People v. NeesePeople v. Neese
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Vogt, J.), rendered May 13, 1985, convicting him of sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), and criminal trespass in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress certain identification testimony.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant challenges the propriety of the hearing court’s decision to permit the complainant and two other witnesses, Mitzie Lau and Sheri Watson, to make in-court identifications of him.
Initially, we find that the hearing court properly declined to suppress the complainant’s in-court identification testimony. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the photographic array and the lineup which were viewed by the complainant were impermissibly suggestive or conducive to irreparable misidentification (see, Stovall v Denno,
The People concede that Mitzie Lau’s pretrial showup identification of the defendant was the result of improper police procedures. Thus we need only address the issue of whether an independent basis existed for Lau’s in-court identification. The record shows that Lau was able to view the defendant under satisfactory lighting conditions for 10 to 20 seconds and that she was able to give a detailed and fairly accurate description of the defendant. Furthermore, Lau was able to make a tentative identification of the defendant after viewing a properly conducted photographic array containing a 10-year-old photograph of him. Given the above facts, the hearing court’s finding that Lau had an independent basis for her identification was not clearly erroneous and thus it should not be disturbed on appeal (see, People v Muriell,
Nevertheless, reversal is unwarranted. The complainant, who had ample opportunity to view the perpetrator in close quarters during the commission of the crime, positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Additionally, Lau, who had ample opportunity to view the perpetrator, also made an unequivocal in-court identification of the defendant as the person she had observed near to the crime scene within the relevant time frame. Moreover, the issue of pretrial identification was sufficiently litigated before the jury, as was the issue of the in-court identification, to permit the jury to properly pass upon the reliability of these identifications. Under these circumstances, we find that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction and it was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Crimmins,