In re LEONA W., a Minor, Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Oscar H., Appellee)
Nos. 103620, 103639 cons.
Supreme Court of Illinois
April 3, 2008
228 Ill. 2d 439
As we noted above, then, it is not that we are unsympathetic to defendant‘s argument regarding overzealous prosecution; rather, we believe that it is the legislature that must decide whether the official misconduct statute would benefit from a de minimis exception. Finding no support for such an exception in the plain language of the statute, we will not carve it out on our own initiative. We do believe, however, that the proper scope of the official misconduct statute is an issue ripe for legislative review, and we strongly suggest that the parameters of the statute be addressed in that forum.
Conclusion
We hold that a violation of the constitution can serve as a predicate unlawful act for the purposes of the official misconduct statute. Accordingly, the indictment against defendant in this case, alleging a violation of
Affirmed.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Deborah Ahlstrand, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Nancy Faulls and Nancy Kisicki, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Protase M. Tinka, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.
Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
This appeal arises from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County that found Oscar H. to be unfit and terminated his parental rights to Leona W. (L.W.), his biological daughter. The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions. In re L.W., 362 Ill. App. 3d 1106 (2005). We denied leave to appeal, but in the exercise of our supervisory authority, we directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and reconsider the cause in light of our decision in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004). In re L.W., 218 Ill. 2d 540 (2006) (supervisory order). Following remand, the appellate court reached the same conclusion it had initially and once again reversed and remanded to the circuit court. 367 Ill. App. 3d 844. The State and the office of the Cоok County public guardian, representing the interests of L.W., then petitioned our court for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. We allowed those petitions and consolidated them. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the appellate court‘s judgment and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.
L.W., the biological daughter of Oscar H., was born in October of 1996 to Sandra W., a drug addict. At the time of her birth, L.W. tested positive for intrauterine cocaine exposure and syphilis. She was subsequently found to be suffering from mental deficits, a seizure disorder and asthma.
Within weeks of her birth, L.W. was taken into protective custody by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Although this was originally intended
In early November 1996, less than three weeks after L.W.‘s birth, DCFS filed a petition under
As an additional basis for requesting that L.W. be made a ward of the court, the petition also alleged that the child was abused within the meaning of
When DCFS initially filed its petition for adjudication of wardship, the identity of L.W.‘s father was unknown. Oscar H. subsequently came forward and admitted paternity. In January of 1997, the circuit court entered an order memorializing Oscar H.‘s admission. By separate order the court appointed the public defender to represent him. The petition fоr adjudication of wardship was then amended to name Oscar H. as L.W.‘s biological father.
The circuit court reviewed the parties’ stipulations, which were read into the record at the February 25, 1997, hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court entered an order which found, based on the stipulated facts, that L.W. was abused within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act because she was at substantial risk of physical injury as set forth in
By consent of all the parties and with approval of the court, the normal 30-day deadline for the dispositional hearing was waived. See
As authorized by
Numerous proceedings ensued. On May 13, 1997, Oscar H. moved to vacate the prior placement orders and to have custody of L.W. be given to him. This was styled “emergency motion to return home” and was submitted on Oscar H.‘s behalf by the public defender. A hearing on that motion was held June 9, 1997, the same date set for the permanency hearing and progress report. The result of that hearing was entry of an agreed order which set as a permanency goal L.W.‘s “return home,” meaning her return to Oscar H.‘s home.
Shortly thereafter, on June 19, 1997, a second agreed permanency order was entered. The new permanency order set as a goal L.W.‘s return home tо Oscar H. within 12 months. Both Sandra W. and Oscar H. were present in court when this was done and both were represented by counsel.
Another permanency hearing was held in February of 2002. Following that hearing, a hearing officer recommended a new goal: substitute care pending a determination by the court as to whether the biological parents’ parental rights should be terminated and a guardian appointed with authority to consent to L.W.‘s adoption. Oscar H., through his attorney, objected to this recommendation, arguing that the other children he had fathered with Sandra W. reside with him, he had proven his ability to care for those children and for L.W., and it would be in L.W.‘s best interests for her to come live with him as well. In Oscar H.‘s view, the appropriate permanency goal should have been return of L.W. to him within five months.
The circuit court rejected Oscar H.‘s arguments and entered a permanency order setting as a goal the placement of L.W. with a private guardian. The intended guardian was a nonrelative foster parent with whom L.W. had been living since shortly after her birth. The reаsons stated in the order for selecting this goal and rejecting previous goals were that L.W., who was then five, had lived with the foster parent nearly her entire life; L.W.‘s mother was not working toward reunification; L.W.‘s father, Oscar H., had not made reasonable progress toward reunification; and the foster parent would allow continued contact with L.W.‘s biological family. The planned date for achievement of the goal was the following October.
