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People v. Mathis
406 P.2d 65
Cal.
1965
Check Treatment

*1 In Bank. Oct. No. 8143. 1965.] [Crim. VIE CARL Respondent, v. DO PEOPLE, Plaintiff THE Appellant. MATHIS, Defendant *3 O’Brien, appointment by Supreme D. under Samuel Appellant. Layne for Court, and Donald M. Defendant Lynch, Attorney General, Harris, Jr., Thomas Albert W. C. Deputy Attorneys Granucci, General, and Robert R. Respondent. Plaintiff and appeal MOSK, This isan automatic under Penal J. Code judgments pursuant (b), from section subdivision guilty finding appellant

verdicts Dovie Carl Mathis mur- degree robbery degree fixing der the first first trial at death. The court denied trial penalty. and for reduction of the motions for new Billy Still was also convicted of murder and Codefendant robbery trial but received a sentence of im- at the same life prisonment. killing Ray The two defendants were convicted of Vernon process robbing approximately him $600

in the which evening person. place had on events took on the early morning Saturday, 1963, and the October hours Ray 20, 1963, displayed large Sunday, October after *4 presence a amount of cash in the of waitress at Fisher’s bar evening Ray early Saturday had bar in San Jose. been shortly p.m. and left before Bill during Still arrived at Fisher’s bar sometime the eve- ning Bay left, after and money heard tales from the waitress. Mathis arrived later, and Still recounted story calling upon him, the waitress to confirm it. Testi- mony offered which established that both defendants were evening. in financial straits that midnight proposed Sometime after Mathis the two leave the He then bar. drove Still to the home of his sister they San Jose where admitted key themselves with Mathis’s telephoned Bay. Bay Mathis told that his car was stuck in the Park, mud Alum Bock Jose, Bay San and asked park pull to drive to the him pickup out with his truck. Bay agreeably and, upon informing consented his wife and guests of his intentions, left his home about 1:30 a.m.

Mathis and Still then drove Alum Park, positioned Bock their automobile off the road and Bay waited for who arrived momentarily. Mathis, meanwhile, had instructed Still to take Bay the revolver he had in his car and hit over the head with appropriate objected it at an moment. Still to the use of the revolver, proposed so Mathis then that Still use a tire wrench which he obtained from the trunk of his car. Still took the nearby. wrench and hid in the bushes Bay When arrived he backed car, his truck to the Mathis connected a line vehicles, between the two attempted placed tow the car. Mathis, however, his foot brake of impression his ear to create the car was stuck. He eventually allowing Bay pull released the free, brake the car whereupon got Bay out proceeded of his truck and to release moment, Bay cable. At that towline, was bent over the crept up Still from behind and hit him over the head with Bay stunned, the tire iron. unconscious, but not and fled nearby to a him, creekbed. Mathis and Still chased and Mathis caught point quarter him at up of a mile the creek. during A scuffle Bay ensued which Mathis knocked uncon- large with a get money scious rock. He then told Still to Bay’s pocket, from Still did. Mathis then adminis- coup grace by striking tered the de several frontal blows to supine the head of victim with either the same or another large rock. departed two scene, driving Bay’s then from the Still

truck, using pair gloves furnished Mathis, and Mathis driving apartment his own car. Mathis returned to the young East Palo Alto where he lived with a woman named arriving complained about 3 a.m. He in- Taylor, an Kathy *5 fight had in a and telling Kathy that he been jured thumb, say had been to that he home anyone inquired she was if that evening. p.m. that since disposed Sunday morning met and and Mathis Still throwing night by previous they worn the clothes had the them Sunday, bay. p.m. About Mathis was arrested into the deputies to Red- County and taken the by Mateo sheriff’s San questioned jail police him. City San officers where Jose wood Kathy con- night, home all told he been Mathis them to for further story. was then taken San Jose his He firmed sleep. to p.m., he was allowed questioning until about when appeared to be Mathis’s thumb At the time was arrested he injuries. told other He officers split, but he had no serious caught in the door of his ear. he had his thumb that interrogation morning about Monday the resumed 8:30 On deny all, that continued to even told and Mathis a.m. Kathy changed story her and had admitted that he had During until course the not returned home a.m. interrogation Monday morning requested to his Mathis see Cyril attorney. being represented by Ash, then a San He was matter. at- attorney, in another criminal The officers Jose busy. Ash, ques- line tempted telephone but his The tioning continued. gave Monday, immediately arrested and At 11 a.m. Still was implicating complete police Mathis

