PEOPLE V MITCHELL
Docket Nos. 98984, 98985
Supreme Court of Michigan
March 25, 1997
Argued October 8, 1996 (Calendar No. 5).
454 Mich 145
Docket Nos. 98984, 98985. Argued October 8, 1996 (Calendar No. 5).
Decided March 25, 1997.
Charlie L. Mitchell was convicted in the Detroit Recorder‘s Court, Samuel A. Turner, J., of second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals, SAWYER, P.J., and WEAVER and H. R. GAGE, JJ., in an unpublished opinion per curiam, affirmed the conviction, but reversed the sentence imposed on the basis of a scoring error under the sentencing guidelines and remanded for resentencing (Docket Nos. 118832, 121158). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Justice BOYLE, joined by Justices BRICKLEY and RILEY, the Supreme Court held:
1. A thirty-day suspension of trial counsel during a seven-month period of representation is not a circumstance making it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that a total or constructive denial of counsel occurred. Examination of the actual performance of counsel and prejudice is required.
2. The defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. The defendant failed to overcome the presumption that counsel‘s performance was reasonable or to show that the deficiencies alleged prejudiced the outcome of his trial. In determining whether a defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court must determine whether counsel‘s performance was objectively unreasonable, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel‘s defective performance. Defendant‘s claims of ineffective assistance fail on both scores.
3. Review of a sentence is available to the prosecution on the same terms as the defense.
4. Because the sentencing guidelines do not have the force of law, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering resentencing on the basis of a scoring error. A scoring error does not violate the law. A
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Chief Justice MALLETT, dissenting, stated that the specific facts of the case justify a presumption of ineffectiveness without inquiry into actual performance or prejudice of counsel.
Where surrounding circumstances make it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance, ineffectiveness may be presumed without inquiry into actual performance or prejudice. The circumstances surrounding the defendant‘s representation precluded crucial trial preparation. The criminal justice and attorney disciplinary systems, without a doubt, combined to deny the defendant any assistance of counsel for a full thirty-four days leading to his trial. This denial was especially egregious because counsel had not previously conducted a private in-depth interview with his client to hear his account of the first-degree murder charge and because challenges to the admissibility of evidence had not been addressed and res gestae witnesses had not been contacted. This was not an instance where counsel chose to take no action. Rather, because of the circumstances of counsel‘s disciplinary suspension before trial and the trial court‘s refusal to assist the defendant in obtaining substitute counsel at that time, the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the critical pretrial period.
The record also does not support a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during the pretrial period. The defendant‘s subsequent expression of satisfaction with his counsel cannot be construed as a valid waiver of counsel. His motion for substitute counsel and his grievance regarding counsel‘s lack of pretrial representation clearly put the court on notice that he was not receiving the assistance of counsel during the critical pretrial period. A defendant‘s expression of satisfaction with counsel‘s performance at the time of trial or a later expression of dissatisfaction is not determinative of an ineffective assistance claim.
Justices WEAVER and KELLY took no part in the decision of this case.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O‘Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Rolf E. Berg) for the defendant.
BOYLE, J. We granted leave to appeal to address whether defendant was denied his right to counsel, whether review of a defendant‘s sentence is available to the prosecution, and, if so, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering resentencing on the basis of a scoring error under the sentencing guidelines. An inference of ineffectiveness and prejudice on the basis of a thirty-day disciplinary suspension in a seven-month period of representation would violate controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court. Sixth Amendment claims based on defective performance must be established by showing constitutionally defective performance that undermines the reliability of the result. We hold that defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel‘s performance was reasonable or to show that the deficiencies alleged prejudiced the outcome. We also hold that review of a sentence is available to the prosecution on the same terms as the defense. Therefore, because the guidelines do not have the force of law, the Court of Appeals erred in
We vacate the order of remand and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in all other respects.
I. FACTS
On October 3, 1988, decedent Raymond Harlin was the victim of an altercation that took place in defendant Charlie Mitchell‘s apartment. Mr. Harlin was beaten with fists, a blackjack, brass knuckles, a baseball bat, and a woodcarving knife before he was shot. He jumped out the window of the third floor apartment and took a cab to Henry Ford Hospital where he died. The cause of death was gunshot wounds to the neck and back.
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder.
Before trial, defendant wrote six letters to the trial judge, the chief judge, and others, requesting removal of counsel. Defendant complained that Mr. Evelyn had not visited him at the Wayne County jail, instead only meeting with him in the “bullpen” at the Recorder‘s Court. Defendant also believed that there were certain motions that Mr. Evelyn needed to make before the time to do so expired. On April 27, 1989, eleven days before jury selection was to begin, defendant appeared before the court in propria persona for a hearing on defendant‘s “motion for withdrawal of counsel.” Defendant informed the judge on the record that he did not believe counsel was responsive to his concerns, and that counsel had been suspended from practice for thirty days from April 5, 1989, to May 5, 1989.2 Counsel was officially reinstated on May 8, 1989, the day jury selection in defendant‘s trial began. That day, Mr. Evelyn advised the court that defendant wanted him removed and had filed a grievance against him. Counsel did not indicate that he was unprepared.