In the months which followed, the public guardian
When March 2003 arrived, the State filed a petition under
A hearing on the State‘s petition was convened on August 15, 2003. At the outset of that hearing, the public
When the hearing resumed on August 19, the court granted the public guardian‘s in limine motion, holding that it would exclude evidence regarding Oscar H.‘s fitness as a parent with respect to his other children. The court then proceeded to hear evidence on whether Oscar H. and Sandra W. were unfit under subsection (b) or (m) of
To support its claim of unfitness, the State сalled as a witness Mary Henderson, a case supervisor for Catholic Charities who had been working on L.W.‘s case since 1997. Henderson reviewed in detail the history of the case, the details of L.W.‘s condition, education, and developmental progress; the parents’ circumstances; their relationship with L.W.; the steps they had taken to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal of the child from them; and the progress they had made toward the return of the child to them. Based on Henderson‘s testimony and the documentary evidence in the record, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the allegation that Oscar H. and Sandra W. were unfit under
After making this finding, the court immediately proceeded to consideration of the child‘s best interests. On that question the court heard testimony from the woman who had been serving as L.W.‘s foster mother. The foster mother described L.W.‘s condition; the conditions in the foster home; L.W.‘s relationship with the foster mother‘s adopted son; L.W.‘s involvement with the neighborhood, school and community; and the foster mother‘s desire to ultimately adopt L.W.
The court also heard testimony from Gina Barrios, a social worker from Catholic Charities currently assigned to L.W.‘s case. Barrios testifiеd about her familiarity with L.W.‘s case and detailed L.W.‘s current living conditions and relationship with her foster family. Barrios reported that a neighbor boy was alleged to have touched L.W. inappropriately, an incident reported to authorities by L.W.‘s foster mother. Barrios also spoke of L.W.‘s medical and developmental needs and how they were being addressed by the foster mother. Barrios thought the foster mother should be permitted to adopt L.W.
Based upon the foregoing evidence and after hearing closing arguments, the circuit court concluded that it was in L.W.‘s best interests to terminate the parental rights of both Oscar H. and Sandra W. and to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to L.W.‘s adoption. The court entered its termination order on August 20, 2003. In that order, thе court granted both parents the right to appeal. Termination of parental rights is immediately appealable under
As grounds for his appeal, Oscar H. raised two issues in the appellate court: (1) whether the trial court erred when it granted the motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding his custody of the four other children he had fathеred with Sandra W.; and (2) whether the trial court‘s finding of parental unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence in light of the fact that Oscar H. was found fit to care for the other four children, some of whom suffer from the same or similar medical problems as L.W. The public guardian cross-appealed, arguing that the circuit court had erred in rejecting his claim that Sandra W. and Oscar H. were unfit for the additional reason that they had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child‘s welfare within the meaning of
The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that the circuit court‘s judgment terminating Oscar H.‘s parental rights could not stand because compliance with
Whether the circuit court‘s decision comported with
After reaching this conclusion, the appellate court went on to address whether evidence of Oscar H.‘s success in gaining custody of four of L.W.‘s siblings should have been admitted. After rejecting an argument by the public guardian that considerations of waiver should bar consideration of the issue, the appellate court opined “that evidence that Oscar H. has been found fit and given custody of four of L.W.‘s siblings is material and relevant and is one factor that should be considered by a court making a determination on the issue of Oscar H.‘s parental fitness and ability to parent and сare for L.W., the child who is the subject of these proceedings.” L.W., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1120. Accordingly, the appellate court held that should the State elect to begin these proceedings anew in the circuit court, the circuit court should not bar Oscar H. from presenting this evidence. The court did not reach any of the other issues in the case.1
The State petitioned our court for leave to appeal. It
A petition for leave to appeal was also filed by the public guardian. As had the State, the public guardian asserted that the appellate court was wrong to overturn the judgment terminating Oscar H.‘s parental rights based on the failure of the circuit court‘s February 1997 determination to specify what acts of Oscar H. caused the child to be abused. It agreed with the State‘s contention that the appellate court‘s ruling conflicted with this court‘s decision in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004),
The public guardian next took issue with the appellate court‘s judgment on the grounds that it appeared to have been predicated on the mistaken belief that L.W. had actually been physically abused prior to the February 1997 hearing, when she had not been. Finally, the public guardian asserted that the appellate court‘s resolution of the motion in limine question conflicted with its prior holding in In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d 792, 798
This court denied both the State‘s petition for leave to appeal and the petition for leave to appeal filed by the public guardian. At the same time, however, we entered supervisory orders directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and to reconsider the cause in light of our opinion in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004). In accordance with our supervisory orders, entered at the end of March 2006, the appellate court filed orders vacating its judgment and indicating that it would reconsider the case. The State and the public guardian were granted leave to file supplemental briefs, and a reply brief was filed by Oscar H.
