People v. MorbelliPeople v. Morbelli
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Gross
OPINION OF THE COURT
Michael A Gross, J.Defendant, charged in an information with endangering the welfare of a child (
“A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when:
“(1) He knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a male child less than sixteen years old or a female child less than seventeen years old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his life or health”.
“Sexual contact” is defined in
The factual portion of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with violating these sections states:
“Deponent is informed by sixteen year old, Odessa Presley, of an address known to the District Attorney’s Office, that the defendant did reach his * * * arm up the informant’s dress three (3) times and fondled the informant’s leg and upper thigh.
“Deponent is further informed by Odessa Presley, that the defendant did not have permission or authority to reach up her dress and feel her leg or thigh.”
Legislative enactments are presumed constitutional and the burden of demonstrating a statute is unconstitutional rests with the party seeking to invalidate it. (People v Bright, 71 NY2d 376, 382 [1988]; People v Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333, 337 [1969].) Unconstitutionality must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. (Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v Du Mond, 309 NY 537, 540-541 [1956].)
A law is void if it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute” (United States v Harriss, 347 US 612, 617 [1954]) or if the failure to provide explicit standards for application encourages “arbitrary and discriminatory enforce
Defendant’s challenge to
For the reasons set forth below this court rejects both claims that
The court in Villacis (supra) made no attempt to parse the language of
Utilizing Bergerson (supra) as a minimum standard of control, it is clear that, based on the misdemeanor complaint against defendant, sufficient facts have been alleged to create an issue of fact for the jury: defendant, a 40-year-old man riding on a bus transporting air travelers from Kennedy Airport to Manhattan was alleged to have approached the 16-year-old complainant, also a passenger on the bus, place his arm “up [her] dress three * * * times and fondled [her] leg and upper thigh.” Clearly, the threshold of control — satisfied in Bergerson by the decision to buy beer for some youths — was crossed here. Moreover, under Villacis (supra) as well as
As to the sexual abuse charge, defendant argues that the “leg and thigh” is not an “intimate part” as required by the definition of “sexual contact”. (
This approach is particularly appropriate given that society’s use of the term “sexual” may connote a “sphere of behavior associated with libidinal gratification” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2082) rather than any specific acts. What is “intimate” cannot be determined independently of the circumstances of the alleged behavior. (See also, People v Victor P., 120 Misc 2d 770 [Crim Ct, NY County 1983].)
Defendant relies on People v Vicaretti (54 AD2d 236 [4th
The court also rejects defendant’s further argument that the statute is void for vagueness as applied. The court considers a person of reasonable intelligence would have sufficient notice that the alleged conduct is prohibited. (See, People v Blodgett, 37 AD2d 1035, 1036 [3d Dept 1971] [” ‘intimate parts’ ” not vague and uncertain]; People v Belfrom, 124 Misc 2d 185, 189 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1984] [some aspects of the prohibited conduct may be left to the commonly accepted community sense of decency, propriety and morality]; People v Darryl M., 123 Misc 2d 723, 730 [Crim Ct, NY County 1984] [“(w)hile the term ‘any other lewd act’ may not conjure up the same specific acts to every person, the ordinary citizen will have a ‘reliable, if visceral, response to them’ ”].)
Accordingly, defendant’s motion as to this charge is also denied.
DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION
Defendant argues that the document filed by the People to convert the complaint to an information is insufficient to constitute a corroborating affidavit as required by
Defendant bases his claim on (1) the absence of an attestation; (2) the supporting deposition’s use of the male gender to describe the female complainant; and (3) the assertion that the document may not have been subscribed in New York State thus invalidating the effect of the form notice that false statements made on the deposition are punishable pursuant to
The law is clear that the existence of such a form notice together with the subscription of the deponent are sufficient to verify the document. (
On January 5, 1989, defendant was arraigned and the matter was adjourned to February 16, 1989, for the corroborating affidavit. This 42-day period is charged to the People.
On February 16, 1989, the matter was further adjourned to March 16, 1989, for the corroborating affidavit. This 28-day period is charged to the People.
On March 16, 1989, the corroborating affidavit was filed with the court and served on the defense and a motion schedule was set. All time subsequent to that date is excludable, the adjournment being as a consequence of defendant’s motion and of the time during which the matter has been under consideration by the court. (
Accordingly, 70 days are properly charged to the People. As this is less than the applicable 90-day period, defendant’s motion is denied.
The People have consented to defendant’s motion for a Huntley hearing which this court has previously ordered. Defendant’s request for the address of the complaining witness is denied, since defendant has failed to demonstrate any need for this extraordinary relief.
Notes
In any event defendant’s speedy trial argument fails to take account of the fact that time may nonetheless be excluded prior to conversion of the complaint when defendant requests or consents to adjournments. (People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 [1985].)