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People v. McNeese
1993 WL 169897
Colo. Ct. App.
1994
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*1 881 (Colo.1983). The Legouffe, P.2d 850 of causation is one such determination

ALJ’s upheld sup- if finding which must be

factual

ported by evidence. F.R. Orr substantial Rinta, 717 v. P.2d 965

Construction Co. making findings, factual it these upon an ALJ to

is incumbent determine witnesses,

credibility Varsity see Contrac Baca, (Colo.App.1985),

tors v. 709 P.2d part, liberty to find but not

and the ALJ is at

all, testimony of a witness’ be credible. Motors, Springs Ltd. Industrial

Colorado 504,

Commission, 165 Colo.

(1968). reports the medical relied ALJ, along

upon by the with claimant’s testi Hence,

mony, support the award. we will it. See F.R. Orr Construction v. disturb

Rinta, supra. Panel is

The order of the affirmed.

STERNBERG, C.J., J., MARQUEZ,

concur. Colorado, PEOPLE of State

Plaintiff-Appellant, McNEESE, Earl

Robert

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92CA0929. Appeals, Court of

Div. II. 20,

May 1993.

Rehearing Denied June 1993. Granted Jan. 1994.

Certiorari *2 against force an unlawful intruder prosecution.

shall be immune from criminal affirm. We that, joint argue inasmuch as a occupant apartment of defendant’s had invit- apartment, ed the decedent into the the trial holding court erred as a matter of law in that entry apartment into that They argue unlawful and uninvited. further that the evidence was insufficient to establish by preponderance of the evidence that the decedent had committed a crime in the dwell- ing that he use force occupant. an Approximately in- three months before the issue, acquaintance cident at a woman apartment defendant had moved into his be- decedent, husband, cause she and the her getting along. night were not On the woman, question, resisting after defen- advances, dant’s sexual told that she was going agreed to move out and defendant with that decision.

During occupancy, paid her the woman per defendant slept month for rent and $50 living on the room couch. She was key belongings after she in and all moved her apartment. were the defendant stay apart- had allowed the woman to in his only ment on the condition that she not allow apartment. decedent to enter the In this regard, the record demonstrates decedent knew he was not allowed into Indeed, apartment. he would wave to his Jr., Early, Atty., Norm S. Denver Dist. wife from the street rather than knock on the Coats, Denver, Deputy Atty., Nathan B. door. Dist. plaintiff-appellant. night On the the woman left Vela,

David F. taking any State Public De- she left without of her fender, Smylie Stephen belongings Frances Brown and and went to the decedent’s home. Flavin, Defenders, There, Deputy M. State Public she told the decedent of the advances Denver, defendant-appellee. decedent, the defendant. The who had drinking, get belongings

been wanted to her Opinion by Judge immediately. agreeing TURSI. After there woman, arguing no fighting, would be People appeal the trial court’s order decedent, and his friend returned to dismissing charges degree of second murder apartment around 2:30 a.m. to defendant, filed Robert Earl get belongings. her The woman used her pretrial hearing, McNeese. After a the court key to let them in. charges pursuant dismissed the 704.5, inside, pro- opened which Once defen- that, circumstances, door, him, vides under certain dant’s bedroom awakened any using doorway of a to him talked from the for about thority to the decedent into the defen- woman asked the invite minutes. When the three living room and to come back to the decedent get things, the decedent re-

