Case Information
*1 Filed 6/10/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B297213
(Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. TA051184) v.
MARIO SALVADOR PADILLA,
Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, *2 Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, appellant Mario Salvador Padilla was convicted of a murder he committed when he was 16 years old, and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Appellant later successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his sentence in light of an intervening decision by the United States Supreme Court. The trial court held a resentencing hearing and again imposed the LWOP term. On appeal, we reversed the new sentence and remanded for another resentencing in light of yet another intervening decision by the Supreme Court. At the second resentencing, the trial court again imposed the LWOP sentence.
In the interim, the electorate passed Proposition 57, the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 . ” Among other things, Proposition 57 prohibits prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court.
(
People v. Superior Court
( ) (2018)
In this appeal, appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 because his judgment is not yet final. Respondent asserts that appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the new law’s retr oactive application for two reasons. First, respondent argues that appellant’s judgment of conviction became final long before Proposition 57’s enactment, and his subsequent habeas and resentencing proceedings did not reopen its finality for purposes of that measure. Second, respondent contends that our Supreme Court’s holding in Lara concerning Proposition 57’s retroactive application does not apply to appellant because he is now too old to benefit from rehabilitation as a juvenile.
Because appellant’s original sentence was vacated and his sentence is no longer final, and because Proposition 57 ’s primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender ’ s sentence, we conclude that the measure applies to preclude imposition of sentence on appellant as an adult, absent a transfer hearing. Regardless of his current age, appellant fits within our Supreme Court’s holding that the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply as broadly as possible. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse appellant’s sentence *4 and remand for appellant to receive a transfer hearing in the juvenile court. [1]
BACKGROUND In 1998, appellant was charged with first degree murder with special-circumstance allegations and conspiracy to commit murder. He committed the offenses that same year, when he was 16 years old. He was tried as an adult, following a hearing at which he was determined not fit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.
The following year, a jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the court imposed the then-mandatory sentence of LWOP. On appeal, this court reversed one of the special-circumstance findings, but otherwise affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition for review in 2001, and he did not petition for a writ of certiorari.
In 2014, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, seeking resentencing in light of
Miller v. Alabama
(2012)
and unusual punishments. The trial court agreed appellant was entitled to resentencing, vacated appellant’s sentence, and following a resentencing hearing, again imposed the LWOP term.
While appellant ’s appeal from his resentencin g was
pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
Montgomery v. Louisiana
(2016)
718], which among other things, clarified its holding in Miller v. Alabama . Because the trial court had exercised its resentencing discretion without the guidance of Montgomery , we reversed and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing. (See People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 661, 674.)
In 2019, on remand from this court, the trial court held a second resentencing hearing and once again sentenced appellant to LWOP. Appellant timely appealed. He contends that in light of Proposition 57, enacted after our opinion on appeal from his first resentencing, he is entitled to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court.
DISCUSSION A. Governing Principles
1.
Proposition 57
At the time appellant was charged in 1998 , “‘ a child
could be tried in criminal court only after a judicial
determination . . . that he or she was unfit to be dealt with
under juvenile court law. ’” ( ,
In November 2016, voters passed Proposition 57, again
changing the procedure for charging juveniles. ( ,
“‘Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the
Welfare and Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing
by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors . . . can still be
tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge
conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such
as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sop histication,
prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be
*7
rehabilitated.’”
[2]
( ,
While Proposition 57’s transfer hearing is similar in some respects to the fitness hearing conducted prior to the 1999 and 2000 amendments, there are key differences.
