PEOPLE v NUNLEY
Docket No. 144036
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided July 12, 2012
491 MICH 686
Argued April 4, 2012 (Calendar No. 5). Certiorari denied, 568 US ____; 133 S Ct 667.
In an opinion by Justice ZAHRA, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices CAVANAGH, MARILYN KELLY, MARKMAN, and MARY BETH KELLY, the Supreme Court held:
The certificate of mailing was not testimonial because the circumstances under which it was generated would not lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the certificate would be available for use at a later trial given that it was generated before the commission of any crime and that its creation was a function of the legislatively authorized administrative role of the
- Both the Michigan and United States Constitutions provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her. One of the core protections of the Confrontation Clause concerns hearsay evidence that is testimonial in nature. Thus, out-of-court testimonial statements are inadmissible unless the declarant appears at trial or the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
- The prosecution in this case moved for the admission of the certificate of mailing without accompanying witness testimony in order to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the certificate: that defendant had been sent notice regarding the revocation of his driver‘s license by first-class United States mail as provided in
MCL 257.212 . Thus, the certificate would constitute substantive hearsay to prove the notice element of DWLS. However, the certificate of mailing was not necessarily akin to the types of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions, that the United States Supreme Court has said are included in the core class of testimonial statements. Rather, the circumstances under which it was generated showed that the certificate of mailing was a business record created primarily for an administrative reason rather than a testimonial affidavit or other record created for a prosecutorial or investigative reason. The certificate was a routine, objective cataloging of an unambiguous factual matter, documenting that the Secretary of State‘s office had undertaken its statutorily authorized bureaucratic duty to notify defendant that his driver‘s license had been revoked. Most significantly, the certificate of mailing was created before the commission of any crime that it might later have been used to help prove. Thus, it was not created under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that it would be available for use at a later trial; at the time the certificate was created, there was no expectation that defendant would violate the law by driving with a revoked driver‘s license and, therefore, no indication that a later trial would occur. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise. The certificate of mailing was nontestimonial and could be admitted into evidence absent accompanying witness testimony without violating the Confrontation Clause.
Reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Justice HATHAWAY concurred in the result only.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — EVIDENCE — RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION — TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS. Both the Michigan and United States Constitutions provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her; the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement violates the defendant‘s right to confront the witnesses against him or her unless the declarant appears at trial or the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (
US Const, Am VI ;Const 1963, art 1, § 20 ).- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — EVIDENCE — RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION — TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS — NOTICE OF SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF DRIVER‘S LICENSES — CERTIFICATES OF MAILING.
A certificate of mailing, which is the document certifying that the Secretary of State mailed a person notice that his or her driver‘s license was suspended or revoked, is not testimonial in nature and may be admitted into evidence absent accompanying witness testimony without violating the Confrontation Clause (
US Const, Am VI ;Const 1963, art 1, § 20 ;MCL 257.212 ,MCL 257.904[1] ). - CRIMINAL LAW — DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED OR REVOKED — ELEMENTS.
The elements of driving with a suspended or revoked license are (1) that the defendant‘s license was suspended or revoked, (2) that the defendant was notified of the suspension or revocation as provided in
MCL 257.212 , and (3) that the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway while his or her license was suspended or revoked (MCL 257.904[1] ).
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark Kneisel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
James E. R. Fifelski for defendant.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Richard A. Bandstra, Chief Legal Counsel, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, and Erik A. Graney, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.
Kym L. Worthy and Timothy A. Baughman for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
ZAHRA, J. The issue in this case is whether a Michigan Department of State (DOS)1 certificate of mailing is testimonial in nature and thus that its admission, without accompanying witness testimony, violates the Confrontation Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The DOS generated the certificate of mailing to certify that it had mailed a notice of driver suspension to a group of suspended drivers. The prosecution seeks to introduce this certificate to prove the notice element of the charged crime, driving while license revoked or suspended (DWLS), second offense,
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 11, 2009, the DOS issued an “ORDER OF ACTION” pursuant to
I CERTIFY THAT I AM EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER AND THAT ON THIS DATE NOTICE OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER OF SUSPENSION OR RESTRICTED LICENSE WAS GIVEN TO EACH OF THE PERSONS NAMED BELOW BY FIRST-CLASS UNITED STATES MAIL AT LANSING, MICHIGAN AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 212 OF MICHIGAN VEHICLE CODE (
MCL 257.212 ).DATE 6-22-09 OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE F. BUETER
[handwritten] [typed]
Before trial, the prosecution moved in limine to admit the certificate of mailing as proof that defendant had received notice that his license had been revoked — even though the certificate did not contain the actual signature of the employee listed on it — without producing the employee listed on the certificate or another DOS employee as a witness. Defendant objected that the admission of the certificate of mailing under those circumstances would deny him his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, § 20 of the Michigan Constitution. The district court denied the prosecution‘s motion, holding that the nature of the certificate required a signature in order to be sufficient to support notice for a DWLS charge and that to admit the certificate without testimony would violate defendant‘s right to confront the witnesses against him because there was no other reason to use the document except in litigation.
