*1 subsequent fact-finding pro- resort to a
ceeding in order to determine whether a guilty plea voluntarily was and under-
standing^ made.
McCarthy,
I am authorized to VOLLACK, JJ., join ERICKSON and in this dissent. Colorado,
The PEOPLE of the State of Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, ROMERO,
Edward ONESIMO Defendant-Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.
No. 85SA319. Colorado, Supreme Court En Banc. Nov. 1987. Rehearing Denied Dec. 1987.
I. 13, 1982, reg- July the defendant
On City County and the istered Denver, listing his residential address as 2755 West 23rd Avenue. When he voted 21, 1983, and September on June allegedly resided at the defendant pre- located within a different an address Attorney In the cinct. December charging filed an information the General voting felony with two counts of by providing false informa- about his of residence and one tion voting in a misdemeanor count of to vote. in which he was preliminary hearing in Denver At a one, two, County on counts Court defendant, three, testimony giv- the of the proceeding conducted en in a related civil 24, 1984, into evi- on June was admitted prosecution proba- established dence. The cause and the case was bound over to ble Woodard, Gen., B. Atty. Charles Duane 18, 1985, the the district court. On March Howe, Gen., Atty. Richard H. Deputy Chief Attorney submitted a motion to General Gen., Forman, Dailey, Daniel Sol. John counts, granted. which file additional was Gen., Perryman, Eric Asst. Deputy Atty. charged fifth the The fourth and counts Gen., Denver, plaintiff-appellant, Atty. voting in elections on No- defendant with cross-appellee. May vember regarding his viding false information Plunkett, Young, D. Richard E. Frank prelimi- Prior place of residence. Jr., Denver, defendant-appellee, cross- hearing the fourth and fifth nary on appellant. counts, prohibit the the defendant moved to testimony given at the admission of ERICKSON, Justice. relying upon priv- proceeding prior civil defendant, VII, Rome- Edward Onesimo 9 of by article ilege afforded ro, voting wrong charged with in the The district was Constitution. the Colorado misdemeanor, sup- agreed with the defendant and precinct, a court Nevertheless, the pressed testimony. (1980), felony and four prosecution found that district court regarding his providing false information of the probable cause for both established IB C.R.S. felony counts. all The district court dismissed finding of limita- charges, that the statute filed a motion The defendant then charge, misdemeanor tions had run on the arguing that sec- felony counts dismiss the felony statute was unconstitu- and that felony, IB C.R.S. applied to the defendant because tional as him be- applied to was unconstitutional as equal protection of the deprived him of substantially proscribed conduct cause it II, under article section 25 1- laws prohibited similar to conduct misdemeanor, ap- prosecution 13-709, ruling. penalty. We re- pealed the district court more severe yet imposed a agreed dismissed each remand the case to the district court verse and district its prejudice. On felony counts with to reinstate court with directions motion, dismissed district court own Any person by knowingly giv- charge, finding that section who votes misdemeanor 1-13-709, though denominated as a misde- ing regarding false information meanor, grants rights carries the present residence commits a class 5 of a offense and therefore punished and shall be prosecuted within the six-month must be in section C.R.S. 1973. petty offenses. statute of limitations for 1-13-709 Section prosecution Because the filed the informa- *3 who, Any person any election period, beyond well the six-month tion law, knowingly or offers to court dismissed the misdemeanor district in in which he is not count. guilty qualified to vote is of a misde- grounds appeal, prosecution As and, thereof, upon meanor conviction (1) deny section 1-2-225 does not claims: punished by fine shall be of not more laws; equal protection of the by imprison- hundred dollars or than two (2) improperly applied the district court county jail ment for not more than six-month statute of limitations months. three offenses; improp- the district court Equal protection guaran of laws is VII, erly applied article section 9 of the teed amendment of the fourteenth Constitution to exclude evidence Colorado United States Constitution and the due testimony given proceeding.1 in a of civil II, process clause article section 25 of agree. Accordingly, We we reverse the People the Colorado Constitution. v. Oli district court and remand with instructions (Colo.1987). ver, 222, Equal 745 P.2d 227 reinstate the
protection of the laws assures that those
II.
similarly
who are
situated will be afforded
Mozee,
People
similar treatment.
v.
723
The defendant contends that section 1-2-
117,
(Colo.1986); People
126
v. Cal
225,
equal protec-
violates
varesi,
277, 281,
316,
188 Colo.
534 P.2d
318
by proscribing
tion of the laws
identical
pre
“When two criminal statutes
conduct as
that
different
for identical con
imposes
penal-
which
a lesser
scribe
C.R.S.
duct,
ty.2
Section 1-2-225
a defendant convicted and sentenced
asserting
cross-appeal
Supreme
1. The defendant filed a
The United States
Court has
concluding
states,
acknowledged
the trial court erred in
nevertheless
because
VII,
article
section 9 of the Colorado Constitu-
authority
of their inherent constitutional
to con-
prohibit
prosecution
tion does not
of the
process,
require persons
trol the electoral
can
defendant under the facts of this case. A crimi-
requirements
meet certain reasonable
before
right
appeal
nal defendant’s
of
is found in sec-
See,
they can vote in state or national elections.
