THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CHRISTIAN P. MIKOLAITIS, Appellant.
Docket No. 130693
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
November 21, 2024
2024 IL 130693
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Christian P. Mikolaitis, appealed the circuit court of Will County‘s order denying him pretrial release pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On December 12, 2023, defendant was charged with attempt (first degree murder) (Class X) (
¶ 3 In the petition, the State provided a factual basis in support of pretrial detention as follows:
“On December 10[ ], 2023, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Lockport Police Officer‘s [sic] responded to Challenge Fitness for a victim, Alec Geibel, who had been stabbed multiple times. Alec was located at Challenge Fitness in Lockport, taken by the paramedics to Silver Cross Hospital, and subsequently transported to a [h]ospital in Chicago as a trauma 1 transport. Alec was heavily medicated but gave a brief statement while at Silver Cross Hospital. Alec stated that [defendant] had stabbed him and was driving a gray Hyundai Elantra with red trim. At 10:49 p.m., Charlene Mikolaitis called 911 and stated her son [defendant] told her he had stabbed Alec while in Lockport. Charlene also stated he would be driving a gray Hyundai Elantra. At 12:39 a.m., Kaitlyn Dunagan, [defendant‘s] girlfriend, called 911 and stated that she had just met [defendant] at a gas station. [Defendant] stated he had just stabbed someone and told her exactly how he did it. Kaitlyn further stated that he picked up Alec, who was going to buy Percocet from him. [Defendant] parked the car and pretended to look for his cell phone in the back seat. [Defendant] then opened the passenger door and stabbed Alec multiple times.
Alec left the vehicle bleeding and [defendant] drove away. [Defendant] also stated he hated the kid. At 1:31 a.m.[,] [defendant] was arrested (west bound I-80) by State Troopers and Grundy County Deputies. [Defеndant] was in the gray Hyundai Elantra and the front passenger seat had knife punctures.”
¶ 4 Pretrial services completed a pretrial risk assessment, but it contained limited information because defendant declined to participate in the assessment. Defendant‘s criminal history information indicated that he had a pending case for failure to notify of a damaged or unattended vеhicle.
¶ 5 On December 18, 2023, the circuit court held a pretrial detention hearing on the State‘s verified petition to deny pretrial release. At the hearing, the court stated that it reviewed the State‘s pleading along with the proffer and then asked the State if it wished to argue anything else. The State presented argument for detention, stating:
“Your Honor, I would first like to point out the nature and circumstances of the offense charged. Your Honor, this is a violent offense and the defendant‘s actions as alleged were violent in nature. Your Honor, I would point to the identity of a person or persons whose safety the defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of that threat. Your Honor, I would point to the alleged victim in this matter, Mr. Alec Geibеl. Your Honor, this defendant did stab allegedly this individual multiple times and left that individual in that state. Your Honor, if this defendant were to be released, I would pose that individual‘s safety is at risk.
Your Honor, I point to any statements made by the defendant and the circumstances surrounding them. Your Honor, this defendant did allegedly tell other people what happened. He said that he had just stabbed someonе and told individuals exactly how he did it. Your Honor, I would point to the defendant having—or having access or possessing weapons. Your Honor, while this defendant didn‘t necessarily have a gun, he had a knife and he used that knife to stab this individual multiple times.
Your Honor, I would ask that you take into account everything put forth in our petition. I would ask that you take into account the argument made today, and I ask that you grant the State‘s petition to deny pretrial release.”
¶ 6 Following the State‘s argument, defense counsel asked for defendant to be released from custody and placed on electronic monitoring, noting that defendant was 19 years old; had no criminal history; and had been “previously diagnosed with depression, anxiety[,] and bipolar disorder for which he takes аntipsychotics—for which he has been prescribed antipsychotics.” The court asked whether defendant was currently taking his antipsychotic medicine, to which defendant said no. Defense counsel indicated the last time defendant took his medication was in September when he “had an admission for mental health.”
¶ 7 After reviewing the State‘s proffer and the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found the proof was evident that defendant committed a detainable offense, he posed a real and present threat to the safety of Geibel, and no release conditions could mitigate the real and present safety threat defendant posed. When addressing that there were no conditions that could mitigate the safety threat defendant posed, the court stated,
“I understand the concept of mental illness, but it does not appear as if the defendant was taking his medicine which was previously prescribed to him in order to combat his antipsychotic behavior
along with his bipolar, so that is a greater concern to me and it certainly poses a question as to whether or not he would be in a position where hе could abide by the conditions of pretrial release. As such, I will find that the defendant here does meet the dangerousness standard and he shall remain detained.”
