*1 No. 3099. Fifth Dist. May [Crim. 1978.] PEOPLE,
THE Plaintiff and Appellant, MORELAND,
RONALD THOMAS Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel Winkler, General, R. J. Jack Chief Assistant
Evelle Younger, Attorney General, General, O. Arnold Assistant Eddie Attorney Attorney Overoye, Binkerd, General, for Plaintiff T. Keller and A. Gary Attorneys Deputy *4 and Appellant. Defender, Nitz,
Melvin W. Public and Harden Roger Spaulding, Defender, for Defendant and Assistant Public Respondent.
Opinion 28, 1976,
TUTTLE, December defendant was in an J.*—On charged At a 246 of Penal Code.1 information with violation of section who shall 246 read in time section “Any person pertinent part: at and a firearm an inhabited dwelling maliciously wilfully discharge 1949, a house or is ...” (Stats. building, occupied guilty felony, 698, 1, ch. 1200.)2 § p. is in this of fundamental
The signifi appeal question presented was a whether defendant with cance: charged properly determining 246, house or should the words “inhabited of section violation dwelling * of the Judicial Council. Assigned by Chairperson indicated, 1Hereafter, are sections of the all references to unless otherwise statutory Penal Code. 1, 1977, was to read in “Any section 246 amended pertinent part: 2Effective January a at an inhabited firearm willfully discharge who shall maliciously person (Stats. . . .” motor vehicle guilty felony, pp. building, house occupied occupied 1976, 350.2, 5106, 5175.) §§ ch. see also Stats. ch. § l,p. 1, 1978, Then, was amended read pertinent section again effective January a at an inhabited who firearm willfully discharge shall “Any maliciously person part: vehicle, car, house, as motor inhabited house occupied occupied building, Code, as defined in Section Vehicle or inhabited camper, in Section defined 243 of section, this ‘inhabited’ ... As used in felony, the Vehicle guilty (Stats. whether not.” used for dwelling means currently being purposes, 690, 1, —.) ch. in that section be construed include a occupied building” with 24-foot recreational vehicle accommo- living Winnebago equipped not warrant dations? these words did such broad Holding construction, the trial motion to set aside court defendant’s granted lack (§ information for cause 995); probable People appeal 1238, subd. (§ (a)(1)).
The evidence received examination be sum- preliminary may marized follows: On the of October in the Town of evening Fresno defendant was at the Inn where he Dunlap, County, Dunlap with several who customers were friends of William quarreled Lindsey. occurred in the and commenced when dispute presence Lindsey woman friend denied defendant’s for a ride home. Lindsey’s request Later, drove his 24-foot recreational vehicle Lindsey Winnebago away inn; from the he was his friends. He accompanied by parked nearby on weekends; he on where night private premises parked customarily after his friends left connected the electrical At about Lindsey supply. 10:30 two blasts were fired into the while p.m., shotgun Winnebago *5 was inside. Defendant was arrested for the Lindsey shooting charged with section 246. violating
This would be an if case we were called to decide whether or easy upon a not reasonable man a into an recreational vehicle firing gun that, would believe he that was some law and if breaking apprehended, he would to unless the blundered. go jail, prosecutor Admittedly, is defendant accused of But serious our is to assess wrongdoing. job acts, the abstract to defendant’s but rather determine wrongfulness whether these the acts violate statute under which the elected prosecutor to proceed. “ ‘
While we that statutes “... should not be frittered agree penal away niceties and at refinements war with the administration of by practical ’ ” ..” v. Crenshaw justice,. Cal.App.2d [167 781]; accord Malcolm (1975) 667]), it that the administration” appears “practical urged by
the oriented; General here is too result it would weaken Attorney vital ato free to bad one actor under an principles society simply punish statute. inappropriate
This is not we deal here with fundamen- quixotic quibbling; principles to tal A under law. democratic cannot state any government jail people be conduct, the
for anti-social but for acts declared to only legislature criminal. text will consider the it is not that a criminal carefully
“Although likely steals, that a fair he murders or it is reasonable of the law before warning world will that the common to the world in should given To understand, law to do if a certain line of what the intends passed. fair, line should be clear.” the so far as the make warning possible 816, 818, 51 L.Ed. v. United States U.S. (McBoyle S.Ct. reversed the this Justice Holmes McBoyle principle,
