3 N.Y.S. 401 | New York Circuit Court | 1889
The questions to be decided in this case are, whether the acts complained of are corporate acts, and if so, whether such corporate acta are grounds of forfeiture, within section 1798 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The people rest their case primarily upon the second and fifth subdivisions of this section, claiming, under the second subdivision, that the defendant has “become liable to be dissolved by the abuse of its powers, ” and under the fifth that it has exercised privileges or franchises not conferred upon it by law. The act complained of in this connection is the defendant’s participation in a combination between the owners of certain sugar refineries. The combination comprises all the sugar refineries in this state, and, with a few exceptions, in the United States. This vast combination is denounced by the people as a public menace, as preventive of competition, and as tending to control prices and create a monopoly. It is defended by the corporation as the mere individual acts of its stockholders, in nowise binding upon it, and at all events as a harmless association, constituting nothing more serious than an unusually large partnership; in other words, a lawful blending of individual interests in a joint arrangement for mutual protection and benefit.
The first question, then, to be considered, is whether the corporation, as such, has entered into this combination; for, if it has not, clearly it cannot be
The board is authorized to make by-laws, to appoint from its members a president, vice-president, treasurer, and committees, and to prescribe their duties and powers. The board is thus clothed with a power co-extensive with the specified objects of the agreement, as applied to the business of each refinery; and it may confer the executive working of that power upon a president or vice-president. Having thus formed the trust, named the trustees, and specified their powers, the deed proceeds to indicate the persons for whom the trust is created, and the duties of the trustees with regard to such persons. The cestuis que trustent are, of course, the entire body of stockholders of the aggregated corporations. It will be observed that these stockholders do not sell a single share of their stock; yet they transfer the entire block to 11 gentlemen, who are thereafter to stand in their shoes. They would naturally look for some acknowledgment from their trustees of the receipt of their shares, and of the obligations which the trust imposes. The deed proceeds to furnish this in the shape of what are termed “trust certificates. ” These certifi
Upon the acceptance of the trust certificates the original corporate shareholder ceases to bold any further relations with his particular corporation, and thenceforward he is treated as a shareholder in the trust board. He can no longer receive a dividend from his particular corporation, nor, indeed, can the latter ever again declare a dividend. Each corporation is thereafter bound by a special provision in the deed to pay over the profits arising from its business to the trust board. Ho discretion on that head is left in the directors of the various corporations. They cannot use any part of such profits for betterments or improved machinery or increased capacity,—certainly not without the consent of the trust board,—but must pay over all the profits directly to the trustees; nor can even the latter declare a dividend upon the trust certificates allotted to the shareholders of any one corporation, payable out of the profits received from any such corporation. On the contrary, their duty is to blend all the profits received from all the corporations into one grand mass, and from that aggregation of profits declare such dividends as they, in their judgment, deem appropriate, to be proportionately distributed to the holder of each trust certificate. To emphasize these positions, it may be well to quote the precise language of the deed: “Profits. The profits arising from the business of each corporation shall be paid over by it to the board hereby created, and the aggregate of said profits, or such amounts as may be designated for dividends, shall be proportionately distributed by said board, at such time as it may determine, to the holders of the certificates issued by said board for capital stock as hereinbefore provided.”
