Dеfendant appeals his conviction of breaking and entering an occupied building, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305. A jury trial took place before Detroit Recorder’s Court Judge Kaye Tertzag in December, 1987. On December 30, 1987, defendant was sentenced to two yeаrs six months to ten years imprisonment. This Court granted defendant’s application for delayed appeal on January 10, 1989. On appeal, defendant raises three issues. First, defendant argues that prejudicial error occurred when the prosecutor violated the trial court’s order in limine prohibiting evidence that the car involved was stolen. We agree and reverse defendant’s conviction. Second, defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed becausе the prosecutor did not render reasonable assistance to locate and produce a witness. We disagree. Third, defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated. We disagree.
At approximately 5:00 a.m. on May 23, 1987, Livonia Police Officers Michael Burke and Terrence Webb were on routine patrol when they observed a moving car in the parking lot of the *42 Wine Palace Party Store. The officers became suspicious and followed the car. A whitе male with dark hair and a white female with long hair were in the front seat of the car. At that time, the officers received information over the police radio that the alarm at the Wine Palace Party Store had sounded.
As the poliсe followed the car, it accelerated up to sixty miles per hour and the officers lost sight of the vehicle. The officers subsequently located the car, which had crashed into a chain link fence. It was unoccupied. One hundred fifty-еight unopened cigarette packs, some lighters and a female’s purse were inside the car. Officer Webb searched the area and found defendant and a female companion, Theresa Simpson, in a wooded lot about a block away from the car. According to Officer Webb, defendant and Simpson were kneeling down on all fours with their heads down, as if hiding. Officer Webb arrested defendant and Simpson. Defendant’s fingerprints were found on the exterior left mirror of the сar.
The owner of the Wine Palace Party Store testified that cigarettes and cigarette lighters were missing from the store after the robbery.
Defendant denied breaking into the Wine Palace Party Store. Defendant claimed that he had fallen asleep in the back seat of the car and that Theresa Simpson woke him and told him to run because they were being chased.
Prior to trial, Judge Sharon Tevis Finch granted defendant’s motion in limine to suppress evidence that the cаr was stolen. At trial before Judge Tertzag, the prosecutor asked Officer Burke if he received any information relative to the license plate, and Burke answered: "The plate came back as being stolen.” Defendant objeсted and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied defendant’s *43 motion on the ground that, although the pretrial order prohibited any evidence that the car was stolen, it did not prohibit reference to a stolen license plate.
On aрpeal, defendant contends that the prosecutor violated the trial court’s order by deliberately eliciting testimony that the license plate was stolen. Defendant argues here, as below, that a reference to the stolen license plate was not different than a prohibited reference to a stolen car. We agree.
The role of a prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.
People v Wallace,
The order granting defendant’s motion in limine was broad enough to prohibit introduction of evidence that the license plate was stolen. Evidence that the car was stolen was excluded on the ground that it was prejudicial. Evidence that the car’s license plate was stolen is similarly prejudicial. The jury could infer from either piece of evidence that defendant was involved in an additional theft act. The evidenсe added nothing to the case except to suggest that defendant was a bad man. The prosecutor’s question was clearly designed to elicit the information that the license plate was stolen. Furthermore, the information that the car was stolen was revealed and repeated three times by Officer Burke during cross-examination in response to questions asking why a police report had been written. Defense counsel’s request that the answers be stricken as nonrеsponsive was denied.
Although Judge Tertzag issued a cautionary instruction, it is unlikely that the jury could have *44 disregarded the evidence. The prejudicial effect could not be overcome by the cautionary instruction. Hence, the repeated admission of evidence that the car and the car’s license plate were stolen constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal.
Under his second issue, defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor did not render reasonable assistance to locate and produce a witness.
Defendant’s motion for assistance to locate and serve process upon Theresa Simpson was granted on November 16, 1987. Thе trial court denied defendant’s motion for mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor’s failure to produce Simpson at trial.
Defendant incorrectly asserts that Simpson was not a res gestae witness. A res gestae witness is a person who witnesses some event in the continuum of a criminal transaction and whose testimony will aid in developing a full disclosure of the facts.
People v Calhoun,
At the hearing on this matter, the investigating officer testified that he was not notified by the prosecutor to give defendant assistance in locating Simpson. Therefore, the prosecutor did not provide reasonable assistance to defendant in locating Simpson. The relevant inquiry is whether the prosecutor’s failure to render assistance in obtaining Simpson prejudiced defendant. In the present *45 case, we conclude that thе prosecutor’s failure to assist did not prejudice defendant.
Under the former res gestae statute, a prosecutor was required to endorse and produce all res gestae witnesses.
Baskin, supra,
p 531. An exception to the production requirement existed when the res gestae witness was an accomplice.
People v Jerry Smith,
Defendant’s final claim is that he was deprived of a speedy trial beсause he remained in custody longer than the six-month period provided in MCR 6.109. 1 Defendant remained in custody from his arrest on May 23, 1987, until trial commenced on December 8, 1987. A hearing on defendant’s motion for release on personal bond was held on November 19, 1987. The trial court denied the motion. An order was entered on November 23, 1987.
Initially, we note that defendant appears to confuse the right to a speedy trial with the right to pretrial release under MCR 6.109. Violation of the right to a spеedy trial can result in dismissal, whereas the court rule provides for release on personal recognizance pending trial and does not result in dismissal of the charges._
*46 MCR 6.109(B) provided in part:
In a felony case in which the defendant has been incarcerated for a period of 6 months or more to answer for the same crime or a crime based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or in a misdemeanor case in which the defendant has been incarсerated for a period of 28 days or more . . . , the defendant must be released on his or her own recognizance. In computing the 28-day and 6-month periods, the following rules apply:
(1) The period of delay is excluded that results from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on competency and the period in which he or she is not competent to stand trial; hearings on pretrial motions; interlocutory appeals; and trial of other charges.
(2) The period of delay is excluded that results from an adjournment granted at the request or •with the consent of the defense attorney, when concurred in on the record by the defendant, after he or she hаs been advised by the court of his or her right to a speedy trial and the effect of concurrence.
(5) Other periods of delay for good cause within the discretion of the court are excluded. Docket congestion is not good сause for delay.
Originally, a calendar conference was held on July 10, 1987, and a trial was scheduled for September 28, 1987. However, on September 4, 1987, defendant brought four motions before Judge Finch. At that conference, the trial was postрoned to March 8, 1988. On October 29, 1987, a hearing on a motion for bond reduction was held. Subsequently, on November 12, 1987, trial was moved forward to December 8, 1987. The six-month pe *47 riod expired on November 23, 1987. Therefore, the trial was scheduled for fifteen days beyond the six-month period of MCR 6.109.
At the motion hearing on November 19, 1987, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to be released on personal recognizance. The trial court indicated defendant had a past history of prison escapes and it was not going to release him in light of the criminal history and the nearness of the trial.
To the extent that defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for release on personal bond, defendant’s argument is without merit. In light of the reasons for the delay, the trial court did not err by refusing to release defendant on his own recognizance. The delay was short, there was no evidence that the prosecutor acted in a manner to delay the proceedings and the delay was occasioned by defendant’s attempts to assert his own rights.
To the extent that defendant argues his right to a speedy trial was violated because he was held in custody longer than the six-month period provided in MCR 6.109, defendant’s argumеnt is without merit. A delay of six months is necessary to trigger further investigation when a defendant raises a speedy trial issue.
People v
Holland,
Where the delay is under eighteen months, the defendant must prove prejudice.
People v Collins,
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
MCR 6.109, while in effect at all times relevant here, was deleted from the Michigan Court Rules effective October 1, 1989.