Applying motor defendant’s conviction of interstate a stolen transportation vehicle because the conduct interstate defendant’s (i.e., transportation a under which stolen was covered statute airplane) clearly was interstate statute prosecution transporta brought; prohibiting “an term vehicle” as tion of stolen motor vehicles defined the “motor automobile, truck, automobile automobile any motorcycle, wagon, on rails.” other vehicle not Although designed running self-propelled word use the Holmes felt that “... it is Justice etymologically possible land, air, water a on conveyance signify working [vehicle] direction,” 283 U.S. sometimes extends the use in that (supra, legislation that at concluded L.Ed. at 51 S.Ct. he 340]) “[w]hen p. p. mind in the common that evoke rule conduct laid down words land, should not be the statute of vehicles on only picture moving similar to us aircraft, seem extended to because simply may had if thought legislature applies, upon speculation policy 283 U.S. at it, been used” broader words would have *6 (supra, very likely 818-819, 51 S.Ct. 341]). 27 L.Ed. at pp. at p. [75 the case was rule Justice Holmes in relied McBoyle upon by earlier, 1820, is Justice Marshall: “It 100 in Chief over stated years by its court, crime, ordain which is define a and the the to legislature, from to collected The intention of the is be legislature punishment. [¶]... (5 18 U.S. (1820) the words States v. (United they employ.” Wiltberger 76, 37, 95 L.Ed. Wheat.) 42].) [5 earlier, more
It said that these were in might concepts developed in of current and are unrealistic years, peaceful impractical light rates But crime and the need law enforcement. experience rigorous relics us are outmoded the 20th teaches that such rules not merely century liberalism, beware of 19th and we know that citizens must century 17 which claims in the interest to government public power imprison those who do acts deemed to be even deserving punishment, though the statute under which the does not prosecution brought clearly such conduct.3 proscribe
It is true that section 4 states that the common law rule of strict
construction
criminal statutes does not
to the California Penal
apply
Code, but
California
Court has stated:
the Penal
Supreme
“Although
Code
to
commands us
construe its
to
fair
provisions ‘according
import
terms,
of their
with a
to
view
effect its
and to
objects
justice’
promote
it is clear
4],
the courts cannot
so far as
an
to create
offense
go
[§
statute,
words,
the terms
enlarging
by inserting
deleting
by giving
used false or unusual
v. Baker
44,
69 Cal.2d
50
(1968)
meanings.
595, 442 P.2d
Penal statutes
will
be made
reach
675].)
Cal.Rptr.
[69
intent;
their
include
those
beyond
offenses
plain
they
only
coming clearly
within the
of their
(DeMille American Fed. Radio
import
language.
Artists
139,
769,
Indeed,
Cal.2d
P.2d
(1947)
Accordingly, reasonably penal constructions, of two that construction which is susceptible ordinarily more favorable to the defendant will be re (In Murdock adopted. v. Valentine 764]; 28, 1935, 3For on June example, statute which Germany following promulgated was hailed as “a mile-stone on the road to a National Penal Socialist Law”: “Any person
who commits act an which the law declares to be or which is of punishable deserving a law penalty according fundamental of and sound conceptions penal popular act, shall be If there is no law feeling, punished. an it shall penal directly covering under the law of which the punished fundamental most to said conception nearly applied Further, act.” article 16 of the Soviet Penal Code “Where a provides: socially dangerous code, act not has been dealt with in the the basis and limits of expressly present thereof shall of responsibility be determined in with those articles respect conformity the code which deal with the (See crimes most it." Michael & closely resembling Weschler, 1080, Criminal Law and (1940) 1.) Its Administration 1080 and fn. p. p. 121, 28 Cal.2d P.2d v. 1]; 24 Cal.2d (1946) (1944) People Ralph 575, 581 The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every doubt, fact, whether arises out a reasonable of of or as to question of or the construction of in a true words interpretation Court, 619, (Keeler statute. Cal.3d supra, Superior Valentine, 121, 143; 24 Cal.2d supra, Ralph, 575, 581.) not to rule, and show that defendant here is entitled
