OPINION OF THE COURT
(June 18, 2012)
HODGE, C J. The People of the Virgin Islands seek appellate review of a July 28, 2011 Superior Court Order,
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
This interlocutory appeal stems from charges filed as the result of a questioning and search of Murrell that occurred on December 18, 2010, near a St. Thomas nightclub. Specifically, the People, in an information filed on January 11, 2011, charged Murrell with unauthorized possession
The Superior Court held a suppression hearing on July 19, 2011, in which it heard testimony only from a single witness, Officer Bernard Douglas, Jr. At the hearing, Douglas testified on direct examination that he and four other officers' were patrolling the area around the nightclub, and that at approximately 1:50 a.m. on December 18, 2010, a citizen — who did not give his name, but who had provided the police with a reliable tip in the past — informed him that “he saw a young black male, purple shirt, white hat with a gun on his person.” (J.A. 35.) Although Douglas testified that there were approximately 100 people at the nightclub, he stated that only Murrell fit that description, and that Murrell tried to walk around the officers after he saw them. (J.A. 36-39.) Douglas further stated that at this point the officers called Murrell over, told him to put his hands on the top of a hedge, with an officer on either side of him and one at his back, and “ask[ed] him if he had any weapons on him.” (J.A. 40.) According to Douglas, when Murrell answered yes, he asked him where the firearm was, and after Murrell said it was in his back left pocket, Douglas retrieved it and identified it as a loaded semi-automatic handgun. (J.A. 40-41.) Douglas then testified that he asked Murrell if he had a license to carry a firearm in the Virgin Islands, and Murrell replied no, at which point Douglas handcuffed him and transported him to the police station. (J.A. 42-43.) During cross-examination, Douglas expressly stated that he did not know if Murrell had a license to possess a firearm prior to asking him that question, testified that he had told Murrell to put
Once Douglas concluded his testimony, the parties presented legal arguments to the Superior Court, with the People arguing that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), authorized the initial “stop and frisk,” while Murrell contended that Terry did not apply because Douglas lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot since, at the time the search occurred, there was absolutely no evidence that Murrell lacked authorization to possess a firearm. At the end of the hearing, the Superior Court orally announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately holding that although Douglas possessed a reasonable belief that Murrell had a firearm, his own testimony indicated that he had no reason to believe that Murrell did not possess a license for the firearm or that the firearm had an altered serial number. (J.A. 88-90.) Moreover, the Superior Court found that Douglas’s testimony indicated that Murrell complied with all of his requests and did not show that he was acting in a hostile manner or otherwise posed a danger to anyone at the time of the incident. Thus, relying on United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000), the Superior Court orally granted the motion to suppress, which it later memorialized in a July 28, 2011 written Order.
The People filed a notice of appeal on August 26, 2011, which sought immediate appellate review of the July 28, 2011 Order, and simultaneously certified that the appeal was not taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence suppressed represented substantial proof of facts material to the charges pending against Murrell. See V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 4 § 33(d)(2). However, although Lofton Holder, Esq., an Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, had represented the People at the July 19, 2011 suppression hearing, the notice of appeal was signed solely by Matthew Phelan, Esq., an Assistant Attorney General assigned by the Solicitor General’s Division who had not entered an appearance on behalf of the People and up to that point had not participated in the Superior Court proceedings. But shortly thereafter, on August 30, 2011, Attorney Holder filed a motion to continue in the Superior Court, which solely requested the automatic continuance pending appeal authorized by section 33(d)(2). However, Attorney Holder attached Attorney Phelan’s notice of appeal as an exhibit
Due to its interlocutory and emergency nature, this Court, in a September 12, 2011 Order, expedited this appeal and issued an abbreviated briefing schedule. However, when the People failed to timely file a brief, this Court, in an October 21, 2011 Order, sua sponte dismissed the appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(c). After the People filed a motion to set aside the dismissal, Murrell, in his first responsive filing on appeal, argued that notwithstanding the People’s failure to timely file a brief, the appeal should remain dismissed because the People also failed to fully comply with section 33(d)(2), which permits an immediate appeal of an order suppressing evidence only if “the Attorney General conducting the prosecution certifies to the Superior Court judge that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” According to Murrell, this language mandates that the Attorney General personally make such a certification to the Superior Court, and that therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal because both the notice of appeal and the motion to continue had been signed solely by an Assistant Attorney General. This Court, in a March 2, 2012 Order, set aside the October 21, 2011 dismissal
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
“The Supreme Court [has] jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law.” 4 V.I.C. § 32(a). Although the People may not generally appeal an order or judgment in a criminal case, People v. George, 49 V.I. 504, 507 (V.I. 2008), statutory authority expressly permits the People to appeal an order suppressing evidence prior to trial. See 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2) (“An appeal by the Government of the Virgin Islands shall lie to the Supreme Court from a decision or order of the Superior Court suppressing or excluding evidence . . . .”). However, the same statute authorizes such an appeal only if only if “the Attorney General conducting the prosecution certifies to the Superior Court judge that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.”
