1 Neb. 182 | Neb. | 1871
The grounds, mainly upon which the denial of McCallum’s right to exercise the duties and receive the emoluments of clerk of the District Court of Otoe county, is placed, are :
1. The alleged'unconstitutiouality of the act of February 9, 1869, which takes from the judges of the District Court the authority to appoint clerks of that county, and which makes the county clerks of the several counties, ex-officio, such clerks; and,
2. The failure of McCallum to give a bond for the faith
The unconstitutionality complained of is that the act referred to, was enacted in violation of so much of section nineteen, article two of the State constitution, as declares that, “ No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title ; and no law shall be revived or amended, unless the new act contain the entire act revived and the sections amended.”
With respect to its title : The act contains but one subject, which is, to provide clerks for the District Coúrt. By section one of the act which is amended, such clerks were appointed by the judges of the respective districts. The amendment makes county clerks ex-officio clerks of the District Court. This is quite well expressed in the title, “ An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled, An act to provide for the appointment of clerks of the District Court, approved June 22, 1867.” It is not required that the title should contain an abstract of the bill, nor set out the particulars of the amendment. Whether this requirement of the constitution is designed as a rule for the government of the legislature, an observance of which is enjoined by a sense of duty and the official oath of each member, and not subject to any supervisory power of the courts (3 Ohio State, 481 ; 6 Ib. 179), it is unnecessary to stop to inquire. The constitution not having fixed the degree of particularity with which a title is to express the subject, it is enough that the legislature, with this provision before them, have selected their own title ; and although we might not agree upon it as the most suitable or comprehensive, the act for that reason is not to be declared void.
The purpose of this provision is to prevent surprise in legislation, by leaving matter of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expresses another. — State v. County Judges of Davis Co. 2 Iowa, 282. There can be no suggestion
The further question is presented under this section of the constitution, whether the new act shall contain the section as it stood before amendment, or simply set out the section as amended ? The able counsel for the relator contends that the new act must recite the old section and that literally. This construction is rested chiefly upon the case of Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 328, which, upon a clause of the constitution of Indiana, similar to this, adopt the interpretation insisted upon. The decision of that case was by a divided court, and the opinion published quite meagre and unsatisfactory. It seems never to have challenged respect, but having been announced by the highest court of that State was, tor a time, adhered to, not without protest however.
Judge Goodkin, in a case where he felt constrained to follow, remarked, “Were this an original question I would not so decide.” — Littler v. Smiley, 9 Ind. 118. At last, however, the Supreme Court boldly met and overturned Langdon v. Applegate, in the well considered case of Greencastle Southern Turnpike Co. v. The State ex rel. Malat, 28 Ind. 382. This was a somewhat recent case, and was not cited upon the argument before us.
The only State, I believe, having a like constitutional provision, which has given it the interpretation here claimed, is Louisiana. Some early cases of that Slate are referred to, but I have been unable to possess myself of them, to see the reasoning upon which they proceeded. Neither have I been able to advise myself whether, like Indiana, the courts of that State have not reversed-these early cases, and relieved themselves from the annoyance and embarrassment attending them.
Judge Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 152, after referring to the rule expressed in these early cases in Indiana and Louisiana, says : “It is believed, however, that the general understanding of the provision in question is different, and that it is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section revised or amended is set forth and published, as revised or amended, and that anything more only tends ho render the statute unnecessarily cumbrous.” The construction insisted on, in my judgment, is wanting in reason as well as authority to support it.
As the best light in which to discover the true meaning of this provision of the constitution, let us briefly inquire into the purpose of its institution, and perhaps the mischief it was designed to correct may be as well illustrated by reference to the course of past legislation. Taking up a volume of Territorial Laws nearest me, I open at page 20,
“ Section 1. Be it enacted by the Council and House of Representatives of the Territory of Nebraska, that line four, section thirty-four, be amended as follows : Strike out the word “ two,” and insert the word “ five : ” that after the word “ precinct ” in tenth line, insert the word “ voting.” Several serious objections to this character of legislation are obvious. With terms as blind as this, a bill may be read three different times, as required by the constitution, or a hundred times, and no one, from its reading alone, except he who drafted the bill, or those immediately interested in it, would comprehend its object. Inexperienced and inattentive members would consent to the passage of any bill concerning the object of which they know nothing, when to inform themselves would involve an examination of other laws not readily accessible. Designing men could effect material changes in the most important laws, by deceiving members into.the belief, that they were acting upon other and less important subjects. These objections are obviated, besides presenting the law when published in a complete and intelligent form, without necessitating recourse to other volumes as a key, by requiring the new act to contain the section amended, i. e., the section as amended. The act above cited, brought into conformity with this constitutonal requirement, would read, (the enacting clause being omitted), that section 34 of chapter 46, of the Revised Statutes be and hereby is amended so as to read : “ Section 34. No special, precinct or district school taxes hereafter levied pursuant to any existing law, for the purpose of building or repairing school houses, or for any other purpose, shall exceed in any one year the rate of five mills on the dollar,” &c. Here, it will be seen, that under the system allowed prior to the
Add to this, the ■ appearance of these amendatory acts upon the pages of our statute book; particularly that of a section, which should unfortunately have undergone repeated amendments, and where old obsolete acts must be brought forward and spread out at length, making our laws unnecessarily cumbrous and confused, and imposing additional expense in their publication, and there remains little to
I am clearly of the opinion, therefore, for the reasons I have mentioned, and for others that occur to me, that this section of the constituion does not require’ the recital of the old section in the amendatory act, but that it is satisfied by setting forth the section as amended.