Thus it will be seen that these dividends are not to be declared or distributed upon the aggregate capital stock of the corporations, which is to be 'turned over to and held by the trustees, but upon what might not inaptly, in view of these particular facts, be termed the trust board’s capital stock, namely, the trust certificates. Thus we have a series of corporations, existing and transacting business under the forms of law, without real membership or genuinely qualified direction,—mere abstract figments of statutory creation,—without life in the concrete or underlying association. Every share of stock has been practically surrendered, and vital membership resigned. With the transfer to the 11 trustees the shareholders ceased to occupy the position of cestuis que trustent with regard to the directors of the various corporations. In lieu thereof, they accept substituted membership in an unincorporated board, and an entirely new, independent, and exclusive trust relation with the trustees of that board; nor are the trustees, as transferees of the capital stock of the various corporations, in any just sense genuine members thereof. They have no beneficial interest therein. Dividends are not declarable thereon, and, if they were, would not be payable to them in their own right, nor as trustees for the shareholders in the particular corporation which had earned the divi
Let us now look at the situation of the directors of the various corporations, as pointed out in the deed. The statute requires that each director shall be a stockholder. Consequently each director must own at least one share. But the deed requires the transfer to the trustees of every share in every corporation. Now, these trustees certainly cannot, under the terms of their trust, sell or pledge a single share of the stock thus held by them. This stock in their hands is substantially dead. It evidences no individual right. It measures no proportionate interest. In fact it serves in the future no purpose whatever, except to furnish the trust board with formal voting power to control the direction of all the corporations. It would seem to be impossible, therefore, to qualify the boards of directors in the various corporations. The draughtsman, however, attempted to provide for this difficulty by the following provision": “The said board may transfer, from time to time, to such persons as it may desire to constitute trustees or directors, or other officers of corporations, so many of the shares as may be necessary for that purpose, to be held by them subject to the provisions of this instrument. Such transfers may be executed by the president and treasurer of the board in behalf of and as attorneys for the board for that purpose, and to be retransferred when so requested by the board.” Here there is no pretense of a sale. The “necessary” shares may be transferred to such persons as the board may desire to constitute directors, to be held by such directors “subject to the provisions” of the trust deed, and to be “retransferred” when so requested by the board. This clearly bears out my previous observation, that these corporations exist as creatures of the law, and are conducting business under its authority, without a single genuinely qualified director; in fact, without directors at all, in the ordinary and legal sense. Every director in every one of the corporations is necessarily the mere creature and agent of the trust board. The share of stock put in his name is not his property, nor can a dividend ever be declared upon it to him or to any one else. For that very share a trust certificate has, in fact, al
There is further evidence upon the face of the deed of the difficulties which surround the execution of the contemplated project. Each refinery might have had debts, and all probably had assets outside of its plant. It would have been impracticable to issue trust certificates in proportion to the capital stock of each company, for one company might be capitalized for much more than its real value, while another might be capitalized for less, and still another for its precise value. It was necessary, therefore, to distribute the trust certificates in proportion to the real value of each property. But here, again, there was a difficulty growing out of the complexity of mortgages upon the realty, floating debt, and the possession of raw material and other personal property. It was clear that the interests in the trust board which were to be substituted for the corporate shares must be proportioned upon the realty, fixtures, and machinery of each company, (free from debt,) exclusive of the transmutable stock and other personal property; in other words, upon the naked plant. Accordingly provision is made in the deed that each refinery, and the corporation to which it belongs, shall be freed from liability and indebtedness by the parties interested in it; or such parties, if the board shall approve, may provide in cash for such indebtedness or liability, leaving the same to stand at the pleasure of the board. So much for the debts. Then, as to the assets other than the plant, provision is made for their appraisal by five of the eleven trustees, and the values thus fixed are to be paid in cash by the trust board to the treasurer of each corporation. Of course all this involved the necessity of providing the trust board with the means of raising money, and it was undoubtedly with this view that, under the head of “Fiscal Arrangements,” authority was given to raise the necessary funds by mortgage, “to be made by the corporations, or either, any, or all of them, on their property, and by such other means as shall be satisfactory to such board.” This covers, in a general way, the methods adopted by the parties to produce cohesion as between themselves. But they did not stop there. Provision is made for the gathering in of every other existing refinery, (“in every instance to be incorporated,”) and in fact four others have joined the combination since the deed was signed by the original partnerships and corporations; and the evidence shows that in the entire country but five sugar refineries of the character in question remain outside of the combination. The trust board is also provided with additional means for adding recruits to the combination, and to facilitate general adhesion thereto. It was with this view that the 15 per cent, of the trust certificates allotted to each refinery was to be reserved, “subject to be disposed of by the board,” for, among other purposes, the “acquisition of other refineries to become parties to this deed;” and, lest the accretions of membership should exhaust this 15 per cent., as well as what might be derived through the exercise of the other powers of the board, the means are afforded of, “from time to time, ” increasing the trust certificates even beyond the $50,000,000. It is not strange that this extraordinary document should close with a provision for strict secrecy; that “the said deed shall not be shown or delivered to any corporation, firm, person or persons, whatsoever, except by the express direction and order of the board.”