help her her The trial court found that the decedent’s living room and *3 turned apartment was unlawful be- followed him. agreement the defendant cause the between prohibited and had an invitation the woman that, leaving after for The woman testified apartment to decedent to enter the moment, to see the decedent a she returned any circumstances. a chokehold around the on the couch with The trial court further found that the dece- According to her testi- defendant’s throat. defendant, “If had inflicted a third assault mony, told the dent the decedent headlock, by him in you.” putting the defendant a you hurt her I will kill She ever in which when considered context with the that the decedent and defen- further testified defendant, decedent’s death threat couch for two to three dant wrestled on the rowdy they stopped, plus reputation being his for and com- and that after neither minutes bative, hurt, they established a basis for a reasonable seemed were not of them committed, belief that he had was commit- arguing. ting, apart- or would commit a crime in the gather- point, At this the woman continued ment. things living in room. The next ing her any person also The trial court found thing the decedent she said she saw was both easi- “the situation of the defendant would lying Although and his friend on the floor. ly expect, justified in and ... would be hav- lay bodies within a few feet of where both case, ing the fear that the intruder stood, she she claimed not to have heard decedent], might phys- [the use some further thing. seen a The defendant then stabbed him, ical force the defendant.” her in the head with a knife and she ran from apartment. She testified the stab- People’s argument The crux of the on bings twenty minutes after occurred about appeal is that the defendant did not establish she, decedent, and his friend entered the actually entered defen and ten apartment, and between five minutes People apartment ar wrestling the couch. after the on gue occupying the that since the woman apartment had invited the decedent into the thus, testify, not The defendant did enter, key to and had used her testimony only the woman’s is the direct despite guest, an invited the decedent was evidence of what occurred. tenancy prohib the fact that the terms of her that, however, testimony, Other revealed ited his admission into the death, night on the of his grams per hun- blood alcohol level was .349 Repl.Vol. Section Also, telling heard dred milliliters. he was 8B) part: states they go his friend as left to over to the Notwithstanding go kill that apartment, “Let’s dwelling justified any occupant of a fucking known nigger.” The decedent was force, in- using any degree drunk, being bragging for a violent for about force, against an- cluding deadly physical friend, despising killing his best person other when other blacks. dwelling, entry into the made an unlawful occupant has a reasonable ruling granting defendant im- and when the In a bench person has commit- munity prosecution, court found belief that such other from in addition to lawfully ted a crime that the woman had returned to entry, committing or things. the uninvited or is apartment to retrieve her The court against person authority intends to commit crime concluded that she had lawful also uninvited property in addition to the apart- friend into the to invite the decedent’s reasonably circumstances; however, and when ment under these person might use that such other without lawful au- believes the court ruled she was legislative in- slight, phrases, we conclude that the any no matter how and “unin- (emphasis supplied) tent was to use against any occupant, entry” interchangeably. vited Guenther, 18-^-201(3), (Colo.1987), supreme court our ‘unlawfully that: “A enters states the statute as follows: upon premises in or when he is or remains’ seeking The burden is on the defendant licensed, invited, privileged otherwise statutory immunity to the benefit to do so.” Neither 18-1-704 nor 18-4r- preponderance of evidence establish provides an unlawful invitation. 1) person made an unlawful that: another 2) dwelling; entry into the defendant’s *4 Furthermore, People the are unable to ex- belief that defendant had a reasonable entry by can plain how a lawful be committed person had committed a crime such other accepting inas- an unlawful invitation. dwelling in addition to the uninvited the much woman tenant did not have the as the committing entry, was or intended authority to invite the decedent to the defen- against prop- commit a crime entry apartment, was 3) entry; erty to the uninvited in addition both unlawful and uninvited. reasonably the defendant believed Finally, People the contend that the person might physical use such other evidence was insufficient to establish the slight, against any no matter how committed a crime in decedent the 4) occupant dwelling; of the and the defen- might against and that he use force against person who dant used force the occupant. entry actually made the unlawful dwelling. The district court found that the decedent had inflicted a third assault the primary construing Our task that it defendant and was reasonable the give and statute is to ascertain effect to fear that Assembly. v. intent of the General Charnes some further force him. use (Colo.1988). Boom, 766 P.2d 665 To discern nothing suggest There is in the record to intent, legislative a court should look first to finding. that the district court erred Warner, statutory language. People the v. (Colo.1990). judgment is affirmed. Statutory words 801 P.2d 1187 phrases given according and should be effect HUME, J., concurs. ordinary meaning plain and and the their and as a statute must read considered TAUBMAN, J., dissents. Court, People whole. v. District TAUBMAN, Judge dissenting. (Colo.1986). presumed It is the Assembly knowledge legal General respectfully I dissent. import it in of the words it uses and that found, majority court and district the part tends of the statute to be each affirms, here that the decedent had unlawful- Guenther, People supra. effect. v. ly and the entered Assembly Had the intended to General entry decedent’s was uninvited because the entry distinguish between an unlawful and authority woman tenant lacked to invite entry, it an uninvited would have so done. agree the I dece- into the Instead, grants immunity to an 18-1-704 unlawful, entry disagree I dent’s but deadly who uses force And, that the was also uninvited. be- entry” “an who has made unlawful requires I both an cause believe statute occupant’s dwelling. into The statute unlawful and an uninvited I would then use of the definite article “the” re- of vacate the trial court’s order dismissal and entry as “the unin- fers back to the unlawful for trial. remand entry.” vited respect, agree In I with the all but one majority satisfy giving plain that the facts of this case effect to the Guenther, People 740 P.2d 971 ordinary meaning statutory of criteria in words was, indeed, (Colo.1987) immunity pros termining leg- whether from criminal such intent, islative we must look to the ecution 8B). unique meaning because the of Repl.Vol. dissent obvious these terms. question Browning, raise a of statu circumstances here 809 P.2d 1086 tory interpretation not discussed Guen- view, my In the words “unlawful” and “un- ther. plain meanings. invited” have different majority opinion, As noted 704.5 uses both the terms person ‘unlawfully “[A] states that: en- entry.” no case law and “uninvited There is upon premises in or ters remains’ when he “uninvited” means in which addresses what invited, licensed, privi- or otherwise Guenther, this statute. the context of leged to do so.” This definition swpra, supreme court our premises indicates that one who enters with- distinguish statute but did not between necessarily out invitation enters “unlawful” and “uninvited.” use of the words meaning because the distinct Therefore, precise meaning of those “uninvited,” the term one be invited question impression is a of first here. words premises yet onto certain be there unlawful- *5 ly- Statutory phrases words and should be according given effect to their and ordi (1992 13-21-115(5)(c), Section C.R.S. Cum. nary meaning must and the statute be read Supp.) person defines “invitee” as “a who People v. and considered as a whole. Dis enters or remains on the land of another to (Colo.1986). Court, 918 It is trict parties transact business in which the are ” Assembly presumed that General mutually interested.... knowledge legal import of the words it Also, “invitation” has been defined as “a part it intends each of the uses and breadth, term of considerable ... [which] statute to be effect. v. Guen- may express be used to the relation between ther, Moreover, supra. a should be statute occupier an owner or of land and one who consistent, harmonious, give to comes under certain circumstances.” thereon parts. People to all its in and sensible effect Further, an “invitee” is defined as “one who D.L.E., (Colo.1982). 645 P.2d 271