Several months later, in September of 2006, the appellate court filed a new opinion in the case. The new version was largely unchanged from the prior version. The opinion revised the court‘s discussion of the requirements of
There being no significant change in the appellate court‘s judgment, the public guardian once again petitioned our court for leave to appeal based on the arguments it asserted in its original petition for leave to appeal. The State did likewise. We granted both petitions and consolidated them for briefing, argument and decision.
Before turning to the merits of these consolidated appeals, there is one preliminary matter we must address. Oscar H. contends that because our court denied the prior petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and the public guardian, principles of res judicata should bar those entities from raising any of the same arguments now that the matter is before us again. This argument is without merit. For res judicata to apply, there must have been a final judgment on the merits of the case. Denials of petitions for leave to appeal are not decisions on the merits. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 257 (2001). They cannot be interpreted as reflecting approval or disapproval of a lower court‘s action. They signify only that four members of the court, for reasons satisfactory to them, have not voted to grant leave to appeal. See People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 183 (1979). The merits of the arguments asserted by the State and public guardian are therefore properly before us.
We turn then to the question of whether the appellate court erred in setting aside the circuit court‘s judgment terminating Oscar H.‘s parental rights to L.W. based on what it perceived as defects in the circuit court‘s order of February 25, 1997, finding L.W. to be abused. The answer to this question is yes. The appellate court
Appeals from final judgments entered in proceedings under the Juvеnile Court Act, other than delinquent minor proceedings, are governed by the rules applicable to civil cases. 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(b). The rule pertaining to appeals from final judgments is
In challenging this conclusion, Oscar H. contends that it would be anomalous to bar parties from seеking review of dispositional orders after time for appeal has passed given that we have held that dispositional orders may normally be modified at any time up to final closing and discharge of the proceedings if the court finds that it would be in the best interests of the child to make the modification. See In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43-44 (2005);
This situation is directly analogous to the one present in In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), which concerned a trial court‘s failure to comply with a comparable written-explanation requirement set forth in
The final question raised by the petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and the public guardian, and the last issue we must resolve, is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the circuit court should not have granted the motion in limine regarding Oscar H.‘s custody of L.W.‘s siblings. In considering this question, we begin by noting that the matter has different significance under our disposition than it did in the appellate court. Because the appellate court reversed the termination judgment based on the defects it perceived in the February 25, 1997, order, its discussiоn of the in limine motion did not alter the outcome of the case. It merely provided guidance to the circuit court in the event the State should initiate new termination proceedings.
The situation is now different. Because we have concluded that the termination judgment should not have been reversed based on the February 25, 1997, order, the issue before us is not whether the guidance given by the appellate court was correct. It is, instead, whether the circuit court‘s ruling on the in limine motion provides an
Generally speaking, evidentiary motions, such as motions in limine, are directed to the trial court‘s discretion. A trial court‘s ruling on such motions will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 392 (2004). The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is high. A trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling unless it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the court. See Clayton v. County of Cook, 346 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (2003). Moreover, even where an abuse of discretion has occurred, it will not warrant reversal of the judgment unless the record indicates the existence of substantial prejudice affecting the outcome of the trial. Holston v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 165 Ill. 2d 150, 170-71 (1995).
Neither of these conditions was satisfied in this case. As we have discussed, the State sought to find Oscar H. unfit on two grounds: that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for L.W.‘s welfare (see
We note, moreover, that while the circuit court granted the motion in limine, it nevertheless did hear testimony later in the proceedings that custody of L.W.‘s
Before concluding our discussion, there is one final matter we must address. The public guardian, as attorney for L.W., argues that instead of remanding this cause to the appellate court for consideration of the merits of Oscar H.‘s challenge to the circuit court‘s judgment terminating his parental rights, this court should address that claim directly. We have declined a similar request by the public guardian in In re Mark W., 228 Ill. 2d 365 (2008), a case involving factual and procedural circumstances comparable to those present in this case. After careful deliberation, we have decided to decline
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for review, on the merits, of the circuit court‘s judgment terminating Oscar H.‘s parental rights. The appellate court is hereby directed to file its judgment in this matter within 60 days of the issuance of this court‘s mandate.
Reversed and remanded with directions.