Defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery armed. 1 Hе appeals, claiming that money removed from the glove compartment of a vehicle was seized in viоlation of his federal 2 and state 3 constitutional rights and further that the prosecutor’s closing argument was inflammatory, contained references to the prosecutor’s own opinion and to the opinion of others, and deprived him of a fair trial.
At the opening of trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence. It is not disclosed why the motion was not timely made,
4
but neither the trial judge nor the prosecuting attorney challenged the timing of the motion. No evidentiary hearing was requested or held and the only evidence available to the trial judge in ruling on the motion was the transcript оf the preliminary examination. We must determine the issue on the same basis.
People
v.
Kaigler
(1962),
On June 29, 1968, at approximately 10:15 p.m. a robbery was committed at a theatre in Dearborn by two men armed with handguns. The robbers took $1,366. The police were informеd of the robbery immediately. At approximately 10:21 p.m. two alert Dearborn policemen saw a Chrysler automobile with two male occupants being driven out of Dearborn and into Detroit and observed that the occupants of the auto matched the description of the two men who had committed the robbery. The policemen stopped the car at an expressway and *668 took immediate custody of the men by covering them with a shotgun. One policeman then looked into the car. He saw a .38 revolver on the seat. He then looked under the front seat and found another gun. At the preliminary examination Officer Joseph Pavlick described the subsequent action in the following manner: “At this time other cars were arriving and they [the men] were placed in handcuffs. One was placed in оne scout car and the other one was placed in another one. I then drove the Chrysler to the station mysеlf. I drove it into the garage and, at the time, pictures were taken. I then searched the car and in the glove compartment were stacks of money. This turned out to be $1,366”.
Defendant was a passenger in the auto.
The people, relying on
People
v.
Lovins
(1968),
The factual situation culminating in the warrant-less search of the vehicle after removal to the police station is remarkably similar to the situation described in
Chambers
v.
Maroney
(1970),
“For constitutional purposеs, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the prоbable cause issue to a *669 magistrate and on the other hand carrying ont an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been searched on the spot when it was stopped since thеre was probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search. The probable сause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little tо choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrаnt and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained”.
Prior to the reporting of
Chambers
v.
Maroney,
the same result could have been obtained, notwithstanding
People
v.
Dombrowski
(1968),
Here, as in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, there was probable cause to arrest the defendant when he was stopped and there was probable cause to search the stopped auto at the scene for guns and stolen money. On the basis of whаt they knew before the search at the police station, the police had probable cause to believe a further search at the police station of this particular auto for particular articles, e.g., the stolen money, would be productive. On the authority of Chambers v. Maroney, we hold that the seizure of the money at the police station was not in violation of defendant’s rights.
*670 We do not find thе prosecutor’s argument to have been inflammatory, but one of defendant’s objections to the argument is worthy of special attention.
In
People
v.
McQuire
(1891),
“It is the rule in criminal as well as in civil cases, that the attention of the trial court must be directed to improper аrgument by timely objections, and its propriety at once determined by a ruling of the trial judge. Exceptions to argument, whеre no ruling is asked for or obtained, will not be considered on appeal.” 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (2d ed), § 627.
Affirmed.