THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS v. PAUL OLSSON
No. 2-14-0635
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
December 23, 2014
2014 IL App (2d) 140635-U
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 05-CF-3046. Honorable Christopher R. Stride, Judge, Presiding. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
¶ 1 Held: We declined to reverse the trial court‘s order following defendant‘s ninth hearing pursuant to section
¶ 2 Defendant, Paul Olsson, appeals from the order entered by the circuit court of Lake County on May 5, 2014, remanding him to the Department of Human Services (Department)
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 In 2005, defendant was charged with sex offenses involving children. In October 2007, he was found unfit to stand trial. In December 2009, at a discharge hearing, the trial court found defendant “not not guilty” of several of the charged offenses. The court ordered defendant‘s treatment extended to October 12, 2010. In September 2010, the State filed a motion to commit defendant to the Department pursuant to section
¶ 5 On May 5, 2014, the trial court conducted its ninth section
¶ 6 Dr. Malis was the only witness who testified. According to Dr. Malis, defendant was mentally ill in that he suffered from pedophilia. Dr. Malis explained that defendant met the clinical criteria for that diagnosis, because he had “multiple incidents of sexually inappropriate behaviors with children under the age of 12 that spanned more than a six-month period,” he was over 16 years old at the time, and his victims were more than five years younger than he was. Dr. Malis opined that defendant required inpatient hospitalized treatment, because he “continue[d] to be a danger due to his untreated pedophilia.” Dr. Malis said that the fact that
¶ 7 The court then questioned Dr. Malis regarding defendant‘s refusal to cooperate with the recommended treatment plan. Asked whether there was anything that could be done to encourage defendant to participate in sex offender treatment, Dr. Malis responded, “I mean if I thought of it I would have probably tried it.” Dr. Malis explained that there are treatment centers focused solely on sex offender treatment, but he did not believe that defendant was eligible to be treated at those facilities given that he has been remanded to the custody of the Department pursuant to section
¶ 8 Defense counsel‘s cross-examination of Dr. Malis focused on the decision to diagnose defendant based on the standards of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, Text Revision (DSM–IV–TR) rather than the DSM-V. Dr. Malis testified that he had “not reviewed all of the specifics of DSM-V as how [sic] they apply to sex offender evaluation and treatment.” He explained that “we have not adopted DSM-V yet,” but it was not clear from his testimony whether such change would be made at the state level or come from changes to the Medicare guidelines.
¶ 9 At the conclusion of the evidence, the State argued to the court: “We‘ve met our burden in this hearing. Based on the witness’ testimony that [defendant is] currently mentally ill specifically with pedophilia, * * * it‘s necessary ** for [defendant] to have hospitalized mental health treatment.” The State also argued that Dr. Malis’ testimony showed that defendant was “reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or others in the future if the
¶ 10 The court reviewed the treatment plan report dated May 5, 2014, submitted by Elgin Mental Health Center, in which the treatment team opined that defendant was making an effort to spend his time there rather than in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The court disagreed with that assessment, stating: “It‘s hard for this Court to look at that and say anybody that would raise their [sic] hand and say leave me in Elgin for up to 30 years is anything but mentally ill.” The court found that defendant “constitutes a serious threat to public safety” and remanded him to the Department for further treatment. The court‘s written order likewise indicates that the court found that defendant “constitutes a serious threat to the public safety.” Defendant timely appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 As an initial matter, the State urges us to dismiss the appeal as moot, arguing that the 180 day time period following the May 5, 2014, order has passed. “An appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Merrilee M., 409 Ill. App. 3d 983, 984 (2011). We disagree that we cannot grant effectual relief to defendant. In Olsson, 2012 IL App (2d) 110856, we held that it was error for the trial court to proceed without treatment plan reports that complied with the statute, and we remanded for a new hearing pursuant to section
¶ 13 The State also argues that defendant forfeited his right to argue on appeal that the trial court made improper findings by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. In this case, any objection to the court‘s findings could only have been made in a motion to reconsider the judgment. In People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 472 (2006), our supreme court held that discharge hearings pursuant to section
¶ 14 We now turn to the merits of the case. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to specifically find that the State proved that he was subject to admission under the
¶ 15 In response, the State argues that, taken in context, the trial court‘s comments indicate that it actually found defendant to be subject to involuntary admission under the Mental Health Code, not merely a threat to the public safety. This case requires us to interpret the language of section
¶ 16 We reject defendant‘s argument. Both defendant and the State focus on the incorrect portion of section
¶ 17 As previously noted, several years ago, defendant was remanded to the Department pursuant to section
¶ 18 The problem is further compounded by the fact that the trial court‘s written order more closely resembles an initial commitment order under section
¶ 19 Nevertheless, it is clear that the trial court had in mind that defendant was “in need of mental health services in the form of inpatient care” within the meaning of section
¶ 20 The uncontested evidence at the May 5, 2014, hearing showed that defendant is: mentally ill in that he suffers from pedophilia; non-compliant with his treatment plan; likely to inflict harm upon others if he were to be released; and in need of inpatient hospitalized treatment. In its argument to the trial court, the State similarly urged that defendant was “currently mentally ill specifically with pedophilia,” that he needed “hospitalized mental health treatment,” and that he was “reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or others in the future if the Court releases him.” Defendant did not dispute in the trial court—and he does not dispute now—that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that he is “in need of mental health services in the form of inpatient care” as that term is used in section
¶ 21 Going forward, we urge the trial court to ensure that its oral and written findings at section
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 24 Affirmed.