People v. OuryPeople v. Oury
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Geiger
delivered the opinion of the court:
In this appeal, the defendant, Deborah Oury, contends that it was error for the trial court to dismiss her post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. (See
In an indictment filed on June 27, 1989, the defendant was charged with home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12— 11(a)(1) (now
On March 16, 1990, the defendant appeared with counsel before Judge Barry Puklin. The court was advised that the defendant had been in the EMHC for treatment until that time. The State indicated that it wished to proceed to trial, and the defendant executed a jury trial waiver. The matter was set for a bench trial on May 10, 1990. In the bench trial before Judge Puklin, the defendant was found guilty of the three charges and was later sentenced to a 10-year term of imprisonment on the charge of home invasion. No post-trial motion was filed.
Following a direct appeal to this court, appointed counsel, a panel attorney for the office of the State Appellate Defender, filed a motion to withdraw as appellate counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. a. 1396, and People v. Jones (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 384. Appellate counsel raised three potential appellate issues: (1) whether the defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether the 10-year sentence was excessive; and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-trial motion raising the first two issues. In his motion, appellate counsel concluded that there was no issue meriting appeal. This court entered an order granting appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. People v. Oury (1991), 212 Ill. App. 3d 1109 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
On or after May 4, 1992, the defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition claiming, among other things, that she was denied the due process of law because of the failure to show that she was fit for trial when she returned from the EMHC. On May 12, 1992, Judge Puklin granted the defendant leave to sue as a poor person, appointed the public defender to represent the defendant, and set May 18, 1992, for a hearing to determine whether the petition was frivolous or patently without merit on its face. Assistant Public Defender Regina Harris was assigned to the defendant’s case and received, prior to May 18, the State’s motion to strike the defendant’s petition as lacking
According to the pleadings, on May 18, 1992, Ms. Harris appeared on behalf of the defendant and pointed out that under the Act, it was the duty of the trial court itself to decide at this stage whether the petition was frivolous or meritless without input from either the State or defense counsel. However, under the circumstances, appointed counsel felt compelled to respond to the State’s motion to strike. The record indicates that, because of the trial court’s perceived uncertainty as to the current state of the law concerning the appointment of counsel when a pro se petition is filed, the court expressed its preference to decide with the benefit of counsel’s argument whether the petition was frivolous or patently without merit. (The court’s comments suggested that it regularly appoints counsel immediately after the filing of pro se petitions.)
On May 18, 1992, after hearing the arguments of the State and of appointed defense counsel, the court granted the State’s motion to strike and dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit under
The defendant argues on appeal that it was reversible error for the trial court to dismiss her petition because the petition supported by the defendant’s affidavit and the trial record sufficiently raise a substantial constitutional deprivation requiring an evidentiary hearing. The petition included, among other things, an allegation that the defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move for a new determination of her fitness to stand trial following her release from the EMHC where she had a “breakdown.” The defendant claims that her pro se petition alleged at least
We do not reach the merits of the appeal because of the procedural posture of this cause at the time the ruling was made. Although the parties have not raised this issue on appeal, defense counsel did point out to the trial court that it was the court’s duty alone to decide initially whether the petition was frivolous or patently without merit without the further input from counsel. Defense counsel was correct in her observation to the court. Our analysis of the case persuades us that, because of this procedural error, the order of the trial court dismissing the petition must be deemed null and void and the cause must be remanded for further proceedings. We endeavor here to clarify any uncertainty regarding the procedural law to be applied in such a proceeding.
Some 10 years ago, the legislature amended the Act by adding
Only if the petition survives this initial reviewing stage can the court appoint counsel or grant leave to the petitioner to proceed as a pauper. (Novak, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 190; People v. Ramsey (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 443, 447.) Similarly, it is only if the petition survives this initial examination stage that the State may file responsive pleadings. If the State moves to dismiss the petition during this initial stage, the motion is a nullity; an order entered in response thereto is also null, void, and of no effect. Jett, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 95; Novak, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 190-91; People v. Magdaleno (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 384, 386.
In the second stage, if the court has determined in the first stage that the petition is not frivolous or patently without merit, the court may appoint counsel if the defendant is indigent, and counsel will have the opportunity to amend the post-conviction petition. (Lemons, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 944.) In this stage, the State may then move to dismiss the petition. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 122 — 4, 122 — 5 (now
In this cause, during the initial stage, the petition should have been docketed for the limited purpose of an examination by the trial judge. The judge could have taken one of two actions: (1) he could have dismissed it as frivolous or patently without merit, in which
It is difficult to assess to what extent the defendant was prejudiced by this procedural error. Remanding the cause for a new consideration by the trial court alone pursuant to
For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal order of the circuit court is vacated, and the cause is remanded with directions that the court docket the petition for further consideration in accordance with
Vacated and remanded with directions.
INGLIS, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.