To avoid this doubt, of a General must show benefit such reasonable Attorney or that the words “inhabited house dwelling occupied building” appear a 24-foot in section 246 cannot be construed to exclude reasonably ing vehicle, thus the statute is recreational reasonably proving of Such an founders two constructions. argument upon susceptible A vehicle which is suitable words. recreational meaning plain plain come for does not and used weekend overnight stays, trips, including definition of within either the common or meaning dictionary or “house” “building.”4 “house” been 4The word has defined as: commonly structure or used human a that serves as intended for habitation: a one’s building “[A] a
residence or domicile as with of business: building containing contrasted esp. place (3d (Webster’s 1961) for a few New Dict. ed. one or families” Internat. living quarters 1096, 1); col. p. live; (Random House Dict. which residence for human building people beings” “[A] 688, 2); 1973) of the ed. col. (unabridged Eng. Language p. habitation, one of a “A intended for human used as residence building especially (Funk Internat. Dict. tenant” & Standard single Wagnalls, family Comprehensive 612, (Bicentennial 1); 1973) ed. col. p. (American Dict. a families” Heritage “A structure as for one several serving 1); col. p. Eng. Language habitation; a that is the ordinary dwelling-place “A for human building esp. building 1). Dict. (5 a Oxford col. family” Eng. p. has been defined as: The word “building” commonly a covering space edifice to stand more or less designed permanently, constructed “[A] walls, land, and serving or less enclosed by covered a roof and more completely usu. animals, storehouse, structure —distin for or other useful as shelter a dwelling, factory, monuments) and (as for fences or from structures not designed occupancy guished from (as trailers) though even subject use in one boats structures intended place 1); (3d 1961) col. added) (Webster’s New Internat. Dict. ed. (italics p. occupancy” a and often roof boxlike construction essentially having relatively permanent “[A] level, its on more one for any within walls than usually windows and enclosing space, activities, (Random etc.” House wide variety living, entertaining, manufacturing, 3); 1973) ed. col. Dict. of the Eng. (unabridged p. Language house, barn, use; built, & (Funk a etc.” edifice for which is “An any 1973) 1); col. (Bicentennial Standard Internat. Dict. ed. p. Comprehensive Wagnalls built; structure; (American Dict. of Eng. that is an edifice” Heritage “Something 1); col. p. Language built; structure, built of the nature a house which is edifice: now a structure “That (1 2). Oxford col. where it is to stand” Dict. Eng. *8 short, whether, we must decide in the of Justice Holmes, the “common world” would understand the “inhabited words house or to mean a 24-foot recreational dwelling occupied building” vehicle. Would the citizen believe that such a vehicle a house ordinary or more than he would believe 24-foot cabin cruiser or building, any boat, car, sail a railroad or an is a house even if airplane building, True, with bunks and a kitchen? he would believe it was equipped wrong to it, anti-social fire a into but that is not the issue before this gun court. The is not whether defendant did a bad and should question thing have known that his conduct was is whether wrong; morally question defendant did the act the statute under which he was by proscribed charged. answer, believe, we clear; the case falls within the squarely of Justice Holmes in the case. v. United
reasoning
McBoyle
(McBoyle
States,
Not would a reasonable doubt a only say wrong beyond recreational vehicle is included within the “inhabited phrase house or but it that at the time occupied building,” defendant appears violated section did not intend for a allegedly Legislature recreational vehicle to come within the ambit of that section.
When section 246 was enacted in 1949 its extended to only scope “inhabited Effective house[s] building[s].” January 1, 1977, statute; motor vehicle” was added to the phrase “occupied thereafter, effective car, the words “inhabited house January defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code” and “inhabited camper, defined in Section 243 Vehicle Code” were added to section 246. 2, ante, (See fn. 14.) and there is is not an this
Ordinarily, nothing suggest case, the uses words for some reason and intends ordinary Legislature them to have 63-64 some Perkins Cal.2d meaning. (People Where have been introduced to a statute changes amendment it is not to be assumed that the were without design; changes a statute the an demonstrates amending substantially Perkins, intent to law. 37 Cal.2d change preexisting supra, 62, 64; Valentine, 121, 142; v. Weitzel Thus, 118-119 P. not until Cal. A.L.R. 811].) 1, 1977, did the intend for of vehicle to January any type come within the ambit of section 246.