We now come to the legal question, is this a combination of corporations, or merely a combination of stockholders? The defendant claims that unless authority to sign the trust deed, given by the directors of each corporation at a regular board meeting, is affirmatively proved, the acts complained of are not corporate acts. This contention ignores the fact proved in the case, that the corporate acts provided for by the deed have actually been performed by
Now, as the only mortgages connected with the organization were mortgages upon the property of the corporations, it would seem to follow that.the defendant’s stock was, in effect, purchased under the provision of the deed authorizing the raising of funds “by mortgage to be made by the corporations, or either, any, or all of them, on their property. ” It is apparent that this was corporate combination. It was a purchase for such corporate combination, of corporate property, by corporate means.
' It also appears, in connection with this particular defendant, that Mr. Searles, immediately after the purchase of the stock, became its president and treasurer, put in new directors, and at once, for reasons satisfactory to himself, discontinued the business. From that hour to this the defendant’s refinery has been closed, and yet a dividend has been declared upon the very trust cer-
Having thus concluded that the acts under consideration were corporate acts, the remaining question is, were they illegal? This question may be divided into two branches: First. Had the corporations authority to enter into any partnership arrangement, however innocent in itself? Such, for example, as would have been perfectly lawful between individuals? Second. Was this combination of the latter character or was it inherently unlawful? Such, for example again, as would have been unlawful between individuals? The answer to the question, as presented in the first branch, must be in the negative. It cannot be doubted that the arrangement in question amounted to a partnership between these corporations or a substantial consolidation. Such was the effect of the massing of all the stock of all the corporations, and the correlative massing of all the profits of all the corporations. The intention was clearly to share both profits and losses. Such, too, was the effect of uniting all the corporations under practically a single control. It is well settled that corporations cannot consolidate their funds, or form a partnership, unless authorized by express grant or necessary implication; nor can they enter into any arrangement amounting to a practical consolidation or copartnership. Ang. & A. Corp. §272; Tayl.Corp. §§305,419,420; Green’s Brice, Ultra Vires, 416; 1 Mor. Priv. Corp. 376-421, and cases there cited; Canal Co. v. Bank, 7 Wend. 412; Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 10 Gray, 582; Bank v. Ogden, 29 Ill. 248. In the Fulton Bank Case, Chief Justice Savage said that “general principles are against the power of corporations to do such acts. They have no powers but such as are granted and such as are necessarily incident to the grant made to them. Corporations at common law have certain powers, but not such as would authorize the forming of a partnership, or the consolidation of two corporations into one. ” It was doubtless because of the recognition of this principle that the Acts of 1867 (chapter 960) and 1884 (chapter 367) were passed, authorizing consolidations in a certain specified manner, and under fixed conditions. The corporations whose conduct we are considering have not taken advantage of these acts, doubtless because such acts are limited to corporations organized “under any general or special law of this state,”—the promoters of the present combination evidently desiring to combine all the refinery corporations in the Union,—and they have sought, by the scheme under review, to effect a far broader and deeper purpose than mere corporate consolidation under these acts. In doing so they have plainly abused their powers, and have exercised privileges not conferred upon them by law. As legal conclusions, forfeiture of the defendant’s franchise and dissolution justly follow. Mr. Morawetz states the rule with precision, (2 Mor. Priv. Corp. § 1024:) “A corporation may incur a forfeiture of its franchises by the doing of an illegal act. Any act of a corporation which is forbidden by its charter, or by a general rule of law, and strictly every act which the charter does not expressly or impliedly authorize the corporation to perform, is unlawful; and, if the doing of such act is an injury to the public, it may be sufficient ground for declaring a forfeiture.” The same rule is laid down in Kent, Taylor, Waterman, Kyd, Angel & Ames, and Green’s Brice. 