The defendant confirmed that he had received copies of the prosecutor‘s file in the instant case and another pending case and his transcripts3 in March, but stated that counsel‘s failure to discuss matters with him had led to specific deficiencies, which he detailed. The court directed counsel to confer with defendant and to evaluate and report back regarding any motions defendant might wish to be heard, and Mr. Evelyn‘s professional opinion regarding whether they were appropriate. The motion was denied without prejudice.
Thereafter, the defendant‘s concerns over evidence seized at the apartment building from apartment 302,4 and the validity of the search warrant with regard to apartment 302 were resolved to defendant‘s satisfaction with a stipulation in which the parties agreed that none of the evidence from apartment 302 except the weapons involved would be admitted. Defendant
Following defendant‘s conviction on May 17, 1989, of second-degree murder,
We granted leave, limiting the issues to whether defendant was denied counsel or effective assistance and whether and to what extent a prosecutor may appeal sentencing errors. 450 Mich 993 (1996).
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
“It has long been recognized that the right to counsel9 is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759, 771, n 14; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970). However, because “the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial, [a]bsent some effect of [the] challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated.” United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 658; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984).
CRONIC10
Cases on the continuum range from actual to constructive denial of counsel to instances where the performance of counsel is so deficient that there has been a functional denial of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The methods of analysis employed to determine whether there has been a denial of the constitutional right likewise range from the general to the particular. Cronic reviews the cases in which the courts have found a Sixth Amendment
Next on the continuum are the rare cases in which the circumstances are such that “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic at 659-660; Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45; 53 S Ct 55; 77 L Ed 158 (1932). As in instances where the state has by statute or order interfered with the attorney-client relationship, the inquiry focuses not on counsel‘s performance at trial, but on whether the surrounding circumstances are so likely to have prejudiced the accused that particularized inquiry into the fairness of the result is unjustified. Where the circumstances are not of such “magnitude,” Cronic at 659, n 26, that there has been an “actual breakdown of the adversarial process during the trial of the case,” id. at 657-658, a defendant “can . . . make out a claim of ineffective assistance only by pointing to specific errors made by trial counsel.” Id. at 666. Thus, at the far end of the continuum opposite an actual denial of counsel are those cases in which the “issue is counsel‘s performance.” DeCoster at 365. Here, the inquiry is particular, not general, and the question is whether counsel‘s actual performance undermines confidence in the reliability of the result.
STRICKLAND/PICKENS
The benchmark case describing the standard for claims of actual ineffective assistance of counsel in Michigan is People v Pickens, supra at 318, which
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment . . . [and] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. [Strickland at 687.]
In applying this test, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . .” Id. at 689. Whereas cases at the other end of the continuum indulge a presumption that defendant was prejudiced by counsel‘s absence or inertness, or by state interference or other surrounding circumstances as egregious as those found in Powell, cases decided under the Strickland/Pickens test require the defendant to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland at 689.
The defendant argues, and the dissent agrees, that a thirty-day suspension of trial counsel during a seven-month period of representation is a circumstance making it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that “a total denial of counsel during the critical pretrial period” occurred, post at 191.12 However, in Cronic, supra, the Court distinguished cases recognizing a presumption of prejudice from claims of ineffective assistance based on defects in performance grounded in allegations of inadequate preparation. The Court rejected the prophylactic approach and held that such claims and other specific claims of a given lawyer‘s incompetence at trial either individually or in combination did not justify an inference that the right to counsel had been violated.
Under the test employed by the Court of Appeals, reversal is required even if the lawyer‘s actual performance was flawless. By utilizing this inferential approach, the Court of Appeals erred. [Id. at 652-653.]
In Strickland, in which the claims of defective performance included, inter alia, counsel‘s failure to investigate and present character witnesses, Justice O‘Connor set forth the test applicable to such a claim. As noted above, the Strickland test applied in Michigan requires that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance based on defective performance has the
The Supreme Court has rejected a categorical prophylactic approach to claims of counsel‘s deficient performance and of failure to adequately prepare or investigate in favor of an inquiry into actual performance and prejudice. As Professors LaFave and Israel have noted, “If the Supreme Court had not clearly so indicated [previously], its subsequent opinions in . . . Cronic and Strickland . . . established without doubt its rejection of any such across-the-board categorical approach.” 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 11.7, p 25 (1991 Supp). “Read in conjunction with Cronic, Strickland leaves no doubt that a strictly judgmental approach applies to ineffectiveness claims based upon the incompetent performance of counsel.” Id., § 11.10 at 45. To justify reversal under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions, defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that counsel‘s performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial.
The dissent attempts to avoid application of this precedent by relying on the examples given in Cronic of cases in which prejudice is presumed and variously characterizing the claim as a circumstance making it unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective representation, as a constructive denial of counsel, or as a denial of counsel combined with a failure to grant a continuance. Dealing with the theories in inverse order, Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1; 103 S Ct 1610; 75 L Ed 2d 610 (1983), demonstrates that the suggestion
[n]ot every restriction on counsel‘s . . . opportunity to investigate . . . or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. . . . [O]nly an unreasoning and arbitrary “insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay” violates the right to the assistance of counsel. [Id. at 11-12.]