20 fact that the is further the when
This conclusion supported by 246, it motor vehicle” to section added the words “occupied a firearm” from the same time deleted the words at “discharges Code, the Vehicle which of section 23110 of subdivision (b) prior of a substance or deletion of those words the proscribed throwing on a Where of firearm a vehicle highway. discharging statute, matter amended to add a the with reference to one is subject, a related such a similar statute omission of from concerning subject the intended a substantial matter, is to show that significant v. to which the addition occurred. (Cf. in the statute People change Valentine, 142.) this court has that General
The suggested Attorney an in 460 as aid 1 of section of subdivision look to should language 1 of section in Subdivision the statutory language question. interpreting house, trailer coach of an inhabited reads 460 “Every burglary in the Code, committed or nighttime, defined the Vehicle building by cited However, General has first Attorney is degree.”5 burglary 459, not subdivi of section court cases to this language interpreting who enters Section 459 any 1 of section 460. sion “Every person provides: bam, warehouse, store, mill, tenement, house, room, shop, apartment, coach, vessel, car, trailer tent, stable, railroad other outhouse building, car, Code, as defined house Vehicle defined in Section 635 any Code, as defined inhabited Section 362 of the Vehicle camper, Code as defined the Vehicle vehicle Section 243 of the Vehicle locked, as defined vehicle are aircraft when doors of such thereof, Code, mine or Harbors and any portion Navigation underground is with intent to commit any guilty larceny felony grand petit section, used As used in this ‘inhabited’ means currently being burglary. whether or not.” for dwelling purposes, 459 and The section broad veiy comprehensive, for human and even stmctures are encompasses 34 Cal. habitation. v. Stickman (1867) Searcy (People People 52 153 1002]; Cal.App.2d [314 Coffee have P. cases section 459 213].) Cal.App. interpreting can include held structures within the ambit of that statute correctly that are not affixed stmctures realty. Burley permanently (People 5The word “inhabited” contained in subdivision 1 of section applicable coach” as well as “trailer house.” v. Lewis “building” “dwelling descriptive 650]; v. Clinton Cal.App. P. *10 213, 214-215 stand on 26 .2d popcorn 148] Cal.App [a 118, 122, 123-124 chicken wheels]; People Coffee, supra, Cal.App. [a As was out house constructed on skids].) pointed Burley, ‘tent, 213, “It be noted vessel 215: should supra, 459], car’ are included in the definition in section railroad burglary [of which can connection ‘tent’ scarcely being regarded permanently broad, affixed to But the same realty.” comprehensive language such an of section 459 is from absent subdivision 1 permits interpretation of section 460.
The one case that has dealt with the more restrictive of language subdivision of section 460 held that a caboose was neither an “inhabited house” nor an “inhabited within the building” meaning 1 of 460; subdivision section the court observed that a caboose was a “railroad car.” v. Jones 683, 684-685 P. Cal.App. We note that the words “railroad car” are included expressly 459, in section but are omitted from subdivision 1 of section 460. Such an omission would raise a reasonable inference that the did not intend for “railroad to come within the ambit subdivision car[s]” section Valentine, even if were inhabited. (See they coach,” 142.) car,” words “trailer “house Similarly, “inhabited vehicle” have been included camper” expressly “[locked] 459, but, coach,” in section for “trailer have omitted been from except 1 of subdivision section 460. Such an omission also raises a reasonable inference that the vehicles, did not intend for such even if inhabited, come within the of subdivision 1 of section scope except for “trailer which are included in that expressly coach[es]” provision. case, the instant General’s allusions Attorney language subdivision 1 of section 460 is more of a hindrance to his than an position assistance.
Since defendant’s conduct occurred before the alleged January section this case is controlled change section 246 as it read to that Witkin, Pen. (See prior change. 9, 17, Cal. Crimes At (1963) §§ the time in 20.) section pp. question of a firearm into an merely proscribed “inhabited discharging house or above, For the reasons stated occupied building.” 24-foot recreational vehicle is neither an Winnebago “inhabited dwelling house” nor an within the of section 246. It “occupied building” meaning follows that the trial court correct in was defendant’s section 995 granting motion. order aside the information is affirmed. setting
Franson, J., concurred. (G. A.), P. J. —I dissent.