The prosecution sought leave to appeal in the circuit court, which, in a written opinion, affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court‘s order. The circuit
[T]he [certificate] is not a multipurpose record or one kept by an agency for its own purposes (that are not principally litigation). The statute that mandates the sending of the Certificate of Notice is the statute that defines the criminal offense with which defendant is charged. There has been no showing that the Certificate is used for anything other than proof of the notice element of DWLS. The People effectively admit this when they describe the twofold purpose of the Certificate: “one to state that notice was given to the defendant, and two, to show the defendant‘s license was suspended.” Unlike the “narrowly circumscribed” class of documents such as “a clerk‘s certificate authenticating an official record — or a copy thereof — for use as evidence,” ... this is not a certificate that the document at issue is an accurate copy of [a] public record....
The legislature apparently intended that the certificate of notice serve as documentary evidence.... That the legislature intended it that way does not mean it does not violate the confrontation clause — in fact, as in Melendez-Diaz [v Massachusetts],3 that circumstance simply establishes that the declaration is, indeed, testimonial.
The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution‘s interlocutory application for leave to appeal.4 In a split, authored decision, the Court of Appeals majority affirmed the lower courts’ rulings that the testimonial nature of the certificate meant that its admission would
The majority rejected the prosecution‘s argument that the certificate was merely a clerk‘s certification of a record, stating that “[t]he critical distinction is that the author of the certificate of mailing, here F. Bueter, is providing more than mere authentication of documents; he is actually attesting to a required element of the charge.”9 The majority also rejected the prosecution‘s argument that the certificate was not created solely for litigation regardless of whether it could be considered a business record because no statute required maintenance of the certificate and “the [prosecution] concede[d] that one purpose of the certificate of mailing is ‘the production of evidence for use at trial....’ ”10
While the majority is certainly correct that the certificate of mailing is an essential piece of evidence in proving defendant‘s guilt, it does not follow that this renders the certificate testimonial. As noted, the majority‘s analysis also ignores the context in which the evidence is made. At the time the certificate of mailing was created, no crime had taken place, nor was there an ongoing criminal investigation involving the defendant. Therefore, it was impossible for F. Bueter, or an “objective witness,” “reasonably to believe” that the certificate of mailing, at the time of its creation, “would be available for use at a later trial.” Crawford [v Washington], 541 US 36, 52; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004) (citation and quotation marks eliminated).
... It strains credulity to suggest that the certificate was “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” because Nunley had not committed a crime, and F. Bueter, when he certified the mailing, had no reason to expect that Nunley would commit a crime. Crawford, 541 US at 52. Bueter, or any other state employees who create certificates of mailing, “cannot be considered witnesses” against Nunley “when no prosecution existed at the time of data entry.” [State v] Shipley, 757 NW2d [228, 237 (Iowa, 2008)]. Bueter would likely have suspected that the certificate of mailing was just that: a certificate of notice, certifying a warning to encourage defendant to comply with the law, not a piece of evidence for use in a hypothetical trial. As such, the certificate of mailing was “created under conditions far removed from the inquisitorial investigative function — the primary evil that Crawford was designed to avoid.” Id.
The prosecution filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. The Attorney General moved to intervene and for immediate consideration, as well as to stay the effect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion and enlarge the record on appeal.
