*1 ILLINOIS, THE THE Plaintiff-Appellee, PEOPLE OF STATEOF PALMER, Defendant-Appellant. STEVEN District Second No. 2 — 88—0477 Opinion February filed
REINHARD, J., dissenting. G. Joseph Lilien, Weller Appellate and Thomas A. both of State De- Office, Elgin, fender’s of appellant. for Foreman,
Fred L. Attorney, Waukegan (William State’s of L. Browers Griffin, and Colleen M. Attorneys Appellate both of State’s Prosecutor’s Of- fice, counsel), of for People.
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the of the court: Defendant, Palmer, 1988, Steven appeals 5, from May of the trial court. This order a hearing was entered after to sec tion 2—4(a) 1987, Code of (Ill. Unified Corrections Rev. Stat. 5— 38, ch. par. 2—4(a)) sentenced defendant to involuntary Department Mental Health and Developmental (Department Disabilities Mental life. Health) natural We reverse and remand. 1983, 38,
Pаlmer (Ill. par. was tried for murder Stat. ch. Rev. 1(a)(1)) 1983, 38, and armed (Ill. 2). violence Rev. Stat. ch. A par. 33A— jury mentally charges. returned verdict of but ill on The guilty both court sentencing conducted a conviction hearing which time the crime armed violence vacated. court found be brutal natural life and heinous and sentenced Palmer an extended term imprisonment the murder conviction. found that
On court reversed conviction. This court appeal, time of the sanity to defendant’s at the reasonable doubt existed as following then mandate: offense. This court issued of the circuit court reversed “Accordingly, judgment cause of a entry and the remanded The trial court is then directed to insanity. proceed accordance with section 5—2—4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (I 1981, 38, Rev. Stat. ch. con par. 2—4), ll. trols such v. Palmer dispositions.” People 9, 1986, On September State filed in the circuit court a “MO- OR, TION TO REINSTATE DEFENDANT’S IN THE CONVICTION ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO SET MATTER FOR TRIAL.” The arguments motions, heard on the and on October motions. The consistent with this court’s entered a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, transferred the defendant to of Mental Department Health for evaluation and set the matter for hearing on November
Prior to the completion evaluation, the State filed two mo- tions our supreme court: a motion for and a motion for stay leave to file a petition for a writ of or, mandamus and in the prohibition alternative, a motion for a order. On November the supreme granted the State leave to file a petition for writs of mandamus prohibition. court also rеcalled the appel- late court’s mandate previously issued this court.
On November the trial that, court found pursuant to the No- vember order, it lacked jurisdiction to proceed fur- *3 ther. The court ordered the defendant to be prison. returned to On No- 21, vember this court ordered its mandate to be recalled pursuant to the supreme court’s order. 21,
On September 1987, оur court held that the State’s motion for leave had been improvidently granted. The court the requests for writs and a supervisory order. People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash 118 Ill. 90, 28, 1987,
On October the State secured an indictment which re the peated charges of the original indictment. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 18, 1988, indictment. On February granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. The State appеaled the court’s decision 18, dismissing 1987, indictment, October and this court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. Palmer 378, 384. 18,
Also on February the circuit court entered an finding not guilty by defendant insanity. court ordered the to defendant be remanded into the custody the Department of Men- tal Health for evaluation.