To the extent that the dissent characterizes Mr. Evelyn‘s thirty-day suspension as an external constraint constituting a constructive denial of counsel, the conclusion is refuted by Cronic, on which the dissent purports to rely. The Court overturned the court of appeals decision in Cronic, which held precisely, as would the dissent here, that “when circumstances hamper a given lawyer‘s preparation of a defendant‘s case, the defendant need not show specified errors in
The fact that the accused can attribute a deficiency in his representation to a source external to trial counsel does not make it any more or less likely that he received the type of trial envisioned by the Sixth Amendment, nor does it justify reversal of his conviction absent an actual effect on the trial process or the likelihood of such an effect. [Cronic, 466 US 662, n 31.]
The Court in Cronic also specifically found that allegations of deficient performance due to allegedly inadequate time to prepare were not the type of circumstances justifying a presumption of prejudice as in Powell v Alabama,14 and specifically observed that the case did not involve a finding that the defendant
The defendants were hurried to trial with counsel who had no opportunity to prepare or investigate. The Court found that counsel‘s representation then proceeded “pro forma,” so that the “defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.” Id. at 58. The Court reasoned that during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself. [Id. at 57 (emphasis added).]
IV. APPLYING STRICKLAND
A. THE GINTHER EVIDENCE
There is no factual basis for a conclusion that counsel‘s performance was constitutionally deficient
“A convicted person who attacks the adequacy of the representation he received at his trial must prove his claim. To the extent his claim depends on facts not of record, it is incumbent on him to make a testimonial record at the trial court . . . which evidentially supports his claim and which excludes hypotheses consistent with the view that his trial lawyer represented him adequately.” [People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).]
No record was made regarding what Mr. Evelyn did or did not do, or whether Mr. Evelyn knew of the alleged eyewitnesses.18 Counsel‘s failure to call witnesses is presumed to be trial strategy, Strickland, supra; Ginther, supra, and Mr. Evelyn was not called to testify at the Ginther hearing. Testimony of the three witnesses who were found by the trial court to be “inconsistent and contradictory of one another” did not exclude the hypotheses of adequacy.
The dissent offers no support for the conclusion that there was any legally viable challenge to the admissibility of the evidence,19 and the witnesses subject to being called were not eyewitnesses. While the dissent concludes that Mr. Evelyn failed to investigate and that “no reasonable trial strategy exists” for this “failure,” post at 189, n 4, the dissent offers no analysis with respect to how these witnesses might have made a difference at trial.
[T]he Sixth Amendment does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade. [Cronic at 656, n 19.]
The only bona fide jury issue open to competent defense counsel on these facts was that the government‘s witnesses were unworthy of belief and that the state had failed to carry the burden of proof.20 This is precisely what Mr. Evelyn argued,21 an argument that persuaded the trial court to direct a verdict on first-degree murder.22
B. PERFORMANCE/PREJUDICE
In Pickens, we adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland. The reviewing court is to determine (1) whether counsel‘s performance was objectively unreasonable, and (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel‘s defective performance. Id. at 687. The first prong requires that counsel make “errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaran-
teed the defendant by the
Defendant‘s claims of ineffective assistance fail on both scores. Nothing in the record indicates that counsel erred in not calling witnesses who were not present when the victim was shot and whose testimony, at best, would have affected only matters collateral to the prosecutor‘s theory that the defendant, as leader of a drug ring, gave the order to kill Mr. Harlin.23
Any claim that the probability is high that had Nelson and Woodson been called defendant would have been acquitted underscores the record deficiencies the dissent ignores. Whether the witnesses were known to counsel or, if known, would have been deemed by him to be believable by the jury is unknown. It is far from evident, however, that the tes
[W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel‘s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel‘s conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel‘s investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel‘s other litigation decisions. [Id. at 691.]
Counsel may have failed to call the witnesses because he did not know about them. Alternatively, he may not have called them because of a familiar strategic consideration, namely, that calling witnesses whose testimony is not believable (even with regard to peripheral matters), may jeopardize an otherwise viable defense. On this record, there is no basis to conclude that the failure to present these witnesses was error or that, had the witnesses been presented, “the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland, supra at 695.
The dissent‘s conclusion that Mr. Evelyn‘s performance at trial is irrelevant, post at 199,24 ignores teaching of the United States Supreme Court that “the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused‘s relationship with his law
The dissent would improvidently extend a remedy to a defendant who received constitutionally effective assistance and who has not been wronged in any real sense.26 As the Court observed in Strickland, when rejecting a presumption of ineffectiveness regarding
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel‘s unsuccessful defense. Counsel‘s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client. [Id. at 690.]
