115 Cal. App. Supp. 4th 1 | Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. | 2004
Opinion
Appellant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, contending that the trial judge erred in concluding that his detention was lawful.
On January 6, 2003, appellant was detained after being stopped by Officer Begley of the Daly City Police Department for a violation of Vehicle Code section 4000, subdivision (a) (driving with expired registration). Officer Begley noticed that appellant’s car was traveling with an expired registration tag on his license plate.
Other than the registration issue appellant did not do anything to justify any stop. As a result of the stop, stolen property was found in appellant’s possession. In the trial court he moved to suppress the discovery of this evidence, based upon the claimed illegal detention. Respondent argued that the stop was valid because all that is needed is “reasonable suspicion” that a crime occurred. The trial court agreed and denied the motion to suppress. From that ruling, appellant appeals.
There is no dispute about the evidence; therefore, the issue is solely one of law.
If the sole issue were the expired registration tag on the rear license plate, then the answer would be surely yes.
Here, however, Officer Begley decided because of his personal experiences that he would stop the vehicle to verify the temporary registration was valid. Ordinarily, if he has time, he would call his department for a registration check. There was no evidence presented as to whether he did or did not check and if he did not, why he did not.
Thus, may an officer’s personal experiences be taken into account in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists? Generally, of course, special training and experience of a police officer may be taken into account in determining whether there is a reasonable suspicion a crime has taken place.
Because of Officer Begley’s experience, he decided to confirm that the temporary sticker was valid. He did not have any particularized belief that appellant’s car was not validly registered; he only assumed based upon his experience that approximately 50 percent of the time the temporary registrations are not valid for the car on which they are placed. There was no evidence presented to suggest that appellant’s temporary registration sticker was invalid. Officer Begley made no effort to ascertain if in fact the temporary sticker was invalid by checking with his dispatcher before intruding on appellant’s Fourth Amendment right to be left alone absent particularized suspicion that he was committing a crime.
Given the circumstances of this case, and based on a record that appellant did everything required of him to operate his vehicle lawfully on the highway, Officer Begley’s stop without checking with his dispatcher to confirm that appellant’s registration was invalid constituted an unlawful detention.
Kopp, J., and Mittlesteadt, J., concurred.
Page
APPELLATE REVIEW
ARBITRATION AND AWARD
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
BAIL AND RECOGNIZANCE
CIVIL RIGHTS
491
Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript (hereinafter Transcript), page 5, lines 18-19.
Transcript, page 5, lines 25-26; id., page 6, line 1.
Transcript, page 5, lines 19-21.
Transcript, page 6, lines 4-7.
People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221], See also People v. Mays (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 972 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519].
People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 761 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].
See Vehicle Code sections 4000, subdivision (a) and 5204. See also People v. Galceran (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 312, 315 [2 Cal.Rptr. 901].
See Vehicle Code section 4606.
See Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (b)(3).
The record does not indicate what type of document was in the window indicating temporary registration for January.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868]; United States v. Prandy-Binett (D.C. Cir. 1993) 302 U.S. App. D.C. 1 [995 F.2d 1069, 1071, 1073],
In this case Officer Begley should have gathered more information before his intrusion into appellant’s freedom. (See generally Filer v. Smith (1893) 96 Mich. 347 [55 N.W. 999, 1002] [“An officer is not warranted in relying upon circumstances deemed by him suspicious, when the means are at hand of either verifying or dissipating those suspicions without risk, and he neglects to avail himself of those means”]; see also U.S. v. Allen (D.C. Cir. 1980) 203 U.S. App. D.C. 17 [629 F.2d 51, 57], fn. 6 [“The gravity of an arrest is such that there may be