People v. McDavidPeople v. McDavid
The question here is whether the same statutory framework permits a court, after striking a
Defendant Weldon K. McDavid, Jr., was Diana Lovejoy‘s shooting instructor when she was going through a contentious divorce from her husband Greg Mulvihill. McDavid and Lovejoy began a romantic relationship and eventually hatched a plan to kill Mulvihill. Lovejoy lured Mulvihill to a secluded location while McDavid hid in nearby bushes. When Mulvihill arrived, McDavid shot him below his right armpit. Mulvihill suffered severe injuries but survived, and McDavid and Lovejoy were prosecuted.
In 2017, a jury convicted McDavid and Lovejoy of conspiracy to commit murder (
On January 31, 2018, the trial court sentenced McDavid to 25 years to life for conspiracy, consecutive to 25 years to life for the
The Court of Appeal, agreeing with McDavid, vacated his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing “for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the
While the appeal was pending, we held in Tirado that a trial court has the discretion to strike a charged
The Attorney General filed a petition for rehearing, which the Court of Appeal granted. On rehearing, the Court of Appeal
Justice Dato dissented. Observing that Senate Bill 620 sought to curb the rigidity of the original
We granted review on this issue, which has divided the Courts of Appeal. (Compare People v. Fuller (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 394 (Fuller) [trial courts have discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement from outside
II.
Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made through the exercise of informed discretion. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) A court acting while unaware of the full scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it. (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 694.) Here we consider whether a trial court, after striking a
A.
We begin with an overview of the statutory framework. ”
In enacting
Two decades later, the Legislature reconsidered the wisdom behind its statutory enactment and changed course. Recognizing that “[l]onger sentences do not deter crime or protect public safety” and that “research has found that these [firearm] enhancements cause problems,” such as exacerbating racial disparities in imprisonment and greatly increasing the prison population, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 620. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 15, 2017, p. 5.) This legislation amended
Meanwhile,
B.
In Tirado, we affirmed the general rule that when an adjudicated enhancement has been dismissed, “imposition of an uncharged enhancement is permitted so long as the facts supporting its imposition are alleged and found true.” (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 699.) We also recognized that a court‘s discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement may be restricted by statute. (Ibid.)
In holding that
The text of
The question here concerns the trial court‘s sentencing discretion when, ”in the interest of justice pursuant to
The Attorney General contends that it is not clear
Indeed, the Attorney General concedes that “it would be ‘entirely illogical’ to require the trial court to impose a
Grammatically, it is hard to see how that can be so. The phrase “pursuant to this section rather than imposing punishment authorized under any other law” in the second sentence of for that enhancement pursuant to this section, to the extent it imposes punishment at all, rather than imposing punishment authorized under any other law . . . .” But that is not what the statute says. The modifying phrase “pursuant to this section rather than . . . under any other law” has no applicability independent of the phrase “the court shall impose punishment for that enhancement” (
Suppose the prosecution were to explicitly charge, in connection with a single offense, an allegation under each of
The Attorney General says this reading should be “disfavored” because it would “render[] a part of subdivision (j) inoperative. . . . [¶] . . . Because subdivision (h) now permits a court to exercise its discretion to dismiss a
Nor does this come as a surprise. The Legislature‘s amendment of
This does not mean that
In rejecting this reading of the statute, the Court of Appeal quoted the following language in Tirado: “Section 12022.53(j) is the subdivision that authorizes the imposition of enhancements under section 12022.53. It provides that for the penalties in
But Tirado, in identifying
Because the main issue in Tirado was whether a court after striking a
We now hold that when a court has exercised its discretion under subdivision (h) to strike a
C.
Our holding today comports with the legislative history of
CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no view on whether the trial court, with a proper understanding of its sentencing discretion, should strike McDavid‘s
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.