Justice RILEY‘S observation in Pickens is also apt:
[T]he inevitable result of such a formulation would be an explosion of civil litigation in which juries would be permitted to award damages to a defendant who by definition has been reliably found guilty . . . [t]hat such a perversion of the truth-seeking function of criminal trials was not intended by the Michigan Constitution is beyond question. [Id. at 325-326, n 31.]
V. THE LIMITS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A reality underlying the Cronic-Strickland continuum is the inability of an appellate court to evaluate in hindsight the infinite variables of trial court practice and the “countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” Id. at 689. For the same reason, the attorney-client privilege is waived and the trial lawyer is a necessary witness on the issue of inadequacy of counsel:
At the hearing, the witness, Williams and Williams’ lawyer are all necessary witnesses. The lawyer is necessary because even the truth and further elaboration of the witness’ assertions would not necessarily require a finding of
inadequacy of counsel. By putting in issue the effectiveness of the representation he received at the trial, Williams waived the attorney-client privilege. [People v Michael Williams, 391 Mich 832, 832 (1974).]27
Absent any presentation of counsel‘s testimony to the trial court, or an inquiry into whether defendant was prejudiced by the suspension, reversal of the trial court‘s conclusion that the defendant failed to carry his burden at the Ginther hearing would be postulated not on truth but on pure conjecture. The dissent‘s approach, despite the holdings in Williams, Ginther, Cronic, Strickland, Pickens, and People v Pubrat, 451 Mich 589; 548 NW2d 595 (1996), would permit defense lawyers to be “found guilty” of ineffective assistance without ever being heard from and face the unenviable prospect of looking to the prosecutor to protect them at the Ginther hearing.28
We do not know that Mr. Evelyn did not “exert at least some effort to explore the truth. . . .” Post at 191, n 7. We do not even know that Mr. Evelyn failed to prepare with regard to the Ginther hearing witnesses. We do know that Mr. Evelyn prepared by holding the preliminary examination and obtaining discovery and that he obtained a directed verdict of
In the real world, defending criminal cases is not for the faint of heart. Lawyers must fulfill ethical obligations to the court, zealously advocate the client‘s best interests (which includes establishing that they, and not the client, are in charge of making the professional decisions), and protect themselves against grievances30 and claims of malpractice. Lawyers will inevitably make errors in the process, but, because both cases and attorneys come in an infinite variety of configurations, those errors can only rarely be
An inference of constitutional ineffectiveness cannot be established on the basis of the “circumstance” of counsel‘s thirty-day suspension during seven months of representation, without any inquiry into the conduct of the trial or any record being developed regarding counsel‘s actual preparedness and its effect on the result.
VI. APPELLATE COUNSEL
Defendant also claims appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to call trial counsel at the Ginther hearing. There is no better evidence for why this claim should be rejected than the dissent‘s holding that ineffectiveness may be inferred without the inquiry into performance and prejudice, which presumes that counsel‘s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Appellate counsel had an obvious strategic reason for not calling trial counsel. That reason was that if trial counsel had been called, his explanation for his actions might have been more believable than the testimony of the witnesses offered at the Ginther hearing. Appellate counsel may have failed to call trial counsel at the Ginther hearing because he determined trial counsel would have testified that he did not have notice of the witnesses or that he had a strategic reason for not presenting them (such as credibility or relevance). In any event, because these are
VII. PROSECUTOR‘S RIGHT TO APPEAL
A. SENTENCING REVIEW
In People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 540 (1983), this Court, by unanimous vote of all justices participating,31 recognized a defendant‘s right to appellate review of a sentence. The Court held:
[A] sentence following a conviction is as much a part of the final judgment of the trial court as is the conviction itself. Since the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear appeals of final judgments of trial courts, . . . the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear appeals involving a review of a defendant‘s sentence. [Id. at 535.]
In 1988, the Legislature amended
B. REVIEW OF GUIDELINES CALCULATIONS
The holding in Townsend is inapposite. First, in Townsend, the United States Supreme Court held that there is no basis for the assertion of a due process right to be sentenced on correct information unless the sentence is based on an “extensively and materially false” foundation. Townsend, supra at 741. The misapplication of the guidelines typically advanced is not premised on a false foundation. The claim advanced is that the guidelines were misapplied because the instructions were not properly interpreted or because an undisputed foundation is “insufficient” to support the score. These claims do not rest on allegations of falsity or lack of factual foundation. They would be claims of legal error if guidelines had the force of law.33
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 656-657; 461 NW2d 1 (1990):
[W]e believe that the second edition of the sentencing guidelines is the best “barometer” of where on the continuum from the least to the most threatening circumstances a given case falls.
Nevertheless, because our sentencing guidelines do not have a legislative mandate, we are not prepared to require adherence to the guidelines. [Emphasis in the original.]
