THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DONALD PARKER, Appellee
No. 65036
Supreme Court of Illinois
Opinion filed June 20, 1988
No. 65005 - Appellate court reversed;
circuit court reversed;
cause remanded.
No. 65022 - Appellate court affirmed;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE STAMOS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John A. Barra, State‘s Attorney, of Peoria (Roma Jones Stewart and Shawn W. Denney, Solicitors General, and Terence M. Madsen and Gary H. Schwartz, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, John X. Breslin and Gerald P. Ursini, of the State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.
Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Frank W. Ralph, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Peoria County, the defendant, Donald Parker, was convicted of the offense of sexual relations within families. The trial judge imposed a $1,000 fine and sentenced the defendant
At the trial, the defendant‘s stepson, who was 18 years old at the time of the offense, testified that on December 31, 1985, he twice performed oral sex on the defendant, once in the early evening and once at approximately midnight. He further testified that such behavior had been going on since he was in fifth or sixth grade. A police officer also testified that on January 3, 1986, in response to questioning, the defendant admitted that his stepson had performed oral sex on him. The victim‘s mother testified that she married the defendant on July 19, 1976, and that the defendant had never adopted the victim.
The appellate court found that the statute under which the defendant was convicted (Sexual Relations Within Families, section 11-11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (
The statute in effect at the time of the defendant‘s trial provided:
“Sexual Relations Within Families. (a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he or she:
(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration as defined in Section 12-12 of this Code; and
(2) The person knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: (i) Brother or sister, either of the whole blood or the half blood; or (ii) Father or mother,
when the child or stepchild, regardless of legitimacy and either of the whole blood or half-blood or by adoption, was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed. (b) Sentence. Sexual relations within families is a Class 3 felony.”
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11-11 .
The State argues that the appellate court improperly held that the statute does not apply to a stepparent-stepchild relationship. The State contends that the language of the statute is clear, and that the legislature intended in section 11-11 to cover all parent-child and stepparent-stepchild relationships where the child or stepchild is over 18 years old.
The defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual relations within families because the statute does not prohibit such conduct between a stepparent and stepchild over the age of 17. The defendant contends that the language of the statute is ambiguous and that because penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants, the appellate court correctly held that the statute was not applicable to him. The defendant further argues that the legislature did not intend to include the stepparent-stepchild relationship under the statute and that the subsequent amendment of the statute created a change in law, indicating that at the time of his conviction, the statute did not embrace the stepparent-stepchild relationship.
Section 11-11 in effect at the time of the trial punished conduct which was not previously punished under an earlier version (
Pointing to the 1984 acts which amended section 11-11, the defendant argues that the legislature did not intend to include stepparent-stepchild relationships within the purview of the statute. The 1984 amendments (Pub. Acts 83-1067, 83-1117) created not only the offense of sexual relations within families (
The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. (People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271; People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 8, 15.) In determining legislative intent, the court should consider not only the language of the statute, but also the “reason and necessity for the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objects and purposes to be obtained.” (Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 271 (quoting People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316).)
We find it significant that the legislature, in amending section 11-11, rewrote the statute to protect both a “child” or a “stepchild” over the age of 18 from an act of sexual penetration by a “person [who] knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** child or stepchild.” (
Our conclusion is further buttressed by the subsequent amendment of section 11-11 in 1986, which may be an appropriate source in determining legislative intent. (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543; People v. Scott (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 353, 358.) The version of section 11-11 in effect at the time of the defendant‘s trial was amended, effective August 15, 1986 (Pub. Act 84-1280), and the pertinent part of the statute now in effect reads:
“(2) The person knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** (iii) Stepfather or stepmother, when the stepchild was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed.”
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 38, par. 11-11(a)(2) .
Although the defendant correctly notes that an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed, “the presumption is not controlling [citations] and may be overcome by other considerations.” (People v. Nunn (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 243, 248.) The circumstances surrounding the amendment should be considered and:
“If they indicate that the legislature intended only to interpret the original act, the presumption of an intention to change the law is rebutted. Usually, an amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the
law, but no such purpose is indicated by the amendment of an ambiguous provision.” (People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 563.)
