People v. PadillaPeople v. Padilla
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, appellant Mario Salvador Padilla was convicted of a murder he committed when he was 16 years old, and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Appellant later successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his sentence in light of an intervening decision by the United States Supreme Court. The trial court held a resentencing hearing and again imposed the LWOP term. On appeal, we reversed the new sentence and remanded for another resentencing in light of yet another intervening decision by the Supreme Court. At the second resentencing, the trial court again imposed the LWOP sentence.
In the interim, the electorate passed Proposition 57, the
In this appeal, appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 because his judgment is not yet final. Respondent asserts that appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the new law‘s retroactive application for two reasons. First, respondent argues that appellant‘s judgment of conviction became final long before Proposition 57‘s enactment, and his subsequent habeas and resentencing proceedings did not reopen its finality for purposes of that measure. Second, respondent contends that our Supreme Court‘s holding in Lara concerning Proposition 57‘s retroactive application does not apply to appellant because he is now too old to benefit from rehabilitation as a juvenile.
Because appellant‘s original sentence was vacated and his sentence is no longer final, and because Proposition 57‘s primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender‘s sentence, we conclude that the measure applies to preclude imposition of sentence on appellant as an adult, absent a transfer hearing. Regardless of his current age, appellant fits within our Supreme Court‘s holding that the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply as broadly as possible. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse appellant‘s sentence
BACKGROUND
In 1998, appellant was charged with first degree murder with special-circumstance allegations and conspiracy to commit murder. He committed the offenses that same year, when he was 16 years old. He was tried as an adult, following a hearing at which he was determined not fit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.
The following year, a jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the court imposed the then-mandatory sentence of LWOP. On appeal, this court reversed one of the special-circumstance findings, but otherwise affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied appellant‘s petition for review in 2001, and he did not petition for a writ of certiorari.
In 2014, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465, which held that mandatory LWOP sentences for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violated the
While appellant‘s appeal from his resentencing was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190 [136 S.Ct. 718], which among other things, clarified its holding in Miller v. Alabama. Because the trial court had exercised its resentencing discretion without the guidance of Montgomery, we reversed and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing. (See People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 661, 674.)
In 2019, on remand from this court, the trial court held a second resentencing hearing and once again sentenced appellant to LWOP. Appellant timely appealed. He contends that in light of Proposition 57, enacted after our opinion on appeal from his first resentencing, he is entitled to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Principles
1. Proposition 57
At the time appellant was charged in 1998, a child could be tried in criminal court only after a judicial determination . . . that he or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 305.) Absent such a determination, any individual less than 18 years of age who violate[d] the criminal law [came] within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court . . . . (Ibid.) Amendments to [the
In November 2016, voters passed Proposition 57, again changing the procedure for charging juveniles. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 303, 305.) According to the text of this measure, it was intended to [s]top the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles and to [r]equire a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court . . . . (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141, (2016 Voter Guide).) The voters mandated that Proposition 57‘s provisions be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes. (2016 Voter Guide, supra, at § 5, p. 145.)
Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the Welfare and Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors . . . can still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor‘s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be
While Proposition 57‘s transfer hearing is similar in some respects to the fitness hearing conducted prior to the 1999 and 2000 amendments, there are key differences. Notably, under prior law, juveniles age 16 or older who were accused of certain offenses, including murder, were subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were unfit for juvenile court treatment. (
One Court of Appeal to consider the effect of Proposition 57 concluded that its primary benefit to juvenile defendants is in potentially affording them the dispositions rendered in juvenile court, rather than the generally much more severe criminal sentences in adult court.4 (People v. Cervantes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 569, 612, (Cervantes)
2. Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Statutes
Whether a statute operates retroactively or only prospectively is a matter of legislative intent. (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319.) In In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), our Supreme Court concluded that statutory amendments mitigating punishment for an offense applied retroactively to a petitioner who at the time of enactment, had committed the offense but had not yet been
Applying this rule in Lara, our Supreme Court concluded that Proposition 57 constituted an ameliorative change to the criminal law. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 309.) Finding no contrary indications, it further concluded the voters intended Proposition 57 ‘to extend as broadly as possible.’ (Lara, supra, at 309.) Accordingly, the court held Proposition 57 applied retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.5 (Lara, at 304.) As discussed further
3. Final Judgments
Under Estrada, [t]he key date [for retroactivity purposes] is the date of final judgment. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 744.) A retroactive ameliorative statute applies in a given case if it becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final . . . . (Ibid.) The court did not specify when a judgment becomes final for retroactivity purposes.
Several months before Estrada, however, the California Supreme Court discussed the finality of a judgment in In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400 (Spencer). In ruling on a habeas petition raising federal constitutional challenges, the Spencer court noted the United States Supreme Court had defined the point of finality as ‘where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari . . . elapsed . . . .’ (Id. at 405, quoting Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618, 622, fn. 5.) Finality therefore denoted
This rule of finality is easy to apply in a typical case, where a criminal defendant is convicted and sentenced, the judgment is affirmed on appeal, a petition for review in the California Supreme Court is either denied or never filed, and a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court is likewise denied or never filed. But questions have arisen as to how this rule applies in different procedural settings.