Ordinarily, this Court reviews findings of fact for clear error, but exercises plenary review over legal conclusions. St. Thomas-St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.I. 322, 329 (V.I. 2007). Likewise, when a case involves the interpretation of the United States Constitution, our standard of review is plenary. Latalladi v. People, 51 V.I. 137, 141 (V.I. 2009). But,
B. Attorney General’s Certification
Pursuant to statute, “[a]n appeal by the Government of the Virgin Islands shall lie to the Supreme Court from a decision or order of the Superior Court suppressing or excluding evidence ... if the Attorney General conducting the prosecution certifies to the Superior Court judge that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2). In their appellate briefs, both the People and Murrell recognize that the phrase “the Attorney General conducting the prosecution” in section 33(d)(2) is unusual, in that the Virgin Islands Code recognizes only a single Attorney General, see 3 V.I.C. § 112(a), who has the duty “to prosecute in the inferior courts all offenses against the laws of the Virgin Islands.” 3 V.I.C. § 114(a)(2). According to the People, it is well known that the Attorney General cannot personally prosecute every single criminal case in the Superior Court, and that therefore local law permits the appointment of Assistant Attorneys General, who “shall perform such duties as the Attorney General prescribes.” 3 V.I.C. § 113(b). Essentially, the People contend that the Legislature deliberately intended for the phrase “the Attorney General conducting the prosecution” to encompass an Assistant Attorney General who has been assigned by the Attorney General to handle a particular matter. Moreover, the People argue, in any event, that section 33(d)(2) was modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and contend that appellate courts have construed the phrase “the United States attorney” in that statute to encompass Assistant United States Attorneys.
Murrell, however, sedulously contends for a much more restrictive interpretation of the statute. In his appellate brief, Murrell argues that the plain text of section 33(d)(2) contemplates that the Attorney General personally make the required certification to the Superior Court. Murrell correctly observes that the United States and the Government of the Virgin Islands constitute the same sovereign, see In re Application of Alvis, 54 V.I. 408, 413-14 (V.I. 2010), and recognizes that the Virgin
We agree with Murrell that the phrase “the Attorney General conducting the prosecution” is likely a holdover from the former section 39(b) and that the Legislature intended to simply refer to the Attorney General. But while the Legislature may have — given that an interlocutory appeal by the government in a criminal case is not an everyday occurrence — intended for the Attorney General to decide whether to take an appeal, this does not mean that the Attorney General must personally sign the section 33(d)(2) certification. The Legislature has expressly authorized the Attorney General to delegate duties to Assistant Attorneys General. See 3 V.I.C. § 113(b). While some courts have recognized that a public official may not delegate a duty to the extent the delegation constitutes divesting or transferring a fundamental responsibility of the office, see, e.g., Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 454 N.E.2d 522, 525, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. 1983), most appellate courts to consider the question have held that — even in the absence of explicit statutory authorization permitting delegation of a particular
C. Suppression of Gun, Ammunition, and Statements
With respect to the merits, the People primarily argue that the Superior Court erred when it granted the motion to suppress because Douglas had a right to question Murrell, and to search his person once he admitted to possessing a firearm.