Simply stated, because this Court‘s guidelines do not have the force of law, a guidelines error does not violate the law.35 Thus, the claim of a miscalculated variable is not in itself a claim of legal error.36
The challenge here asserted is directed not to the accuracy of the factual basis for the sentence, but, rather, to the judge‘s calculation of the sentencing variable on the basis of his discretionary interpretation of the unchallenged facts. The challenge does not state a cognizable claim for relief. There is no juridi
As emphasized in Milbourn, the guidelines are vehicles to assist the trial judge regarding where a given defendant falls on the sentence continuum recognized by Milbourn. Where the guidelines calculation differs from the trial court‘s intended sentence, the judge is alerted that the sentence falls outside a normative range and should be evaluated to assure that it is not unfairly disparate, has a rational basis, and is not disproportionate.39 On postsentence review, guidelines departure is relevant solely for its bearing on the Milbourn claim that the sentence is disproportionate.40 Thus, application of the guidelines states a cognizable claim on appeal only where (1) a factual predicate is wholly unsupported, (2) a factual predicate is materially false, and (3) the sentence is disproportionate.41
Appellate courts are not to interpret the guidelines or to score and rescore the variables for offenses and prior record to determine if they were correctly applied. Guidelines are tools to aid the trial court in the exercise of its authority and a framework for the appellate courts’ inquiry into the question whether the sentence is disproportionate and, hence, an abuse of the trial court‘s discretion. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing defendant‘s sentence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and vacate its order remanding this case to the trial court for resentencing.
BRICKLEY and RILEY, JJ., concurred with BOYLE, J.
MALLETT, C.J. I respectfully dissent from parts II through V of the majority opinion. Counsel‘s disciplinary suspension precluded him from preparing defendant Mitchell‘s defense during the critical period leading to his first-degree murder trial. Mr. Mitchell‘s repeated attempts to obtain substitute counsel went unheeded and his trial began, as scheduled, on the morning that his attorney‘s suspension expired. Consequently, defendant was denied the assistance of counsel during the critical period leading to trial.
I would hold that the specific facts of this case justify a presumption of ineffectiveness without inquiry into actual performance or prejudice. United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 653; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984), Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45; 53 S Ct 55; 77 L Ed 158 (1932). I would therefore reverse the
I
BACKGROUND
The prosecution‘s theory was that the defendant was the leader of a drug-trafficking ring and that he had been effectively in charge of all that took place in his apartment on the night of Raymond Harlin‘s death. Defendant was depicted by the prosecution witnesses as a midlevel drug dealer. His apartment allegedly served as a wholesale warehouse for several street-level sellers who conducted illicit drug sales in the first floor lobby of the apartment building. Harlin had allegedly been working for the defendant.
The pertinent events surrounding Mr. Harlin‘s death occurred in the defendant‘s apartment about 10:00 P.M. Those initially present were defendant Mitchell, Mr. Harlin, codefendant Antonio Moore, and two friends of the defendant, Serena Nelson and Brent Woodson. There was no evidence that either Nelson or Woodson were involved in the alleged drug ring.
The only evidence at trial concerning the start of the altercation was the statement Mr. Mitchell gave to the police indicating that the fight had started in the kitchen after Moore had become angry at the way the victim was staring at him. At the Ginther1 hearing, Woodson and Nelson also testified that the fight had broken out between Moore and Harlin in the kitchen over somebody looking at somebody strangely or
Both Thompson and Puryear testified at the trial. They were involved in drug sales from the apartment lobby, although, apparently, the defendant was not their supplier. Thompson, the prosecution‘s primary witness, testified that Harlin was already bloodied when he arrived at the apartment. He stated that a gun was in plain view on a window ledge and that he took possession of the gun out of fear that the defendant would shoot Harlin. At the Ginther hearing, Nelson and Woodson disputed this testimony, both indicating that they never saw a gun in plain view on the window sill and that Thompson had the weapon in his possession when he entered the apartment.
Thompson testified that he heard the defendant exclaim, “Shoot a hole in his heart.”2 Soon after this occurred, codefendant Lamont Mason, who ultimately fired the shots, and Nehemiah Anderson arrived. Apparently, Mason was involved in the defendant‘s drug business and Anderson had come to the building to purchase drugs. Thompson testified that by the time Mason arrived, he thought that the situation was calming down. Consequently, he laid down the gun that he had been holding. To his surprise, after laying
Harlin jumped out the third floor window. Amazingly, he was able to summon a cab, taking it to Henry Ford Hospital where he later died of gunshot wounds of the neck and back.
Defendants Mitchell, Mason, and Moore were all charged with first-degree murder. Mason and Moore moved for separate trials. The court ruled that separate juries would hear defendant Mitchell‘s and codefendant Mason‘s cases, while codefendant Moore opted for a bench trial.
The defendant did not testify or present any witnesses. At the close of proofs, his attorney moved for a directed verdict. The court partially granted the motion by reducing the charge to second-degree murder.
