THE PEOPLE, Aрpellant, v. ONE 1940 FORD V-8 COUPE, ENGINE NO. 18-5601077, Defendant; BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, Respondent.
L. A. No. 21572
In Bank
Dec. 15, 1950
471
Samuel B. Stewart, Jr., Hugo A. Steinmeyer, John E. Walter and Keith W. Miller for Respondent.
Notice of seizure and intended forfeiture procеedings was served on Nick G. Chronis, the registered owner of the designated Ford automobile, on Frank John Chronis, who is Nick‘s brother, and on the bank, based on an alleged unlawful transportation and possession of narcotics by Frank John Chronis while he had the use of the vehicle. Neither Nick nor Frank answered the notice. The bank filed an answer alleging that it was the legal owner of the vehicle and the holder of a conditional sales contract dated in August, 1948, on which the balanсe remaining unpaid was $467.92.
Section 11610 of the Health and Safety Code provides that a vehicle used as charged in the notice shall be forfeited to the state.
In its answer the bank did not allege that a reasonable or any investigation was made pursuant to
The trial court found that the bank did not make any investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner; that the moral responsibility, character and reputation of Nick Chronis was good at the time of the creation of the bank‘s interest; but that such fact was not known to the bank before or аt the time its interest was created. As support for the judgment in the bank‘s favor the court applied the provision of
The State contends that error occurred in admitting the evidence objected to and that the judgment is not supported by the findings and conclusion.
Prior to 1933 there was no exception favorable to a lien claimant in the provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle when unlawfully used in the transportation or concealment of narcotics. (Stats. 1929, р. 380, § 15 at p. 388.) In 1933 section 15 was amended to except the lien claimant‘s interest from the forfeiture when there was proof of the prior reasonable investigation and other factors as required by the present code provisions.
It is conceded that there is no case holding that where no
In People v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 5 Cal.2d 188 [53 P.2d 970], a judgment for the lien claimant was reversed where there had been no investigation of the purchaser‘s moral character and reputation and the only inquiry was to ascertain whether he was employed. That case was relied on in People v. One Ford V8 Tudor Sedan, 12 Cal.App.2d 517 [55 P.2d 908], to reverse a judgment for the lien claimant where no investigation was made.
In People v. One Pontiac 8 Sedan, 22 Cal.App.2d 503 [71 P.2d 302], a judgment adverse to the lien claimant was affirmed where no investigation had been made. Thе court rejected the claimant‘s contention that it was not required to prove the investigation unless the State produced evidence that such an investigation would have developed knowledge of the intended illegal use. On the authority of the Harley-Davidson and other cases it was held that the Legislature placed upon the lien claimant the burden of proof as to the elements conjunctively enumerated in the statute; that in the absence of such proof the trial court properly found against it; that although forfeitures are not favored and statutes are strictly construed against them, the language leaves no room for construction and the court could not rewrite the clear provisions under the guise of construing them. In reliance on that reasoning the court in People v. One LaSalle Four Door Sedan, 23 Cal.App.2d 237 [72 P.2d 766], rejected a contention that the claimant was not required to prove an investigation in the absence of the State‘s production of evidenсe that by such reasonable investigation facts could have been discovered which would put a prudent person on inquiry as to the possible unlawful use of the automobile; and reversed the judgment for the claimant. (See, also, People v. One 1936 Pontiac 6 Four Door Sedan, 28 Cal.App.2d 410 [82 P.2d 706].) Again in People v. One 1939 Buick 8 Coupe, 43 Cal.App.2d 411 [110 P.2d 1013], where judgment for the lien claimant was reversed, it was held that the burden of proving the fact and the extent of the investigation was upon the lien claimant. It was said that because of the public interest in the character of the purchasers of automobiles the proof was insufficient where the investigation was no more than would have been done if the contract had been for the purchase of a piano or a refrigerator. That case, among others, was followed in People v. One 1937 Packard, 50 Cal.App.2d 761 [123 P.2d 900], where a judgment for the finance company was reversed because there had been no prior investigation of the purchaser‘s moral character and reputation. It was stated that the investigation of a prospective purchaser of an automobile was not alone for the protection of the investment of the seller or the institution financing the sale; that the Legislature had said in effect that the public also has an interest in the character of persons who may acquire automobiles; that the purpose of the law was to keep automobiles out of the possession of those who might use them for unlawful purposes and that this was one of the methods devised to aid in crime prevention.
In construing the statutory provisions a court is not authorized to insert qualifying provisions not included and may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language. The court is limited to the intention expressed. (Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 365-366 [5 P.2d 882]; People v. One 1941 Buick 8 Four Door Sedan, 63 Cal.App.2d 661, 667 [147 P.2d 401].)
