Defendant, Donny Lee Muniz, appeals his conviction of aggravated robbery, second degree kidnapping, and two counts of violent crime. We affirm.
The following facts are revealed by the record. At approximately 4:00 a. m. on February 14, 1978, an owner of the Bonfire Lounge, a Lakewood bar, was robbed by a masked man armed with a gun. The assailant forced the victim to drive him away in the victim’s car, but later jumped out of the car and fled on foot when a police car approached.
A police officer who arrived at the scene about an hour later observed defendant’s car parked in a parking lot a few blocks from the Bonfire. The driver’s side of the vehicle was unlocked and a key was in the ignition. The police sealed the car and towed it to an impound lot. One week later police officials obtained a warrant authorizing a search of the vehicle for a handgun, for property taken from the bar, for clothing, and for papers or articles showing ownership of the vehicle. While executing that warrant an officer attempted to start the car to check out its electrical system. It started on the first turn of the key, and the electrical system operated satisfactorily.
A prosecution motion for discovery and inspection was granted prior to trial. Defendant then filed a notice of alibi defense *102 which stated that he was in the company of one Debora Berry at a park far distant from the Bonfire’s parking lot from 3:00 to 5:00 a. m. on the morning in question. The notice also requested disclosure of prosecution witnesses who would rebut the alibi defense. Both the defense and the prosecution continued to endorse witnesses until the date of trial.
At trial, defendant, Berry, and Sandy Dunfee testified concerning defendant’s activities on February 13 and February 14, 1978. Berry, Dunfee, and defendant testified that defendant was with Dunfee, Dun-fee’s uncle, and Berry in the Bonfire from around 11:30 p. m. or midnight until it closed at 2:00 a. m., at which time defendant and Berry left in defendant’s car. Defendant and Berry testified that after leaving the bar they drove around, stopped at a park, and remained until 4:10 a. m., when defendant dropped Berry off at her home. Defendant testified that he then drove to a friend’s apartment located near the Bonfire, that his friend did not answer the door, that he subsequently was unable to start his car, and that he then left his car at the parking lot and set off on foot.
Defendant also testified that his car had a history of sporadic failures to start. Defendant’s father testified that the car had a defective electrical system prior to February 14, 1978, and that he had corrected the problem by replacing a part after the car was released from the police pound.
After defendant rested his case, the prosecution called Jody Miller to testify as a rebuttal witness. Defendant moved unsuccessfully to suppress her testimony because she had not been endorsed as a witness. Miller testified that defendant was with her until 1:00 a. m. on the morning of the robbery, and that he subsequently telephoned her from jail and told her not to “say anything” to anyone.
Defendant first contends that the prosecution failed to comply with the reciprocal disclosure provisions of Crim.P. 12.1 and 16{II)(c), and that, therefore, the trial court erred in permitting Jody Miller to testify. The prosecution contends that Miller’s testimony was offered to impeach the credibility of defendant and defense witnesses Berry and Dunfee rather than as “rebuttal” to defendant’s alibi defense, and that therefore defendant’s reliance upon Crim.P. 12.1 and Crim.P. 16(II)(c) is misplaced. We agree with the prosecution’s position.
Upon receipt of notice that a defendant intends to assert an “alibi” defense, a prosecuting attorney must:
“advise the defendant of the names and addresses of any additional witnesses who may be called to refute such alibi within a reasonable time after their identity becomes known.” Crim.P. 12.1.
Crim.P. 16(II)(c) states as follows:
“Subject to constitutional limitations, the trial court may require that the prosecuting attorney be informed of the nature of any defense which defense counsel intends to use at trial and the names and addresses of persons whom defense counsel intends to call as witnesses in support thereof. Upon receipt of the information required by this subsection (c), the prosecuting attorney shall notify defense counsel of any additional witnesses which he intends to call to rebut such defense within a reasonable time before trial after their identity becomes known.”
The defense of alibi arises when a defendant claims that he was at another place at the time the crime charged was committed.
Wisdom v. People,
*103
A distinction may be drawn between rebuttal testimony which refutes alibi evidence and impeachment testimony which does not contradict alibi evidence but does attack the credibility of defense witnesses on matters collateral to the alibi defense.
See People v. Wilson,
Here, defendant’s notice informed the prosecution that his alibi defense involved the hours of 3:00 to 5:00 a. m. and that he was at a park far away from the Bonfire during those hours. This description provided no basis for the prosecution to assume prior to trial that Miller’s testimony would be material to that alibi defense. Miller’s testimony attacked the veracity of the testimony of defendant, Berry, and Dunfee concerning defendant’s activities prior to 1:00 a. m.; it did not contradict defendant’s alibi evidence that at 4:00 a. m. he was not in front of the Bonfire. We conclude that Miller’s testimony did not rebut or refute defendant’s alibi defense; thus, the disclosure requirements of Crim.P. 12.1 and Crim.P. 16 are not applicable.
The endorsement of prosecution witnesses not related to the defense of alibi is governed by Crim.P. 7(d). The allowance of late endorsements is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
People v. Bailey,
In view of the foregoing conclusions, there is no merit to defendant’s contention that the prosecution’s conduct constituted prejudicial “gamesmanship,” in violation of the principles of full disclosure embodied in the reciprocal discovery rules. The adversary system is indeed, as defendant states, a means to achieve the goals of ascertaining truth and achieving justice.
Wardius v. Oregon,
Defendant finally contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress testimony concerning the testing of the electrical system of his car. Defendant argues that such testing exceeded the scope of the search warrant which had been issued and that admission of that testimony was prejudicial to him. We find no prejudicial error.
Police officials executing a search warrant are limited by the terms of that warrant and may not conduct a general exploratory search not reasonably calculated to uncover the items specified in the warrant.
Hernandez v. People,
However, admission of the fruits of an illegal search does not constitute a basis for reversing a jury determination of guilt when such evidence does not affect the substantial rights of a defendant. Crim.P. 52(a);
People v. McClure,
Judgment affirmed.