Interest of goes premises on of another in answer to construing primary Our task a statute is expressed implied or an invitation give to the intent of to ascertain and effect occupant.” owner or 48A C.J.S. Invitation. Boom, Assembly. the General Charnes entry” simply an is one “uninvited (Colo.1988). P.2d 766 665 express implied without an or invitation of premises. of certain the owner 2-4-201, RepLVol. IB) enacting part hand, states in that: a “[I]n entry” On the other means (b) statute, presumed ... it is that: entry upon peaceably lands effected “an effective; entire statute is intended to be but which was without color of without (e) just and reasonable result is in- [and] accomplished title and is means of fraud ” court, Additionally, .... in in- “[a] tended wrong.” some other willful Black’s Law statutory 1968). terpreting language, required (rev. to Dictionary 4th 1706 ed. There- clause, word, give every phrase, fore, effect to person could be invited without color section, presume and cannot means, sentence and through yet of title or fraudulent Assembly language used Indeed, General enter land this oc- idly meaning and with no intent that should family or roommate cur when a member Wells, Marriage given to it.” In re person property, onto his or her invites a (Colo.1993) (fn. 6). P.2d family unaware that another member has directed that not to roommate Here, Assembly since the General used the property. enter the entry” terms “unlawful and “uninvited en- correctly try,” principles of con- the district court found the above “unlawful,” since postulate would lead us to that each that the victim’s was struction And, meaning. it of the woman occu- phrase has a distinct de- violated the view, intended to However, my and “uninvited” were lawful” tenancy. pant’s oral bill things. The House concluding that the mean two different court erred the district to “unlawful and clearly introduced referred first The woman “uninvited.” victim was compromise bill la- entry while the apartment, al- forcible” the decedent invited point “unlaw- adopted at one to ter referred authorized to make was not beit that she points to “uninvit- entry and at two other Indeed, ful” such an invitation. entry” entry. “uninvited re- 13-21-115(5)(c), ed” The term since “invitee” under give great- “forcible order placed to transact property of another he entered homeowners, principal protection to er his wife were mutu- in which he and business Tape Recording of legislation. intent of the removing belongings ally her interested — on H.B. Legislative Committee Conference from the defendant’s Assembly, 1st Session 55th General majority that the stat- disagree with the 22, 1985); Wilbanks, Report A (May the words “unlawful” ute is clear and My Day Legislature, the Make interchange- be used “uninvited” should Experiment Pro- in Home Law: Colorado’s to “the ably. statute does refer While the 1989). tection, (August at 32 it entry,” suggesting that refers uninvited entry,” it does not back to “an unlawful Assembly wanted the statute The General thing. same the words mean the follow that who provide a defense for a homeowner above, provisions of As noted forci- an intruder who not have killed 8B), all bly Lamm also voiced entered. Governor This does are unlawful. uninvited entries the bill as introduced could concern that there cannot be invited entries not mean his home to lure another into allow view, my are also unlawful. which Wilbanks, away.” supra, and then “blow *6 ambiguous. means that the statute Assembly did not at 29. the General apply to a the statute would intend face, can be read to On its the statute resi- person invited into the homeowner’s that “unlawful” and “uninvited” mean either dence. and “uninvit- are the same or that “unlawful” the statute are different. While believe ed” reading of the statute also clarifies This meaning analy- upon is clear based 2-4-203(1) (a) ambiguity pursuant to above, perceived as the statute could be sis (e). consequence of this con- While the ambiguous, ambiguous. If it is as we viewed statutory in- narrowing is a struction interpret it. aids to must look extrinsic legisla- terpretation, it is consistent with the un- protect from tive intent to homeowners IB) Drennon, intruders. states: lawful Cf. P.2d 589 (1) court, ambiguous, the If a statute is general determining the intention of the Furthermore, object sought be at- assembly, may among other mat- consider Assembly did not in- tained the General ters: protecting the homeowner when the clude (a) attained; object sought The to be entrant was an invitee. his extensive (b) which the The circumstances under 18-1-704.5, in- study of Wilbanks observed enacted; statute was applied had been stances where the statute (c) legislative history, any; if The way in a he did not believe to lawful invitees