The bank places reliance on such cases as People v. One 1937 Plymouth 6 4-Door Sedan, 37 Cal.App.2d 65 [98 P.2d 750] (see, also, People v. One 1941 Buick Sport Coupe, 28 Cal.2d 692 [171 P.2d 719]), where an exception is claimed to have been read into the statute. Accordingly it is argued that the court may likewise declare an exception dispensing with thе requirement for prior investigation and absolve the bank from the requirement where it later shows by undisputed evidence that at the time of the creation of the lien the purchaser had a good moral character and reputation.
The exception declared in the 1937 Plymouth case involved a violation of the Narcotics Act by the driver of a stolen vehicle. The State‘s forfeiture rights as against the owner were in question. It was held that forfeiture in such a case would be an arbitrary act of govеrnment in violation of the
To escape the application of the constitutional provision and to justify the forfeiture there must be some connection, either by agency, consent to operate or control the vehicle, or knowledge, nеgligence or connivance between the owner and the person committing the crime. (People v. One 1941 Buick Sport Coupe, supra, 28 Cal.2d 692, 695, and cases cited.) The argument that such a defense would open the way to collusion and perjury in an attempt to defeat forfeiture was answered by the observation that the problem was one to be resolved by the trial court‘s careful scrutiny of the evidence and the witnesses, to the end that there be no arbitrary invasion by the Legislature of constitutionally prоtected property rights.
There are no constitutional obstacles to the application of a provision for forfeiture of all the rights of an owner who has consented to the use of his automobile even though he had no knowledge of the unlawful use. (Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 [47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354]; People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, 26 Cal.2d 503 [159 P.2d 641]; People v. One 1933 Plymouth Sedan, 13 Cal.2d 565 [90 P.2d 799]; People v. One Ford V8 Tudor Sedan, supra, 12 Cal.App.2d 518.) The undisputed evidence here is that Nick the owner consented to Frank‘s use of the car. The bank‘s connection arises from its contractual relationship with the owner. The Legislature provided prior to 1933 that the bank‘s interest would be forfeited with that of the owner, probably on the theory that the contractual relationship made it subject to the regulation. The present statute removed the rigors of its predecessor by providing that the lien claimant may prevent a forfeiture of its interest by compliance with the statutory requirements. (People v. One 1941 Buick Club Coupe, 72 Cal.App.2d 593 [165 P.2d 44]; People v. One 1938 Ford Sedan (July 7, 1950), 98 Cal.App.2d 333 [219 P.2d 839].)
Since the investigation was not made, its interest is forfeited with that of the owner and the provision of
In this application of the present statute its express terms may not be nullified or defeated by a maxim or a fiction. (Lass v. Eliassen, 94 Cal.App. 175 [270 P. 745]; Moore Grocery Co. v. Los Angeles Nut House, 90 Cal.App. 792 [266 P. 583].) It is true that in dealing with contractual rights and in some
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority, nor can I agree with the reasoning upon which that conclusion is based.
Under
The trial court found that the respondent, the Bank of America, had an interest in the automobile which is thе subject of this proceeding at the time of its seizure; that the interest of the bank was bona fide and was created without any knowledge that the vehicle was to be used in violation of the narcotics laws; and that the bank did not make any investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner and purchaser of the automobile (Nick Chronis) before the bank‘s interest was acquired. The court also found, on substantial evidence, that the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner was good at the time of the creation of the bank‘s interest, but that such fact was not known to the legal owner (the bank) at that time. The court concluded that section 11620 of the Health & Safety Code is not applicable and that a reasonable investigation need not be shown by the legal owner since the
The issue, then, may be simply stated: Is the interest of the legal owner of an automobile, created bona fide and without knowledge that the vehicle was being, or was to be, used in violation of the narcotics laws, to be forfeited to the state where the legal owner failed to make an investigation as to the moral character of the registered owner but where such an investigation would have revealed that the latter did in fact have a good moral character? I am of the opinion that that question must be answered in the negative and that the judgment in favor of the bank should be affirmed.