a statement major perpetrator with the evidence crime. Confronted again possessed, requested to his police Mathis see now police placed office, attorney again a call to Ash’s attorney reaching secretary them the this time who told police for to call the was in court. The officerleft word Ash regard to client who wished to him. department a see truth,” Following agreed “to call Mathis tell the from him. That a was taken statement recorded statement at trial. was later introduced gave, however, Mathis was neither a The statement which attempt truth. It was an to absolve himself confession nor the casting robbery suspicion murder both and the from although police that Mathis told upon a third individual. parked Rock Park and had his ear off had been Alum he suggestion; stuck, though had done so at Still’s road as impor- merely accompanied Still the latter’s that he had tuning planned Ray’s do about idea what Still and had no cable, hooking up myste- a Ray the tow money; while confusing stranger and, him appeared from the bushes rious rendering him Mathis, head, uncon- Ray, him, hit over with Ray. stranger and then robbed and killed that the Still ; scious stranger person named resembled indicated He talking with at Fisher’s bar. Larry he had seen Still Jones apprehended Jones, who was held police then period released when his alibi was substantiated. brief gave investigation no During Mathis remainder during trip statements, and, to the scene of the further cooperate urged with the Still, he Still crime with duty reminding do him that he had no so. police, was used to discredit trial the recorded statement At the veracity. prosecution demonstrated *6 story Mathis, fabrications. exculpatory were elements enticing Ray behalf, into the admitted testifying on his own Ray part with plan it of a devised Mrs. park, but said was surprised fidelity to He said that he was Ray’s his wife. to test giving denied Ray over the head. He Still Still hit when disappeared the bushes as that Still had into and said tool it they parked the car and that he assumed was had needed to relieve soon as because Still According Mathis, himself. to enough him Ray hit hard to knock unconscious did Still charged tool from and after Ray had taken the Still then uttering “playing around” oaths about Mathis while Mathis Ray ran to creek where Mathis said he his wife. with up Ray attempted hit him caught with him. eventually protested that he did not want Mathis times while several managed warding blows Mathis off several fight. After picked creek. Mathis said he then trip Ray, fell into the who then Ray on the back of the head hit once up rock and apparently that Still had followed said from the scene. He ran ran, Ray until Mathis hit creek, waited down to the them Ray’s money and killed him. taken then had given a false statement to he Appellant testified depressed, wanted to see his tired and police he was because brought story that thought if told a he lawyer, and gain investigation time he would some suspect into the new questioning. from the and relief prosecution trial asked for phase of the penalty At the character not for Still. Two penalty for Mathis but the death prior of violence Mathis instances witnesses testified attorney district stressed convicted. The had been for which implicate an innocent man in this had tried to Mathis crime. judg- grounds reversing the urges for several Appellant statement improper of the recorded including the use ments, The other contentions relate aid of counsel. given without attorney and dam- alleged district misconduct appellant’s Appel- at the trial. wife aging photographs the victim taken color maintains that lant also been not have admitted body discovered should when ground they are inflam- the trial evidence at into matory. appellant’s grappling the use re- with Before containing substance, the most we statement, the issue corded specifications other error. discuss seriatim shall grue are indeed photographs this case The color admissibility probative is whether the some, but the test inflammatory outweighs the it effect of the evidence value 622, (People Harrison 59 Cal.2d may have. People Darling ; Cal.Rptr. 841, 381 P.2d 665] [30 Cal.Rptr. 484, 316]; People 372 P.2d v. v. Cal.2d [22 8]; People P.2d (1959) 53 Cal.2d Brubaker (1957) 48 Cal.2d Carter point in chambers on was considerable discussion There ruling probative outweighed that the value to the court prior photographs used inflammatory effect. The were to dis theory by showing that the the self-defense victim’s credit beyond recognition and that blood and had been beaten