Defendant wrote numerous letters complaining about Mr. Evelyn‘s representation. For example, in a letter to Judge Farmer he complained that “I have been locked up for 5 months and not once have my lawyer took time out to talk to me. . . . [I]f I can‘t express to Gerald K. Evelyn what happen on the night this incentdent occur [sic], he will not know the best stradaegy [sic] of what and how to fight this case. . . . I am tired of being in the dark & knowing he‘s in the dark.” He also complained of not having
A hearing was held on defendant‘s complaints eleven days before the scheduled trial date. At the hearing, defendant requested a change in counsel and an adjournment to allow time for new counsel to prepare. He also informed the court of Mr. Evelyn‘s disciplinary suspension. The court never ruled on Mr. Mitchell‘s request, instead taking the motion under advisement in order to allow Mr. Evelyn to respond. Mr. Evelyn had been notified of the hearing, but neither he nor his law partner appeared.
Mr. Mitchell renewed his complaint on the second day of jury selection, after counsel failed to visit him as promised the previous evening. Defendant explained his concerns to the court:
Well, from the very beginning, you know, Mr. Evelyn promised to talk with me. He has failed to talk with me on every occasion that he promised. He has failed to make any motions for me, and he‘s failed to talk with my mother, which she has written many letters and calls, and went to his office, also, left word with his secretary.
And he also showed up an hour late on my final conference and by him letting me know yesterday that he was going to come over and talk with me and by him failing to do that, I just, I just feel it‘s just incompetent.
After the court asked if defendant‘s complaint was that counsel had not visited him at the jail as many times as he would have liked, Mr. Mitchell responded, “Yes. Never seeing me at all.” Counsel responded by explaining that he had supplied defendant with all the records that he had requested. Although Mr. Mitchell agreed, he stated that reading the records without his
On the sixth day of trial, Mr. Evelyn acknowledged his receipt of a grievance filed by defendant with the Attorney Grievance Commission and formally requested to withdraw. For reasons discussed more fully in part IV, the request was denied.
After his conviction, the defendant and the prosecutor appealed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and remanded for a Ginther hearing. After the hearing, the Court rejected defendant‘s Sixth Amendment claims, holding that Mr. Mitchell had not met the standard for ineffective assistance and had abandoned any claim of error by failing to continue his objection to counsel‘s performance midtrial.
After providing a brief overview of the right to the effective assistance of counsel in part II, part III will address how the circumstances in this case led to a denial per se of Mr. Mitchell‘s
II
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. [
US Const, Am VI .]
Similarly, the Michigan Constitution states that, “[i]n every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have . . . assistance of counsel for his defense . . . .”
The constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system. The assistance of a competent attorney is essential because it provides the means through which the other rights of the accused are secured. Consequently, without counsel‘s assistance, the right to a trial would mean little. Cronic, supra at 653. Notable federal and Michigan jurists have long recognized the importance of the right to the assistance of counsel. Justice Sutherland, in his opinion in Powell, supra at 68-69, emphasized:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. [Emphasis added.]
Justice COOLEY similarly noted the importance of the right, stating that ” [p]erhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of crime, connected with his trial, is that to be defended by counsel.‘” People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 311; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), quoting 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 696.
Because of its great importance in our adversary system, the right to the assistance of counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Cronic at 654, citing McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759, 771, n 14; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970).
In People v Pickens, supra, a majority of this Court held that the Michigan constitutional guarantee of the right to the effective assistance of counsel is coextensive with its federal counterpart. Consequently, this Court applied the two-part test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). The Strickland test requires examining whether counsel‘s errors fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether the errors so prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial.
The Strickland performance/prejudice analysis is not the sole indicia of ineffective assistance. The United States Supreme Court in Cronic, supra, the
I would find that under the per se approach discussed in Cronic and Geders, defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
III
PER SE STANDARD
When the surrounding circumstances make it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance, ineffectiveness may be presumed without inquiry into actual performance or prejudice. Cronic at 661. As explained by the Court in Cronic, Powell v Alabama exemplifies this type of ineffectiveness.
In Powell, the United States Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clause to find a denial of fundamental fairness to the “Scottsboro Boys,” nine illiterate young black men accused of capital rape in Alabama in 1931. Six days before trial, the judge appointed “all the members of the bar” to represent the defendants for purposes of arraignment. Id. at 49. On the day of trial, a lawyer from Tennessee appeared after speaking to persons “interested” in the case. However, he stated that because he was unprepared and unfamiliar with local procedure, he was unwilling to represent the defendants on such short notice. The trial court resolved the problem by deciding that the Tennessee lawyer would represent the defendants with assistance from the local bar and ordered that the trial begin as scheduled.
The United States Supreme Court held that “such designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid . . . .” Id. at 53. Without examining the actual performance of counsel at trial, the Court concluded that under the circumstances, the trial was inherently unfair because the likelihood that counsel could have performed as an effective adversary was too remote. Critical to the Court‘s analysis was counsel‘s inability to prepare or to conduct pretrial investigation because of his appointment on the day of trial.
It is not enough to assume that counsel thus precipitated into the case thought there was no defense, and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt
and thorough-going investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to investigate. No opportunity to do so was given. Defendants were immediately hurried to trial. . . . Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities. [Id. at 58.]
