Opinion
Noelle M. (the minor) appeals from an order of the Lassen County Juvenile Court declaring her a ward of the court and committing her to the Department of Juvеnile Justice (DJJ) based upon her *195 admission of two counts of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b) (counts I, II)), one count of conspiracy to sell methadone (Pen. Cоde, § 182, subd. (a)(1) (count III)), and five counts of selling methadone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a) (counts XI-XV)).
On appeal, the minor contends the court violated Penal Code section 654 1 by sentencing her for both conspiracy to sell methadone and selling methadone, and by imposing separate sentences for the five counts of selling methadone. She also contends the trial court improperly calculated both her maximum period of confinement and her precommitment credits. We agree thаt the court erred as claimed in the minor’s first, third and fourth contentions, but disagree that she was improperly sentenced on the five sale counts.
FACTS
As to the eight counts the minor admitted, the facts are uncontested. The minor and Ryan F. conspired to steal the latter’s grandmother’s methadone pills and sell them to other juveniles at a high school homecoming football game. The minor sold pills to seven students, two of whom died from overdosing.
The court determined the minor’s maximum period оf confinement was 13 years four months, calculated as follows: The upper term of four years for the manslaughter in count I; a consecutive term of 16 months fоr the manslaughter in count II; a consecutive term of 16 months for the conspiracy in count HI; and five consecutive terms of 16 months for each of the five sales in counts XI through XV.
DISCUSSION
I *
II
The minor contends that sentencing her to consecutive terms for each of the five sales counts is prohibited by section 654 because “all of the counts of furnishing Methadone were pursuant to a single objective, i.e., furnishing of the drug at the football game, and represent an indivisible course of conduсt.” The minor is incorrect.
*196
“[I]t is well settled that section 654 applies not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there was a cоurse of conduct which violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. [Citation.] Whether a course of conduct is indivisible dеpends upon the intent and objective of the actor. [Citation.] If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. [Citation.] ...[][] On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for the independent violations committed in pursuit оf each objective even though the violations were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citations.]”
(People
v.
Perez
(1979)
The minor views her circumstances аs having a single objective, to wit, the sale of the methadone pills, which was accomplished during a single course of conduct, to wit, selling them during the football game. The minor’s concept of a single objective in these circumstances is too broad.
Although neither party has cited any case directly on point, and our research has disclosed none,
Perez, supra,
The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning as follows: “Suсh an intent and objective is much too broad and amorphous to determine the applicability of section 654. Assertion of a sole intent and objectivе to achieve sexual gratification is akin to an assertion of a desire for wealth as the sole intent and objective in committing a series of sepаrate thefts. To accept such a broad, overriding intent and objective to preclude punishment for otherwise clearly separate offensеs would violate the statute’s purpose to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his culpability. [Citation.] It would reward the defendant who has the greаter criminal ambition with a lesser punishment. [Citation.] [][] A defendant who attempts to achieve sexual gratification by committing a number of base criminal acts on his victim is substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one such act. We therefore decline to extend the single intent and objective test оf section 654 beyond its purpose to preclude punishment for each such act.” (Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 552-553.)
*197
Here, by parity of reasoning with
Perez,
supra,
The minor claims that her circumstances “are most analogous to [those of]
People
v.
Bauer
(1969)
In
Bauer,
by ruse the defendant and an accomрlice gained entrance to the home of three elderly women, blindfolded them, tied them up, ransacked the home and took items belonging to each оf them, including a vehicle.
(People v. Bauer, supra,
On appeal, the defendant contended section 654 prohibited punishment for both the robbery and the auto theft.
(Bauer, supra,
Bauer, supra,
Ill, IV *
*198 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court is directed to correct its records to show that the minor’s maximum period of confinement is 11 years eight months and that she is entitled to 297 days of precommitment custody. In all other respects, the order committing the minor to the DJJ is affirmed.
Sims, Acting P. J., and Raye, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 8, 2009, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 18, 2009, S170974.
Notes
Hereafter, any undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
See footnote, ante, page 193.
Our resolution of defendant’s contentions renders it unnecessary to address the People’s proposition that multiple punishment was appropriate under the multiple victim exception of section 654, specifically, that the minor’s crimes involved violence against multiple victims.
See footnote, ante, page 193.