—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (James Leff, J.), rendered March 5, 1992, which convicted defendant of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, and sentenced him to a definite term of imprisonment of onе year, and judgment, same court and Justice, rendered March 22, 1994, which convicted defendant, upon his guilty plea, of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from three to six years, and order, same court and Justice, entered November 10, 1993, which dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, unanimously affirmed.
On March 6, 1991, two police officers, parked on Broadway between 140th and 141st Streets in Manhattan, saw defendant driving toward them at a high rate of speed in a dark blue, 1985 Mercedes sedan. Defendant stopped аlongside them, at which time the officers noticed that the rear vent window of the car was shattered and the trunk crushed upwards. The officers pursued defendant as he passed through three red lights,
Defendant was charged with criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.50) and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.05 [1]). On February 6, 1992, a jury found defendant guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, but deadlocked on the count charging criminal possession of stolen property. Supreme Court declared a mistrial and directed a retrial on that charge. On March 5, 1992, defendant was sentenced to one year in jail for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, at which time the court ordered that defendant be assigned new court-appointed counsel for trial on the remaining count.
What transpired between the imрosition of sentence and June 15, 1993 is unclear as defendant has only furnished the transcripts of two brief court appearances. Both make reference to some five or six lawyers having reрresented defendant at various times during this time period. At the June 15, 1993 appearance, the court was informed (by the attorney who represented defendant at the first trial) that defendant had rejected an offer of a reduced sentence in exchange for his guilty plea, which had been discussed with him "at great length.” Supreme Court, voicing its displeasure with the time and resources "squandered” by defendant, relieved his appointed attorney, to which counsel expressed neither objection nor surprise. The court thereupon directed that defendant represent himself at the upcoming triаl. Jury selection was conducted on July 12, 1993, but culminated in the declaration of a mistrial on the following day after defendant disrupted the proceedings. On March 1, 1994, defendant (again with the assistance of thе attorney who represented him at the first trial) entered a plea of guilty to criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and waived his right to appeal in exchange for a рrison term of three to six years. Sentence was imposed on March 22, 1994 in accordance with the plea agreement.
Although appeal is taken from two judgments, defendant concedes in his brief that no issues are raised with respect to
Given the number of times new counsel was appointed in this case, defendant is in the untenable position of the boy who cried "Wolf!” It is well settled that "[w]here a mistrial is granted without the consent or over the objection of a defendant, retrial is barred by double jeopardy protection unless there was 'manifest necessity’ for the mistrial or 'the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated’ ” (People v Ferguson,
In the absence of any explanation for defendant’s dismissal of at least six former attorneys—listed by the court as Messrs. Stone, Wachtel, Portnoy, Rоsenthal, Traub, and O’Rourke (omitting Muraskin)—the suggestion that the court was required to appoint yet another attorney while jury selection was in progress is presumptuous. "The right of an indigent criminal defendant to thе services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant’s option” (People v Sides,
Defendant’s protestations tо the contrary notwithstanding, his failure to cooperate with so many appointed attorneys during the course of these proceedings constitutes the effective waiver of the right to counsel. While the circumstances of the court’s dismissal of defendant’s attorney on July 13, 1992 are unclear from the brief record, it is significant that neither counsel nor defendant raised any objection. As noted pаrenthetically, the attorney had represented defendant at his first trial of this crime. Moreover, the transcript of the proceedings during sentencing reveals that defendant was to have a new lаwyer "for the retrial of the criminal possession of stolen property” count. To defendant’s obvious disdain for counsel in general is added the clear indication of dissatisfaction with this attorney in particular. The obvious inference is that defendant did not want the attorney to represent him at the new trial and acquiesced in his dismissal. The record provided by defendant to this Court contravenes his subsеquent contention that Supreme Court unilaterally dismissed counsel in violation of defendant’s wishes.
As to the declaration of a mistrial, it seems that the experience of jury selection forced dеfendant to acknowledge that he was not better equipped than assigned counsel to mount a defense if, in view of the overwhelming evidence against him, there was a defense to be mounted. Hаving been warned by the court, in no uncertain terms, that conviction would likely result in "heavy time” (15 years to life as opposed to an offer as low as 21/2 to 5 years in exchange for a guilty plea), defendant’s threat to continue to disrupt the proceedings until new counsel was appointed is understandable. It was also grounds to declare a mistrial, a step that was very much in defendant’s best interests. It hаrdly behooves defendant to suggest that his concerted efforts to make a mockery of the judicial process should be rewarded because he was successful in waiving—by his conduct—a constitutional right that process is designed to protect (see, United States v Dinitz,
Defendant’s brief contains extensive references to intemperate remarks made by Supreme Court. While it is desirable that a court at all times maintain its demeanor, it is apparent from the record that this defendant would try the patience of the
Defendant’s other contentions have been examined and found to be without merit. Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Rubin, Ross, Tom and Andrias, JJ.