Defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to deliver. MCLA *620 335.341(l)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(a). He appeals as of right, raising several issues.
The most difficult issue raised by defendant involves his sentence of 12 to 20 years, which was made consecutive to a Federal sentence. Defendant was convicted in Federal court on September 10, 1974. He was sentenced in that case on November 21, 1974. The crime for which he was convicted in the instant case occurred on October 16, 1974.
The statute on which the trial court relied in imposing the consecutive sentence, MCLA 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2), provides:
"When a person, who has been charged with a felony and pending the disposition of the charge, commits a subsequent offense which is a felony, upon conviction or acceptance of a guilty plea of the subsequent offense, the sentences imposed for conviction of the prior charged offense and any subsequent offense, may run consecutively.” (Emphasis added.)
The problem we face is what is meant by "pending the disposition of the charge” in this statute.
In
People
v
Sanders,
People v Leal,
*621
The rationale of the statute authorizing consecutive sentencing was explained in
People v Bonner,
"The purpose of the statute is to deter persons accused of one crime from committing others by removing the security of concurrent sentences should conviction result on any or all of the crimes so committed. Such a purpose is laudable, rational and the statute reasonably tends to achieve that purpose.” (Citation omitted.)
If consecutive sentences were not allowed, a defendant in a pending action would have the security of knowing that the sentence for a second felony committed will run concurrently with the£, sentence imposed for the first felony. The sentence for the second felony would be minimized. Thus, the Legislature passed MCLA 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) to deter charged persons from committing a second felony by removing the security that the sentence must run concurrently with the first. In order to achieve the deterrent effect obviously intended by the Legislature, we will construe this statute liberally under existing case law.
People v Leal, supra, held that a charge is no longer "pending” for purposes of this statute after sentencing. Conversely, a charge should be deemed pending until sentencing in order to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. 2
We need not decide the farthest reach of MCLA 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) here. In the instant case, the second felony was committed before sentencing on the first charge. It was therefore committed "pending disposition of that charge”. The consecu *622 tive sentence imposed by the trial judge was proper.
The evidence against defendant in this case was obtained in a search of premises located in the City of Detroit at which defendant and several others were present pursuant to a search warrant signed by a judge of the Detroit Common Pleas Court. Defendant contends that Recorder’s Court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue such warrants under MCLA 726.11; MSA 27.3561, and that the search was therefore illegal. This precise issue was decided by this Court in
People v Moss,
Defendant raises several other alleged defects with the search warrant. First, he contends that the reliability and credibility of an undisclosed informant, upon whose information the warrant was issued, was not adequately established. This contention is meritless. The affidavit states that the informant had given reliable information in the past and that he personally observed the heroin at the subject premises. Credibility and reliability were adequately established.
Spinelli v United States,
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of posséssion of weapons by the occupants of the premises searched. This evidence was properly admitted as part of the res gestae of the execution of the search warrant. See
People v Kayne,
Defendant argues that the trial judge’s comments during trial "pierced the veil of judicial impartiality”. We have examined the record in this case closely and find no evidence of partiality. See
People v McIntosh,
Defendant claims error in three instances where witnesses volunteered information that was not responsive to the prosecutor’s questioning. Generally, unresponsive answers cannot be the basis of reversible error.
People v Swann,
Finally, contrary to defendant’s contention, it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to give a requested instruction on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s case was premised solely on direct, not circumstantial, evidence.
Cf. People v Davenport,
Defendant’s other assignments of error are without merit.
Affirmed.
Notes
The defendant in Leal had been sentenced to probation. He pleaded guilty to attempted possession of heroin during the probationary period. This Court held that the sentence for violating probation could not be made consecutive to the sentence for attempted possession, as the original charge was no longer "pending” when the attempted possession crime was committed.
By analogy, a Sixth Amendment "criminal prosecution” continues at least until sentencing.
See Mempa v Bhay,