2 Kent, Comm. 312; Tayl. Corp. §§ 289,457,459 ; 2 Wat. Corp. § 427; Kyd, Corp. § 479 et seq.; Ang. & A. Corp. §§ 774-776; Green’s Brice, Ultra "Vires, 708, 709, (3d Ed. 787.) Waterman says that “the state is not required to prove an actual injury. It is sufficient cause of forfeiture if the act. be such as in the nature of things is calculated to produce injury.” The cases all hold the same doctrine, laying down the general rule that the corporate franchises are granted upon a trust or condition;, that the corporate privileges shall not be abused; that the corporation undertakes and agrees, upon condition of forfeiture, that it will so manage and conduct its affairs that it shall not become dangerous or hazardous
- We might rest upon the conclusion thus arrived at, for it is sufficient to entitle the people to a verdict. As, however, the second branch of the question was fully argued, and is fairly up, it becomes my duty to consider it. At the outset, let me say that the modification by modern jurists of some of the rules laid down in the old English cases is fully recognized. The liberty of contracting is the most important factor of commercial life, and it should only be abridged when it is clear that the public must be injuriously affected by its unrestrained exercise in a particular case. Freedom of all kinds may be abused, and commercial freedom, as well as any other, may degenerate into license. The development of judicial thought in regard to contracts in restraint of trade has been especially marked. The ancient doctrine upon that head has been weakened and modified to such a degree that but little, if any, of it is left. In Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473,13 N. E. Rep. 419, it was held that “a party may legally purchase the trade and business of another for the very purpose of preventing competition, and the validity of the contract, if supported by a consideration, will depend upon its reasonableness as between the parties.” It was .also held that a restraint of trade was not general, but partial, though covering the whole country, with the exception of ITevada and Montana.
Indeed, excessive competition may sometimes result in actual injury to the public, and anti-competitive contracts to avert personal ruin may be perfectly reasonable. It is only when such contracts are publicly oppressive that they become unreasonable, and are condemned as against public policy. Horner v. Craves, 7 Bing. 735. But all the cases, ancient and modern, agree that a combination, the tendency of which is to prevent general competition and to control prices, is detrimental to the public, and consequently unlawful. This seems to be coheeded by one of the learned counsel for the defendant. Judge Daly sums up the result of his examination of the cases in these words: “That combinations are unlawful, the design and effect of which necessarily is to give the party combining a monopoly, more or less, for any length of time, of the manufacture or sale of a commodity, * * * or to regulate and control the price of a commodity, * * * or to secure any pecuniary advantage in restraint of trade which would be injurious to the community. ” ITow, it seems to me to be entirely clear that the agreement which has been previously analyzed brings this case conspicuously within the above rule. It is not a case where a few individuals in a limited locality have united for mutual protection against ruinous competition. It is the case of great capitalists uniting their enormous wealth in mighty corporations, and utilizing the franchises granted to them by the people to oppress the people. First, they utilize the corporate franchises to guard themselves against the dangers incident to personal association; and, second, they centralize these franchises
In Hooker v. Vandewater it was held that an agreement between the proprietors of five lines of boats engaged in the business of forwarders on the Brie and Oswego canals, to run for the remainder of the season at certain rates for freight and passage, then agreed upon, and to divide the net earnings among themselves in certain proportions, was a conspiracy to commit an act injurious to trade, and consequently void. The object expressed in the agreement was the “establishing and maintaining fair and uniform rates of freight,-and equalizing the business among themselves, and to avoid all unnecessary expense in doing the same.” Of this Jewett, J., observed: “The object of the agreement, as expressed in the written contract, was plausible enough, but it is impossible to conceal the real intention.” He adds that “the great, if not the sole, object of the agreement” was to destroy rivalry, and “keep up the price to certain rates fixed by themselves.”
