People v. OsbornePeople v. Osborne
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Farmer
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court :
Plaintiff in error, Harry Osborne, was convicted in the circuit court of Peoria county of an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. The indictment consists of two counts. The first count charges that plaintiff in error “with force and arms in and upon one Daniel Smith, in the peace of the people then and there being, with a certain dangerous weapon, to-wit, with a gun, with which the said Harry Osborne was then and there armed, feloniously, willfully and of his malice aforethought did make an assault, and the said Harry Osborne in and upon clothing, to-wit, coat, of him,
While this indictment could not be used as a model for faultless pleading, its defects are not such as to destroy the sufficiency of the charge against plaintiff in error. It is contended by plaintiff in error that the language in the first count, “and the said Harry Osborne in and upon clothing, to-wit, coat, of him, the said Daniel Smith, then and there feloniously and unlawfully did shoot,” and in the second count, “and the said Harry Osborne at, against, into and upon the clothing of him, the said Daniel Smith, then and there feloniously and unlawfully did shoot,” is descriptive of the particular manner in which the offense charged was committed, and while it might have been omitted from the indictment, having been thus alleged it becomes an essential ingredient of the charge made. Prom this premise it is then argued that the indictment does not charge the commission of any offense against plaintiff in error because it does not state where the clothing was, and that if it was not on or about Smith’s person no assault could have been committed
The indictment will not bear the construction sought to be placed upon it by plaintiff in error. It is quite clear that the language pointed out was not meant to be descriptive of the assault made but was simply intended to describe the effect of the assault. The only reasonable construction which the language used in the two counts of this indictment will bear is that plaintiff in error made a felonious assault upon Smith with a gun or rifle with intent to kill him, and that in making such assault he fired a shot which struck Smith’s clothing. The statement in regard to the effect of the assault was unnecessary and under the authorities may be treated as surplusage. An averment in an indictment may be treated, on the trial, as surplusage and be rejected where it can be stricken out without vitiating the indictment. (Durham v. People, 4 Scam. 172; People v. Boer, 262 Ill. 152.) The language pointed out in the two counts being merely a statement of the effect of the assault was not necessary, did not become a material averment when made and should be rejected as surplusage. The court did not err in overruling the motions to quash and in arrest of judgment.
Plaintiff in error did riot testify on the trial. The testimony of the People tended to prove that the assault occurred at the home of the plaintiff in error, in the city of Peoria, between midnight and two o’clock in the morning of June 24, 1914. Between twelve and one o’clock that morning Mrs. Morrissey, who lived next door to plaintiff in error, was awakened by two gunshots. She went to the door and saw plaintiff in error sitting in a chair on his own porch with a gun. in his hands. She asked him if he would please put
It was not improper to admit the testimony of Mrs. Morrissey relative to the statement of plaintiff in error as to what he would do if an attempt were made to arrest him. This statement was competent and tended to show the intent with which the shot was fired. We do not believe that this language is susceptible of the construction placed upon it by counsel for plaintiff in error. It was clearly a threat to shoot any policeman who might attempt to arrest him, and not a threat that he would shoot every policeman after he had been “pinched” or placed under arrest.
During the opening argument the assistant State’s attorney, holding the gun used by plaintiff in error on the night in question and after stating and illustrating the circumstances testified to, said: “And there has been no evidence offered by the defendant-.” At this point he was interrupted by an objection, which was sustained, and thereupon he withdrew the remark. It is contended that this was a direct reference to the fact that plaintiff in error did not testify. We do not think the remark can be so construed. Testimony was offered on behalf of plaintiff in error which the State’s attorney had a right to discuss. While this statement might be constru.ed as an attempt to evade the statute, under the state of the record in this case it cannot be fairly said to be an indication of misconduct on the part of the assistant State’s attorney. It would have been a legitimate argument for the State’s attorney to make that no evidence had been offered by the defendant sufficient to show that he was incapable of forming the intent charged, and he may have intended making such an argument. We are of the opinion that the statute was not violated and plaintiff in error was not prejudiced by this statement.
The following instruction was given on behalf of the People:
“The court instructs you that the intent of a party committing an act may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of such act. A person is
It is claimed this instruction ignored the defense that plaintiff in error was in such a state of intoxication that he was incapable of forming an intent to commit the crime charged or to comprehend the threats he made. The use of a deadly weapon in making an assault upon another is not necessarily conclusive that the party making the assault intended to commit murder. To sustain the charge of an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder the proof must show that the assault was made under such circumstances that had the attempt been successful the killing would have been murder. (Hammond v. People, 199 Ill. 173.) A man may intentionally use a deadly weapon in self-defense without the implication of malice. He may use such weapon in a sudden heat of passion under circumstances that if killing resulted it would be manslaughter. None of these elements, however, were involved in the defense in this case. Proof was offered that plaintiff in error was drunk, and it is insisted if he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming an intent to commit the crime with which he was charged he could not be found guilty, and that the instruction complained of denied him that defense. If it be conceded that the court should not have given the instruction, the error, under the state of the record, would not justify a reversal of the judgment. There was some testimony offered by plaintiff in error that he was drunk, but it utterly failed to show that he was in such a state of intoxication as to not know and realize what he was doing or that he was incapable of forming the intent charged. On the contrary, the proof of his condition, acts and declarations, and the testimony of a number of witnesses for the prosecution that he was not drunk, warranted the conclusion that he was not intoxicated to such a degree that he was incapable of forming an intention to commit the crime with which he was
Other instructions given on behalf of the People directed a verdict of guilty. It is urged that each of these instructions is erroneous in that it excludes a necessary element of plaintiff in error’s defense. The only defense which it could be claimed these instructions ignore is that plaintiff in error was in the defense of his habitation at the time he fired the shot. For the reasons we have already given, these instructions are not subject to this criticism.
One of the instructions given on behalf of the People which directed a verdict omitted the words “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and told the jury that if they believed, from the evidence, certain facts, they should find plaintiff in error guilty of assault with intent to kill. The words omitted in this instruction were used in each of the other instructions given on behalf of the People where it was necessary to use them, and, in addition, a general instruction was given on behalf of plaintiff in error correctly defining the degree of proof required before he could be found guilty. Under this state of the record it was not error to give the instruction complained of. Steiner v. People, 187 Ill. 244.
Complaint is made of the action of the court in giving and refusing other instructions. For reasons already given in this opinion the court committed no error in this respect.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I concur in all that is said in the majority opinion except the discussion and holding in reference to the instruction of the People which is quoted. I am of the opinion that by that instruction the only defense interposed was withdrawn from the consideration of the jury and that the giving of the instruction constituted prejudicial error.