Defendant appeals his convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the murder of Denise Bandfield in East Lansing, Michigan, in June 1981. Bandfield was abducted from her apartment sometime around midnight. Her body was found the next day at a golf course.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting deoxyribonucleic acid (dna) evidence bаsed on the polymerase chain reaction (pcr) method. More specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to meet his burden of proving that the pcr method used in this case is generally accepted as reliable.
Under the
Davis-Frye
rule,*
1
novel scientific evidence must be shown to have gained general acceptance in the scientific community in ordеr to be admissible at trial.
People v Young (After Remand),
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts. At trial, the court permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence regarding two prior acts by defendant. Testimony was introduced that defendant, on separate occasions, entered the homes of two women and assaulted them. The prosecutor offered the evidence for the purpose of establishing that the defendant was the person who kidnapped and killed Bandfield.
This Court reviews the trial court’s admission of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard.
People v Taylor,
Defendant argues that two of the four requirements set forth in Golochowicz were not met. He first argues that there was no "special quality or circumstance” linking the prior aсt and the present ofiense in this case. We disagree. Both the prior and present acts involved the perpetrator’s entry into a home when the woman was alone and the door wаs unlocked. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, all three acts involved a struggle. In all three cases, the victims lived within walking distance of defendant’s residence and, although each case invоlved the removal of clothing, sexual intercourse did not occur. There was violence against all the victims resulting in injuries above the waist, including the neck. Furthermore, after viewing the photographs of all three victims, the trial court concluded that the victims were similar in appearance.
Defendant further argues that the "fourth test” under Golochowicz was not satisfied because the *139 evidence was more prejudicial then probative. We disagree. As the trial cоurt noted, the prosecutor presented other evidence to establish identity. Furthermore, the trial court admonished the jurors with respect to their consideration of the evidence. Bеfore the jury heard this testimony, the court issued a cautionary statement to the jury not to consider the evidence in terms of characterizing defendant as a "bad person,” likely to have committed the immediate offense, but only in terms of whether it contributed to the identification of the defendant. Thus, we do not believe that evidence of the prior acts was given undue weight by the jury. Acсordingly, we conclude that under either VanderVliet or Golochowicz the evidence was admissible. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence.
Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidеnce to establish that he was the perpetrator of the crimes. We disagree. To determine whether sufficient evidence has been presented, this Court must view the evidence in a light most fаvorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasоnable doubt.
People v Wolfe,
Defendant next argues that he was denied his right of confrontation and effective assistance of counsel when the trial court refused to permit defense counsel to cross-examine a prosecution witness regarding an alibi because of defense counsel’s failure to file a notice of alibi. Dеfendant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to cross-examine Deborah McMillan, defendant’s sister-in-law, regarding his whereabouts on the night of the murder. In this case, Debоrah McMillan was called as an adverse witness by the prosecution. When the defense began questioning McMillan about her grand-jury testimony regarding her observations on the night of the abduction, the prosecutor objected on the basis of defense counsel’s failure to file a notice of alibi. The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection and disallowed the questioning.
A trial court may exclude alibi evidence if the statutory notice is not given.
People v Travis,
Defendant next argues that, if the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit McMillan’s alibi testimony, he was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to filе the notice of alibi. Defendant failed to move for a Ginther
3
hearing or a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes aрparent on the record.
People v Hurst,
Defendant furthеr argues that he is entitled to a remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant does not ask this Court to review the actual legal reasoning of the triаl court, nor does he argue that it is clearly erroneous. Instead, defendant focuses on the trial court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing before its decision regarding the motion. A
*142
remand is not necessary in this case, however, because there was no dispute of fact but only legal questions at issue before the trial court. The only "fact” raised by defendant on appeal as being at issue is the fact that one police officer pointed out shoes to another police officer. However, defendant does not indicate how or why that fact would advance his position, nor does he point to any area in which further elucidation of the facts might advance his position.
People v Futrell,
Affirmed.
Notes
People v Davis,
The prosecution urges this Court to follow
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
509 US —;
People v Ginther,