face head demonstrated matter around victim’s severe brain supine and had been struck after he was ren been blows deny Appellant does not hors combat.1 eviden dered tiary de objects pictures, to the use of color value of the but photographs which were available could have black-and-white reviewing purpose. It difficult for a the same court served *7 inflammatory if would less to determine black-and-white be considering subject pictures, ap but matter than color it significant. pears unlikely that the difference would be Since pictures unquestionably evidentiary did have value and weighed thoughtfully the trial court since alternatives ruling, do not find an abuse discretion before we admit into ting photographs reached a evidence. We similar comparable People a factual conclusion under situation Cal.Rptr. 59 Cal.2d Modesto People 33], reaffirmed v. Modesto P.2d 436, Cal.2d Cal.Rptr. 398 P.2d 753]. develop prosecution attempted mayhem-murder theory 1The also to eye purpose sought that and for further to show that one the victim theory put out. But this was had been eliminated from case when mayhem give to refused instruction. court attorney the district contends that next Appellant during the at least twice misconduct prejudicial engaged phase once in the guilt in the trial, once bifurcated eliciting inad of otherwise involved incidents Both phase. ohjections followed and both testimony from witnesses missible inquiry. line of to the sustained during redirect examination incident occurred first The designed to attorney questions asked Ray. district The Mrs. Ray which she Mrs. a letter written the date of obtain during appellant’s identify cross-examination. to been asked at- date, and the district Ray not remember could Mrs. torney event. might it in relation to some suggested recall she during he was out the time when Ray “it was then said Mrs. objected. counsel point defense at which and—” on bail admonished the witness stricken and the words court ordered merely and not document was written when the to state attorney per- information. The district additional volunteer repeated time over trying to some reference elicit sisted objections Ray said, I counsel, Mrs. “but until from defense ’’ Kathy. point girl At this say he trying to when shot was denied the for a mistrial. The court counsel moved defense record, and from the the statement stricken motion, ordered disregard had said. what the witness admonished the expected had not attorney apologized and said he The district Appellant contends from the witness. this answer during penalty phase compounded error was Kathy Taylor present as attorney who was dismissed district hearing jury after in full view and prospective witness testimony would not in chambers that her the court had ruled requested that the witness Defense counsel had be allowed. unobtrusively during a recess. dismissed context, one nor both of these incidents Taken in neither Ray’s likely prejudiced outcome. inad- Mrs. have shooting Kathy Taylor was an vertent reference during guilt court the three-week trial. The isolated incident properly jury. appellant testified admonished the responsible crime, he had been scene of the the victim being there, the victim and that he struck for the Appellant's testimony that case rested on his with a rock. Ray Ray in self-defense and did not lure into the he struck appellant's prior anti- park in order to rob him. Evidence of likely tip only social conduct would have been balance disprove prosecution had weak or no if the evidence strong appellant’s guilt defense. Here evidence of *8 convincing. attorney appellant The district demonstrated that money Saturday, 19, Sunday needed on October and that on gave Kathy Taylor morning, explana- October he $51. His acquisition money of tion at trial sudden was another fab- testimony exposed effective rication, rebuttal. On the self-defense, medical and photographs issue of evidence probable developed the manner in which the victim had been prosecution appellant killed. The also established that had injuries split no other than the thumb when he arrested, though Ray he testified that had hit him on Finally, head, even leg back, with the tire iron. defendant Still’s testimony clearly implicated Mathis. guilty robbery Since both defendants were found degree murder, jury apparently they first concluded that engaged Ray in a resulting common effort to rob Vernon during perpetration robbery. In his death addi- appellant living tion, Kathy knew that with Taylor originally pro- the time of the murder and that she testimony gave vided him with an alibi. Her no indication appellant. Therefore, unlikely of bitterness toward it seems shooting any remark her that the inadvertent about the say jury, probability effect on the nor can we as a reasonable (People its omission would altered the have outcome. 