These words apply forcefully to Mr. Evelyn‘s representation of the defendant. As in Powell, the circumstances surrounding defendant‘s representation precluded crucial trial preparation. As in Powell, defendant was hurried to trial on the same day that counsel was able to first provide any meaningful pretrial assistance. As in Powell, this Court cannot assume some feigned tactical reason for counsel‘s failure to contact defendant while he was in prison or to otherwise investigate and interview witnesses during the critical thirty-four days before trial. Mr. Evelyn could not prepare for Mr. Mitchell‘s defense, as a matter of law, because he was prevented from doing so by his disciplinary suspension.3
Other cases also illustrate circumstances justifying a presumption of ineffectiveness. A long line of federal and state precedent holds that
In Geders, supra, the Court held that a trial court‘s order preventing the defendant in a federal criminal prosecution from consulting his counsel “about anything” during a seventeen-hour recess in the trial between his direct and cross-examination deprived him of his right to the assistance of counsel. The Court emphasized that overnight recesses are often critical periods for preparation:
Such recesses are often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed. The lawyer may need to obtain from his client information made relevant by the day‘s testimony, or he may need to pursue inquiry along lines not fully explored earlier. [Geders at 88.]
This being the case, the Court found that prejudice was so likely to result from the overnight denial of access to counsel that a specific inquiry into prejudice would be superfluous.5
Denial of counsel midtrial is but one example of a
[P]erhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.
In this case, the criminal justice and attorney disciplinary systems, without a doubt, combined to deny Mr. Mitchell any assistance of counsel for a full thirty-four days leading to his trial. This denial was especially egregious because counsel had not previously
This is not an instance where counsel chose to take no action. Rather, the circumstances of counsel‘s disciplinary suspension and the trial court‘s refusal to assist the defendant in obtaining substitute counsel combined to deprive the defendant of his
“It is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare for it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving the latter any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case.” [Id. at 59, quoting Commonwealth v O‘Keefe, 298 Pa 169, 173; 148 A 73 (1929).]
The majority‘s suggestion that a finding that prejudice should be presumed violates “controlling precedent” causes some concern and merits examination. Although unclear, the precedent the majority apparently refers to are cases such as Cronic and Strickland in which the Court concluded that the claims of inadequate preparation or investigation did not merit a presumption of prejudice. In this regard, the majority states, “[t]he Supreme Court has rejected a categorical prophylactic approach to claims of counsel‘s deficient performance and of failure to adequately prepare or investigate in favor of an inquiry into actual performance and prejudice.” Ante at 158. On the other hand, the majority begrudgingly recognizes, in n 10, that in some circumstances, such as those present in Powell, prejudice will be presumed.*
The fact that the majority reaches a different conclusion than the one I reach does not render either conclusion violative of controlling authority. This is because the disagreement does not concern the basic analytical framework. To the contrary, I agree with my respected sister‘s premise that the cases concerning ineffective assistance of counsel represent a continuum. My disagreement lies in where this case falls on that continuum.
Contrary to the majority‘s assertions, I do not contend that the thirty-day suspension alone warrants a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel per se or that a lack of preparation alone warrants a “categorical approach.” Rather, I believe that the suspension, combined with the surrounding circumstances and the gravity of the charge justify a presumption of prejudice in this particular case. To reiterate, the record discloses that defendant‘s attorney was suspended from the practice of law for approximately thirty days before his trial began. The record further reveals that the defendant and his mother attempted to contact Mr. Evelyn on several occasions to arrange a meeting. Defendant also made numerous timely requests to the trial court to appoint him new counsel because he had not been able to tell his attorney his side of the case. In spite of all this, defendant was never able to meet privately with his attorney before trial after his preliminary examination, other than in the “bull pen” before hearings. Given the gravity of the charge, first-degree murder, and the constructive denial of counsel brought on by Mr. Evelyn‘s suspension and the trial court‘s refusal to appoint substitute counsel, defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel per se.
The majority criticizes this analysis by focusing on one element at a time, in isolation, from the totality of circumstances leading to the constructive denial of counsel. Citing Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1; 103 S Ct 1610; 75 L Ed 2d 610 (1983), the majority concludes that denial of a 1983 continuance does not warrant a new trial. I agree that not every refusal of a continuance warrants a new trial, only those where there is an “unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ . . . .” Id. at 12-13. The majority also cites Cronic, in support of its conclusion that the thirty-day suspension is not an external constraint constituting a constructive denial of counsel and that allegations of deficient performance due to inadequate preparation time do not justify a presumption of prejudice. I agree that a thirty-day suspension alone, out of a seven-month period of representation, would not warrant the presumption. I also agree that not every case where an ill-prepared attorney is forced to trial will warrant the presumption. However, where all the circumstances attendant in this case combine, the whole is qualitatively different from each part taken in isolation. There is no “controlling precedent” in which all the particular circumstances present in this case combine, as they do here, to effectuate a denial of counsel in the critical pretrial period.8
IV
WAIVER/ABANDONMENT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Court of Appeals concluded that by telling the trial judge six days into the trial that he no longer wanted to pursue the grievance he had filed against his attorney because he was satisfied with counsel‘s resolution of his concerns, defendant abandoned his ineffective assistance claim. Defendant‘s
Defendant filed a grievance against Mr. Evelyn with the Attorney Grievance Commission, dated May 1, 1989. On the sixth day of trial, May 15, 1989, Mr. Evelyn moved to withdraw from the case in light of the grievance filed against him. The following colloquy, between Mr. Evelyn, Mr. Mitchell and the court ensued:
Mr. Evelyn: I just want to bring a matter to the Court‘s attention. As Mr. Mitchell had indicated earlier in his request that I be removed, he did, in fact, file a grievance which I received in my office on Friday, and on Saturday I prepared a response which will go out today, and response includes my reference to the fact that we‘re in trial and that I think the Canon of Ethics require that I at least make a motion to withdraw from the case at this time, if his position is that he‘s still dissatisfied.
