People v. Miranda-Olivas
41 P.3d 658
Colo.
2001
Check Treatment

*1 Colorado, State PEOPLE Plaintiff-Appellant, AS, MIRANDA-OLIV Efren

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 01SA227. Colorado,

Supreme Court

En Banc. 29, 2001.

Oct.

G59 involuntary product as the of coercive con- duct.

The record does support not that Defendant's statements involuntary product as the of coercive by police. Instead, conduct in reviewing the totality of the surrounding cireumstances De- statements, fendant's we find that the record demonstrates that Defendant's force, not threats, result of promises, or other forms of undue influence by police. Thus, exerted Defendant's will was not by police overborne and his state- voluntary. ments were We therefore reverse suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. AND FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant charged with one count of possession of a II schedule controlled sub- stance, grams, with intent to dis- tribute, 18-18-405@8)(a)(ID, § 6 CRS. (2001). These charges arose out of police search of Defendant's residence. origi- target nal of the search Joaquin warrant was Villalobos, Anchondo Defendant's uncle. search, At the start police of the escorted Defendant, gunpoint, at pregnant girlfriend,1 Lechuga, from a bed Jr., A.M. Dominguez, Attorney, District room in the yard house into the front District, Nineteenth Judicial Meyer, Michele handcuffed him behind his back. Officer Deputy Attorney, CO, District Greeley, At- Schrimpf, an investigator involved in the ex torneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. warrant, ecution testified, of the search "Mr. Varallo, CO, very nervous, Michael Greeley, Olivas was Attorney for and he made a Defendant-Appellee. saying, statement I know that-like this is pretty said, close to what he my know Justice RICE Opinion delivered the uncle you some bad shit. I'll tell any Court. thing you want to know. spon He made (R. taneous to that effect." interlocutory at appeal pursuant to 19.) II, p. 4.1, vol. Sergeant Black, After C.A.R. seek reversal of the charge officer in personnel task force suppression trial of statements made executing warrant, police the search April on arrived at the 2001. The scene, police court ruled that he advised officer's state- that he was not arrest; ment however, under he did not want because the officers see girlfriend "get drug might believed perceive into this he was thing actively if not arrest, Sergeant involved" was under "tanta- Black advised Defen dant of his mount rights. Miranda to a valid threat Defendant indi arrest woman who he had no reason to believe in- cated that he rights understood his volved," rendering Defendant's agreed questions. to answer According to 1. The record is unclear as to ga whether Ms. Lechu- is Defendant's or wife. guilty and trial, pleaded At Sergeant Schrimpf, Defendant he suppress anything, that a motion know filed he did