The Department submitted an evaluation to the court prepared by Dr. A. in Calаbio March 1988. Calabio concluded his evaluation stat- by in ing was need of mental health services. inpatient defendant 5, 1988, hearing pursuant a May On court conducted 38, The State (Ill. par. 2—4(a).) Stat. ch. 2—4(a). Rev. say as to if and counsel defendant what Calabio would stipulated to Defendant ex testify. objected testimony. called Defendant outpa and pressed findings his with Calabio’s disаgreement requested tient status a veteran’s through hospital. subject involuntary
The court found that the defendant was code. The commitment under section 5—2—4 and the mental health found cruel and heinous an wantonly court also crime was 5, 1988, the May sentence was appropriate. exteiided-term On natural life term of commitment. The sentenced defendant life if the commitment for natural provided court’s order also and, if then the term of commitment shall be 100 impermissible, years, then term of commitment shall impermissible, term was 100-year notice from this order. timely appeal be 80 Defendant filed years. its September This court reissued mandate on original stating:
“MANDATE that, REMEMBERED, IT the 31st of De day BE to-wit: On cember, was en Opinion of the aforementioned Court in in expressed tered of record and accordance with the views the Circuit of Lake Opinion the attached Court of a entry judg is reversed and the cause remanded County The trial court is then insanity. ment of not accordance with section 5—2—4 proceed directed to par. ch. (Ill. of Corrections Rev. Stat. Unified Code dispositions. controls such 2—4) which remanded directions.” Reversed and First, defendant presents arguments appeal. Defendant three committing him to De- contends that the circuit court proceedings void due to trial partment of Mental Health for natural life were that, if Second, lack defendant contends jurisdiction. offering the defendant an jurisdiction, court did have it erred not evaluating requiring psychia- examination independent Third, that if defendant contends appear person testify. trist to the maximum term jurisdiction, setting had erred the court *4 at natural life. jurisdiction the court conduct argues Defendant first that lacked Defendant claims that the involuntary commitment proceedings. the that court’s man- of from the date this deprived jurisdiction court was 1986, recalled, 12, to the that this court reis- November date date was Therefore, mandate, 15, sued its September any proceedings 1988. time and entered during period any that occurred this are void orders must be vacated.
It is the the upon filing appeal jurisdic clear that of a notice and, of the the instanter tion court attaches appellate concomitantly, v. jurisdiction. (Daley Laurie trial court is deprived 33, 37; 661, Bаker 662.) 85 Ill. 3d It is equally it clear court retains the cause until appellate jurisdiction mandate, its mandate trial reviewing issues and court’s revests the is mandate. jurisdiction required court with to do that which only (B aker, If at a trial court acts outside and, hence, its trial scope jurisdiction, mandate beyond Baker, court’s order must reversed and be vacated. 85 Ill. App. 663. bar,
In the casе is trial court’s undisputed jurisdiction divested on the date the notice of filed. May appeal was court 31, issued its opinion mandate on December mandate revested the trial court finding to enter a not insanity and to in accordance with sec- proceed 1986, tion 5—2—4 of the Code of Unified Corrections. On October the trial finding court entered a guilty insanity set the matter hearing However, on November 18. the State’s upon motion, the supreme court recalled this court’s mandate on November 12, 1986, and set the matter for in the hearing supreme court. This action, as the determined, trial correctly deprived court court trial of jurisdiction in the matter.
The supreme court rendered its September 1987. The court State’s motions. The denied; stated: “Writs judg Motion order denied.” The ment order provide did not for this court’s mandate to be reinstated. that, find contrary argument, We State’s order did not automatically reinstate this court’s mandate re- and thus the trial court’s jurisdiction. nothing vest There is the supreme court’s order that this Both indicating court’s mandate was reinstated. court court and this issued orders that expressly recalled expression necessary and a similar reinstate mandate. The trial did not until regain jurisdiction court this matter court issued its mandate on 1988. The September trial 12, that occurred between November and Septem 15, 1988, are ber void. orders entered the trial during this time are period vacated.
The State if urges even the circuit court lacked jurisdic- *5 750 Ill. Rev. Stat.