Notably, under prior law, juveniles age 16 or older who were accused of certain offenses, including murder, were subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were unfit for juvenile court treatment. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.) No such presumption applies in transfer hearings under Proposition 57, and the People have the burden to show that the juvenile should be treated as an adult. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 707, subd. (a);
Castillero
, 33 Cal.App.5th at
398;
J.N. v. Superior Court
(2018)
criteria, but has broad discretion in applying them, and need not find that all five support juvenile court treatment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3) [“the court shall consider the criteria specified”]; Castillero , at 398 [court has broad discretion to apply these statutory criteria].) [3]
One Court of Appeal to consider the effect of Proposition 57 concluded that its primary benefit to juvenile defendants is in potentially affording them the dispositions rendered in juvenile court, rather than the generally much more severe criminal sentences in adult court. [4] ( People v. [3] The five statutory criteria are: (1) “[ t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” which may include consideration of such factors as “ the minor ’ s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense, the minor ’ s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior, . . . and the effect of the minor ’ s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor ’ s criminal sophistication ”; (2) “[w] hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court ’ s jurisdiction ”; (3) “[t] he minor ’ s previous delinquent history ”; (4) “[s] uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor ”; and (5) “ [t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. ” [4] “‘There is no “sentence,” per se, in juvenile court. Rather, a judge can impose a wide variety of rehabilitation alternatives after conducting a “dispositional hearing,” which is equivalent to a sentencing hearing in a criminal court. [Citations.] In the more serious cases, a juvenile court can “commit” a minor to juvenile hall or to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) . . . . DJJ ( Fn. continued on the next page .)
Cervantes
(2017)
2. Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Statutes
Whether a statute operates retroactively or only prospectively is a matter of legislative intent. ( People v.
Brown
(2012)
[Citation.]’” ( ,
convicted and sentenced. ( Id. at 742-743, 748.) The court reasoned that when the Legislature makes an ameliorative change to criminal law, it must have determined the former law was too severe. ( Id. at 744-745.) As a result, absent indications of a contrary intent, “ [i]t is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute . . . should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” ( Id. at 745.) According to the court, an ameliorative criminal statute may be constitutionally applied to acts committed before its passage, “provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” ( Ibid. ) Thus, under Estrada , absent indications of the legislati ve body’s contrary intent, courts presume it intended an ameliorative statute to apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments. (See ibid. )
Applying this rule in
Lara
, our Supreme Court
concluded that Proposition 57 constituted an ameliorative
change to the criminal law. (
Lara
,
supra
,
below, if, at a retroactive transfer hearing, the juvenile court finds a defendant would have been fit for juvenile court treatment, the defendant’s sentence must be reversed, and the juvenile court must then treat the convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. ( , at 310, 313.)
3. Final Judgments Under Estrada “[t]he key date [for retroactivity purposes] is the date of final judgment.” ( Estrada , 63 Cal.2d at 744 . ) A retroactive ameliorative statute applies in a given case if it “ becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final . . . . ” ( Ibid. ) The court did not specify when a judgment becomes “final” for retroactivity purposes.
Several months before
Estrada
, however, the
California Supreme Court discussed the finality of a
judgment in
In re Spencer
(1965)
“ that point at which the courts can no longer provide a
remedy to a defendant on direct review.” (
Spencer
,
supra,
at
405
.
) Our Supreme Court has since applied this definition of
finality to the
Estrada
retroactivity rule, stating that an
amendatory statute applies in “‘any [criminal] proceeding
[that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet
reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to
review it.’” (
People v. Rossi
(1976)
This rule of finality is easy to apply in a typical case, where a criminal defendant is convicted and sentenced, the judgment is affirmed on appeal, a petition for review in the California Supreme Court is either denied or never filed, and a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court is likewise denied or never filed. But questions have arisen as to how this rule applies in different procedural settings.
In
People v. Jackson
(1967)
time, however, the court agreed that the defendant could rely on Escobedo to challenge his new sentence , notwithstanding that his “conviction was final” before that case was decided. ( Jackson , supra , at 100.)
Jackson
therefore established that a collateral
proceeding may reopen the finality of a sentence for
retroactivity purposes, even while the conviction remains
final. While
Jackson
involved the retroactivity of
constitutional law, rather than an ameliorative statute, it
applied the same definition of finality later applied in
Rossi
.
(See
Jackson
,
B. Analysis
Appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition 57, asserting its provisions apply retroactively to him. He maintains we should therefore conditionally reverse his judgment and refer the matter to the juvenile court. Appellant argues his judgment is not yet final because we reversed his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing in 2016, and he is now appealing from bifurcated process for adjudicating death penalty cases is a final judgment” ].) Yet the interest in retaining the finality of convictions despite ongoing sentencing proceedings applies in other contexts as well. Because we conclude that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to appellant’s resentencing, we need not decide whether Jackson applies to non-capital cases.
that resentencing. Respondent counters that appellant’s judgment became final in 2001, when he originally exhausted direct appeal procedures. Respondent contends the reopening of appellant’s sentencing following his successful habeas petition had no effect on the finality of his “ judgment of conviction, ” and therefore does not entitle him to the benefit of Proposition 57’s retroactiv e application.