243]; People Watson 46 Cal.2d P.2d Cal.Rptr. 4, Hamilton 60 Cal.2d Kathy Taylor effect of the ostentatious dismissal of The appear prior penalty trial does not substantial to the prosecution presented The two witnesses who testified error. Kathy Taylor prior appellant; acts of would have violent another such incident. The testified to extremely damaging appellant two witnesses was yet suggestion People produce that the could another subtle appear likely appellant’s to have victim of violence does been the difference between life death. alleged final act of misconduct occurred when the attorney character cross-examined defendant Still’s district during penalty trial. Each witness was asked witnesses nagatively, appellant. witnesses answered if also knew Two the court sustained did not answer because one objection replied affirma question, and a fourth questions attorney claimed that the were district tive. The knowledge testing of Still the witnesses’ proper as a means boyhood. from friends defendants were close since the two questions proper where, here, no in- were additional *9 jury was created since the was aware of the defend- ference undoubtedly friendship and close realized that some of ants’ appellant. Furthermore, knew Still’s witnesses also defense object question posed only did not to the to the counsel affirmatively. witness who answered appellant’s im now reach contention that it was We testify penalty phase proper Mathis to to allow Mrs. of trial because of section 1322 of the Penal Code.2 are, however, exceptions to rule that

There several testify against spouse may not for or the other in a crim one exception spouse may inal action. is that either The basic testify framing in consent, if both thus the rule terms of a privilege. personal Furthermore, privilege is a preserved. right in order to In the which must be asserted Singh leading People 483 (1920) case of v. Cal. “spouse present in court 987], P. this court held that a who is spouse testifies, and and when the other is offered as a witness presumed . . .” object, who does not is to have consented. People Kroeger (Accord, v. 61 Cal.2d 246 [37 ; People (1961) 195 Cal.Rptr. 593, 390 P.2d v. Calderon 369] Cal.Rptr. ; People Cal.App.2d 576, v. Odmann 579 [15 874] ; People Cal.App.2d 693, P.2d v. 696 [325 495] (1937) Cal.App.2d Van Skander testimony objection by spouse of the other must An one Singh, proper ground (People v. explicitly and be made appeal be raised for the first time on supra), and cannot People Singh, supra.) Kroeger, In (People supra-, appellant no present and raised Mrs. Mathis testified case appeal. the fore> objection doing until this Under to her so testimony hold, therefore, that her going we must authorities properly admitted. testimony been would have We hold that the further timely objection. We appellant even had entered admissible in accordance proceeding conducted concerned with a are here following penalty 190.1 to determine with Penal Code section purpose punishable by death. The stated of a crime conviction “of of evidence permit introduction 190.1 is to of section surrounding crime, of the defendant’s circumstances part: provides husband nor wife “Neither relevant 2Section against competent in a criminal action or the other is witness for or parties, except proceeding with the consent of both are to which one or proceedings both, by committed for a crime actions or of criminal or ease other, person property against of ... or eases or one ..." the other. violence one criminal any aggravation or history, facts background testimony penalty.” Clearly the offered mitigation of the Legislature which in- type of evidence Mrs. Mathis fixing penalty. weigh in jury should hear tended physically appellant assaulted Mrs. Mathis testified cutting with a knife and occasions her times, her three on two point un- strangling an electric cord to her with once During Mrs. Mathis one these attacks consciousness. fearing through husband would jumped window, a closed her right duty and the her had both the take life. The testimony making determination, for these its consider this are background certainly aspects history might appropriate penalty. which bear on the question any thus is whether sufficient reason exists to jury. keep this from the We shall otherwise relevant evidence see that to the rules evidence at conforms guidance adopted trials for the which this court has *10 applying only remaining of trial courts in section 190.1. The objection testimony then cannot ad- would be that the be creating mitted without a direct conflict with the terms of hold, developed, section 1322. hereinafter We the reasons 1322 that there is no conflict with section because exclusion promoted by testimony purpose would serve no section. which would inad- types of evidence be present, some At guilt phase permitted of a trial are at the