With respect to the motion to enlarge the record, which we ultimately granted, the Attorney General sought to introduce the affidavit of the DOS Driver and Vehicle Records Division Director, Fred Bueter, whose name, “F. Bueter,” was printed on the certificate of mailing concerning defendant. In his affidavit, Bueter describes his duties — including ensuring the integrity of motor vehicle records — and facts related to the creation of certificates of mailing. Bueter averred that the DOS sends out numerous types of notices in compliance with
We granted the Attorney General‘s motions for immediate consideration, to intervene, and to stay the precedential effect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion.14 Subsequently, we granted the application for leave to appeal, directing the parties to address
whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the Department of State certificate of mailing is testimonial in nature and thus that its admission, without accompanying witness testimony, would violate the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US 305; 129 S Ct 2527; 174 L Ed 2d 314 (2009); and Bullcoming v New Mexico, 564 US 647; 131 S Ct 2705; 180 L Ed 2d 610 (2011).15
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the admission of certificates of mailing would violate a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right of
III. ANALYSIS
A. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him....” 17 The state of Michigan has at all times “afforded a criminal defendant the right to ‘be confronted with the witnesses against him,’ [by] adopting this language of the federal Confrontation Clause verbatim in every one of our state constitutions.”18
The Confrontation Clause is “primarily a functional right” in which the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is aimed at truth-seeking and promoting reliability in criminal trials.19 Functioning in this manner, “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”20
The specific protections the Confrontation Clause provides apply “only to statements used as substantive evidence.”21 In particular, one of the core protections of the Confrontation Clause concerns hearsay evidence
Addressing what constitutes a testimonial statement, the United States Supreme Court explained in Crawford that “testimony” is a ” ‘solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”24 The Court refrained from giving one particular definition of what evidence will constitute a “testimonial statement,” but did provide the following guidance:
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: ”ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” “extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial[.]” These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the [Confrontation] Clause‘s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise articulation,
In the case at hand, the prosecution moved for the admission of the certificate of mailing without accompanying witness testimony in order to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein: that defendant was sent notice regarding the revocation of his driver‘s license by first-class United States mail as provided in
In Davis v Washington, the United States Supreme Court considered whether statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are testimonial.28 The Court recognized that Crawford had identified ” ‘[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations’ ” as among the
[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.30
One of the circumstances the Court examined when making this objective determination in Davis was the formality of the statement.31 Ultimately, the Court ruled that the declarant‘s statements identifying her assailant during a 911 call were not testimonial.32 However, in the companion case of Hammon v Indiana,33 the Court ruled that the Hammon declarant‘s statements in response to police questioning at the crime scene were testimonial.34
In Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court considered whether “certificates of analysis” were testimonial when they reported the results of a forensic analysis showing that material seized by the police and connected to the defendant was cocaine.35 The Court
In addition, the Court reasoned that the certificates were “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” given that “under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the [certificates] was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance.”39 Further, “the analysts were aware of the [certificates‘] evidentiary purpose, since that purpose — as stated in the relevant state-law provision — was reprinted on the [certificates] themselves.”40
In Bullcoming v New Mexico, the United States Supreme Court considered whether “the Confrontation
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion in Williams v Illinois that addressed whether portions of the expert testimony from a forensic specialist violated the defendant‘s right of confrontation.45 Specifically, the expert witness testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside labora-
The lead opinion concluded that the expert‘s testimony concerning the outside laboratory did not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause for two reasons.48 First, the out-of-court statements were related by the expert only for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which the expert‘s opinion relied. They were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.49 Second, even if the report that the outside laboratory produced had been admitted into evidence, it was not a testimonial document.50