The 1986 amendment of section 11-11 is consistent with our interpretation of section 11-11 in effect at the time of the defendant‘s trial. Although we do not believe that section 11-11 in effect at the time of the defendant‘s trial is ambiguous, we believe that the legislature did not intend by the 1986 amendment to create a new offense not punishable by the prior statute. As our earlier discussion pointed out, the legislature, in the 1984 amendments to section 11-11, intended to punish conduct which was previously unpunished and further intended to prohibit stepparents, as well as parents, from engaging in sexual conduct with their stepchildren over the age of 18. The amendment simply provides a fuller description of persons who know that they are related to their children or stepchildren. The language in Youngbey indicates that usually the amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law. We do not believe that the legislature should be precluded from later clarifying an already unambiguous law to confirm its earlier intent, without being held to have thereby intended to change the law. We believe, therefore, that the amendment, by adding the words “stepfather” and “stepmother,” did not substantively change the law, but provided a fuller description of the group of persons who know they are related to their child or stepchild.
The defendant argues that the language of the statute creates an ambiguous and irreconcilable conflict; the term “stepchild,” he argues, cannot be reconciled with the phrase, “regardless of legitimacy and either of the whole blood or half-blood or by adoption.” The defendant correctly notes that “half-blood” refers solely to brothers or sisters and is an inapplicable reference to “stepchild.” (See Black‘s Law Dictionary 157 (5th ed. 1979).)
The defendant argues that because stepparent-stepchild marriages are not expressly prohibited under section 212 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (
The defendant asserts that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and that nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against a defendant beyond the obvious and literal meaning of the statute. (Citing People v. Christensen (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 321; People v. Isaacs (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 205.) He contends, therefore, that because the statute is ambiguous, it must be resolved in his favor.
While penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of an accused, they must not be construed so rigidly as to defeat the intent of the legislature. (People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271; People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543; see A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 59.06, at 35 (4th ed. 1986).) It is obvious from a reading of the statute under which the defendant was convicted that the legislature intended to prohibit acts of sexual penetration, as defined in the statute, when the person who commits the act knows that the other person is related as a child or stepchild.
Because the defendant was proven guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.
JUSTICE CLARK, specially concurring:
Although I agree with the decision reached by the majority, I do not agree that it is necessary to rely on the subsequent legislative amendment to the statute. As I noted in my dissent in People v. Hicks (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 29, there is an inherent problem in attempting to interpret legislative intent based on the subsequent action of a later legislature. (119 Ill. 2d at 39.) The continually changing membership of the legislature “impels us to seek ‘intent’ in the objective words of its statutes, as informed by our own judgment and common sense, rather than in the inevitably subjective thoughts of individual members.” 119 Ill. 2d at 39.
The statute here in question is printed in the majority opinion (123 Ill. 2d at 207-08). We are confronted with the interpretation of this specific statute in effect in 1985; the fact that it was subsequently amended, absent a finding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, need not impact our decision.
While the State argues that the meaning of the statute is clear, the defendant alleges that the language is
Justice Marshall noted in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294, that as long as we are “[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” (408 U.S. at 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 228-29, 92 S. Ct. at 2300.) Grayned involved interpretation of a Rockford antinoise ordinance which restricted activities which “tend to disturb the peace” around a school. In upholding the ordinance, the Court noted that it was “clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits” (408 U.S. at 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 229, 92 S. Ct. at 2300) and that it served as fair notice to those to whom it was directed. In so holding, the Court recognized that the ordinance “may not be as precise” as other statutes which the Court had upheld but that it “clearly ‘delineates its reach in words of common understanding.‘” 408 U.S. at 112, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 230, 92 S. Ct. at 2301.
I turn now to applying the Grayned principles to the statute here in question, being also cognizant of the necessity of strictly construing criminal statutes in favor of the accused. (People v. Foster (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 48, 55.) The question thus becomes one of whether, within common understanding and practices, the defendant was sufficiently warned that his activities were proscribed by the statute.
One of the activities which the statute prohibits is sexual relations within families when the person “knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** Father or mother, when the child or stepchild ***
For these reasons, I specially concur.