarrel with the dissent‘s references to the fact that a defendant can have multiple registered residences. However, the dissent wholly ignores section 3(b). Under that provision, to ensure that law enforcement knows where the defendant
¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Boone County is affirmed. As part of our judgment, we grant the State‘s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal.
¶ 49 Affirmed.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN PEARSE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-14-0051
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT
Order filed June 22, 2016
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting.
¶ 52 The Sex Offender Registration Act (the Registration Act) defines “registration,” in part, as “a statement in writing signed by the person giving the information that is required by the Department of State Police.”
¶ 53 Well, this defendant certainly did. Consider this, a partial copy of State‘s Exhibit #1 at trial. This is the form that Officer Keeling testified that he filled out for Pearse at Riveredge Hospital on January 5, 2012 (more on this later), which he then “had [Pearse] initial each section and then sign“:
Note that the form states Pearse‘s “Resident Address” is Riveredge Hospital. The form also states that Pearse‘s “Secondary Address” is the upstairs apartment in Belvidere. Given the definition of “registration” (again,
¶ 54 So how does one get around the form? The State argued at trial, and the trial court instructed the jury, that the January 5, 2012, registration was insufficient because, when defendant returned to Belvidere, he was no longer residing at his “last registered address.” Implicit in that approach is that an offender may have only one official address under the Registration Act; i.e., that the defendant‘s “Resident Address” is the one he “last registered” to the apparent exclusion of his “Secondary Address.” Under that interpretation then, one might reasonably conclude that Pearse misreported where he was residing; he told the authorities that he could be found in Forest Park (i.e., his “last registered address“) when, all along, his real residence was in Belvidere. In fact, the plot needn‘t even be that complicated because the State proceeded on the strict liability version of the offense under
¶ 55 There‘s just one problem. We have held that, under the plain language of the Registration
¶ 56 So, is there a basis to distinguish Robinson or Peterson? Not that I can see. In Robinson and Peterson, we examined the term “fixed residence,” which the Registration Act defines as “any and all places that a sex offender resides for an aggregate period of time of 5 or more days in a calendar year.”
¶ 57 OK. So what about the distinction between “Resident Address” and “Secondary Address“? There isn‘t one, at least not in the Registration Act. In fact, the terms “Resident Address,” “Secondary Address,” and “last registered address” do not appear in the Registration Act at all. They are thus unknown to our state‘s laws. The terms “Resident Address” and “Secondary Address” appear to have been crafted by the drafters of the registration form, the Illinois State Police‘s Sex Offender Registration Unit, but a state agency cannot broaden its authority beyond the confines of a statute. See, e.g., People v. Woodall, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1149 (2002).
¶ 58 Taken together, these terms—both in the registration form and, in particular, the use of the phrase “last registered address” in the non-IPI elements instruction—impermissibly expanded the scope of defendant‘s criminal liability. Those terms enabled law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and the trial court judge to mislead the jury into convicting defendant of a crime where one simply had not been proven. Their use in defendant‘s trial was a clear violation of the his constitutional rights. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 328 (1990) (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)); People v. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216, 222 (1981). Simply put, there is no “last registered address” requirement in the Registration Act; so, how can the State or a court add one? See People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 42; People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 162 (2006). And had the legislature intended that a sex offender could have only one “registered” address at a time, then they would have said so—particularly after we issued our decisions in Robinson and Peterson. See People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶ 27 (“When the legislature chooses not to amend a statute following a judicial construction, it will be presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in the court‘s statement of the legislative intent“).
¶ 59 In my view, the registration form‘s extra-legislative distinction between an offender‘s “Resident” address and “Secondary” address drops out and so we‘re left with the January 5, 2012, registration form from that registered both defendant‘s Belvidere residence and Riveredge Hospital, which (again) is entirely consistent with the Registration Act. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 18; Peterson, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 152. That police computers spit out only a single address in response to an address query (as Sergeant Pollock testified) is lamentable, but that
¶ 60 The majority asserts that defendant did not raise these arguments in his appellate brief. I believe he did, and quite clearly at that. That said, even if there was a need for defendant to have been more explicit, the issues in this case are too weighty for me to ignore. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) (“There may always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or administrative agency below“).
¶ 61 Candidly, I have grave concerns regarding the notion that a hospital is a “residence,” or that a brief stay at an inpatient medical facility constitutes a “change in residence” under the Registration Act. A hospital is a place someone goes to in a time of need; it is not a residence. No one admitted to a hospital for at least 72 hours would, upon reaching hour 72, turn to the staff and say, “I live here now. This is my domicile.” Nor is it reasonable to think that upon a brief hospital stay, a person has “abandoned” his or her residence. Either conclusion would be plainly absurd for, as our supreme court has said, albeit in a different context, one‘s residency does not change so easily. Cf. Maksym v. Board of Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 303, 319 (2011) (for purposes of the Election Code, “a residence is not lost by temporary removal with the intention to return” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 331
¶ 62 Given this absurdity, I do not understand the majority‘s failure to apply the rule of lenity in this case. I understand the majority‘s point that we should determine the legislature‘s intent before applying the rule (supra, ¶ 34 (citing People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416, 421 (2011))), but isn‘t it “always presumed that the legislature did not intend to cause absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results“? Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d at 421. What is the result in this case if not that?
¶ 63 And in all reasonable likelihood, the defendant in this case never meant to “change” his residence to Riveredge Hospital. Normally, sex offenders register in person with the local chief of police or the county sheriff (
¶ 64 My core concern though is that the majority‘s decision will gravely impact defendant and other sex offenders; that it will have a chilling effect on their willingness to seek emergency
¶ 65 I do not doubt the wisdom and importance of sex offender registration requirements, but the law should be fairly and equitably enforced. In this case, it was not. The jury instructions deprived defendant of a fair trial. The evidence showed that he had in fact registered his Belvidere residence with the state police. No properly instructed, reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.