With respect to the second reason, the lead opinion emphasized that the report “was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual,” which distinguished the report from the evidence at issue in Crawford and its progeny.51 Rather, the lead opinion reasoned that, viewed objectively, the primary purpose of the report was to catch the perpetrator who was still at large and that no one at the outside laboratory could have known that the DNA profile would implicate the defendant.52 Thus, the lead opinion viewed the report as “very different from the sort of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits, depositions,
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas disagreed with the lead opinion‘s two rationales.54 He nonetheless agreed that the challenged testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the report “lacked the requisite ‘formality and solemnity’ to be considered ‘testimonial‘....” 55 The dissenting opinion expressed agreement with Justice Thomas that the statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted.56 The dissent, however, concluded that the out-of-court statements were indeed testimonial under Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, noting that although it is relevant to inquire whether the primary purpose of the statement was to establish “past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” Crawford and its progeny do not suggest that “the statement must be meant to accuse a previously identified individual[.]”57
Lastly, in Fackelman, we considered whether evidence from a psychiatrist‘s report violated the defendant‘s right of confrontation.58 This Court concluded that the evidence from the report fell within the core class of testimonial statements that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.59 This Court reasoned that the report memorialized the “defendant‘s medical history and the events that led to his admittance to the hospital, provided the all-important diagnosis, and outlined a
(1) defendant‘s admittance to the hospital was arranged by lawyers, (2) defendant was arrested en route to the hospital, (3) the report noted that the Monroe County Sheriff requested notification before defendant‘s discharge, (4) defendant referred to a trial and to a gun in his responses related in the report, and, perhaps most significantly, (5) at its very beginning and ending, in which its overall context is most clearly identified, the report expressly focused on defendant‘s alleged crime and the charges pending against him.62
Accordingly, this Court concluded that the admission into evidence of the psychiatrist‘s diagnosis — an out-of-court, testimonial statement offered for its truth — violated the defendant‘s constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.63
B. APPLICATION
The Court of Appeals majority relied largely on Melendez-Diaz to conclude that the certificate of mailing was testimonial in nature. In so doing, the majority stated that the “sole purpose of the preparation of the certificate of mailing was to provide proof of notice as required by
To begin, we do not believe that the certificate of mailing here is necessarily akin to the types of extrajudicial statements—such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions—that Crawford included in the core class of testimonial statements.66 The certificate of mailing memorializes that the DOS on a particular date sent the “Order of Action” to defendant by first-class United States mail, notifying him that his driver‘s license had been revoked. Thus, like an affidavit, it certifies a fact in question.67 However, this fact alone does not render the certificate a formal affidavit that is necessarily testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
Instead, we believe that the circumstances under which the certificate was generated show that it is a nontestimonial business record created primarily for an administrative reason rather than a testimonial affidavit or other record created for a prosecutorial or investigative reason. As set forth earlier in this opinion, under Crawford and its progeny, courts must consider the circumstances under which the evidence in question came about to determine whether it is testimonial.68
Perhaps most significant to this analysis is the fact that the DOS certificates of mailing are necessarily created before the commission of any crime that they may later be used to help prove. This is because receipt of notice is an element of the crime of DWLS, and the certificate of mailing is created contemporaneously with the notice itself. Accordingly, a person, even one whose license has been suspended, cannot legally commit the crime of DWLS before he or she receives notice. Given this significant distinguishing fact and the relevant statutes, we conclude that the certificates of mailing are a result of the legislatively authorized administrative function of the DOS, which is independent of any investigatory or prosecutorial purpose.
Instead, just as all statements made in response to police interrogations are not de facto testimonial, see Davis, 547 US at 822, not all documents akin to affidavits are de facto testimonial, see, e.g., Williams, 567 US at __; 132 S Ct at 2242-2244 (opinion by Alito, J.); id. at __; 132 S Ct at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring) (a majority of the Court concluding that a lab technician‘s report producing a person‘s DNA profile was not testimonial given the circumstances in which the report was created and its lack of formality). Further, even if the certificate constitutes a business record, when such a document is “prepared specifically for use at... trial,” it is generally testimonial and subject to confrontation. Melendez-Diaz, 557 US at 324.
If the secretary of state is authorized or required to give notice under this act or other law regulating the operation of a vehicle, unless a different method of giving notice is otherwise expressly prescribed, notice shall be given either by personal delivery to the person to be notified or by first-class United States mail....