As in this case, the “stop and frisk” in Ubiles originated after a member of the public informed a law enforcement officer that a man standing on the sidewalk at a crowded event possessed a gun, 224 F.3d at 215, with
For cases arising out of the Virgin Islands... the treatment afforded firearms under territorial law continues to be of paramount importance in our analysis. In United States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2010), an officer received a tip from a reliable source that a man was walking on a street in Wilmington, Delaware with a firearm in his jacket. Id. at 376-77. Based on the man’s description, officers responded to the area where the informant indicated that the man could be found. Id. at 377. Officers located the man, handcuffed him, and patted him down, finding an unlicensed handgun in violation of Delaware law. Id.
We noted that the facts in Gatlin resembled those in Ubiles — i.e., the sole evidence to support the Terry stop was a tip about a firearm —• but nonetheless concluded that reasonable suspicion existed to frisk the defendant for weapons. Id. at 378-79. Critical to our analysis was the presumption under Delaware law, unlike in the Virgin Islands, that an individual has no license to carry a concealed firearm. Id. The reliable tip coupled with the presumption of illegality provided officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop within the confines of Terry. Id. at 379.
... It is lawful for certain individuals in the Virgin Islands to carry a firearm provided that a license is obtained. See V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 23, § 454. Ubiles recognized that the possession of a firearm in the Virgin Islands, in and of itself, does not provide officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. 224 F.3d at 217 (“[A] mere allegation*807 that a suspect possesses a firearm, as dangerous as firearms may be, [does not] justify an officer in stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion.”). Indeed, Virgin Islands law contains no presumption that an individual lacks a permit to carry a firearm. Gatlin, 613 F.3d at 378-79. As we observed in Gatlin, the Government bears the burden of proof in the Virgin Islands that the defendant had no license for a recovered firearm. Id. at 379 (citing United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 630, 36 V.I. 367 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Lewis, 672 F.3d at 239-40.
We agree with Murrell that, if this Court were to apply the Ubiles and Lewis decisions, there is no question that the Superior Court correctly granted Murrell’s motion to suppress. As in Lewis and Ubiles, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Douglas received any information that Murrell possessed an unlicensed firearm or a firearm with an altered serial number, nor is there any evidence from which Douglas could have inferred that Murrell was engaging in criminal behavior. On the contrary, Douglas unambiguously testified at the suppression hearing that he only had reason to believe that Murrell lacked a license after Murrell told him that he did not have one, which did not occur until after Murrell had been told to place his hands on the hedge and Douglas obtained the loaded firearm out of Murrell’s pocket. (J.A. 53-54.) Therefore, were we to concur with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that local Virgin Islands law does not contain a presumption that an individual lacks a permit to carry a firearm, we would easily conclude that the Superior Court committed no error in granting the motion to suppress the firearm and the ammunition.
In this case, we note that the Superior Court, when it announced its oral decision at the July 19, 2011 suppression hearing, recognized the existence of title 23, section 488 of the Virgin Islands Code, which authorizes a law enforcement officer to question and search an individual who the officer believes “may be wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in violation of section 454 of [title 23,]” provided that the officer also believes the person may be presently dangerous, that it is impracticable to obtain a search warrant, and that it is necessary for the officer’s protection or the protection of others to take “swift measures to discover whether [the] person is, in fact, wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm.” 23 V.I.C. § 488(a). If the officer discovers during the stop and search that the individual possesses a firearm, the statute unambiguously places the burden upon the individual to “produce
Prior to Ubiles, one Superior Court judge observed that “[rjead together, the plain language of the statutes [23 V.I.C. §§ 488 and 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a)] suggests a legislative intent to make the mere carrying of a firearm illegal.” Gov’t v. King, 31 V.I. 78, 84 (V.I. Super. Ct. 1995).