We begin with the simple observation that a ppellant’s sentence is not final: the superior court vacated his original
sentence and resentenced him, we then reversed his new
sentence and remanded for another resentencing, and
appellant has taken this direct appeal from his second
resentencing. Because appellant’s sentence is still pending
on direct appeal, his judgment is not final under our
Supreme Court’s definition of finality for retroactivity
purposes. (See
Jackson supra
,
Respondent does not suggest that appellant’s sentence is entirely immune to challenges based on retroactive changes to the law. Instead, citing the Jackson / Kemp rule, respondent con tends that appellant’s judgment remains final as to his conviction and all other matters not encompassed by his resentencing , including “pretrial proceedings under Proposition 57, ” such that he may not benefit from that measure’s retroactive operation. We disagree.
Assuming the rule established in these capital cases applies in other contexts, it would not preclude appellant’s claim based on Proposition 57 because that measure affects *16 his sentencing , independent of its potential effect on his convictions. As the Cervantes court observed, a juvenile disposition is far more advantageous to the defendant than a criminal sentence for the same offense: indeed, “adult criminal sentencing is the biggest disadvantage to being ‘tried in adult court . . . . ’” ( Cervantes , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at 612.)
Based on the purposes underlying Proposition 57 and
the substantially more severe consequences of sentencing in
adult court for many juvenile felons, the court in
Cervantes
concluded that a juvenile felon may not be “‘sentenced in
adult court’” without a prior transfer hearing. (
Cervantes
, ,
In itself, the c ourt stated that “[o]nly if the
juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the
juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult.” ( ,
supra
, 4
Cal.5th at 303.) Relying on this language, the court in
People v. Ramirez
(2019)
Because Proposition 57’s primary ameliorative effect is
on a juvenile offender ’ s sentence, independent of the
convictions, we conclude it applies retroactively to
appellant’s nonfinal sentence and requires that he receive a
transfer hearing.
[7]
(See , s
upra
,
Respondent argues that ’s conclusion about
Proposition 57’s retroactivity nevertheless does not apply to
appellant beca use “ considered the specific circumstance
of a defendant who had been charged but not sentenced. ” Respondent maintains it is unlikely the voters intended the
provisions of Proposition 57 to apply to those, like appellant,
far removed from their teenage years and for whom
treatment as a juvenile would likely result in release from
custody. These assertions, however, are at odds with our
Supreme Court’s determination of the electorate’s intent --
that Proposition 57 should apply retroactively to “all
juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment
was not yet final at the time it was enacted. ” (
Lara, supra
, 4
Cal.5th at 304.) It is not for us to say, at this time, whether
appellant should be treated as a juvenile offender -- only that
our Sup reme Court’s pronouncement that Proposition 57
should apply “as broadly as possible” encompasses appellant ,
regardless of his current age. (
Lara, supra
, at 308; see
Ramirez
,
Our conclusion that Proposition 57 applies
retroactively to appellant’s sentence is consistent with our
Supreme Court’s determination in that the voters
intended Proposition 57 “‘to extend as broadly as possible’”
( ,
supra
,
DISPOSITION
In , the court approved the remedy one Court of
Appeal had ordered for a juvenile defendant who had been
convicted and sentenced without having received a transfer
hearing. (See ,
Appellant’s sentence is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to refer the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing, to determine if it would have transferred the case to adult criminal court had it originally been filed in juvenile court in accordance with current law.
If the juvenile court determines it would not have transferred appellant to criminal court under current law, it shall treat appellant’s convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. If the juvenile court determines it would have transferred appellant to adult criminal court, it shall transfer the case to criminal court, which shall then reinstate appellant’s sentence.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION MANELLA, P. J.
We concur:
WILLHITE, J. COLLINS, J.