Lead Opinion
In our view, Bradford’s testimony, which was specifically credited by County Court in the proper exercise of its fact-finding authority, was entitled to belief and established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s oral admissions were not involuntarily made within the meaning of CPL 60.45 (2). We are not persuaded that the surrounding circumstances pointed to by defendant, i.e., that the questioning took place in the middle of the night, following police officers’ forced entry into the residence and during the pendency of a search of the premises by police officers and a drug-sniffing dog, rendered the questioning inherently coercive. Further, in his analysis, defendant relies in large measure upon self-serving testimony that he and Karschner gave at the Huntley hearing and which County Court expressly discredited. Given County Court’s “peculiar advantages of having seen and heard the witnesses” (People v Prochilo,
Cardona, P. J., Carpinello, Mugglin and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Lead Opinion
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tompkins County (Sherman, J.), rendered September 10, 1999, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree.
A search of defendant’s residence in the Village of Dryden, Tompkins County, conducted on February 19-20, 1999 pursuant to a “no-knock” search warrant, revealed a quantity of cocaine in a furnace air vent. In response to questioning by Investigator Ronald Bradford, defendant stated that the cocaine had been brought into the house by an overnight guest, Cynthia Stocks, and that when defendant heard the police at the door, he retrieved the drug from under an upstairs mattress and threw it down the heat register, hoping to dispose of it. He was convicted after trial of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and sentenced as a second felony offender to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 4 to 8 years. Defendant now appeals, primarily contending that County Court erred in refusing to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of the execution of an invalid search warrant and statements by defendant that were involuntarily made or otherwise illegally obtained, and further arguing that the sentence imposed by County Court was harsh and excessive. We disagree and accordingly affirm.