There does not appear to be any decisions holding that the legal owner‘s interest is forfeited where a useless investigation is not made. The cases cited in the majority opinion (People v. One Pontiac 8 Sedan, 22 Cal.App.2d 503 [71 P.2d 302]; People v. One 1939 Buick 8 Coupe, 43 Cal.App.2d 411 [110 P.2d 1013]; People v. One 1936 Pontiac 6 Sedan, 28 Cal.App.2d 410 [82 P.2d 706]; People v. One LaSalle Sedan, 23 Cal.App.2d 237 [72 P.2d 766]) merely hold that the burden of proving the facts necessary to avoid a forfeiture rests upon the lien claimant. There is no question here as to the burden of proof. The facts claimed to establish the bank‘s right to maintain its interest as against the state have been proved (that is, that an investigation would have been an idle act) and the only remaining issue is the legal sufficiency оf those facts to avoid a forfeiture of the bank‘s interest. The decisions holding that the state need not establish that an investigation would have revealed information as to the intended use of the vehicle are not authority for the proposition accepted by the majority that proof by the lien claimant that an investigation would have been an idle act is not a defense to a forfeiture proceeding. Neither are the cases in point which declare the interest of the legal owner forfeited where the latter offered insufficient evidence or no evidence at all that a reasonable investigation was made or that such an investigation would have been useless. (As in People v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 5 Cal.2d 188 [53 P.2d 970]; People v. One 1938 Ford Sedan, 98 Cal.App.2d 333 [219 P.2d 839]; People v. One 1937 Packard 6 Sedan, 50 Cal.App.2d 761 [123 P.2d 900]; People v. One 1938 Buick Sedan, 39 Cal.App.2d 42 [102 P.2d 447]; People v. One Packard 6 Sedan, 26 Cal.App.2d 150 [79 P.2d 130]; People v. One Lincoln Eight, 12 Cal.App.2d 622 [55 P.2d 925]; People v. One Ford V8 Sedan, 12 Cal.App.2d 517 [55 P.2d 908].) In fact, in several of those cases it was apparent that an investigation would have disclosed the bad moral character and reputation of the registered owner. (People v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, supra, 5 Cal.2d 188, 189; People v. One 1938 Buick Sedan, supra, 39 Cal.App.2d 42, 50.)
In my opinion the trial court properly apрlied the maxim that the law does not require idle acts. That doctrine is not limited to matters dealing with contractual rights, but it has also been invoked in many cases involving questions of compliance with statutes and statutory construction in order to avoid absurd results. (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307, 339 [74 P.2d 761]; Voorhees v. Morse, 1 Cal.2d 179, 192 [34 P.2d 153]; Savings Bank of San Diego County v. Barrett, 126 Cal. 413 [58 P. 914]; Chapman v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.App.2d 186 [79 P.2d 128]; Arnaudo v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.2d 671 [67 P.2d 700]; Scott v. Superior Court, 125 Cal.App. 513 [14 P.2d 99]; Isleton Canning Co. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal.App. 687 [286 P. 447]; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Universal Elec. & Gas Co., 94 Cal.App. 343, 348 [271 P. 377]; Kistner v. Pomeroy, 84 Cal.App. 550 [258 P. 619]; People v. Putty, 64 Cal.App. 519 [222 P. 158]; Maionchi v. Nicholini, 1 Cal.App. 690 [82 P. 1052].) The majority opinion states that the “express terms (of the present statute) may not be nullified or defeated by a maxim or a fiction.” Yet it is conceded that the express terms of the statute have not been applied where the result would be to deprive the registered owner of his property without due process of law. Thus, a judgment decreeing forfeiture of the interests of both the registered and the legal owner was reversed in People v. One 1941 Buick Sport Coupe, 28 Cal.2d 692 [171 P.2d 719], where the registered owner, who was then in control of the automobile, had no knowledge that an occupant of the automobile was carrying narcotics. In that case the trial court had found that the legal owner had made no investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner before the conditional sale contract was executed and the appeal was on the judgment roll. Similarly, a judgment denying forfeiture was affirmed in People v. One 1937 Plymouth 6 Sedan, 37 Cal.App.2d 65
The majority opinion intimates that the legislative policy established by sections 11620 and 11622 of the Health and Safety Code is to withhold automobiles from use by narcotics law violators by inquiry on the part of sellers and mortgagees into the moral character of purchasers and mortgagors of automobiles and that the decision of the trial court would
The logical consequence of the majority opinion is that the interest of the legal owner will be lost in a forfeiture proceeding if the legal owner did not go through the motions of conducting a useless investigation, even though the legal owner knew that the moral character and reputation of the registered owner was good because of a personal acquaintance with the latter (see People v. One 1939 Plymouth 6 Coupe, 41 Cal.App.2d 559 [107 P.2d 266]) or by reason of information volunteered by a third person (see People v. One 1939 Buick Coupe, 56 Cal.App.2d 163 [132 P.2d 308]). I believe that such an unreasonable interpretation of the statute is neither necessary nor desirable.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.
Schauer, J., concurred.