(1978): "Every person
8 C.R.S.
686,
Forston,
e.g., Burns v.
410 U.S.
93 S.Ct.
of
convicted
an offense under the statutes of
1209,
(1973) (Court upheld
L.Ed.2d 633
resi-
35
right
appeal
this state has the
of
to review the
dency
citizenship requirements); Martson
proceedings resulting in conviction." Because
Lewis,
679,
1211,
410 U.S.
L.Ed.2d
v.
93 S.Ct.
35
convicted,
may
the defendant was not
appeal.
(1973) (same).
"re-
627
Under Colorado law
Moreover,
jurisdiction
initial
over de-
franchise,
strictions on the
classifications based
appeals
judgment
fendants'
from final
of the
upon residency, citizenship
age
have never
ap-
district court is conferred on the court of
suspect.”
been considered
Millis v. Board
of
peals,
supreme
not the
court.
6
County
652,
County,
Comm’rs
Larimer
626 P.2d
(1973
Supp.). Accordingly,
& 1986
we
(Colo.1981) (citing Holt Civic Club v.
657
cross-appeal
dismiss the
of the defendant.
Tuscaloosa,
60,
383,
City
439 U.S.
99 S.Ct.
58
legislation
2. Where
does not involve an intrinsi
(1978);
L.Ed.2d 292
Kramer v. Union Free
cally suspect classification or a fundamental
IS,
621,
1886,
School Dist. No.
395 U.S.
89 S.Ct.
right, the test is whether the classification is
Rorex,
(1969);
dollar
less than the maximum
imprisonment,
sentence of six-month
seven-
prosecution argues
the dis
fine,
hundred-and-fifty-dollar
or both.
VII,
improperly applied
trict court
Article
legislature
by
9 of
alone is vested with
the Colorado Constitution
power
excluding testimony given
prescribe pun-
to define crimes and
in the civil suit.
VII,
People Montgomery,
ishment.
669 P.2d Article
section 9 of the Colorado Con
(Colo.1983);
stitution,
provides:
Trujillo,
pro-
5. Section
8B C.R.S.
6. Section
8 C.R.S.
vides:
"petty
A
of a
violation
this state is a
section,
purposes
"petty of-
For the
of this
specifically
offense” if
classified as a class 1
any
fense" means
crime or offense classified
petty
penalty
or class 2
offense. The
for com-
or,
classified,
petty
as a
offense
if not so
offense,
petty
upon
mission of a class 1
con-
punishable by imprisonment
which is
other
viction, is a fine of not more than five hun-
facility
than in a correction
for not more than
dollars,
imprisonment
dred
or
for not more
months,
by
six
or
a fine of not more than five
than six months other than in the correctional
dollars,
imprison-
hundred
both such
City,
penalty
facilities Canon
or both. The
fine,
any
ment and
and includes
violation of a
petty
for commission of a class 2
offense is a
municipal ordinance or offense which was
specified
defining
fine
in the section
the of-
law; ex-
not considered a crime at common
cept
penalty
procedure
fense. The
assessment
municipal
that violation of a
traffic ordi-
16-2-201, C.R.S.,
is available for the
which does not constitute a criminal
nance
payment
petty
of fines in class 2
offense cases.
shall not constitute a
offense.
offense
elections,
(a)
eligible
contested
and for
When the contestee
In trials of
law,
to the office to which he has been de-
arising
the election
offenses
under
permitted to withhold
clared elected.
person shall be
no
ground
testimony on the
that it
his
Because the defendant was not “declared
himself,
subject
pub-
him to
criminate
duly elected” to an office
cannot claim
infamy;
testimony
such
shall not
lic
that,
l-ll-201(l)(a),
under section
the June
judicial pro-
against
any
him in
be used
proceeding
1983 civil
did not involve an
giving
in
such
ceeding except
perjury
election,
“election contest.” To contest an
testimony.
statutorily
one is limited to the
enumerated
causes,
11—201(l)(a) -201(l)(e),
sections
petitioned the dis
In
the defendant
1—
giving rise to such an action.
See Lewis
require
he be certified as
trict court to
Boynton, 55 P.
for the state senate on the
a candidate
The defendant has not established
primary
proceed
At a civil
election ballot.
contest,
grounds
for an election
and is
ing
the defendant
testi
on June
claiming
precluded
protec-
therefore
from
not reside at 2755 West
fied that he did
VII,
tion under article
section 9
Sandavol,
Romero v.
See
23rd Avenue.
Accordingly,
(Colo.1984). The defendant
elections. See Colo. Const. art.
11.