BROWN *11 a 24-foot motor The narrow issue to be resolved is whether Winnebago the weekend on which was for near residence home private parked was house within “an inhabited or occupied building” property dwelling the Penal 246.1 I that at least the of Code section conclude very meaning “an house.” classified as inhabited dwelling properly The motor home was with accommoda- Winnebago equipped sleeping tions, area, for owner kitchen area and a stove Its sitting cooking. in drove the unit on to the foothills near weekends habitually Dunlap in Fresno and it in same location. On the weekend the County parked he followed umbilical was his usual The electrical question practice. owner connected to the were closed. The an outside source and curtains two as a habitation when and another were the using person Winnebago from were into the home at close and blasts range discharged shotgun different angles. the with in the defendant had had
Earlier the evening disagreements took and at a inn where some owner’s friends shoving pushing nearby Defendant and been denied a ride home in the had Winnebago. place Code the with Penal arrested after and was violating shooting charged 246. section is' a of law for of proper interpretation statutory language question court, in which is not constricted this regard by appellate court. Neal State
conclusions of
trial
(Evid.
11,
607,
55
357 P.2d
(cert.
Cal.2d
17
(1960)
Cal.Rptr.
839]
[9
California
den.,
S.Ct.
It is also to observe that the “should statute be construed appropriate with the the social evil which flexibly principal objective discouraging statute was v. Malcolm designed prevent” [the] 217, 223 667], fn. and that omitted) rule “[t]he law, of the common construed, statutes are to be has no penal strictly *12 this to Code. All its are to application be construed [Penal] provisions the fair terms, to of their awith view to effect according its import objects and to (Pen. v. promote justice.” Haskins 177 (1960) People 84, 86-87 34].) Cal.App.2d
The manifest intent of the in Penal Code section enacting 246 could have been other than to the inhabitants of a nothing protect structure or altered or for human designed habitation and equipped used as such from killed or being missile from a being injured by firearm.2
This the discernible intent of the in being overriding section it is the the structure so enacting mobility apparent little, and used for habitation is of if measurable designed any, therefore should be directed toward whether significance. inquiry either case or other law of statutory preclude principles interpretation such a I conclusion. think not. law, first to the case no cases have been found which define
Turning the terms “inhabited house” or are they “occupied building” used in section 246. direct such it is both of Lacking authority, agreed the that it is to turn to the statutes and the parties appropriate burglary cases which them. Penal Code section subdivision interpret 2At the the offense time of herein Vehicle Code 23110 section prohibited discharge thereof, firearm at a motor vehicle on thus highway occupant protecting in a motor home and other motorists from criminal persons such conduct while on highway.
24 first uses term “inhabited degree defining burglary, precise house ... or The terms “house” and in are used building.” “building” Penal Code 3 section 459. Chavira People Cal.App.3d the court looked for 851], cases guidance construing [83 Cal.Rptr. statute in order to of words in burglary interpret meaning Penal Code section 246.
A review of those cases
the view that the
degree
supports
mobility,
not,
whether
does
an inhabited or
prevent
self-propelled
occupied
structure from
an inhabited
classified as
being
dwelling,
is noted that
terms “house”
have
building. Initially
“building”
Thus,
been
in
v. Stickman
liberal
given
interpretation.
People
house,
242, 245,
statute,
Cal.
the court said: “A
the sense
is any
structure
has
sides and
which
walls on all
is covered
a roof.” (In
accord,
v. Miller
P.2d
534];
Cal.App.2d
People
A
has been
Buyle
Cal.App.2d
building
Miller,
631, 634,
defined in
“‘a
contain,
structure which has
and is
for the habitation
capacity
designed
”
of,
animals,
man or
or the
Witkin,
sheltering
property.’
California Crimes (1963
section
stated that a
ed.)
page
building
kind of structure
as a
if used
habitation.”
the word
may
“any
Defining
in terms of its
v. Alexander (1966)
“building”
purpose
design, People
*13
301,
244
305
states: ““‘The
65],
well-
Cal.App.2d
Cal.Rptr.
