70 P. 735 | Cal. | 1902
Defendant is informed against for the crime of burglary. Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty. Judgment of conviction was entered, from which this appeal is prosecuted. The information reads as follows: "The said David Miller, on or about the twenty-fourth day of November, A.D. 1901, . . . . did then and there feloniously," etc. The information was presented and filed on November 26, 1901. It appears from the transcript that "the defendant being present in court and appearing for arraignment, the arraignment was then made by the clerk, under direction of the court, by the clerk's reading to the defendant the said information, with the indorsement thereon, and by delivering to him a copy thereof. . . . The defendant was then asked by the court if he had secured the aid of counsel and of his right to be represented by counsel, to which defendant replied that he had not secured, nor did he desire the aid of counsel, but that he waived time to plead to the information, and thereupon, in response to the court, plead that he is guilty of the offense charged against him. Defendant further stated that he waived time for sentence, and asked that judgment be pronounced against him forthwith." It then appears that defendant was sworn, and on being interrogated by the court testified that the offense charged against him was committed at the hour of 11 o'clock P.M., "from which evidence the court determined that the defendant is guilty of burglary in the first degree, in that the offense was committed in the night-time." It then appears that defendant came into court with the district attorney and "was *644 duly informed by the court of the nature of the information filed on November 26, 1901, charging him with the crime of burglary (a felony), committed on the twenty-fourth day of November, A.D. 1901, of his arraignment and plea of guilty . . . . entered on the twenty-sixth day of November, 1901. The defendant waived time for judgment, whereupon the court, from the evidence offered, determined the offense of which defendant was guilty to be burglary of the first degree. The defendant was then asked if he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he replied that he had none, and thereupon judgment followed."
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient, in that it does not state the precise time at which the offense was committed nor that it was committed before the filing of the information. (Citing People v. Lafuente,
In the Moody case the information was filed June 18, 1885, and the offense was charged as committed on July 20, 1885, and it was held that no offense was charged. People v. Squires, supra, more nearly illustrates the point, but, we think, is authority against defendant's contention. The information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom "That the offense was committed at some time prior to the time of finding the indictment or filing of the information." (Pen. Code, sec. 959, subd. 5.) In the Squires case the court said: "One may be accused of an offense on the very day of its commission; and, as already said, to accuse is to state that the act charged was prior to the accusation." In the present case the accusation was made on November 26th, and the act was charged to have been committed "on or about November *645 24th." This by no possibility could be taken to mean a date subsequent to filing the information, for it would still be true under this allegation, as in the Squires case, that "to accuse is to state that the act charged was prior to the accusation."
Section
2. It is next contended that there was no sufficient arraignment of defendant as provided by section
3. Defendant appeared without counsel, and it is claimed that he was not informed of his right to counsel before he was arraigned, as required by section
4. Finally it is urged as error that the court proceeded to try the defendant after he had pleaded guilty. A fair reading of the record shows that the court did no more than to inquire into a fact which bore alone on the degree of the crime, as was the duty of the court to do. (Pen. Code, sec. 1192.)
The judgment should be affirmed.
Haynes, C., and Gray, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment is affirmed.
Henshaw, J., McFarland, J., Temple, J.