In rе Y.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. P.A., Respondent-Appellant)
No. 3-07-0568
Third District
June 18, 2008
382 Ill. App. 3d 311
required to pay more than the contract price. See
Excel is entitled to a mechanic‘s lien of $130,948.48, the amount shown to be due Excel in the final payment certificate that St. Francis wrongfully paid Stonitsch. See Contractors’ Ready-Mix, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 458, 611 N.E.2d at 535; see also Luczak, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 303, 451 N.E.2d at 1281 (a subcontractor is entitled to a lien in the amount shown to be due on the last statement for which payment is made). The trial court erred in granting St. Francis‘s motion for summary judgment and denying Excel‘s motion for summary judgment.
The judgment of the circuit сourt of Will County granting summary judgment to St. Francis and denying summary judgment to Excel is reversed. We remand to the trial court to enter an order granting Excel‘s motion for summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
HOLDRIDGE and O‘BRIEN, JJ., concur.
Kevin W. Lyons, State‘s Attorney, of Peoria (Terry A. Mertel and Richard T. Leonard, both of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People.
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
The trial court adjudicated the one-year-old minor, Y.A., neglected because he lived in an environment injurious to his welfare.
FACTS
On December 27, 2006, the State filed a petition alleging that the minor was neglected.
On January 3, 2007, the minor‘s mother stipulated to the allegations in the petition. On January 17, the respondent stipulated to the allegations concerning the minor‘s mother but denied the allegations concerning himself. On March 30, the State notified the respondent that a significant error had been made in the neglect petition. The State had improperly stated in the petition that the respondent had been found unfit in the prior juvenile proceedings when, in fact, he had been found fit but reserved. The State indicated that it would amend the petition at the next hearing. On April 17, the State made an oral motion to amend the petition, which the trial court granted.
On May 16, 2007, the respondent filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to
On Junе 19, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on the respondent‘s motion for sanctions. Mettel testified that he had been a DCFS investigator for 14 years. He stated that he initiated the neglect petition in this case. He sent the State a petition, seeking shelter care for the minor, based on the prior finding of unfitness against the minor‘s mother. The State then returned the petition to him with the additional allegations against the respondent. Mettel read and signed the petition, believing that the State had added accurate allegations. Mettel testified that it was not unusual for the State to add allegations to a petition after it conducted its own investigation. Mettel stated that he could have asked the State or a DCFS liaison to confirm the truth of the new allegations.
The trial court denied the motion because Mettel‘s conduct did not warrant sanctions under
On June 26, 2007, the trial court ordered that the motion to vacate the shelter care order be heard before the judge who originally heard the matter. The record does not contain further information about the resolution of the motion.
On July 3, 2007, the trial court held an adjudication hearing. In addition to the stipulations of the minor‘s mother as to the
Lutheran Social Services (LSS) filed a dispositional hearing report on July 31, 2007. The report indicated that the respondent lived with the minor‘s mother in a house that appeared to meet the needs of the family. The respondent worked various odd jobs. He told LSS that he recently started a nеw job, but he did not send LSS any verification of employment. The report also indicated that visits between the minor and his mother had been suspended because the mother said that she would give her children pills to kill them rather than see them in someone else‘s home.
On July 31, 2007, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. Danielle Norman, an LSS caseworker, testified that the respondent and the minor‘s mother continue to reside together. She stated that the respondent did not visit with the minor for about a month but that thеy resumed visitation recently. Respondent‘s interactions with the minor were appropriate during visitation.
The minor‘s mother testified that she did not make any comment about killing her children. She also stated that she would abide by any restrictions on contact with the minor, including living in another home, if the minor were returned to the respondent.
The respondent testified that he wanted the minor to live with him. He stated that he would send the minor to day care while he worked, but he had not arranged for any day care serviсes. He noted that he had a bedroom for the minor, but he stated that he needed to buy a crib for him. The respondent also testified that he started a new job and that he had had two other jobs in the past few months.
The trial court found that the minor‘s mother remained unfit and that the respondent was fit. The trial court made the minor a ward of the court and named DCFS as guardian with the right to place. The trial court believed that placement was necessary because the respondent: (1) had been еvasive, if not dishonest, about his employment; (2) was not prepared for the child as he had not bought a crib or arranged for day care; and (3) had no contact with the minor for a month until just before the dispositional hearing. Finally, the trial court stated that it was not confident that the respondent would live apart from the mother and protect the minor from her, as she remained unfit.
The respondent appeals.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the respondent first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it placed the minor outside his home.
Under section 2-27(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the trial court may commit a minor to DCFS wardship if the trial court determines that the parents are “unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care fоr, protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his or her parents.”
The respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by placing the minor outside his home because he was fit and, therefore, he had a superior right to custody of thе minor. Although it is true that the respondent was fit, the purpose of the dispositional hearing was for the trial court to determine whether it was in the best interests of the child to be made a ward of the court. In re Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 799 N.E.2d 304 (2003). As such, the trial court could consider any evidenсe presented at the hearing, including the respondent‘s living arrangements. Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 799 N.E.2d 304.
In the present case, the trial court was concerned about the fact that the respondent was living with the minor‘s mother because she had been found unfit and had threatened to kill the children if they were placed in someone else‘s home. The trial court questioned whether the respondent would actually live apart from the mother and protect the minor from her. Furthermore, the evidence showed that the respondent was not prepared to take custody of the minor. He stopped visiting the minor for about a month right before the dispositional hearing, and he had not bought a crib or arranged for day care for the minor. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing the minor outside the respondent‘s home.
The respondent also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for sanctions. The respondent requests that we remand this cause to the trial court to impose sanctiоns against Mettel, DCFS, and the Peoria County State‘s Attorney‘s office. In the alternative, the respondent requests that we enter whatever order the circumstances demand, including, but not limited to, vacating the shelter care order.
“The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law оr a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost оf litigation.”
155 Ill. 2d R. 137 .
The purpose of the rule is to prevent the filing of false or frivolous lawsuits. Sadler v. Creekmur, 354 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 821 N.E.2d 340 (2004). It is designed to prohibit the abuse of the judicial process by parties who make claims based on unsupported allegations of fact or law. Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 570, 682 N.E.2d 266 (1997). We review a triаl court‘s decision on a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Sadler, 354 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 821 N.E.2d 340.
The respondent argues that the trial court should have imposed sanctions because Mettel signed the original neglect
The respоndent also argues that he was prejudiced by the false allegations in the petition as the trial court relied on the original petition in granting the shelter care order and removing the minor from his custody. We find that the respondent was not prejudicеd as he had the opportunity to vacate the shelter care order after the mistake was corrected, and, according to the record, he attempted to do so. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent‘s motion for sanctions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, JJ., concur.