missible at penalty shortly after 190.1 phase. court stated section As this appear the new section embodies would enacted, “It was that has al- of evidence liberal rule admission broad, the ways pleaded guilty and has where a defendant existed degree of the crime and being relate to the only tried issues (1959) 52 (People v. Jones Cal.2d imposed.” penalty (1964) People Terry v. 577]; 61 see also 636, P.2d 647 [343 381].) Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d Under this 137, 143 Cal.2d [37 of testi- the introduction likewise sanctioned view, have “We necessarily related to crime acts not mony of criminal being (People Terry tried.” the defendant for which 143-144.) 137, Evidence of such acts supra, 61 Cal.2d (1964) admissibility govern- the rules of may if it meets be introduced (People v. Purvis question. ing proof of the crimes 713].) 362 P.2d Since the Cal.Rptr. 97 56 Cal.2d admissible under have been testimony Mathis would of Mrs. for the acts to which a trial 1322 at of section provisions penalty trial. testified, it at this she admissible Nevertheless, question remains whether a literal reading requires of section 1322 us to limit testimony of one spouse upon to criminal hy acts committed him or her spouse, other to an actual trial for acts. those To the contrary, penalty proceeding we conclude that the trial is a where the exceptions may enumerated section 1322 ap found plicable. provides We so hold because no other solution an adequate purpose function and for both code sections here under consideration. precisely Section is not so worded easy as to allow judicial interpretation. contains, It for example, sepa two appear rate exception clauses which to create the same in cases by criminal spouse acts of violence committed one other,3 although apparently given no court has these two independent meanings (Marital clauses Privilege, 8 Stan.L. (1956) 420, 432). Rev. course, suggest Of by we do not language Legislature this erning provisions gov intended to make penalty phase trial, of a murder since the latter

proceeding was not in existence when section 1322 was enacted or last amended. As we seen, however, helpful have analogy has been drawn between the trial and proceeding (Pen. Code, 1192) general plea which is conducted after a § guilty degrees. (People to a crime divided into Terry (1964) supra, People 137, 143; Cal.2d v. Jones (1959) supra, 52 636, 647.) In particular, Cal.2d it has been held that proceeding testimony spouse against latter of one the other may properly (In be introduced. re Cal.App. Steve 2d Moreover, purposes none said to underlie section 1322 by excluding would be served here, offered while operation impaired intended of section 190.1 would be ruling. Apparently such a the common-law rule codified in the now defunct fiction that a origins section 1322 had its single legal entity. (See man and his wife are a Wigmore, (McNaughton 1961) 2228, p. 214.) Evidence rev. Recent § *11 concept attacks this anachronistic have resulted in the many aspects of interspousal legal immunity demise of (e.g., People v. (1964) Pierce 61 Cal.Rptr. 845, Cal.2d 879 395 [40 P.2d [conspiracy ; between husband and Klein v. 893] wife] (1962) Klein Cal.Rptr. 58 Cal.2d 102, 376 P.2d [26 70] [negligent ; (1962) Cal.2d torts] Cal. Self Self in proceedings . or case of criminal actions or for a com crime 3“ . . by against person property mitted one or of the other in ... or cases , ,”, other, upon by (Pen, Code, 1333.) § of criminal violence one Rptr. torts]), and we are not 97, 376 65] [intentional persuaded present to revive the fiction in the context. It has is also said that the rule survived because another harmony. policy consideration, preserve marital the desire to Cal.App.2d 759, (Young Superior (1961) 190 Court (McNaughton Cal.Rptr. Wigmore, rev. 331]; Evidence pp. 216-217; Law Revision Com. 1961) 2228, 1 Cal. § pp. seq.; Privilege, Marital 8 Stan.L.Rev. F-14 et Young however, case, in 421.) agree We court with the ’’ ‘‘ (Id. peace at violence, that after is doubtful. [marital] especially p. appear to be Cal.App.2d.) 764 of 190 This would prior acts of spouse true who has committed the where carry upon a crime his mate has been convicted of violence ing imprisonment, and where the a minimum of life sentence spouse voluntarily against interest of the testifies assaulted keeping in this any purpose If can he found other. useful homage to a formal jury, evidence from the other than mere interpretation statutory language which itself istic may be.4 unambiguous, we fail to that see what spouse of the hold, therefore, penalty trial We latter, testify against may compelled defendant not be the defend- yet may voluntarily do even in the