Black April interviews residence, into the recently moved only hearing, the theAt At and nervous. scared testimony from the De- presented Schrimpf confronted state point, Officer *3 Defen- questioning of in the involved officers not believe he did him that and told fendant any testi- present not outburst, did The defense dant. spontaneous him, given his earlier trial court hearing, mony. After him to tell for that it was and It held part. motion Defendant's granted truth. before Officer that Lechuga spoke with Schrimpf then Officer to Mr. Mi- the statement Schrimpf "made pres had been Defendant him that who arrested, would his that randa his with transactions during the narcotics ent trou- be in implied she and otherwise go her to required uncle; Defendant that voluntary and up" didn't fess if he ble be transactions into the bedroom after intelligent, but involved; and that her not want he did cause involun- Schrimpf's statement Officer handguns couple of hidden had by conduct of coercive product tary and Lechuga, with speaking After house. in the up ruled that also police. The confronted Schrimpf Officer - Schrimpf's statements point of Officer lying. he knew telling him that again, custody Lechuga, Defendant about that he told Schrimpf testified also knowingly his waived intelligently and and see Clau want to he "didn't followed. appeal rights. This Miranda actively not thing if drug into get dia to Defendant emphasizing while involved" ANALYSIS II. (R. atv. truth.2 telling the importance of 27.) 11,p. A. VOLUNTARINESS he had been admitted then of Process Clause Due drug transactions during several prohibits admission Amendment Fourteenth two his uncle on accompanied had he into evidence.3 involuntary statements of He cocaine. uncle sold when his occasions 181-82, 157, 479 U.S. Connelly, Colorado Schrimpf the location also told (1986). 473 515, L.Ed.2d 184, 98 107 S.Ct. Although Officer in the house. drugs voluntari challenges the a defendant When armed, gun in his kept his Schrimpf was must statement, prosecution of a ness Defendant, who with speaking while holster of the evidence preponderance establish handcuffed, the couch seated, on still was voluntari the defendant's the second conversa- during living room 208, Valdez, 210 People ly made. The conversation Schrimpf. with Officer tion approximately lasted English and activity nee- is a "[Cloercive during time minutes, including the thirty confes finding that a essary predicate Lechuga. spoke with Schrimpf which meaning of 'voluntary' within is not lawyer sion speak to ask to did not of the Fourteenth speaking stop Process Clause the Due a desire he indicate nor did 167, 107 at 479 U.S. Connelly, Amendment." prom- Schrimpf made no police. Officer (1986). Police L.Ed.2d him to S.Ct. entice in order to Defendant ises only physical abuse not includes coercion give a statement. rights at- Miranda When rights Miranda. under not know he did testified 2. «Officer subjected questioning. when the time of tach, ie., Lechuga pregnant at person inquiry includes interrogation, custodial volun- was made the waiver only or not whether determining an whether one-part for test 3. The was made voluntarily waiver also whether but was made inculpatory statement tarily, Because Defendant intelligently. knowingly and the Four- Process Clause purposes the Due waiver was not appeal argue did not distinguished from Amendment must teenth only intelligent, address knowing validity determining two-part test for Defendant's statements. voluntariness Amendment Fifth alleged of one's waiver threats ately prior to person directed at a during but also subtle the interrogation as forms of psychological coercion. v. well as his background, educational employ- Gennings, (Colo.1991) status, ment prior experience with law (citing Fulminante, Arizona v. 499 U.S. enforcement justice system. criminal (1991)). S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d 302 Al Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844. though a defendant's mental condition does apart itself and from its relation to B. DEFENDANTS STATEMENTS official coercion resolve the issue of constitu A trial court engages in both fact- voluntariness, Valdez, tional 969 P.2d at 211 application and law when it rules on a (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. suppress motion to a confession or inculpato- 515; Gennings, 844), 808 P.2d at "the delib ry statement. People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d exploitation erate person's of a weaknesses (Colo.1991) (citing People Quezada, by psychological can, intimidation under cer *4 730, (Colo.1987)). 31 P.2d 732 In re 7 circumstances, tain constitute coercion ren viewing suppression appeals, grant we defer dering a statement involuntary." Valdez, ence to a trial court's findings of historical 969 (citing P.2d at 211 Gennings, 808 P.2d at fact supported are by competent evi 844). Moreover, police must not any dence in the Pitts, record. People v. 13 P.3d direct or implied promises or exert an im 1218, (Colo.2000); 1221 Quezada, 731 P.2d at proper influence order to obtain the state (trial 732 court's of fact will not be ment, People Medina, v. 25 P.3d 1222 if supported overturned by competent evi (Colo.2001) (citing People Quintana, v. 198 record). dence in Where, the however, find 461, 464, Colo. (1979)), 601 P.2d 351 and ings of fact clearly are erroneous or not physical "[eloercive or psychological conduct supported by we set them government aside. renders otherwise vol People Mendoza-Balderama,

untary statement 981 involuntary, if the conduct (Colo.1999); plays 158 significant Gennings, role inducing the P.2d at 844 state Medina, (reversing ment." 25 P.3d at 1222. order after ruling were sup not Ultimately, the test of voluntari ported by competent record). evidence ness is whether the individual's will has been Thus, both a trial application of an Valdez, overborne. 969 P.2d at 211. legal erroneous standard in resolving sup determining whether a confession inculpa- or pression motion and a trial court's ultimate tory statement voluntary, is a trial court legal conclusion of constitutional law that is analyze should totality of cireumstances inconsistent with unsupported or by eviden- under which the statement was made. Gen tiary findings subject to correction on re nings, 808 P.2d at 844 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, view. Id. 385,401, U.S. 98 S.Ct. (1978)). L.Ed.2d 290 include, These factors D.F., In People said, "When but are not limited to: whether the defen ... controlling undisputed, facts are dant custody was in or was free to leave and legal effect of those facts ques constitutes a situation; was aware of his whether Miranda tion of law." (Colo.1997). 933 P.2d warnings given were prior any interroga Moreover, where the record below reveals no tion and whether the defendant understood conflicting evidence regarding the details of and waived his rights; Miranda whether the encounter, unnecessary remand is where defendant had opportunity to confer with appellate court can apply the correct counsel or prior one else to the interro legal Johnson, standard. gation; whether the challenged statement during made the course of an interroga case, In this volunteered; controlling tion or facts was instead are un- whether disputed. Therefore, implied overt or whether promise threat or was di defendant; rected to the involuntary question is a method and style employed by law. interrogator We ques conclude that the district court's tioning the defendant length holding and that Defendant's statements made place interrogation; and the defen after Officer Schrimpf's remark about Lechu- physical dant's mental and condition ga immedi- involuntary is not supported by the Le- arrest threaten to Schrimpf did totality review record. Our that he imply to he chuga, nor did us that convinces circumstances refused to if Defendant her arrest voluntarily. Schrimpf simply Rather, Officer testify. supports record First, although the the truth. urged Defendant inwas finding that Defendant trial court's Schrimpf testified: of his informed custody,4 police truthful] be important [to it was I him understood and rights Miranda have saying she because Second, Defendant rights. those waived and in what was involvement any knowledge or him gave after counsel request did And it's residence.... going on at Therefore, al advisement. the Miranda honest, during ... to be important with coun confer did not though Defendant going to it's investigation the course making a statement anyone else before sel he It's anyway. out come being interro while statement made the lie me a He told up front. honest to con opportunity given the gated, He recanted originally started. he when Third, although if he so wished. counsel sult he made nervous, Officer that. clearly He needs to good. things don't look shows own demeanor testified in what be consistent honest and interrogation polite was calm the board. get it on than no more knows lasted interview and that *5 38-89.) consid Defendant's thirty (R. While on II, p. minutes.5 Based v. at custody inwas my Defendant un- fact that "I know that ered spontaneous statement he made a that interrogation and outset of at the bad shit" is in some cle waiver, it failed to intelligent knowing contradictory to and statement search, his later listed or the others any- factors analyze these not know he did Black that Sergeant state determining that Defendant's Lechuga in that above information thing, and Rather, it relied sole involuntary. drug during ment was Defendant regarding Schrimpf's statement ly on Officer to Schrimpf had reason transactions, Officer a "val Thus, given it saw as girlfriend-what lying. Defendant arrest" her. threat to id which the statement in the context him to encour- for made, coercive it was not the rec Thus, consider whether the truth. age Defendant that ruling the trial court's supports ord Mas- question, the addressing a similar In to the level rose Schrimpf's statement Officer held that Supreme Judicial Court that, sachusetts demonstrates record coercion. involuntary was not cireumstances, confession a defendant's Offi totality of the given the him, officer police merely not coercive. statement was Schrimpf's cer lied his mother that being questioned, while told Defen that he Schrimpf testified Officer be might also that she and truth, his behalf that dant, him to tell urging while 424 Raymond, culpable. Commonwealth drug into get see Claudia want to he "didn't (1997). N.E.2d Mass. (R. involved," at v. actively thing if not this may not ruled, "While have The 27), "if II, p. and over with the defendant bargain expressly saying, then it was she was as involvement or individuals of other release talk about he be honest charging others (R. arresting and threats at v. involvement was." their actual what is ab- conduct basis, type of this no where testimony, 37.) Offi- II, According to p. Officer addition, being interrogated. "sub- In custody been when he has person in A - - free to "wasn't Defendant with a formal testified jected associated the constraints Therefore, II, 32.) Thomas, (R. Defen- p. People at vol. leave." arrest." signifi- objective: "whether in a test is freedom "deprived of his dant was position suspect's person in the custody." reasonable way" was "in cant deprived of his freedom himself consider Thomas, way." any significant of action in edu- not indicate record does 5. The case, Sergeant although In this P.2d at 1178. level, previous ex- or employment cation arrest, not under Black told the criminal enforcement perience with law gunpoint, house at of his was led out system. justice while officers surrounded handcuffed, by

G63 sent, police may bring rendering defendant's conduct involuntary"); statement possibility Loza, attention the that his relatives State 71 Ohio St.3d 641 N.E.2d (internal may culpable." (1994) Id. at 884 cita- (rejecting Defendant's ar omitted). tions gument police played feelings on his his and unborn child in order to case, In Schrimpf, concerned coerce him ruling to confess and that "[ald- conflicting about by Defen monitions to tell the truth are considered to girlfriend, dant and his was attempting to promises be neither per threats nor and are so, doing uncover the truth. In brought missible"). possibility Defendant's attention the girlfriend might Accordingly, involved. His state reviewing totality after Lechuga cireumstances, ment about must be in read context. we find that the record amply record demonstrates that Officer demonstrates that Defendant's will Schrimpf's reference was not Lechuga overborne was made and that Defen- urging while to tell the truth. dant made voluntarily. Offi- context, Schrimpf's Given this Schrimpf's Lechuga, about state ment was not a the context urging threat to arrest Lechuga, but tell the truth attempt light prior ascertain the truth. There inconsis- fore, tent statements ruling and informa- indicating statement was tion lying, "tantamount to a Defendant was "tantamount to a valid valid threat threat to arrest a arrest a woman who he had no woman who he had no reason to reason to believe was believe was involved of these involved of these transactions" and supported by transactions" is not did the record.6 not amount to coercive conduct. In examining reproof whether a regarding coercion, defendant's equals truthfulness III. Conclusion previously we have ruled that the mere fact summary, we hold that the district polygraph that a examiner told a defendant court erred in that Defendant's state- *6 "in opinion that there had been some April ments on 2001 were involuntarily deception" by the defendant in his examina Therefore, made. ruling reverse the of not, tion considering totality was the of the the district court and remand for further cireumstances, enough to make his statement proceedings. Hutton, involuntary. People addition, courts Justice MARTINEZ dissents and Justice jurisdictions in other have held that joins BENDER in the dissent. encouragement to a defendant to tell the Justice MARTINEZ dissenting: Seq, truth does not amount to eg., coercion. Amaya-Ruiz Stewart, 121 F.3d case, In this majority the concludes that (9th Cir.1997)(ruling, as a factor in the totali "the record demonstrates that Defendant's ty cireumstances, of encouraging that Defen statements any force, were not the result of dant to tell the truth did not threats, amount promises, or other of forms undue coercion); United States v. Feyler, police," maj. influence exerted the op. at (D.Me.1999) F.Supp.2d (holding that and thus sup- reverses the trial court's "[aldvising or admonishing suspect pression disagree. order. I My review of truth during an investigatory interview the record leads me to that conclude the trial does not constitute coercive law enforcement findings court's of inadequate fact are 6. This upheld case is unlike going Medina where we to take [the child] from us. That that suppression the trial court's only way. order after My only was the option was to come support in the record findings for the speak court's of in to him." Id. at After 1219. hear- fact and detective, ing conclusions of law. The testimony from the the social work- er, interrogating members, concluded that family defendant, detective's the trial threat to have the defendant's child taken from court found that the detective "did in fact utilize parents both unless the taking defendant confessed to a threat of the minor child from Defen- injuring played significant the child family role in dant's in coopera- order to elicit further inducing the defendant's confession. 25 P.3d at tion from Defendant." Id. at 1223. We ruled trial, 1217. At the defendant findings Medina testified clearly the trial court's were not in, they told him: "[Ilf I didn't come light erroneous in of the record. effect, way made but no to that regarding of law any conclusion

reach Finally, 27. II at R. vol. any promises." con- Schrimpf's remarks of Officer nature Of- between exchange occurred following the vol- cerning the counsel: af- Defense Schrimpf and statements ficer untariness Schrimpf. As with Officer exchange your discus- ter his Now Counsel: Defense trial below, inadequacy of it him, you obviously stressed explained sions try clear the ten- if he would from helpful resulted factual court's of nature ambiguous involvement; cor- tative isn't of Claudia testimony. Because rect? - likely become are not court's I said to Schrimpf: I what detailed, case would in this remand more any involve- have is, if him accept record Thus, I would helpful. impor- was saying, then it as she was ment they as findings of fact and the trial what and talk about honest that he be tant of the burden turn to currently stand was, yes. actual involvement their case. to decide the cases suppression proof in statements, these Based on II at 37. R. vol. by a proof, have the burden the state- all of suppressed the trial evidence, to demon- preponderance had after he by the Defendant ments defendant's strate with Officer foregoing conversation record inade- find the voluntary. Because I make ex- court did Scehrimpf. The trial law, I would any conclusion to reach quate simply fact, instead findings of but tensive suppression or- trial court's thus affirm Schrimpf made this tan- that "Officer stated People failed ground that on the der a woman to arrest a valid threat tamount burden. meet its involved to believe had no reason who he majority that agree with Although I vol. II at R. transactions." these supported holding is not the trial court's majority's disagree with general, same majority these relies on sup- the record assertion subsequent paraphrased - - of the trial ports reversal law that its conclusion Schrimpf to reach that, "the record demonstrates order because or threatened not coerced the Defendant cireumstances, Offi- totality of the given the Maj. op. inculpatory statements. giving into not coercive." Schrimpf's statement cer majority that Offi- reasons at 662-663. Instead, my review of Maj. op. at 662. had reason to believe testimony of Officer that the reveals record so, given the context lying, was the basis Schrimpf, which regard- Sehrimpf's statements which Officer *7 order, inade- alone is suppression court's made "it girlfriend were ing the Defendant's the issue of any support decision quate encourage Defen- him to not coercive was to the his statements whether at 662. Id. tell the truth." dant threatening. were coercive essence, determines majority, The testimony about Schrimpf re- by made Office regarding the to the statements amount to girlfriend garding the Defendant's at best. general was "encouraging Defendant than nothing more sufficiently vague as manner in a He testified considered trial court the truth." content, specific the question about a to raise and determined those same statements with the tone, his conversation nature of coercive to a amounted statements girl- regarding view, my In both threat. Schrimpf testi- example, Officer For friend. pre- of law majority a conclusion reach him, told I confronted point fied: "At one inves- inadequate factual maturely I told him it was me. him Claudia what tigation and determination. II at R. vol. to be honest." important when correctly majority states explained: point, At another legal undisputed, controlling are facts I any promises. him I made "I don't believe question of a constitutes facts effect of those ... I effect I made D.F., (citing People Maj. op. at 661 law. drug into get see want to However, (Colo.1997)). my 9, 15 933 P.2d I made actively involved. thing if not view, majority's key, assertion that "the con- uncontested fact the trial court trolling undisputed," maj. failed to consider. facts are majority op. at correctly nothing does to address the threshold states that where the trial findings court's adequacy issue of the allegedly of those un- clearly fact are supported erroneous or not disputed facts. Whether the record below by record, may this court set those factu conflicting reveals no findings regarding al evidence aside. See v. Mendoza- details of the encounter between the Defen- Balderama, (Colo.1999). 981 P.2d Sehrimpf dant and Officer is not the control- However, I am by troubled majority's ling Rather, my issue in mind. the determi- willingness to substitute its own finding fact inadequacy native issue is the of the factual for the trial court's fact in the face of record, which I sufficiently consider inade- such inadequate record and in the absence quate so as to render conclusion of law of a D.F.