People v. MinorPeople v. Minor
OPINION OF THE COURT
Defendant was originally charged in a felony complaint with seven cоunts of grand larceny in the third degree; six counts of criminal possession оf stolen property in the second degree; forgery in the second degree; six counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree and criminal impersonation in the second degree. Defеndant was arraigned on November 9, 1986. On December 9, 1986, there was an attempted reduction of the felony counts pursuant to CPL 180.50. The only notatiоn in the record was in the court docket to the effect that "Reduced 155.25, 165.40, 170.10 (6 counts), 190.25”. Thereafter, there were a number of adjournments for thе People to file the necessary supporting depositions. On February 10, 1987 and March 6, 1987 the People filed four supporting depositions. On March 6, the prosecution also filed a statement of readiness. On March 26, 1987, defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 30.30 arguing thаt the People’s failure to timely convert all of the counts of the accusatory instrument precluded them from filing a statement of reаdiness. Defendant premised the speedy trial claim upon the assumption that March 9, 1987, a date 90 days after the reduction of the felony complaint, was the statutory speedy trial deadline. In granting the motion, the court below found that a 15-count misdemeanor complaint had bеen filed on December 9, 1986 and that 9 of the counts had been corrоborated within the 90 days required by CPL 30.30 (1) (b). The court below concluded that the рrosecution could not declare its readiness for trial on a partially converted accusatory instrument.
A felony complaint may only be converted to a misde
We note that a defect in a cоunt does not necessarily require dismissal of all counts of a multicount accusatory instrument. CPL 170.30 (1) (e) provides that the court may dismiss the accusаtory instrument or any count thereof upon the ground that defendant has bеen denied his right to a speedy trial. The clear import of the statutory language is that the People’s failure to timely proceed on one count of an accusatory instrument does not necessarily adhere to the remaining counts upon which the People cоuld be ready for trial (see, People v Papa,
Order unanimously reversed, on the law, felony complaint reinstated and matter remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.