Bоth defendants were charged with robbery armed, MCLA § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp §28.797). They pled guilty to reduced charges of larceny from a person, MCLA § 750.357 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.589).
The defendants recited in considerable detail sordid facts which indicated the truth of their pleas. The defеndants said that on September 28,1968, they were solicited by two women and that the four of them then went to a motel where the defendants purchased the women’s sexual services for $10 each. The defendants stated that following the completion of the transactions they discovered that the women had stolen money from them and that this made the defendants angry. They then forcefully took back the stolen mоney and defendant Newsom also took back the $10 he had paid and a watch and ring from *374 one of the women while defendant Young took hack the $10 he had pаid the other woman for her services.
On appeal defendant Young’s only argumеnt is that his actions did not constitute a crime since the agreement he made to purchase sexual services was illegal and so his forcefully taking back the $10 wаs not a crime.
We are not persuaded by .that argument. The trial court did not enfоrce any contract legal or otherwise. The agreement had been completed and both parties had received the agreed-upon cоnsideration. Defendant Young then forcefully took back the $10 which by that time belonged to the woman. Such action constituted the crime of larceny from a pеrson. “Public policy requires that courts should lend active aid in punishing persons who оbtain money or property from others by criminal means, and it is no defense that the complaining witness was himself engaged in an illegal transaction.” 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (2d Ed), § 29, p 49.
On appeal defendant Newsom’s only argument is that the trial court did not properly examine him as to whether his plea was freely and voluntarily offered. GCE 1963, 785.3(2), MCLA § 768.35 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28.1058).
Defendant Newsom admits that no set form of examination is required.
People
v.
Bumpus
(1959),
The record shows that the defendants were represented by separatе counsel and that the trial judge advised the defendants that they were charged with *375 robbery armed which carried a penalty of life imprisonment but that they could plеad guilty to an included offense of larceny from a person which carried a maximum period of imprisonment of ten years. The trial judge also told the defendаnts that they must tell him accurately and truthfully what happened and if their testimony didn’t state fаcts constituting a basis for the pleas he would not accept them.
The defеndants were then asked if they understood and both answered affirmatively. Newsom was sрecifically asked if he wished to plead not guilty or guilty to the offense of larсeny from a person. He replied, “Guilty.” The court again asked him if he knew that he сould be sentenced up to ten years and Newsom answered, “Yes.”
In turn both defendаnts then stated facts which showed a substantial basis for accepting the pleas. Later defendant Newsom was sentenced to a term of 5-1/2 years to 10 years in prison and defendant Young was sentenced to a term of 5 to 10 years in prison.
Defendant Newsom does not allege that he is innocent or that his plea was not frеely and voluntarily entered. His sole point is the failure of the court to interrogаte him on the question of voluntariness.
The court rule is mandatory but failure to comрly with it is not considered jurisdictional, GCR 1963, 785.3(4). As was said in
People
v.
Winegar
(1968),
“First of all, a conviction based upon a plea of guilty is a judgment of the trial court. If the court has jurisdiction to enter the сonviction, it is presumptively valid.
«.y. ¿¿, “¡V *7v-
“¡V *7v-
“A convicted defendant no longer enjoys the рresumption of innocence, (citations omitted) He has *376 the burden of showing something more than technical noncompliance with a rule. Absent a showing of violation or denial- of constitutional rights, he has the obligation of alleging in a motion to withdraw plea such facts as would, if true, substantiate a finding that there was noncompliance which resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
We find no miscarriage of justice.
Affirmed as to both defendants.