McCallum' having been duly elected county clerk of Otoe county, taken the oath of office and given the bond required of him as such, it remains to be considered whether, under a law making county clerks ex officio clerks of the District Court, it was required of him to give another and additional bond for the discharge of his duties as clerk of the District Court. Before this act of 1869, the office of clerk of the District Court was a separate and distinct office, the judges of the several judicial districts appointing their own clerks. By section 38, page 52, Eevised Statutes, such clerks were' required, before entering upon their duties, to give a bond in the sum of three thousand dollars, conditioned for their faithful performance. But under the amended law I do not understand that this bond must be given in addition to that already given as county clerk. It has not been so understood in either of the other judicial districts. In fact, I believe no doubt upon this point ever was suggested Until this case arose. Even the relator must, in the first instance, have believed.no bond was required, by acting as clerk of the District Court, under a deputyship given him by McCallum. Similar laws have never been so understood. By laws of First General Assembly of the Territory, page 162, the office of register of deeds was created. His bond was fixed at five thousand dollars, page 178. By an act of January 11, 1861, county clerks were made ex officio registers of deeds, and empowered to keep the books and perform the duties heretofore belonging to that office, and I will venture to say there is not an instance
But I confess I mistake the purport of the term ex officio ,-f McCallum, by virtue of his office, by his election, taking the oath of office, and giving the bond required as county clerk, is not entirely competent and entitled to discharge the duties as clerk of the District Court for Otoe county. Those duties are added to and imposed upon those who hold the office of county clerk. There is no loss of security arising from it. The bond required of county clerks is not to be less than throe thousand dollars, and may extend to ten thousand. In this case it was placed at six thousand, and the presumption is that it will be always fixed with reference to all the duties to be discharged. The bond heretofore required was but three thousand of the District Court clerk. It cannot be, as contended, that the bond given for the faithful performance of his duties as county clerk, will not extend to acts done as clerk of the District Court. That he may sign himself in one cáse as county clerk, and in another as clerk of the District Court, is an immaterial circumstance. His acts are all done under his election and qualification as county clerk, and his bond is given to cover any of them. As well might it be contended
To settle any point which might again arise under this law, I have considered the broad question whether county clerks can be required to give any other bond than that given as county clerks before they can demand the right to exercise the duties of clerk of the District Court. This question is not fairly presented by the record in this case, and this point might have been dismissed, in my opinion, with that suggestion. It is alleged simply that McCallum, “failed and neglected,” to give the bond contended for; not that he refused so to do. For reasons, some of which I have already alluded to, it may have never occurred to McCallum, that any other bond than that given was required. The very conduct of the relator in accepting and acting for a time under a deputyship given him by the defendant, was calculated to induce that ignorance of such requirement; and before the court undertook to exercise the inherent right of supplying itself with a clerk when, none is provided, or before the relator can ask that McCallum be dismissed and himself be instated, it should appear, that by order of court or otherwise, McCallum was required to present his bond for approval, and that he refused so to do. I could not consent to see one driven from an office, in which the partiality of his fellow citizens had placed him, for innocently neglecting to meet a requirement of the law which, perhaps upon the sligthest intimation, would have been cheerfully complied with.
Some further point, if I understood counsel, was sought to be made, that the defendant has not alleged in his answer the making of a proper bond, as county clerk even. After setting out his election in October, 1869, as County Clerk of Otoe county, the defendants answer recites, the making of
The judgment of the court below overruling the demurrer, must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed.