THE PEOPLE,
S251333
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
February 27, 2020
Fifth Appellate District F073942; Madera County Superior Court MCR047554, MCR047692 and MCR047982
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuellar, Kruger, and Groban concurred.
Opinion of the
We granted review in this case to decide whether a convicted defendant who is placed on probation after imposition of sentence is suspended, and who does not timely appeal from the order granting probation, may take advantage of ameliorative statutory amendments that take effect during a later appeal from a judgment revoking probation and imposing sentence. The Court of Appeal answered this question in the affirmative and, in light of a newly effective amendment to a sentence enhancement statute, ordered four of defendant Douglas McKenzie‘s sentence enhancements stricken. We affirm the Court of Appeal‘s judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2014, in three separate cases, defendant pleaded guilty to a number of drug-related offenses and, as here relevant, admitted having sustained four prior felony drug-related convictions for purposes of sentence enhancement under
In March 2016, the Madera County Probation Department sought revocation of defendant‘s probation based on alleged probation violations. Defendant admitted the violations and, on June 1, 2016, the trial court revoked probation, declined to reinstate it, and imposed a prison sentence that included four three-year prior drug conviction enhancements under
About two weeks later, defendant filed a notice of appeal. On September 13, 2017, the Court of Appeal filed an opinion modifying the judgment in certain respects and otherwise affirming.
On October 11, 2017, the governor signed Senate Bill No. 180 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which was to take effect January 1, 2018. Under
On October 20, 2017, defendant petitioned this court for review based on the enactment of Senate Bill No. 180 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). On December
We then granted the People‘s petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
We begin with In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), which first set forth the current rule regarding retroactive application of ameliorative statutory amendments and which is the foundation of the People‘s argument. In that case, between the defendant‘s escape from a drug rehabilitation center and his guilty plea to the crime of escape, statutory amendments took effect that reduced “both the term of imprisonment [for his crime] and the time necessary to spend in prison to be eligible for parole.” (Id. at p. 744.) We held that the ameliorative changes applied to the defendant, explaining: “The key date is the date of final judgment. If the amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final then . . . . it, and not the old statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, applies.” (Ibid.)
This conclusion, we reasoned in Estrada, was warranted by factors indicating that, consistent with the common law rule, the Legislature must have intended the amendatory statute to apply in “all prosecutions not reduced to final judgment” at the time of its passage. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747.) “[O]f paramount importance,” we explained, was the following consideration: “When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment[,] it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology. . . . [¶] . . . ‘A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative
Estrada involved statutory amendments that “merely reduced . . . penal sanctions” for a given act, but we subsequently applied it to amendments that “entirely eliminated” such sanctions. (People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 301 (Rossi).) “[T]he common law principles” underlying the Estrada rule, we reasoned, “apply a fortiorari when criminal sanctions have been completely repealed before a criminal conviction becomes final.” (Ibid.) As we explained, “it would be untenable to give defendants the benefit of a reduction in punishment while denying them the benefit of a complete remission of punishment.” (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 213 (Collins).) Such a rule “would clearly lead to absurd results.” (Rossi, at p. 302, fn. 8.) It would enable a defendant to benefit from a statutory change if the amendment “simply . . . reduce[s] the maximum punishment” for a given act — even “to one day in jail” — but would “subject[]” a defendant “to the full punishment [formerly] prescribed” if the amendment instead “completely repeal[s] all criminal penalties for” the act. (Ibid.) “[S]uch a reading of legislative intent belies reality.” (Ibid.) Thus, ” ‘when the [L]egislature repeals a criminal statute or otherwise removes the State‘s condemnation from conduct that was formerly deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding charging such conduct. The rule applies to any such proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it.’ ” (Id. at p. 304.)
The record here shows that when the revisions to
The People‘s arguments fail under our precedents. Initially, the People err by assuming that when we used the phrase “judgment of conviction” in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at page 744, we were referring only to “underlying” convictions and enhancement findings, exclusive of sentence. In criminal actions, the terms “judgment” and ” ‘sentence’ ” are generally considered “synonymous” (People v. Spencer (1969) 71 Cal.2d 933, 935, fn. 1), and there is no “judgment of conviction” without a sentence (In re Phillips (1941) 17 Cal.2d 55, 58). Moreover, in Estrada, we also referred to the cut-off point for application of ameliorative amendments as the date when the “case[]” (id. at p. 746) or “prosecution[]” is “reduced to final judgment” (id. at p. 747). And in Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at page 304, we stated that an amendatory statute applies in ” ‘any [criminal] proceeding [that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it.’ ” (Italics added.) It cannot be said that this criminal prosecution or proceeding concluded before the ameliorative legislation took effect.
This conclusion is also consistent with our recent decision in People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771 (Chavez). In that case, four years after successfully completing probation, the defendant asked the trial court to dismiss his action and expunge his record in furtherance of justice under
In the course of so holding, we noted that “[u]nder well-established case law, a court may exercise its dismissal power under [Penal Code] section
Notably, in reaching this conclusion, we also found it irrelevant that “under [Penal Code] section 1237, an order granting probation is deemed a ‘final judgment’ for the purpose of taking an appeal.” (Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 786.) Under our precedents, we explained, “such an order” has only “limited finality” and ” ‘does not have the effect of a judgment for other purposes.’ ” (Ibid.) Based on these precedents, we declined to find that, by virtue of
In this regard, Chavez is consistent with prior decisions in which we stated that under
Based on the preceding analysis, we reject the People‘s argument that, by virtue of
This reading of Estrada is consistent with the “consideration of paramount importance” we identified in that decision: the “inevitable inference” that the Legislature, having “determined that its former penalty was too severe,” “must have intended” that the ameliorative statutory change “should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744-745.) A contrary conclusion, we explained, would ” ‘serve no purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance,’ ” and would have to rest on the impermissible view “that the Legislature was motivated by [such] a desire.” (Id. at p. 745.) Here, the People offer no basis for concluding that the revisions to
The People instead offer several policy bases for their view. They assert that precluding probationers like defendant from taking advantage of ameliorative statutory revisions that become effective after expiration of the time for direct appeal from an order granting probation would be “consistent with the public‘s interest in finality, an interest that the Legislature would not intend to implicitly undercut by reducing a penalty.” Finality is important, the People argue, because it (1) “prevents criminals from escaping prosecution” due to destruction of evidence and loss of witnesses over the years, (2) “conserves public resources” by eliminating potential retrials and the need “to preserve evidence during the period of probation,” and (3) “encourage[s]” probationers “to accept responsibility” for their actions and to “focus on rehabilitation.” By contrast, the People contend, applying such revisions under these circumstances would produce “absurd results.” It would “mean” that probationers “who do[] not initially challenge [their] underlying conviction” and “successfully complete[]” probation are worse off than probationers who violate their probation terms, have probation revoked, and appeal from that revocation, because only the latter may “benefit from a subsequent amendment to the pertinent statute.” It would thus ” ‘encourag[e] defendants to violate the terms of their probation in the hopes of extending the probation term to take advantage of any beneficial changes in the law during the probationary period.’ ” This, in turn, might make trial courts “reluctant to extend probation and give defendants additional opportunities to achieve rehabilitation.”
The People‘s contrary view rests on an asserted distinction — between amendments that merely reduce punishment and those that entirely eliminate punishment — that, as already explained, we long ago rejected for purposes of applying the Estrada rule. The People argue that “because” the statutory amendment here “did not [merely] change the sentence or the superior court‘s sentencing discretion as to the former enhancements, it did away with them altogether,” this case necessarily involves a prohibited “challenge to the [now final] adjudication of defendant‘s guilt — specifically, the adjudication of the allegations of prior narcotics-related convictions” — rather than a question of “sentencing discretion.” In other words, in the People‘s view, although defendant could have benefitted from the amendment had it merely reduced the punishment for the enhancement — even to a single day in jail — because the amendment completely eliminated the punishment, he cannot. As we explained over 40 years ago, as a basis for determining the Estrada rule‘s
Finally, rejection of the People‘s argument is consistent with our discussion in Estrada and subsequent decisions of “legislative intent,” i.e., whether “the Legislature intend[ed] the old or new statute to apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) We find no basis to conclude that the Legislature intended the old statute imposing punishment to apply to those on probation simply because they may no longer appeal from orders granting probation as to which there was no ground for appeal. On the other hand, as we have explained, “an amendment eliminating criminal sanctions is [itself] a sufficient declaration of the Legislature‘s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so decriminalized.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 213.)
In addition to these generally applicable statements regarding legislative intent, the legislative history of
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
CHIN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUELLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. McKenzie
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 25 Cal.App.5th 1207
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S251333
Date Filed: February 27, 2020
Court: Superior
County: Madera
Judge: Ernest J. LiCalsi
Counsel:
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Alex Green, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, R. Todd Marshall, Raymond L. Brosterhous II, Eric L. Christoffersen, Janet Neeley, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Catherine Chatman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Catherine Chatman
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 210-7699
Elizabeth Campbell
Attorney at Law
3104 O Street
Sacramento, CA 95816
(530) 786-4108