Stanton v. Allen was a very similar case, where the court, without considering the conspiracy statute, held that, the agreement was void at common law as contravening public policy and injurious to the interests of the state.
In Coal Co. v. Coal Co. the combining mines were not the only ones in the region, much less in the country. It appeared that there was another mine in the region not within the combination, but that the product of that mine could only reach the market (thought to be controlled) by tide-water. It also appeared that there were other mines in two other counties of the state, though the quantities taken from them were small. Still the court held that the combination was not only illegal, but a criminal offensó. The common-law origin of this doctrine was dwelt upon,-—that while an individual may do many things to oppress others which, though morally wrong, are not the subject of legal discipline, he cannot lawfully combine with another to do the same things. The wrong which, when done by the individual, cannot be redressed, becomes a conspiracy the moment it is effected by two or more in combination. As the learned judge (Agnbw) observed, “the combination has a power in its confederated form which no individual action can confer. The public interest must succumb to it, for it has left no competition free to correct its baleful influence. ”
In Salt Co. v. Guthrie the agreement was between the producers in salt in a limited locality. The court held the agreement void, although the price of the commodity had not been unreasonably advanced. The tendency of the agreement was sufficient. The court remarked that it is “no answer to say that competition in the salt trade was not in fact destroyed, or that the price of the commodity was not unreasonably advanced. Courts will not stop to inquire as to the degree of injury inflicted upon the public; it is enough to know that the inevitable tendency of such contracts is inj urious to the public. ”
In Craft v. MoConoughy the agreement was between all. the grain producers in but a single town. It was held to be void, the court saying that, “while the agreement upon its face would seem to indicate that the parties had formed a copartnership.for the purpose of trading in grain, yet, from the
Hoffman v. Brooks is also an instructive and well-reasoned case. The combination there was between sellers of tobacco, for the purpose of destroying competition among themselves. It was held to be unlawful, the court using this pointed language: “ The presumption is always against the validity of such agreements.” And they will not be enforced “when they include all those engaged in any business in a large city or district, are unlimited in duration, and are manifestly intended, by the surrender of individual discretion, by the arbitrary fixing of prices, or by any of the methods of which the hope of gain makes human ingenuity so fruitful, to strangle competition outright, and breed monopolies. ”
The cases where anti-competitive agreements were upheld had none of the distinguishing characteristics of monopoly, but were plainly fair contracts entered into for mutual protection, and were not injurious to the public; such for instance, as Ontario Salt Co. v. Merchants’ Salt Co., 18 Grant, Ch. 540;. Wickens v. Evans, 3 Younge & J. 318; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, (1885,) 15 Q. B. Div. 476; Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522.
In the Canadian case first cited the learned vice-chancellor declared that “it was out of the question to say that the agreement had for its object the creation of a monopoly, as the parties were not the only persons engaged in the production of salt in the province;” and; after examining the particular facts of that case, he adds: “ What is this more than two persons carrying on the same trade, binding themselves not to undersell each other?”