Where,
here,
LOHR, J.,
places
part
defendant
concurs
voluntarily testifying
part.
residence at issue
dissents in
proceeding
instigated,
a civil
that he
JJ.,
KIRSHBAUM,
join
ROVIRA and
purity of elections is not
threatened
in the concurrence and dissent.
admitting
testimony
proceed
at a later
LOHR, Justice, concurring
part
ing.
dissenting
part:
The defendant
further
contends
parts
major-
I concur in
III and IV of the
grounds
“one of the
for an election contest
dissent,
ity opinion.
respectfully
I
how-
eligible
is that the candidate ‘is not
ever,
part
opinion,
from
II of that
in which
office to which he has
declared elect-
been
”
majority
holds that the trial court erred
(citing
l-ll-201(l)(a),
ed’
IB C.R.
dismissing
charg-
the four
(1980)).
disagree
S.
We
with the defend-
ing
voting by knowing-
with
construing
primary
ant.
In
our
*7
regarding
ly giving false information
his
give
task is to ascertain and
effect to the
present
in
residence
violation of
Assembly. People
intent of the General
1-2-225,
(1980).
agree
IB
I
C.R.S.
Guenther,
971,
975
applied
with the trial court that as
to the
intent,
“To discern that
we look first to the
charges in
facts that form the basis of the
itself,
language
giving
of the statute
case,
proscribes
this
section 1-2-225
con-
statutory
commonly accepted
terms their
prohibited by
duct that
is identical to that
Id.
meaning.”
(citing
and understood
IB
a misde-
C.R.S.
People,
1111,
Binkley v.
P.2d
1113-14
716
prescribes
meanor statute which
a lesser
¶.
Court,
(Colo.1986):
People District
result,
penalty. As a
the defendant’s con-
918,
(Colo.1986): Engelbrecht
P.2d
right
equal protection of the
stitutional
to
Co.,
Indemnity
Accident &
Hartford
precludes
laws
his conviction of the four
(Colo.1984)).
Section 1-11-
felony
201(l)(a),
IB C.R.S.
reads:
duly
declared
any
person
The election of
In order to violate section
here,
elected to
must
any
may
felony
person
office
statute at issue
a
be contested:
knowingly giving
vote
false information
scribed
applied
two statutes as
in
regarding
his
residence.
case
this
because
the defendant
“[w]hen
statute,
It is a violation of the misdemeanor
to vote and
false infor-
1-13-709, knowingly
to
in
mation, he
violated
element of the felo-
precinct
quali-
election
in which one is not
statute,
ny
but
an element of the mis-
person
permitted
fied to vote. No
to
Majority op.
demeanor.”
pur-
at 538. The
being
registered.
without
ported
illusory.
distinction is
Neither the
IB C.R.S.
In order to
§
felony nor the
complete
misdemeanor is
vote,
qualified
register
person
a
until a vote has been cast. Under the
precinct
must have resided in the
thirty-
statutory
outlined,
previously
scheme
one
immediately
days
preceding
two
the elec-
in
precinct
cannot vote
a
where he is not
(1980).1
IB
Upon
tion.
C.R.S.
§
qualified by
ballot,
residence to cast his
applying
registration,
for voter
one must
violation of the misdemeanor
un-
provide
regarding
accurate information
provides
less he
false information concern-
l-2-203(l)(a),
(2)(b), (3)(a),
residence.
§
ing his residence either at
the time he
(3)(b),
(1980);
l-2-203(2)(b),
IB C.R.S.
IB
§
registers or at
the time he votes. Al-
(1986
1-2-204(1), (2),
Supp.);
C.R.S.
§
though
formally
an element of the mis-
provide
The voter must also
(section 1-13-709), pro-
demeanor statute
accurate information
about
residence on viding false information about current resi-
card,
signature
his voter’s
which must be
dence at one time or the other is essential
presented
precinct polling place.
person
in order to
enable
to vote in an
l-7-107(l)(a),
Under
precinct
qualified.
election
he
is not
scheme,
statutory
this
one can vote in an
against
background,
Viewed
the statutory
qualified
where he is not
supposed
evaporates.
distinction
only
gives
if he
false information about his
This is not
a case like
v. Czajkow
place of
registers
residence either when he
ski,
193 Colo.
apply prescribe Bramlett, 194 Colo. People v. denied, 435 U.S. cert. 98 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d People suggest that the statutes do proscribe identical conduct because person could elude monitors and providing information
vote without false about his there- violating but not sec- equal tion 1-2-225. I do not believe protection determinations should turn on imaginative hypothetical possibilities.
such nothing suggest There is in the record to that such unusual facts are here. Calvaresi, As said in we 277, 281-82, satisfy equal protection require- in order to ments, must be substantial differ- “[t]here having relationship
ences a reasonable persons public purpose involved and the to be achieved.” No such differences exist applied
as the two statutes are in this case. I would affirm the dismissal of the four violation of section 1-2-225. say I am authorized to KIRSHBAUM, JJ., join ROVIRA and concurrence and this disssent.
