THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JERRELL MATTHEWS, Appellee.
118114
Supreme Court of Illinois
December 1, 2016
January 23, 2017
2016 IL 118114
Illinois Official Reports
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Arthur F. Hill, Jr., Judge, presiding.
Judgment: Appellate court judgment reversed. Circuit court judgment affirmed.
Counsel on Appeal: Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State‘s Attornеy, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Annette Collins, and Hareena Meghani-Wakely, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Rachel M. Kindstrand, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
OPINION
¶ 1 On March 25, 2012, defendant Jerrell Matthews mailed a petition for relief from judgment via the prison mail system at Menard Correctional Center to the clerk of the Cook County circuit court and the Cook County State‘s Attorney‘s office. On May 24, 2012, the circuit court dismissed the petition sua sponte as untimely. The appellate court concluded that the dismissal was premature because the State was never properly served. The judgment of the circuit court was vacated, and the cause remanded. The State appealed to
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Defеndant-petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in 2007. The appellate court affirmed the conviction. Defendant filed a postconviction petition in 2010 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. The appellate court again affirmed.
¶ 4 On March 25, 2012, defendant mailed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to
¶ 5 On appeal, defendant argued that the dismissal was premature because he never properly served the State and, thus, the 30-day period for filing a responsе had not yet expired. Defendant contended that service was improper because the proof of service does not indicate that the petition was mailed via certified or registered mail as required by
However, the appellate court held the petition was not ripe for adjudication and dismissal was рremature because less than 30 days had passed from the date the State received actual notice of the filing. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court, which was allowed January 20, 2016.1
¶ 6 ANALYSIS
¶ 7 The сircuit court dismissed defendant‘s petition for relief from judgment as untimely. Such petitions “must be filed
¶ 8
¶ 9 This court reviews the dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition de novo. People v. Carter, 2015 IL 117709, ¶ 13. This court also reviews de novo whether the circuit court obtained personal jurisdiction. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 17.
¶ 10 As the appellant below, defendant had the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record so that the reviewing court could determine whethеr the claimed error occurred. People v. Carter, 2015 IL 117709, ¶ 19. The State contends that defendant did not sufficiently show that service was improper. Alternatively, the State claims it had actual notice of the petition more than 30 days before the dismissal; therefore, the court had personal jurisdiction, and dismissal was appropriate. However, the State urges this court to first аddress whether defendant should be estopped from making such an argument based on his own failure to properly serve the State or whether he has standing to challenge the dismissal order.
¶ 11 We have been presented with this issue before. In Carter, the defendant similarly argued that dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition was premature because he had not yet correctly served the State. Id. ¶ 18. Based on the evidence in thе record, we concluded that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that service
¶ 12 Whether Defendant Is Estopped From Challenging the Validity of the Order
¶ 13 Defendant‘s argument that the dismissal order should be reversed rests on his claim that service was improper. He concedes that such error was caused by his own failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 105. “[I]t is well established that ‘an accused may not ask the trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then contend in a court of review that the order which he obtained was in error.’ ” People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000) (quoting People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992)); see also People v. Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d 41, 58 (1998) (“[T]he law is understandably reluctant to aid litigants responsible for the very errors of which they complain.“); Clemson v. President & Directors of the State Bank of Illinois, 2 Ill. 45, 46 (1832) (“It would be clearly unjust to permit a party to assign his own mistakes as errors to reverse a judgment.“).
¶ 14 In People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001), the defendant challenged the propriety of the verdict forms used at trial. The defendant‘s own counsel provided those forms. Id. The court concluded that “[t]o allow defendant to object, on appeal, to the very verdict forms he requested at trial, would offend all notions of fair play.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.; see also People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368 (2004) (concluding that the defendant was estopped, pursuant to the invited error doctrine, from challenging admission of mere-fact impeachment evidence on appeal after agreeing to the admission of the evidence at trial); People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319 (2003) (precluding the defendant from challenging his conviction on grounds that a certain jury instruction was not given after he declined to provide such an instruction
¶ 15 Furthermore, if defendant were allowed to invalidate the circuit court‘s order based on his own failure to properly serve the State, future litigants may have an incentive to improperly serve respondents or provide incomplete certificates of service to create a second opportunity to litigate their claims. See Alexander, 2014 IL App (4th) 130132, ¶ 46 (“If we were to accept defendant‘s rationale, a prisoner who uses regular mail to effect service upon the State will—uрon appeal—be rewarded with a second bite of the apple if the court denies his petition on the merits.“). This would effectively revoke the State‘s power to waive service in these cases. Such a result would be inconsistent with the purpose of
¶ 16 Whether Defendant Has Standing to Challenge the Order
¶ 17 Defendant alternatively claims that, even if he is estopped from objecting to a violation of Rule 105, the entire proceedings were invalid and the dismissal order should be dismissed as void based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the parties. Courts must have both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment. In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 414 (2009). “Absent a general appearance, personal jurisdiction can be acquired only by service of process in the manner directed by statute.” State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308 (1986). Both parties agree the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation.
¶ 18 Defendant maintains that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over the State, based on his own failure to properly serve the State. Typically, a lack of personal jurisdiction argument based on improper service is raised by a respondent claiming an order is invalid because he or she did not receive notice of the proceedings. See, e.g., Keener v. City of Herrin, 235 Ill. 2d 338 (2009); State Bank of Lake Zurich, 113 Ill. 2d at 303. Defendant relies upon State Bank of Lake Zurich for the rule that a judgment entered without jurisdiction can be attacked at any time and “is void regardless of whether the defendant
¶ 19 In In re M.W., we concluded that, because objections to personal jurisdiction and improper service may be waived, “a party may ‘object to personal jurisdiction or improper service of process only on behalf of himself or herself.’ ” Id. at 427 (quoting Fanslow v. Northern Trust Co., 299 Ill. App. 3d 21, 29 (1998)). In that case, a minor was adjudicated delinquent. Id. at 412. She argued on appeal that the adjudication was void for lack of jurisdiction because her father had not been served in violation of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. Id. We concluded that, because the father could waive service, the minor did not have standing to object to improper service on his behalf. Id. at 427. Therefore, the minor could not claim the adjudication was void for lack of personal jurisdiction over her father. Id.
¶ 20 Nothing in In re M.W. indicates that this rule should be limited to proceedings pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. Thе same logic applies outside the context of juvenile proceedings. For example, in In re Estate of Meskimen, 39 Ill. 2d 415 (1968), the respondent challenged a trial court order on grounds that other trust beneficiaries had not been notified as required by the Probate Act. Id. at 422. The court declined to consider the argument after noting the respondent was “in no position to raise thе question.” Id. “The beneficiaries who failed to receive notice are the only persons in a position to raise the *** issue.” Id. at 422-23; see also In re Estate of Millsap, 75 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (1979) (“Appellant commenced these proceedings, appeared, and therefore was not entitled to notice. Since he was not entitled to notice, he may not complain of a failure to require that notice be given to others. Second, because he did have notice of the proceedings, appellant may not complain that others were not notified.“). We apply the same logic today to conclude that defendant lacks standing to challenge the validity of the circuit court‘s dismissal order based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the State.
¶ 21 Since we have concluded that defendant cannot object to improper service or lack of personal jurisdiction on behalf of the State, we need not consider whether the record is sufficient to support defendant‘s claim that service was improper. Nor do we need to consider the merits of the substantivе arguments originally raised in the petition.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 A section 2-1401 petitioner must serve the responding party with notice of the petition in compliance with
Defendant‘s petition is dismissed with prejudice.
¶ 24 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 25 Circuit court judgment affirmed.