People v. McDanielsPeople v. McDaniels
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Kasserman
delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Tracy McDaniels, was convicted in a bench trial of aggravated battery by intentionally causing permanent disfigurement to Barry Bigsby. She was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. While the defendant raises five issues on appeal, we deem it
The instant proceedings arose out of an incident in which the defendant poured hot grease on Barry Bigsby, resulting in third-degree burns to Bigsby’s torso and arms. According to Bigsby, although the police had told him not to visit the defendant because of an altercation between the defendant and Bigsby two weeks prior to the instant events, he nevertheless went to the defendant’s apartment at about 5:30 a.m. on the morning of June 5, 1983. He testified that he knocked on the door and that defendant let him in. He stated that he and the defendant talked for a while and the defendant performed an act of fellatio upon him. Bigsby testified that he then dozed off on the couch but was suddenly awakened when hot grease was poured on him.
The defendant contends, however, that she was defending herself when she threw the hot grease on Bigsby. It is the defendant’s position that Bigsby would have beat her or forced her to succumb to anal intercourse if she had not thrown the grease on him in an attempt to escape. According to the defendant, she had reason to believe this because two weeks prior to the instant occurrence, she and Bigsby had argued over a curl activator and eight-track tape which were hers but which Bigsby wanted to take. She testified that on that occasion Bigsby had pushed her and she had fled into the bathroom, whereupon he kicked in the bathroom door and began hitting her in the head. With the help of her son, the defendant managed to run out of the bathroom and out the front door of her apartment with Bigsby in close pursuit. When he caught her in the hallway, he hit her in the stomach and face and kicked her in the ribs, causing bruising and swelling of her face and continuing pain in her ribs.
The defendant testified that on the morning she threw grease on Bigsby, she had been playing cards with friends in her apartment building and arrived home at about 5 a.m. About 5:30 a.m. Bigsby walked in through the unlocked front door of her apartment and locked the deadbolt behind him. She said that he took off his suit coat, hung it on the rocking chair and placed an eight-track tape in the stereo. She testified that she then told Bigsby that he was not supposed to be there and he said he was not there. According to the defendant, she asked Bigsby to leave, whereupon he began talking about sex, asking her to perform an act of fellatio on him and to bend over in front of the window so that he could have anal intercourse with her. The defendant testified that she refused him but that he asked her again to bend over. She testified that after she asked him to leave at least twice more, he put his penis back in his pants and sat
It was the defendant’s theory of the case, therefore, that she had been defending herself by the act of throwing the grease on Bigsby. She believed that she could not induce Bigsby to leave her apartment nor could she herself leave without suffering another beating or ‘submitting to anal intercourse unless she in some way deterred Bigsb^.‘-v ’ ■’
The defendant’s attorney had begun cross-examining the first1 ‘Witness to testify for the State, Bigsby, in an attempt to elicit information from him concerning the prior altercation, when the State objected
“Seems to be pretty ridiculous to claim self-defense. You might do that before a jury, but this is a bench trial.”
This remark was made at page 20 of a 105-page report of proceedings, and was made before any evidence of self-defense, other than the prior altercation between the parties, had been presented. Moreover, the witness who was being cross-examined at the time these remarks were made was the victim, Barry Bigsby, whose very involvement in the crime as the alleged victim would indicate his testimony would be biased against the defendant.
These facts make it plainly apparent that the trial court, as the trier of fact, had prejudged the validity of the defendant’s defense prior to hearing the totality of the evidence. At the time the court stated that the claim of self-defense was “pretty ridiculous,” the court had not only not heard all of the evidence to be presented by the defendant, it had not even heard the completion of the testimony of the first witness to testify for the State.
The right of a defendant to an unbiased, open-minded trier of fact is so fundamental to our system of jurisprudence that it should not require either citation or explanation. It is rooted in the constitutional guaranty of due process of law (see People v. Diaz (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 988, 992, 275 N.E.2d 210, 212), and entitles a defendant to a fair and impartial trial before a court “which proceeds not arbitrarily or capriciously, but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial” (City of Chicago v. Cohn (1927), 326 Ill. 372, 374, 158 N.E. 118, 120). It is axiomatic that “[p]re-judgment is the antithesis of a fair trial.” (People v. Diaz (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993, 275 N.E.2d 210, 213.) These standards of impartiality apply to both judges and juries; one does not waive his right to an impartial trial by waiving his right to a jury. (People v. Diaz (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993, 275 N.E.2d 210, 213.) If this most basic and fundamental right is not afforded a defendant during trial, that defendant had been denied due process of law and is entitled to a new trial. People v. Diaz (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993, 275 N.E.2d 210, 213.
The doctrine of plain error as required for reversal may be invoked where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error is of such a magnitude that the accused is denied a fair and impartial trial. (People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 1, 28, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1181.) We believe that the trial judge’s premature and clearly biased remarks denied the defendant a fair and impartial trial. The fact that the court
We conclude, therefore, that the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial, and for this reason, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the grounds of plain error.
Reversed and remanded.
EARNS and WELCH, JJ., concur.