The court subsequently entered a written detention order.
¶ 8 Defendant appealed the circuit court‘s order granting the State‘s verified petition to deny pretrial release, arguing the State failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any threat he posed. 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 9.
¶ 9 The appellate court affirmed the circuit court‘s order granting the State‘s verified petition to deny pretrial release. Id. ¶ 15. The court found the State provided argument and evidence regarding the factors set forth in
¶ 10 Justice Brennan specially concurred, writing separately to express his disagreement with the dissent‘s suggestion that the Code obligates the State to argue and prove why each condition or combination of conditions set forth in
“in a variety of ways: from the presentation of evidence, to be sure, but also by common sense consideration of the factors listed in section 110-5(a)(1)-(7), including the nature of the offense, the strength of the case, the defendant‘s mental condition, the defendant‘s criminal history, the defendant‘s compliance with mandatory supervised release (MSR) оr probation, and several others.” 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 20.
The special concurrence further provided,
“[t]he State‘s burden does not obligate it to specifically address the efficacy of every conceivable condition or combination of conditions. Rather, it is the trial court that must ultimately consider all it has heard and, if ordering detention, make written findings explaining ‘why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat tо the safety of any person or persons or the community.’ ” Id. (quoting
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h) (West 2022) ).
¶ 11 Presiding Justice McDade dissented, finding
“[t]he distinction between sections 110-5 and 110-10 [of the Code] is important because the State‘s explicit burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code is
that it must establish by clear and convincing evidence, in relevant part, that ‘no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate’ either the safety risk the defendant poses or the risk of his or her ‘willful flight,’ depending on the basis for the State‘s detention request.” Id. ¶ 27 (McDade, J., dissenting) (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022) ).
Specifically, the dissent asserted that “[s]ection 110-5 provides guidance for the court when considering whether conditions exist that would, in part, ‘reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other persоn or the community.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 25 (quoting
¶ 12 Ultimately, the dissent would reverse the circuit court‘s decision and order defendant‘s release. Id. ¶ 29. Specifically, the dissent concluded,
“the State presented no evidence regarding any condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate the safety threat posed by Mikolaitis. Even though it may have presented evidеnce relevant to the factors the court is required to consider under section 110-5, the State could not meet its burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3) by presenting nothing more than that evidence. Because the State failed to present any evidence related to its burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3), it has failed to meet its burden and has essentially conceded that there are adequatе conditions.” (Emphases in original). Id.
¶ 13 This court granted defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Under the amended Code, every person charged with an offense is presumed eligible for pretrial release.
“no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a), or (ii) the defеndant‘s willful flight for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of subsection (a).”
Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) .
Section 110-10(b) provides a list of pretrial conditions that may be imposed.
¶ 15 Defendant appeals arguing the State failed to meet its burden as to the third element contained in section 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3)
¶ 16 In this instance, defendant posits the State cannot meet its burden to prove by cleаr and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate any threat he poses, when the State fails to present any argument and any evidence regarding conditions of release contained within section 110-10(b). See
¶ 17 In response, the State argues (1) the circuit court properly found that no conditions could mitigate the safety threat posed by defendant and (2) section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code requires only that the State present clear and convinсing evidence that establishes that no conditions can mitigate the safety threat and does not, as defendant suggests, require any argument.
¶ 18 We hold that, while section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code places the burden of proof on the State, the State‘s burden of proof does not require it to specifically address every conceivable condition or combination of conditiоns and argue why each condition does not apply. Absent from the statutory language outlining what the State must prove in order to detain defendant is any language requiring argument as to specific matters or language dictating what evidence or argument the State must present in attempting to meet its burden.
¶ 19 To the еxtent defendant argues that the State cannot meet its burden by offering evidence and argument based on the statutory factors in section 110-5 of the Code, we disagree. Section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code does not preclude the State from presenting evidence as to the statutory factors in section 110-5 to clearly and convincingly establish that no conditions can mitigate the sаfety threat posed by a defendant‘s release. See
¶ 20 Moreover, there is no language prohibiting the circuit court from considering evidence that may come from a source
¶ 21 Here, the record shows that at the pretrial detention hearing the State presented evidence regarding the statutory factors to be considered in determining which conditions of pretrial release, if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant, the safety of any other person, the safety of the community, and compliance by the defendant. See
¶ 22 Ultimately, it is up to the circuit court to review the evidence presented and determine whether conditions of release would mitigate the safety threat posed by a defendant. See
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting the State‘s verified petition to deny pretrial release.
¶ 24 Judgments affirmed.