(d) contemplated by the General As- The common law or former had been remedy ambiguity per- he provisions, including sembly. laws the same To ceived, subjects; proposed a revised statute or similar Wilbanks which, things, among other would substitute (e) consequences particular The of “uninvited.” the word “unlawful” for construction; (f) pur- legislative declaration argues must pose. for the “unlawful” and “uninvited” be both correctly apply. The district court legisla- statute to respect to With entry of the decedent was found that history that the words “un- tive makes clear “unlawful,” since it violated the tenancy

the woman’s oral with the defendant. the district court was mistaken

holding that the decedent was “uninvited.”

The woman tenant did invite the decedent apartment. Despite the fact that

she was not authorized to make this invita-

tion, it was still an invitation.

Construing require the statute to both an

“unlawful” and “uninvited” I believe require

the facts of this ease reversal Accordingly,

district court. I would vacate

the order of dismissal and direct reinstate-

ment of the information on remand.

Roy ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, P. COMPANY,

DUNTON MANAGEMENT corporation; and Central Life Company, corpora

Assurance an Iowa

tion, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 92CA0420. *7 Appeals,

Colorado Court of

Div. IV. 24,

June 1993.

Rehearing July Denied 1993.

Certiorari Denied Dec. 1993.

Case Details

Case Name: People v. McNeese
Court Name: Colorado Court of Appeals
Date Published: Jan 10, 1994
Citation: 1993 WL 169897
Docket Number: 92CA0929
Court Abbreviation: Colo. Ct. App.
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