Notwithstanding the fact that legitimate, non-frivolous arguments exist to depart from Ubiles and Lewis, and despite the existence of section 488, we decline to resolve this issue as part of this appeal because the People have failed to argue, either before the Superior Court or in their
III. CONCLUSION
Although the phrase “the Attorney General conducting the prosecution” in title 4, section 33(d)(2) likely refers to the Attorney General rather than a trial prosecutor, the Attorney General was not required to personally sign the mandatory certification, for title 3, section 113(b) permits the Attorney General to delegate this and other duties to Assistant Attorneys General. As to the merits, the “stop and frisk” of Murrell was unquestionably unlawful under Ubiles and Lewis, but we hesitate to fully endorse those decisions given that legitimate arguments exist for departing from them. Nevertheless, since the outcome of this appeal would not be impacted by the continuing vitality of Ubiles and Lewis, we affirm the July 28, 2011 Order without resolving whether section 488 of title 23 should dictate a different result.
Although signed by the Superior Court judge on July 27, 2011, the Clerk of the Superior Court did not enter die order until July 28, 2011. See V.I.S.Ct.R. 5(b)(6) (“A judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this subdivision when it is entered on the criminal docket.”).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to the Virgin Islands. See The Revised Organic Act of 1954, § 3,48 U.S.C. § 1561, reprinted in V.I. CODE ANN., Historical Documents, Organic Acts, andU.S. Constitution at 87-88 (1995) (preceding V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1) (“The following provisions of and amendments to the Constitution of the United States are hereby extended to the Virgin Islands ... and shall have the same force and effect there as in the United States ... the first to ninth amendments inclusive....”).
In his appellate brief, Murrell contends that this appeal is moot because the March 2,2012 Order had found that the People did not provide sufficient explanation for the failure to timely file a brief pursuant to the initial briefing schedule. However, notwithstanding this holding, the March 2, 2012 Order unambiguously set aside the October 21, 2011 dismissal and reinstated this appeal. Even if we were to very liberally construe this portion of Murrell’s brief as an argument that this Court should not consider the People’s appeal on the merits because the People have failed to “diligently prosecute[]” this appeal in violation of title 4, section 33(d)(5), we decline to do so because the People timely filed a motion to set aside the initial dismissal, and were precluded by Supreme Court Rule 35(e) from filing a brief unless this Court granted permission to cure the deficiency, which we did not do until March 2, 2012.
The parties disagree in their respective briefs as to whether any defect with the certification mandated by section 33(d)(2) represents a jurisdictional defect. Significantly, while Murrell frames his argument in jurisdictional terms, the People have noted that federal courts have held that the certification requirement codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 is not jurisdictional, and therefore the failure to timely file a certification — as opposed to a notice of appeal — does not mandate dismissal as a remedy. See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Nevertheless, since the People have complied with the certification requirement, we decline, as part of this appeal, to determine whether the failure to timely file a section 33(d)(2) certification deprives this Court of appellate jurisdiction.
But see W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d at 506 (stating, in dicta and without citation to any legal authority, that a 18 U.S.C. § 3731 certification must be made “by a United States Attorney (personally, not by an Assistant United States Attorney)”). The Ninth Circuit, however, has recently implied that the authority to certify an interlocutory appeal may be delegated. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 111 L. Ed. 2d 705 (2010).
Given our holding that the certification contained in the August 26,2011 notice of appeal was sufficient to comply with section 33(d)(2), it is not necessary or proper for us to resolve any of the other issues identified in our March 2, 2012 Order.
Additionally, the People argue — without citing to any legal authority or portions of the suppression hearing transcript — that Murrell somehow consented to the confiscation of his firearm and ammunition. However, the record — which consists solely of Douglas’s own testimony — clearly reveals that the firearm and ammunition were taken by Douglas after he stopped Murrell, ordered him to place his hands on the hedge, and then proceeded to search his person. In fact, Douglas himself testified that Murrell was not free to leave at this point. Under these circumstances, we cannot discern how the incident could possibly be construed as Murrell consenting to the police seizing the firearm and ammunition.
In its appellate brief, the People emphasize that, when evaluating the legality of a Terry stop, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances. However, as the Third Circuit also explained in Lewis,
The Government misapprehends the totality of the circumstances standard. Facts known to an officer at the time of a Terry stop must bear individual significance if they are to be considered in the aggregate. See United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 174-75, 51 V.I. 1196 (3d Cir.2009) (“We will examine the factors separately to address their individual significance, and then in the aggregate to assess the agents’ reasonable •suspicion under our totality of the circumstances inquiry.”).