I should note for the record that a number of things, the grievance is dated May 1, so a number of things that he was concerned about have been addressed, I should indicate—I suppose that it‘s possible that his position may have been changed in light of that fact, but I think he should have an opportunity to bring that to the Court‘s attention and state on the record what his feelings are at this point. I think that I have to formally request that I be removed from the case at this time.
The Court: Mr. Mitchell, anything you have to say?
Defendant Mitchell: Yes. I would like to, you know, cancel that grievance, you know, because all the motions and everything that I requested have been answered.
The Court: Okay. So your [sic] satisfied with your counsel?
Defendant Mitchell: Yes, I‘m satisfied, your Honor.
The Court: All right, then, the motion to withdraw will be denied and we‘ll proceed.
Mr. Evelyn: Okay.
Defendant Mitchell: Thank you, your Honor.
A careful reading of this exchange does not comport with Mr. Mitchell waiving or abandoning his ineffective assistance claim concerning Mr. Evelyn‘s lack of pretrial investigation and preparation. His statement that he was “satisfied” with counsel cannot be fairly read to mean he no longer believed that it was unjust and prejudicial to force him to begin trial with unprepared counsel. Read in its proper context, this “waiver” is nothing more than Mr. Mitchell‘s indication that he was “satisfied” with the resolution of the motions he had formerly requested. A close reading of the exchange also suggests that Mr. Mitchell had decided, probably with counsel‘s advice, to put aside his grievance in order to avoid aggravating the court by disrupting the trial‘s progress, given that the court‘s handling of defendant‘s previous motion for
Even if Mr. Mitchell‘s expression of “satisfaction” might be characterized as applying to his counsel‘s pretrial representation, and not just to counsel‘s efforts during the trial, the record does not support a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel during the pretrial stage. Mr. Mitchell‘s motion for substitute counsel and his grievance regarding lack of pretrial representation clearly put the court on notice that he was not receiving the assistance of counsel during this critical stage. If the court intended to secure a retroactive waiver of defendant‘s right to pretrial representation, it should have clearly informed defendant, on the record, that this was the intent.9
Here, defendant‘s “waiver” was not knowingly and intelligently made because he was never apprised of the right that he was waiving. Before trial, faced with a total lack of representation on Mr. Evelyn‘s part, defendant requested new counsel. The trial court did not resolve this request until the day of trial. Just before jury selection, when Mr. Mitchell again raised his right to effective representation, he was told that he could not have new counsel and that the trial
[I] don‘t want to mislead you with the impression that just because you‘re still dissatisfied with your attorney that the Court is going to discontinue the trial and appoint new counsel.
Clearly, rather than acknowledging defendant‘s right to counsel during the critical pretrial stage, the court made clear that the trial would proceed regardless of defendant‘s lack of pretrial assistance. The court‘s handling of Mr. Evelyn‘s motion to withdraw, relied on by the Court of Appeals, for Mr. Mitchell‘s “waiver” of his
Further, as noted in Cronic, a defendant‘s expression of satisfaction with counsel‘s performance at the time of trial, or his later expression of dissatisfaction, is not determinative of an ineffective assistance claim. Id. at 657, n 21. The defendant in Cronic, as here, expressed his satisfaction with counsel during the course of the trial because this seemed to be the prudent thing to do at the time. See id. at 652, n 6. The Court noted, “we attach no weight to either respondent‘s expression of satisfaction with counsel‘s performance at the time of his trial, or to his later
V
CONCLUSION
I would hold that the circumstances of this case, particularly Mr. Evelyn‘s failure to prepare for defendant‘s trial for first-degree murder, attributable in part to his disciplinary suspension, and the trial court‘s failure to grant defendant‘s timely and reasonable request for new counsel combined to deprive Mr. Mitchell his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the per se standard explained in Cronic.
I would further hold that the defendant‘s midtrial expression of satisfaction with his trial counsel was not a valid waiver or an abandonment of his
Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). I concur with Chief Justice MALLETT‘S partial dissent in this matter. I write separately only to note my disagreement with my sister BOYLE‘S repetitive dicta about sentencing guidelines. Within the next year we will have the Legislature‘s effort on sentencing guidelines, which should make my sister‘s continuing declamation on the subject all the more pointless.
WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.