In People v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 96 (Jackson), a capital defendant‘s judgment of death became final when he failed to seek certiorari. (Id. at 97, 98.) In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, the California Supreme Court reversed his death sentence and remanded for a penalty retrial. (Id. at 97.) The defendant was again sentenced to death, and in the automatic appeal, sought to raise both
Jackson therefore established that a collateral proceeding may reopen the finality of a sentence for retroactivity purposes, even while the conviction remains final. While Jackson involved the retroactivity of constitutional law, rather than an ameliorative statute, it applied the same definition of finality later applied in Rossi. (See Jackson, supra, 67 Cal.2d at 98 [A judgment becomes final when all avenues of direct review are exhausted], citing, inter alia, Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 405.)
B. Analysis
Appellant claims he is entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition 57, asserting its provisions apply retroactively to him. He maintains we should therefore conditionally reverse his judgment and refer the matter to the juvenile court. Appellant argues his judgment is not yet final because we reversed his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing in 2016, and he is now appealing from
We begin with the simple observation that appellant‘s sentence is not final: the superior court vacated his original sentence and resentenced him, we then reversed his new sentence and remanded for another resentencing, and appellant has taken this direct appeal from his second resentencing. Because appellant‘s sentence is still pending on direct appeal, his judgment is not final under our Supreme Court‘s definition of finality for retroactivity purposes. (See Jackson, supra, 67 Cal.2d at 100; McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 46; Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 304.)
Respondent does not suggest that appellant‘s sentence is entirely immune to challenges based on retroactive changes to the law. Instead, citing the Jackson/Kemp rule, respondent contends that appellant‘s judgment remains final as to his conviction and all other matters not encompassed by his resentencing, including pretrial proceedings under Proposition 57, such that he may not benefit from that measure‘s retroactive operation. We disagree.
Assuming the rule established in these capital cases applies in other contexts, it would not preclude appellant‘s claim based on Proposition 57 because that measure affects
Based on the purposes underlying Proposition 57 and the substantially more severe consequences of sentencing in adult court for many juvenile felons, the court in Cervantes concluded that a juvenile felon may not be sentenced in adult court without a prior transfer hearing. (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at 612.) Thus, even before its ruling that Proposition 57 was not retroactive was disapproved in Lara, the Cervantes court recognized that a defendant may not be resentenced on remand without a prior transfer hearing. (Cervantes, supra, at 612.) Lara left undisturbed Cervantes‘s conclusion about Proposition 57‘s application to sentencing.
In Lara itself, the court stated that [o]nly if the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 303.) Relying on this language, the court in People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64 (Ramirez) held that on a limited remand for resentencing, the trial court was required to consider the effect of Proposition 57 and issue any related orders, thereby rejecting the People‘s contention that the defendant‘s request for a transfer
Because Proposition 57‘s primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender‘s sentence, independent of the convictions, we conclude it applies retroactively to appellant‘s nonfinal sentence and requires that he receive a transfer hearing.7 (See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 303; Ramirez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 64; Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at 612.) Any resulting effect on appellant‘s convictions would be a mere byproduct of his required treatment as a juvenile, should the juvenile court decide that he would have been fit for such treatment. (See Lara, supra, at 306 [there are no conviction[s] in juvenile court‘];
Respondent argues that Lara‘s conclusion about Proposition 57‘s retroactivity nevertheless does not apply to appellant because Lara considered the specific circumstance of a defendant who had been charged but not sentenced. Respondent maintains it is unlikely the voters intended the provisions of Proposition 57 to apply to those, like appellant, far removed from their teenage years and for whom treatment as a juvenile would likely result in release from custody. These assertions, however, are at odds with our Supreme Court‘s determination of the electorate‘s intent -- that Proposition 57 should apply retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not yet final at the time it was enacted. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 304.) It is not for us to say, at this time, whether appellant should be treated as a juvenile offender -- only that our Supreme Court‘s pronouncement that Proposition 57 should apply as broadly as possible encompasses appellant, regardless of his current age. (Lara, supra, at 308; see Ramirez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 60-61 [affirming referral for transfer hearing for defendant who was 28 years old]; Garcia, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at 321, 330 [ordering transfer
Our conclusion that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to appellant‘s sentence is consistent with our Supreme Court‘s determination in Lara that the voters intended Proposition 57 ‘to extend as broadly as possible’ (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 309), i.e., to every case to which it constitutionally could apply (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 745). Respondent offers no basis for concluding that this ameliorative amendment may not be applied constitutionally to appellant‘s sentence. Accordingly, we conclude appellant is entitled to a retroactive transfer hearing under Proposition 57.
In Lara, the court approved the remedy one Court of Appeal had ordered for a juvenile defendant who had been convicted and sentenced without having received a transfer hearing. (See Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at 310, 313.) We afford appellant a similar remedy.
Appellant‘s sentence is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to refer the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing, to determine if it would have transferred the case to adult criminal court had it originally been filed in juvenile court in accordance with current law.
If the juvenile court determines it would not have transferred appellant to criminal court under current law, it shall treat appellant‘s convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition. If the juvenile court determines it would have transferred appellant to adult criminal court, it shall transfer the case to criminal court, which shall then reinstate appellant‘s sentence.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MANELLA, P. J.
We concur:
WILLHITE, J. COLLINS, J.