■ Wickens v. Evans was still freer from the element of monopoly. The agreement was confined to three trunk-makers, who divided England into three districts, each taking one, and limiting himself to one. The court said that the restraint of trade was but partial, and that there was no monopoly except as between the three parties, “because every other man may come-into their districts and vend his goods. ”
The Mogul S. S. Co. Case, though cited by the defendant, seems to be strongly against its contention. The action was in equity, and an injunction to-restrain the wrong was refused. Lord Coleridge placed his judgment entirely upon the adequacy of the legal remedy, and the consequent impropriety of equitable interference. But assuming the allegations of the bill to be true, (which question of fact was not then passed upon,) he denounced the so-called “conference” as a criminal and indictable conspiracy, and therefore actionable. “It is also clear,” he observed, “that, supposing the allegations here-could be established in point of fact, the damages in such a case might be extremely heavy. They might be what are called exemplary or vindictive damages, such, indeed, as it might severely tax the resources of the conference to pay. That, I think, cannot be denied. ” It seems that the plaintiffs acted on this suggestion of Lord Coleridge, and brought an action at law, in which, however, they were again unsuccessful. The judgment here was also pronounced by Lord Coleridge, (54 Law J. Q. B. Div. 541,) who ruled that, as there was no evidence of malice or personal ill will, the plaintiffs could not recover. The learned chief justice held that the “conference” was not unlawful merely because it offered a rebate of 5 per cent, upon all freights paid by those shippers who shipped their cargoes on board conference vessels alone, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ vessels. “It seems to me,” said
The same danger is clearly pointed out by our own court of appeals in the late case of Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519, 18 N. E. Rep. 363, where Gray, J., speaking of agreements in restraint of trade, observed: “In later times the danger in such agreements seems only really to exist when corporations are parties to them, for their means and strength would better enable them to buy off rivalry and create monopolies.” And again, speaking of corporations: “If allowed to engage, without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are engaged, they become a public menace, against which public policy and statutes designed protection. ”
The principles established by these cases seem to cover and fully meet the main position taken in support of the present agreement. There, are, however, one or two minor considerations which should be noticed. The first is that this agreement seems to avoid the pitfall of many of the cases by carefully omitting any specific authority to fix prices. Such authority, however, is plainly covered by the enormous general power conferred upon the trust board. The greater includes the less, and any specification on this head would have been superfluous. Even Mr. Carter finally yielded this point. “I agree, ” he says, “in the broadest manner, that the power exists there to fix a price eventually; it is for the interests of the parties to fix the price.” The truth is that, under this agreement, the trust board can direct the business movements of these 17 or 18 corporations as absolutely as the general of a great army can direct the movements of its various corps d'armée. But a director may rebel, say the learned counsel. Well, even in war there is a bare possibility that a corps commander may disobey the orders of his chief, but discipline and change of military agency speedily follow. There is still less likelihood of mutiny in boards of directors who practically take office under the trust board, (and subject to the provisions of the trust deed,) who are appointed by the trust chiefs, and removed by a mere retransfer of stock “upon request” at any time, and, above all, who are spurred to active and zealous obedience by the hope, nay, by the substantial certainty, of gain; for there is nothing whatever to prevent the trustees from filling these corporate boards with their own members, or with other holders of their own trust certificates. The trust board is, indeed, clothed with power far in excess of the ordinary
Why, then, does not this trust board combine all of these unlawful purposes with ample power of accomplishment? Theoretically, it cannot prevent other capitalists from coming forward and utilizing their means in combination with labor, but practically it can. The struggle would be unequal, and, except under powerful, unusual, and extraordinary conditions, impossible.- A vast harvest could be reaped at the expense of the public before the foundation of the competitive edifice could be thoroughly laid. Nor could the power of combination be defeated by outside forces. The undue enhancing of prices might draw to the locality the attention of the foreign commercial world. But the argument here overlooks the laws of the United States, and the duties imposed by those laws upon imports. It overlooks, too, the expense of transportation and handling and the delays incident thereto. The harvest could again be reaped at the public expense before the advent of competition, and that harvest could be then utilized, by the sudden lowering of prices, to the repression of the foreign competitor. Such, at least, is the tendency of the combination, and such its practical power. The defendant’s whple argument on this- head is based upon theory rather than fact, just as its earlier argument, with regard to the corporations, is based upon legal form rather than substance. The doctrines of political economy which have been pressed upon us are based upon normal conditions, and have no bearing whatever upon combinations organized for the express purpose of surmounting and subverting those conditions.
Lastly, this appeal to the law is criticised as an interference with a natural state of things. The unnatural thing is said to be the law when it attempts to check the natural order. Unfortunately for this argument it is the combination which has resorted to what it calls the unnatural thing. It was not content with natural partnerships or associations of individuals, but resorted to the device of corporate artificiality to effect its ends. Having asked and