As we explained in supra Part III. A., based on the testimony at the suppression hearing, the illegal tints on the vehicle were an impermissible ex post facto justification for the traffic stop. The informant’s tip about the white Toyota Camry is equally of no aid to the*808 Government. We cannot consider in the aggregate these two facts that individually have no relevance to our totality of the circumstances assessment.
672 F.3d at 240-41. If this Court were to follow the Ubiles and Lewis decisions, the factors emphasized by the People — that Douglas had reason to believe that Murrell possessed a firearm and had a right to ask Murrell if he had a firearm — are irrelevant, in that mere possession of a firearm, without more, is not a crime.
The statute reads, in its entirety, as follows:
(a) Any law enforcement officer who, in the light of his observations, information and experience, has a reasonable belief that (i) a person may be wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in violation of section 454 of this title, (ii) by virtue of his possession of a firearm, such person is or may be presently dangerous to the officer or to others, (iii) it is impracticable, under the circumstances, to obtain a search warrant; and (iv) it is necessary for the officer’s protection or the protection of others to take swift measures to discover whether such person is, in fact, wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm, such officer may:
(1) approach the person and identify himself as a law enforcement officer;
(2) request the person’s name and address, and, if the person is in a vehicle, his license to operate the vehicle, and the vehicle’s registration; and
(3) ask such questions and request such explanations as may be reasonably calculated to determine whether the person is, in fact, unlawfully wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in violation of section 454 of this title; and
(4) if the person does not give an explanation which dispels, the reasonable belief which he had, he may conduct a search of the person, limited to a patting or frisking of the person’s clothing in search of a firearm. The police officer in acting under this section shall do so with due regard to all circumstances of the occasion, including but not limited to the age, appearance,'physical condition, manner and sex of the person approached.
(b) In the event that the officer discovers the person to be wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm, he may demand that the person produce evidence that he is entitled to so wear, carry, or transport the firearm pursuant to section454 of this title. If the person is unable to produce such evidence, the officer may then seize the firearm and arrest the person.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the right of any police officer to make any other type of search, seizure, and arrest which may be permitted by law. Any police officer sued in a civil action for conducting a search or seizure pursuant to this section which is alleged to be unreasonable and unlawful shall, upon his request, be defended in said action and any appeals therefrom, by the Attorney General.
Every police officer who conducts a search or seizure pursuant to this section shall, within twenty-four hours after such search or seizure, file a written report with the U.S. Virgin Islands Police Department (V.I.P.D.) describing the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the reasons therefor on a form prescribed by the Police Commissioner. Such report shall include the name of the person searched.
23 V.I.C. § 488.
The Third Circuit referenced the King decision in United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 631, 36 V.I. 367 (3d Cir. 1997), in which it noted that a different portion of the King opinion — relating to whether the government was required to prove that a defendant possessed an unlicensed firearm for more than 24 hours — was no longer operable due to a subsequent amendment to section 470 of title 23. However, section 488 has been in existence since 1975 and has not been amended, and the portion of the King decision discussing its implications was not addressed by the Third Circuit.
Effective October 1, 2002, this enactment was renumbered as § 4-206 of the Maryland Code, without substantive change. The present statute provides, in its entirety, as follows:
(a) Limited search —
(1) A law enforcement officer may make an inquiry and conduct a limited search of a person under paragraph (2) of this subsection if the officer, in light of the officer’s observations, information, and experience, reasonably believes that:
(i) the person may be wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in violation of § 4-203 of this subtitle;
(ii) because the person possesses a handgun, the person is or presently may be dangerous to the officer or to others;
(iii) under the circumstances, it is impracticable to obtain a search warrant; and
(iv) to protect the officer or others, swift measures are necessary to discover whether the person is wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun.