tion, original (see should its this court invoke re remaining issues instead of par. 32.1) ch. and decide that it hearing. inappropriate for another We find would be manding to the correct remaining pertaining for this to decide the issues 114 Ill. v. McBride (See People ness of the below. hearing pertaining to 81.) The defendant is entitled have App. 3d of Mental Health before Department to involuntary competent jurisdiction. a cоurt of we feel address. compelled
There one matter that presented other dis- occasions by has addressed two specific This issue been per- life is a The issue is whether natural results. contrary tricts with by exception- accompanied “maximum sentence” for murder missible 2—4(b). heinous behavior under section ally brutal or pro the trial court to original mandate directed of Corrections. 5—2—4 of the Unified Code ceed states: 2—4(b) Section 5— ad involuntary subject “If the Court finds defendant *** acquit of a defendant the initial order for admission
mission shall be for an indefinite insanity ted of a reason of felony by shall exceed the of commitment not period of time. Such period time that the defendant would have been length maximum behavior, becoming сredit before serve, good less required had he been convicted of received the for release eligible for the most serious crime for which he has maximum sentence reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. acquitted by insanity.” been 38, par. 1005-2-4(b). after
In v. Larson 132 Ill. App. the trial insanity, found not defendant was statute, set the defendant’s of the extended-term using provisions credit for at less years of criminal commitment 80 maximum period using erred that the court argued The defendant good behavior. sentence the maximum extended-term statute establish crime had he been convicted could have received defendant The argued State insanity. acquitted by which he had been the court applicable, extended-term statute that, not was the only life, as that is the maxi of natural a “sentence” imposing erred had he been con could have received that the defendant mum sentence victed. cannot read a limitation that a court court stated reviewing (Lar fit to establish. not seen has legislature a statute which
into there was nothing The court found son, 596.) words “maximum that the indicating language of the statute the plain sentence” are to be limited the maximum sentence available under section (Larson, 5—8—1 the Unified Code Corrections. The court then held the of the extended- provisions
term statute did apply.
However, when determining contention, the merits of the State’s the court did limit the “maximum sentence” available under section The court stated: 2—4(b).
“Courts will not construe to render a statute such asway part of the position statute nullity. State’s [Citation.] would render section superfluous language 2—4(b) automatically gives insanity acquittees good credit for be [citations], havior credit permitted because such is not when a *6 term of natural life is imposed. Moreover, use of a [Citation.] life natural sentence would legislative objective undermine the that a definite outer perimeter defendant’s commitment per set iod be at the time the is initial commitment order issued. that We find a term of natural life is permissible not a [Citation.] Larson, 2—4(b).” ‘maximum sentence’ under 132 section Ill. 5 — at App. 3d 597-98. In Cochran Ill. App. 167 trial finding after defendant not guilty by reason of set the insanity, maximum period defendant’s of commitment at natural life. The re viewing court stated: may
“We not alter the plain meaning of those words or read any limitations into the statute that do not exist. Section [Citation.] 2—4(b)does not or limit the ‘maximum sen qualify phrase 5— tence’ manner. any By comparison, 25(g)(4) section of 104— of of [citation], pertaining the Code Criminal Procedure 1963 defendant, the maximum of of an period treatment unfit defines 8—1, maximum as that sentence established section ‘ex 5— of cluding any sentence natural life.’ If legislature wished to impose similar limitations for found not persons by reason guilty of insanity, could have easily done Since legislature so. chose not to limit section 2—4(b),we will not do so either.” (Cochran, Larson, In discussing reasoning the court in the Cochran stated:'
“Merely good-time because credit is available for natural life sentences does not render the of section language 2—4(b) superfluous. good-conduct credit is still to insan- applicable ity acquittees found have committed offenses other than mur- der accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous If behavior. District’s) First accept (and position,
we were to defendant’s language 8—1(a)(1)(c). of section ignore we would have a or is previously defendant hаs been convicted murder When im victim, than one natural life murdering found more guilty is the sentence set mandatory. is prisonment [Citation.] If a acquit law under these circumstances. faced with defendant no murders, have insanity ted of two court would at natural choice to set the commitment period but defendant’s of section 5 — 2— language life. We therefore read the [Citation.] is goоd- to mean an entitled to whatever 4(b) insanity acquittee time is for that offense. Nor do we permitted particular credit life sentence undermines imposition find that the a natural to a legislative objective having definite outer perimeter A period pe definite outer defendant’s [citation]. set, still rimeter defendant’s natural life. Defendant has been his early regain release if he ever should has possibility Cochran, sanity.” 832-33. that the extended- agree
