delivered the opinion of the court:
Wе granted the People leave to appeal from a judgment of the appellate court (
On December 17, 1970, the defendant, Larry McCoy, pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Cook County to an indictment for robbery and was placed on probation for 5 years. The defendant later was convicted on a theft charge, and оn July 2, 1973, after a hearing, he was found to have violated the terms of his probation. At that time the defendant sought to elect to receive treatmеnt for his drug addiction under the terms of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act, but the judge, who was the judge who had placed him on probation, sentenced the defendant tо a term of 5 to 15 years.
On the defendant’s appeal the appellate court rejected the People’s contention that robbеry was a “crime of violence” making the defendant ineligible to elect to receive treatment under the Act. The court remanded the cаuse and ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant otherwise was eligible to make the electiоn under the Act and then to decide whether the court in its discretion would admit the defendant to the treatment program.
A basic purpose of the Dаngerous Drug Abuse Act is “to provide diagnosis, treatment, care and rehabilitation for controlled substance addicts to the end that these unfortunatе individuals may be restored to good health and again become useful citizens in the community.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 9VÁ, par. 120.2.) Under the Act a drug addict who is charged with or convicted of a crime, and who qualifies under the terms of the Act, may elect to undergo treatment for his addiction under the supervision of the Department of Mental Health as an alternative to prosecution or probation unless “the crime is a crime of violence.” The statute says in part:
“An addict charged with or convicted of a crime is eligible to elect treatment under the supervision of the Department instead оf prosecution or probation, as the case may be, unless (a) the crime is a crime of violence ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 91%, par. 120.8.
As originally enacted in 1967, the Act defined “crime of violence” as follows:
“ ‘Crime of violence’ means all offenses defined as forcible felonies in Section 2 — 8 оf the Criminal Code of 1961 except for burglary ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 91%, par. 120.3-8.)
Section 2 — 8 of the Criminal Code at that time provided, and it still provides:
“ ‘Forcible felony’ mеans treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery and any other felony which involves the use or thrеat of physical force or violence against any individual.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 2 — 8.)
Thus, as first drawn and passed, the Act included robbery in its definition of “crime of violence,” and one convicted of it was not eligible to elect for treatment.
Effective January 1, 1973, however, the statutory definition of “crime of violence” was amended to read:
“ ‘Crime of violence’ means the following crimes: treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, armed rоbbery, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery, and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence agаinst another individual.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 91%, par. 120.3-8.
Thus, the legislature created a list of crimes for specific application in administering the provisions of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act. The crimes on the list were nearly the same as those constituting forcible felonies under the Criminal Code, but the legislature in declаring the list of disqualifying crimes omitted burglary and selectively, we judge, substituted the specific offense of armed robbery for the more general crime of robbery. The offense of armed robbery (robbery when “armed with a dangerous weapon” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 18 — 2)) is patently more dangerous to sociеty and more socially intolerable than simple robbery.
The People nevertheless contend that the General Assembly intended the offense of robbery to remain “a crime of violence” when the 1973 amendment was enacted. They argue that robbery under its plain and common definition is a fеlony which involves the use of force or threat of force and therefore is within the language with which the amendment concludes: “*** and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against another individual.” It is undeniable that robbery does involve the use of or threat of force. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 18 — 1; People v. Patterson,
“Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of thе surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always hаve some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” Cabell v. Mаrkham (2d Cir. 1945),148 F.2d 737 , 739.
The first canon of statutory interpretation is to construe a statute so as to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. (People ex rel. Kucharski v. Adams,
To give the construction the People seek would be, to deny effect to the legislative intent. It would render meaningless the legislature’s careful omission of the offense of robbery and the substitution of the graver offense of armed robbery. This court has held it is presumed that an amendment of a statutе is made to effect some purpose, and that effect must be given the law amended in a manner consistent with the amendment. Acme Fireworks Corр. v. Bibb,
A purpose the legislature may have had in removing the disqualification from the offense of robbery would have been of course to broaden the eligibility for treatment and further the humane purpose of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act to restore addicts to health and usefulness.
For the reasons given the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.