absence so vio- prior acts of testimony ant’s consent when the relates by witness-spouse the defendant.5 lence committed into evidence testimony properly The admitted here was by jury. considered One is mentioned. are 4Two other reasons for the rule often Proc., (Code spouses Civ. “communications” are confidential. between rationale, validity it 1.) passing § of this subd. Without on the question enough cannot in here is be considered to observe that the criminal assaults any privileged term. sense of the “communications” repugnance” may part “natural from a have arisen The rule also might guilty, testi spouse, be convicted however to the idea that one mony theory, sharply Wigmore spouse. criticized has of the other being contrary immunity,

insofar as it underlies testimonial truth, pursuit path justice. impediment of the aims of serving It is an justice purpose except of criminal administration to make the no 1961) (McNaughton (8 Wigmore, rev. sport.” Evidence a “kind of p. 217.) supra, at newly- holding 970 of the section in full accord with 5Our herein is 299), (Stats. 1965, declares which ch. enacted Evidence Code privi person statute, has a “Except provided a married as otherwise ’’ exception any proceeding. testify spouse lege against not to (largely proceedings in section 972 enumerated the several refers to similar compelled trial witness-spouse may 1322), Code, present § in which such Pen. spouse. objection regardless of either hence among proceedings listed section is not (Por testify privilege in this situation. not to retains Code, privilege spousal the new Evidence under a full discussion see 178-185.) (1965), pp. Revision Com. Law 7 Cal. *12 Appellant two raises additional contentions. He asks alleged prejudice of the basis in the follow for a reversal on ing attorney “Q. question which the district asked Mathis: days you a conversation four before the death Did ever have Kathy Cyril Taylor your and Ray Ash, at of Vernon with concerning getting Appellant rid of witnesses?” an torney, objection negatively, and the court sustained counsel’s swered along attorney questions lines. The district to further those being attempted justify question to to the issue as relevant upon Although question in motive. is based a remote of appears improper, prejudice no in of the and view ference is negative rseponse.6 questions of coun Appellant also Still his resents concerning had ever hit Still and whether whether Mathis sel anyone questions were he had ever Mathis strike else. The seen showing purpose state of admitted for the limited of Still’s mind, jury It contention and the was so admonished. was his tragic night in because participated the events of that refused, known fear Mathis and had he Mathis’s of his of been him. propensity would have visited for violence prior claiming may testify about A defendant self-defense defend only victim not directed toward the violent acts of his also others in to show the defendant’s but toward order ant state of mind (see People Jones to victim v. relation People 544], v. Cal.App.2d 175 P.2d and (1955) 136 [288 Cal.App.2d 230]). same P.2d (1939) 34 278 [93 Jefferson rule is at applicable to a in which codefendant situation partner crime, tempts relationship to his explain his properly admitted. challenged was here hence evidence Cal.App.2d 658, 661 People Villegas (See (1938) 29 Sing People (1944) 64 ; Chan R.2d the extent 480] contrary, Cal.App.2d 81], holds to the 171 [148 disapproved.) it is alleged attorney referring 6The a conversation he district was pre Ray. shortly killing Vernon Mathis occurred before the of According Taylor. viously shooting Kathy charged been with proceeding attorney, Mathis had advised counsel district Mathis’s testify Kathy if leave California and were unavailable that against attorney were to him, drop prosecution The district would have to case. importance knew from this that Mathis desired to show Ray thereby complaining witnesses, kill order motivated to robbery. testifying regarding prevent of the In view Mm from incident, questions further about court’s appellant’s by refusal to allow prejudiced unlikely negative reply, it is ’ ’ ‘ ‘ fairly typical type error harmless matter. This any strategy frequently trial a result and heat of arises which length importance. of this appellant the court erred Finally contends that the trial playing statement at allowing recorded given aid of counsel at a time without it had been because (Escobedo v. right assistance.7 to such appellant had L.Ed.2d 1758, 12 S.Ct. (1964) 378 U.S. 478 Illinois *13 to appellant was entitled question that be little There can (1965) People Dorado Escobedo, in unlike counsel, and, as 361], he twice asked Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 62 Cal.2d police pur the no indication lawyer. While