We with both Larson Cochran determining sentencing apply term do when provisions scheme to section 5—2—4 of maximum sentence available pursuant However, reasoning set disagree Code of Corrections. we with sen forth in natural life not an available determining Larson Cock, cm agree 5—2—4. tence We omit natural life as available language of the statute does not plain no as it was expressing sentence. We are to whether maximum of natural life. impose this case to sentence factually appropriate life is feel commitment for natural point We wish to out we simply *7 to section 5—2—4. sentencing pursuant alternative available сommit jurisdiction The court did not have to conduct circuit 5—2—4 of the Unified Code proceedings pursuant ment on September of this court’s mandate prior Corrections issuance the 1988. The of defendant was void. reversed, is is the cause remanded County court of Lake and circuit to section 5—2—4. to proceed instructions remanded with instructions. Reversed and WOODWARD,J., concurs. REINHARD, dissenting:
JUSTICE the were void because that the trial court disagree I jurisdiction. trial court lacked
753 original People This court issued its v. appeal mandate the 966, following Palmer the court’s de (1985), supreme 3d nial of for v. Palmer petition appeal (People defendant’s leave to Thereafter, 112 (1986), 566). Ill. 2d the court was divested of appellate jurisdiction pursu in this case and no recall the longer could mandate ant to Court Supreme 368(c) (107 368(c)). (See People Rule Ill. R. 2 MeCloskey (1971), Ill. subsequent proceeding brought in supreme the court a motion for leave to by petition file for an writ of original prohibition (107 mandamus and for a Ill. writ and, 2d R. for Ill. 381) (107 order 2d R. alternatively, supervisory 383) was an action the separate original appeal distinct from to thе appellate court. (See ex rel. Foreman v. Nash 118 People court, Ill. 2d 90.) Unless supreme otherwise directed our which by not, was the appellate court was without to jurisdiction anything do relating Thus, proceeding. this court recalled although supreme the appellate court’s considering mandate while for the petition writs order, and supervisory was apрellate court not revested with jurisdiction act in this proceeding.
Thus, appellate jurisdiction court was recall the without mandate, had court, been already supreme recalled nor did it possess jurisdiction to later issue a mandate on September 1988, after the supreme court issued its mandate original own on the action once it decided that improvi mоtions it had been before dently granted. (People Foreman, ex rel. this ba 98.) On sis, I with the disagree majority’s statement that the court circuit Lake County regained jurisdiction once this issued its mandate on September remains, however,
The question whether the circuit ever re gained jurisdiction once the supreme appellate court recalled the court’s pending mandate of the court’s determination original for action issuance of writs for a order. supervisory It apparent mandate was on motion of the State’s recalled of Lake Attorney County stay disposition of the mandate pending action. original original Once the was the su action decided preme court’s ex opinion rel. Foreman v. Nash Ill. 2d wherein court determined that writs and the motion be Ill. 2d at (118 98-99), should and the mandate on this was issued subsequently recalled, been appellate which had au reinstated in the circuit Lake tomatically County. pro court of vided the circuit court as it did. the su proceed, While preme appellate court did reinstate the court’s mandate expressly *8 as mandate, can no other conсlusion drawn in its or there be merits, denied, writs reaching without supreme Attorney the State’s requested by motion for supreme The effect of the Lake and issued its mandate. County the pro to reinstate and issuance of its mandate was court’s decision con implied may in the circuit Matters which are be ceedings court. In Realty the mandate. See Co. v. Granite by sidered embraced PSL vestment Co. 86 Ill. 2d reasons, reasoning I cannot foregoing accept
For the was without jurisdic- that the circuit court of Lake majority County enter order of commit- involuntary tion to conduct be- and, from the reversal of accordingly, ment dissent defendant, I raised remaining merits of the issues low. On the affirm the circuit court. would the effect of I has misconstrued majority
Because believe expe- may the State wish court’s decision and supreme or- in the court for an moving dite review this decision deci- it is the Court Rule as Supreme der under in the finds has failed to revest sion the majority and, to have would continue County presumably, circuit court of Lake court. is resolved until the issue of jurisdiction that effect ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE STATE OF THE PEOPLE OF SEEHAUSEN, Defendant-Appellant. C. SCOTT 2 — 88—0721 Second District No. February
Opinion filed