Defendant, Otha Lee Edwards, was arrested and charged with breaking and entering a business place with the intent to commit larceny therein. MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305. An alleged accomplice, Barbara Spears, was also arrested and similarly charged. A preliminary examination was held and both partiеs were bound over for trial on the charged offense. After being bound over, defendant and Barbara Spears, through their attorneys, engaged in plea bargaining with the prosecutor. As a result of these negotiations it was agreed that defendant would plead guilty to the lesser charge of attempted breaking and entering and, if his plea was accepted, Bar *198 bara Spears would be permitted to plead guilty tо larceny under $100. On June 29, 1973, defendant and Barbara Spears both offered pleas of guilty. Defendant pled guilty to the lesser charge of attеmpted breaking and entering (MCLA 750.92; MSA 28.287 and MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305) and was sentenced to a term of from 3 years and 4 months to 5 years in prison. Barbara Spears was then pеrmitted to plead guilty to larceny under $100. MCLA 750.356; MSA 28.588. Defendant, Otha Lee Edwards, now appeals raising several issues for our consideration.
Defendant contends that his guilty plea must be set aside because the trial judge did not comply with GCR 1963, 785.7(2). At the time the two guilty pleas were offered, the plea agreement was stated on the record by defendant’s attorney and acknowledged by defendant, Barbara Spears, and the attorney representing her. The pre-trial statements contained in the lower court file also reflect the agreement. The problem in this case arises, however, from the fact that there was no representative from the prosecutor’s office present during the taking of defendant’s plea. GCR 1963, 785.7(2), which became effective June 1, 1973, requires that the following procedure be followed:
"The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without personally addressing the defendant and determining that the plea is freely, understandingly аnd voluntarily made. If the tendered plea is the result of an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant or his lawyer regаrding the entry of a plea, the agreement shall be stated on the record and affirmatively acknowledged by the defendant, his lawyer and thе prosecutor.”
Defendant argues that the above rule was not complied with because the agreement was not *199 affirmatively acknowledged by the prosecutor. Defendant maintains that this failure to comply with the rule requires the reversal of his guilty plea. Defendant does not maintain that the agreement as stated on the record does not accurately reflect its terms nor does he maintain that the agreement was not complied with. All that defendant argues is that since no one from the prosecutor’s office was present during the plеa-taking procedures the agreement could not have been affirmatively acknowledged by the prosecutor and that therefore his plea must be reversed. This argument is ridiculous. Nothing here was violative of the agreement and defendant was not in any way misled. We do not believe that this new court rule was designed to reverse an otherwise acceptable plea simply because the proseсutor was not present at the plea-taking procedure. In our opinion GCR 1963, 785.7(2) was designed to "bring plea agreements into the open” 1 аnd have them placed on the record so that if it is later argued by either party that an alleged plea bargain has not been kept, a record of all of its terms would be available to aid a reviewing court in determining such a claim.
In
People v Leonard,
We aré not unmindful of the reсent order of our Supreme Court in
People v Shekoski,
In the past the courts of this state havе consistently eschewed a policy of reviewing guilty pleas in a manner which placed form over substance. See
People v Butler,
*201 This portion of the new court rule requires that all the terms of a plea agreеment be stated on the record and acknowledged by the parties so that an accurate record of its terms is available should futurе reference be necessary. If the prosecutor acknowledges that the agreement in this case is properly reflected by the terms stated on the record, the purpose of GCR 1963, 785.7(2) will have been satisfied.
Defendant also predicates error on the manner in whiсh the trial judge informed him of his right against self-incrimination and his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. These alleged errors are basеd on the trial judge’s failure to inform defendant of certain matters which are not included in the list of rights which must be explained to a defendant under GCR 1963, 785.7(1),(2). Wе find no error.
For the reasons set forth in our discussion of the first issue this case is remanded to the trial court to determine whether the plea, аs stated on the record, correctly reflects the negotiated agreement between the parties. If it does, defendant’s conviction is affirmed; if it doesn’t, defendant’s conviction is reversed and the case is remanded.
Notes
People v Palmer,