delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Gilbert R. Nuccio, appeals from a conviction of domestic battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12—3.2(a)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/12—3.2(a)(1) (West 1992))). He argues that he did not understanding^ waive his right to a jury trial in open court and that his conviction is "against the manifest weight of the evidence.” We reverse and remand.
The defendant was charged with domestic battery after a September 13, 1992, altercation with Patricia Nuccio. He was convicted in a bench trial February 16, 1993, and was subsequently sentenced to one year of court supervision. He was also ordered to attend a domestic violence program.
On appeal, the defendant first asserts that he did not understandingly waive his right to a jury trial in open court. He bases his argument on section 103 — 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), which requires that a jury trial be understandingly waived in open court. 725 ILCS 5/103—6 (West 1992).
The defendant notes that although his counsel requested a bench trial November 16, 1992, he was not present in court on that date and that he had previously demanded a jury trial. The only reference to a bench trial, in the defendant’s presence, was when the trial court stated that the case was set for bench trial. The prosecutor responded ready and began discussing witness notification letters. Neither the defendant, nor his defense counsel, responded ready or objected to proceeding with the bench trial. The defendant argues that he cannot be held to have acquiesced in his counsel’s waiver made outside his presence (see People v. Clauson (1989),
We agree that the defendant’s jury waiver was defective but instead base this determination on section 115 — 1 of the Code, as amended, effective January 1, 1992. (725 ILCS 5/115—1 (West 1992).) Section 115 — 1 requires a written waiver of the right to a jury trial. (725 ILCS 5/115—1 (West 1992).) The record on appeal does not contain a written jury waiver executed by the defendant.
Both section 103 — 6 and section 115 — 1 address a defendant’s right to a jury trial and a defendant’s waiver of that right. When both a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision exist qnd relate to the same subject, either in the same or in a differeht act, the specific statutory provision controls and should be applied. (People v. Villarreal (1992),
The defendant’s second argument is that the verdict is "against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Under the mandate of People v. Taylor (1979),
In raising this argument, the defendant refers to a general, usually civil, standard for reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. For all criminal cases, the correct standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is the reasonable doubt test. (People v. Sanchez (1990),
The defendant argues that Mrs. Nuccio’s testimony was impeached and that she was evasive, illogical, and hostile while testifying. He points out that his own testimony, as well as the testimony of his witness, Officer Kolodziej, was unimpeached. At trial, Mrs. Nuccio testified that the defendant screamed and swore at her and that he grabbed her arms, threw her up against the wall, and threatened her life several times. The defendant denied touching or threatening Mrs. Nuccio. Officer Kolodziej testified that when he arrived Mrs. Nuccio was the one screaming and yelling. He also testified that he saw Mrs. Nuccio sitting on the defendant’s back.
Matters of conflict in the testimony as well as questions of the credibility of the witnesses are for the trier of fact to resolve. (People v. Irby (1992),
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
WOODWARD and QUETSCH, JJ„ concur.