*811 (2) If the circumstances specified under paragraph (1) of this subsection exist, a law enforcement officer:
(i) may approach the person and announce the officer’s status as a law enforcement officer;
(ii) may request the name and address of the person;
(iii) if the person is in a vehicle, may request the person’s license to operate the vehicle and the registration of the vehicle;
(iv) may ask any question and request any explanation that may be reasonably calculated to determine whether the person is unlawfully wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in violation of § 4-203 of this subtitle; and
(v) if the person does not offer an explanation that dispels the officer’s reasonable beliefs described in paragraph (1) of this subsection, may conduct a search of the person limited to a patting or frisking of the person’s clothing in search of a handgun.
(3) A law enforcement officer acting under this subsection shall take into account all circumstances of the occasion, including the age, appearance, physical condition, manner, and gender of the person approached.
(b) Seizure of handgun and arrest —■
(1) If the officer discovers that the person is wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, the officer may demand evidence from the person of the person’s authority to wear, carry, or transport the handgun in accordance with § 4-203(b) of this article.
(2) If the person does not produce the evidence specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the officer may seize the handgun and arrest the person.
(c) Written report. —
(1) A law enforcement officer who conducts a search or seizure in accordance with this section shall file a written report with the law enforcement officer’s employer unit within 24 hours after the search or seizure.
(2) The report shall be on a form that the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services prescribes, shall include the name of the person searched, and shall describe the circumstances surrounding and the reasons for the search or seizure.
(3) A copy of the report shall be sent to the Secretary of State Police.
(d) Civil actions. — On request of a law enforcement officer, the Attorney General shall defend the officer in a civil action, including any appeal, in which the officer is sued for conducting a search or seizure under this section that is alleged to be unreasonable and unlawful.
(e) Construction of section. —
(1) This section may not be construed to limit the right of a law enforcement officer to conduct any other type of search or seizure or make an arrest that is otherwise authorized by law.
(2) The provisions of this section are in addition to and not limited by the provisions of Title 2 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 4-206.
We recognize that section 488 may itself be subject to potential constitutional challenges. Although the Superior Court in this case concluded that section 488 imposes a higher standard than Terry, one could argue that the provision that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the right of any police officer to make any other type of search, seizure, and arrest which may be permitted by law,” 23 V.I.C. § 488(c), implies that the purpose of the statute is to impose lower standards for a firearm search than Terry. While it is not necessary for this Court to consider this issue as part of this appeal, we note that Maryland courts have found article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code constitutional by holding that the language simply codifies Terry in order “to allow a police officer to conduct a limited search for unlicensed concealed handguns under a standard of reasonable suspicion, rather than a standard of probable cause.” Allen, 584 A.2d at 1285.
We also note that local Virgin Islands firearm licensure laws may not necessarily be significantly different from Delaware law, which the Third Circuit concluded provides a presumption of illegality. At first glance, it may seem that Delaware imposes greater restrictions on the carrying of concealed weapons than the Virgin Islands, in that the pertinent statute imposes numerous requirements not found in the Virgin Islands Code, such as requiring applicants to submit character affidavits and to file proof of completion of firearms training courses. See Del. CODE Ann. tit. 11, § 1441. However, while chapter 5 of title 23 imposes several limitations on who may attain a license to possess a firearm, section 485 vests the Police Commissioner with the authority to impose additional rules and regulations that, “upon approval by the Governor, shall have the force and effect of law.” We note that several of the additional requirements found in the Delaware statute have also been adopted in the Virgin Islands, but are found in these regulations rather than in the Virgin Islands Code itself. See, e.g., 23 V.I.R.R. § 485-6(a)(4)(D) (completion of recognized course in firearm safety).
In fact, the People have not cited to Lewis at all in their appellate brief, and cite to Ubiles only twice — once in the statement of facts to note that Ubiles was referenced by the Superior Court, and later to note that the Attorney General considered Ubiles when deciding to make the section 33(d)(2) certification. In other words, while Murrell has declined to address this issue due to his incorrect belief that Lewis and Ubiles are binding on this Court, it appears the People have made a conscious decision not to even attempt to address these authorities in their brief, despite acknowledging that Ubiles formed the basis for the Superior Court’s decision.
We recognize that, in this case, the Superior Court suppressed Murrell’s statements to the police during the search as fruit of the poisonous tree. However, the United States Supreme