-type situation in which the trial improper. merely neglects court to consider disposi- Additionally, essence, tive fact. In this case is distinguishable majority gen takes eral paraphrased by D.F., from majority which the relies on to Schrimpf, support vague elevates these its assessment of the factual statements to findings hard, DF., facts, historical proceeds this case. In we then reversed the trial reframe the trial court's conclusion order, that the court's concluding officers had suspicion reasonable statements were a "threat" to its own conclu D.F., stop sion that defendant. merely 933 P.2d at 10. "en DF., In accepted findings couragement" fact to tell the truth. by court, the trial but also determined addition, disagree majority's that the trial court inexplicably had failed to expansion of the reasoning in D.F. to this incorporate key, fact, one uncontradicted case, which importantly different from which in the into its majority's D.F. The extension of D.F. to situ- findings of fact. We thus included that fact this, ations such as key, which no uncon- in our consideration of the record and our tested fact left by unconsidered the trial decision to reverse the trial suppres court's court, problematic creates a precedent per- key sion order. That fact was that the de mitting this court to substitute its own fact fendant walking stiff-legged, indicating finding for that of the trial court. carrying that he was weapon, concealed Previously, we have held that when the which support for the of fact inadequate are suspicion. officers' reasonable Id. at 14. We regarding conclusions of law sup found proper that it was for us as a review pression, remand appropriate is the course ing fact, key consider which See, e.g., Pitts, action. People v. 18 P.3d went court, unconsidered the trial in our (Colo.2000); A.W., People v. review of the trial of fact and (Colo.1999); Curtis, People v. conclusions of law. Id. at 14-15. We thus Trujillo, (Colo.1998); 959 P.2d People v. controlling concluded that when facts are 9 undisputed, including controlling those facts Just distinguishable as this case is court, unconsidered legal *8 D.F., it distinguishable is also from effect the cases of those facts question constitutes a of in which we remanded findings. law. further (citing Assoc., Id. at 15 Lakeview Ltd. Maes, (Colo.1995)). previously discussed, As testimony v. P.2d 580 of vague ambiguous. present The presents case a much differ- Thus, although we could remand for further ent situation than the one D.F. In this findings, such a unlikely remand would be case, the trial court did not fail to consider a result more detailed because of "key, uncontradicted fact" that disposi- the vague nature of testi- tive to the conclusion of law. On the con- mony. Accordingly, I believe that remand trary, the trial court in this case considered likely here would more than be futile. all of the presented relevant facts as in Offi- Schrimpf's testimony. Thus, this case Because I believe inappro- that remand is does not opportunity employ priate given the nature of this I view the reasoning of D.F. because there is no this case as a majority stalemate between the the same Both consider court: trial and the differing facts

inadequate majority differ findings of The of fact. each court trial those with the same inferences make different Thus, majority finds testimony. vague truth where

encouragement threats. implied coercive finds futility of stalemate Faced proof of remand, to the burden turn I would this case. resolve of demon burden bear defendant's

strating preponderance voluntary Valdez, People v. See evidence. correctly majority (Colo.1998). The

208, 210 apply it burden, fails then but

explains this Because record here. inadequate to base upon which inadequate record is the Peo law, hold that I would conclusion proof, and burden of meet their

ple failed suppres affirm thus order.

sion joins in the dissent. BENDER

Justice Colorado, of the State

The PEOPLE

Plaintiff-Appellant, Defendant-Appellee. HALEY,

Dedrick Colorado, People of the State

Plaintiff-Appellant, Defendant-Appellee. Dunlap,

Gene Colorado, People of the State Plaintiff-Appellant, Defendant-Appellee. Daniels,

Larry 01SA149, 01SA148, 01SA150.

Nos. Colorado,

Supreme Court

En Banc. 27, 2001.

Nov.