[53
understood
of the word
is a structure which has a
meaning
[building]
contain,
of,
and is
for
animals,
the habitation
man or
capacity
designed
’ ”
or the
of
sheltering
property.”
213,
v.
26
(1938)
214-215
P.2d 148], the
Burley
Cal.App.2d
[79
court held that a mobile
stand
small
mounted on
wheels which
popcorn
was
enclosed was a
The court said:
are no
entirely
building.
“[T]here
words in the statute to indicate a
intent
limit such
offense to
legislative
are a
unlawful
structures that
entry
part
realty.” Similarly,
been held
included
have
to be
within the
statutes:
following
burglary
Mobile
52
chicken
on skids
v.
(1921)
coop
(People
Cal.App.
Coffee
120-122
bus
P.
used as an office
213]); passenger
[198
156
296
P.2d
(1957)
365]);
McLaughlin
Cal.App.2d
sheep wagon
[319
on wheels used
habitation
v. Ebel
(State
sheepherder
place
25
240
181
A.2d
trailer
407];
(Commonwealth Mayer
Pa.Super.
[362
office
v. Parsons
Alexander, 301, 304-305; Witkin, Cal. Crimes supra, Cal.App.2d Ebel, (1963 ed.) State v. Mont. A court Jones noted that caboose is a “railroad car.”
234-235].) “railroad car” is included in Penal Code section whereas it expressly is omitted from section 460. Such an omission would raise an inference that the did not intend section 460 to apply burglary a caboose. In the case there is no similar indication that the present intended the terms in Penal Code section 246 to be narrowly Nevertheless, construed. Jones is therefore to the extent distinguishable. herein, I that the in Jones is inconsistent with the conclusions holding with the other would decline to its inconsistent follow teaching being cases on subject. of a structure conclusion that mobility
Inferentially supportive
my
for
human
otherwise
converted
designed
customarily
3In noncriminal context the cases
hold
and mobile structures to
semimobile
uniformly
See,
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hacienda Mobile Home Park
buildings.
example, Pacific
(a
mobile home or trailer is
building
559]
*14
easement);
or structure as those two terms were
in a
of
Melton
subject grant
City
restaurant,
(bus
used as a
San Pablo
[61
29]
of
connected,
on,
inflated.
code
building
lines
wheels
tires
utility
Building subject
use,
characteristics the bus
otherwise have
ordinance. “Once
to such a
any
might
adapted
are,
.”);
as a
. . .
Aetna
mobile
unit
least temporarily,
transportation
suspended
Life
(house
used for
(5th
1939)
Ins. Co. v. Aird
Cir.
The that because Penal Code section majority 246 was argues amended in 1976 to include vehicle,”4 motor it must be that a “occupied presumed in the intended, law was thus change inferentially demonstrating a firearm at a motor home before the discharging amendment was not v. Valentine prohibited. indeed made a in amendment, the law the Legislature in change
that it included within the of Penal Code section 246 all protections vehicles, motor whether used on or off the occupied for human highway habitation. The also eliminated concurrently Vehicle Code section 231105 which had restricted the offense therein to of a firearm at a vehicle on a making discharge highway punishable. Nevertheless, the conclusion is not from this amendment or compelled the 1977 amendment that the had intended to exclude motor homes and trailers from under the former being protected provisions 4Penal Code section 246 as amended in 1976 who shall provides; “Any person and maliciously a firearm at willfully an inhabited discharge house or occupied or motor vehicle is building, occupied of a and guilty felony, conviction shall be upon in the punished by imprisonment state or prison in the by imprisonment county jail one exceeding year.” that; Section 246 was further amended in 1977 to who shall provide “Any person house, and a firearm at maliciously willfully an inhabited discharge occupied vehicle, car, motor building, Vehicle inhabited house occupied defined in Section 362 of the Code, or inhabited as defined in Section 243 camper, Vehicle of a guilty conviction shall be felony, upon punished the state by imprisonment or in the prison, one imprisonment county jail As used in exceeding year. this section, ‘inhabited’ means used for whether currently being dwelling purposes, or not.” herein; 5Vehicle Code section 23110 at the time of the events provided “(a) who throws substance Any person at a vehicle any thereof on a any occupant highway guilty misdemeanor. “(b) who with Any person intent to do great bodily injury maliciously wilfully rock, brick, bottle, throws or missile, projects any metal or other other projects any harm, substance serious capable doing bodily a firearm at such discharges vehicle or *15 thereof is occupant guilty felony conviction shall be upon punished by imprisonment for not less than one or more than five in the year state years prison.” The 1976amendment deleted the a firearm.” language “discharges be that the it can concluded section 246. With rationally equal logic are concerned intended as motor homes must have insofar reaffirmance and clarification that the was a amendment legislative law. Haskins Cal.Rptr. existing view use term Corroboration of this is found in Legislature’s statute “motor vehicle” rather than “vehicle” when in 1976 amending and in the reenactment of the “inhabited house or dwelling language The terms of the reenactment establishes that the occupied building.” statute have the same decisions meaning construing judicial of which decisions the to be aware. language, presumed (Witkin, Cal. Crimes If “inhabited (1975 24.) § p. supp.) language house or is not construed to include building” habitable mobile vehicles which are thus are not self-propelled Code, “motor vehicles” a whole class of structures defined (Veh. 415), § as trailer coaches would remain excluded from (Veh. 635) absurd intent under the law. I cannot ascribe such an protection pre-1977 to the Legislature. also relies principal opinion principles upon interpretation Keeler v. Court Cal.3d
repeated Superior 470 P.2d 40 A.L.R.3d where it said: “It 420], is the of this state construe a statute as to the policy favorably penal defendant as its and the circumstances of its language application may fact, in the case defendant reasonably just permit; question is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt as to the true every of words or the construction of in a statute. interpretation Valentine, (See 143.) On its [Citation.]” face this seems to be in conflict with the rule set forth principle statutory in Penal Code section to the effect rule of the common law that construed, statutes are to has no and that penal all strictly application are to be construed terms, the fair of their provisions according import with a view to effect its and to closer objects promote justice. Upon however, there is no conflict as terms, to this case. its analysis, applied By of Keeler of the words and principle applies interpretation in a statute when the and the phrases circumstances its “language . .. view, . ..” Cal.3d at (2 application 631.) reasonably permit; my the term “inhabited house” under the circumstances herein does other than that I have reasonably any permit interpretation espoused. I do not believe reasonable could believe he was not any person possibly the statute into a known inhabited violating weapon discharging *16 motor home used as a To find otherwise would lead to being dwelling. the absurd conclusion that the to 1966 did not intend to Legislature prior make the actions at issue in this case under law. this punishable Moreover, the of Keeler does not mean that “the principle language statute must be stretched and strained the limitation of reason.” beyond Court P.2d (Downing Municipal Cal.App.2d As was said in v. Crenshaw 781], from Lewis’ Sutherland Construction quoting (2d Statutory “ section ‘A ed.) 981: statute should receive a reasonable page penal and common construction, sense and “its force should not be frittered niceties and refinements at war with the away by administration practical of strict construction justice.” does allow court to principle make that an offense which enactment; is not such but this by legislative does not exclude the of common sense to the terms made use application of in an act in order to avoid an which the absurdity legislature ought ” to be to have intended.’ (See v. Hallner presumed Cal.2d P.2d 393].)
In this it is also noted in that the regard, Keeler and passing principle Valentine has caused the courts no the identical problem construing to include mobile and semi-mobile structures in the context language statutes. burglary it must be observed that the construction of
Finally, majority’s statute as it existed to amendment in 1976 would eliminate prior of a motor home after the vehicle left protection occupants afforded Vehicle Code highway, protection up point being section 23110 itas then read. There is inconsistent nothing inappropriate, Code, the two statutes (Veh. incongruous § interpreting Pen. 246) and as a whole for the together congruent purpose of a motor home while on the affording protection occupants under the Vehicle Code and under the Penal Code off while highway highway.
I would hold that the term “inhabited house” as used in section 246 of the Penal Code includes a motor home Winnebago being used for habitation when on that a reasonable parked private property, in the of the defendant would know that the person conduct in position which he statute, was and that engaged prohibited by considering statute, of the statute and other circum- purpose *17 held, so would be reasonable. no other conclusion stances Having a motor home is an to determine whether would be unnecessary building.
I would reverse the order.