Once the DOS sent defendant the required notice regarding the revocation of his license,
Accordingly, because the certificate of mailing was necessarily generated before the charged crime could be committed, it was not made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that it would be available for use at a later trial. At the time the certificate was created, there was no expectation that defendant would violate the law by driving with a revoked driver‘s license and therefore no indication that a later trial would even occur. Thus, the Court of Appeals majority wrongly assumed that “the certificate of mailing is testimonial because it will be used for the purpose of proving or establishing some fact at trial.”72 Instead, as Judge SAAD noted in his dissent, it does not follow that simply because a statement relates to an element of the crime it must be testimonial.73
Unlike Crawford or its progeny, the evidence at issue in this case was not prepared as a result of a criminal investigation or created after the commission of the crime. Rather, the DOS generates certificates of mailing contemporaneously with the notices that are mailed to drivers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked. Again, under no circumstances could the drivers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked be charged with DWLS before having received the notice of the suspension or revocation. In our view, the distinction
Caselaw from the other two states that have reviewed this precise question provides additional support for our conclusion that the certification of mailing at issue is not testimonial. In State v. Murphy, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered a certificate-notice system, seemingly identical to the one our DOS uses, in which notice was also a necessary element of the charge of operating while the person‘s license was suspended or revoked under the laws of Maine.78 Examining Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, the court stated that “[r]ead expansively, Melendez-Diaz might be construed as requiring us to conclude that [the certificate] is testimonial . . . , [but] we are not persuaded to embrace that construction.”79 The court set forth several reasons for its holding. First, the court stated that the facts in Melendez-Diaz did not involve the type of certificate at issue in Murphy and, thus, Melendez-Diaz did not control the outcome.80 Second, the court reasoned that unlike the certificates of analysis in Melendez-Diaz, which “substituted for live, in-court expert testimony prepared in an effort to secure the defendant‘s criminal conviction,” the certificates at issue in Murphy did “not involve expert analysis or opinion.”81 Instead, the certificates merely reported neutral information from the Maine Secretary of State, who was charged with the custody of that information.82 Moreover, the certificates did not “contain ‘testimony’ of the Secretary of State‘s personal knowledge that the required notice of suspension was mailed; rather, the certificate attests to his or
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also ruled on this issue in Commonwealth v. Parenteau.86 In Parenteau, the request by the police or the prosecution for the certificates attesting to the mailing of the notice at issue occurred after defendant had committed the crime.87 On those facts, the court held that “the certificate was created exclusively for trial so the Commonwealth could prove a fact necessary to convict him” and thus it was testimonial.88 The court, however, stated that like the notice itself, if the certificate had been created at the time that the notice was sent, it would have been a business record and thus nontestimonial, reasoning:
[T]here is no evidence of the existence of a contemporaneous business record showing that the notice was mailed
on that date. If such a record had been created at the time the notice was mailed and preserved by the registry as part of the administration of its regular business affairs, then it would have been admissible at trial. That would have been the correct procedure for the admission of a business record from the registry. . . . [However, the actual certificate used here] was not created as part of the administration of the registry‘s regular business affairs, but for the purpose of establishing an essential fact at trial. Accordingly, the registry certificate did not constitute a nontestimonial business record.89
Both Murphy and Parenteau provide support for our conclusion that the certificate of mailing here is not testimonial. Significant in both cases were the circumstances under which the certificates were created. The timing of the certificates’ creation, who requested that creation or how they were generated, and the information therein all informed the decisions in those cases. In Murphy, the circumstances showed that the creation of the certificate was for purposes other than prosecution, while in Parenteau, the creation of the certificate was made at the request of law enforcement after the crime had been committed. In the instant case, the certificate of mailing was necessarily created before the crime was committed as part of the legislatively permitted administrative function of the DOS and was akin to the neutral records largely maintained as a part of a bureaucratic purpose in Murphy. Thus, the certificate of mailing here is like the hypothetical business record contemplated in Parenteau, but the opposite of the actual certificate at issue in Parenteau, which “was not created as part of the administration of the registry‘s regular business affairs, but for the purpose of establishing an essential fact at trial.”90
We are persuaded that a warrant of deportation does not implicate adversarial concerns in the same way or to the same degree as testimonial evidence. A warrant of deportation is recorded routinely and not in preparation for a criminal trial. It records facts about where, when, and how a deportee left the country. Because a warrant of deportation does not raise the concerns regarding testimonial evidence stated in Crawford, we conclude that a warrant of deportation is non-testimonial and therefore is not subject to confrontation.93
This conclusion is representative of the manner in which the United States Courts of Appeals for other circuits have reasoned.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the certificate of mailing at issue is not testimonial, its admission into evidence without accompanying testimony will not violate the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
YOUNG, C.J., and CAVANAGH, MARILYN KELLY, MARKMAN, and MARY BETH KELLY, JJ., concurred with ZAHRA, J.
HATHAWAY, J., concurred in the result only.
Notes
A person whose operator‘s or chauffeur‘s license or registration certificate has been suspended or revoked and who has been notified as provided in [
MCL 257.212 ] of that suspension or revocation, whose application for license has been denied, or who has never applied for a license, shall not operate a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of motor vehicles, within this state.