there is for his right counsel, it is also a appellant the to posefully denied attorney proved futile attempts reach the that to fact pause. investigation proceeded without stage. accusatory interrogation had reached the Here the appel- that Attorney heavily on the fact relies The General suspect to of a new in the arrest lant’s statement resulted investiga- in engaged police establish that were still circumstance does tory stage crime, but this of the unsolved persuasive to it. not effect attributed have reasonably existed at the time of No chance the statement eventually appellant not stand trial that would as at least participated had police one of who this crime. The those false, alibi that he knew that his first was had come home at Sunday possession of an amount of a.m. cash which he Billy implicated left, did not have when he that Still had him, person Ray that he was the who called Vernon and asked him park, to cometo the and that his hat was found at the murder police Nevertheless, scene. were still uncertain as to the participation. precise appellant’s extent of and others’ The police unfolded. role of the east of characters already persons knew two who were involved—Mathis and subsequent prove Still—and arrest of a third does not appellant investigation that the had not focused as at least culprit. prescribed People v. one The two Stew conditions Cal.Rptr. 201, art 400 P.2d 62 Cal.2d 577-579 [43 arrest, process 97], were met: Mathis under of interrogation eliciting incriminating that lent state- itself to 7Although appellant issue of voluntari has alluded to additional ness, question an of the examination record discloses no of that nature present. interrogators Voir dire examination of revealed no in possible exception of of stances mistreatment with the medical given appellant’s However, appellant attention to thumb. never com injury plained pain prompted give him caused that to custody only Additionally, appellant statement. had been hours eight or when he made the statement and been allowed more hours of sleep. doctrine the ac- the Stewart undertaken. Under ments was point appellant’s reached

cusatory phase had been undeniable. Escobedo was right under to counsel question raised is whether there penultimate right knowledgeable waiver of to counsel. a conscious supra, 62 Cal.2d People v. Stewart stated As right to the of the waiver “in order establish de indicate that the record must counsel the assistance of right and to silent to counsel remain advised fendant was intelligently rights and know these or ingly he knew of Ascertaining (Italics added.) them.” waived though not requires difficult generally the latter alternative however, have a subjective determination; here, we impossible knowledge in objective significant disclosure during crime trip the scene him and told remain silent urged which he his codefendant than police. Rather duty cooperate with the he had no legal of a needing the role legal advice, appellant assumed adviser to his codefendant. appellant it is difficult to hold that Nevertheless waived rights admittedly which, he was not advised and of which chronology legal literature, virtue of he could not fully interrogation prior have been aware. This occurred *14 (1964) in Massiah v. United States the decisions 377 U.S. 201 1199, 246], 12 Escobedo S.Ct. L.Ed.2d and v. Illinois [84 supra, and, People (1964) 478, 378 this court stated in U.S. presume (1965) supra, 571, 581, 62 Cal.2d “that v. Stewart warnings right his absent the defendant knew of to counsel prearraignment stage prior time that the United right in Supreme States Court would established this Escobedo ’’ utterly clairvoyance. him an to ascribe to fictitious There knowledgeable fore we cannot find conscious waiver required by Carnley (1962) 506, v. Cochran 369 U.S. 516 [82 884, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 8 70]. Finally we prejudice come issue of in the ad statement, mission of which did not constitute a confession attempted exculpatory but anwas statement. People As in v. Hillery (1965) Cal.Rptr. 62 Cal.2d 712 [44 401 P.2d 382], appellant did robbery not confess either the or the mur der, indeed, if his had statement true, been he would have guilt “stranger been exonerated from and the re [who] person Larry sembled a named Jones” would have been im plicated. The recorded statement added little of an affirmative prosecution’s nature to the case in chief, but was used to dis-

433 showing that he had testimony appellant credit the attempt in an falsehood an elaborate previously constructed appellant’s that the Adopting contention to absolve himself. excluded, its elimination been should have recorded statement upon ap- reflection additional merely removed one have would image. badly already tarnished pellant’s course of an at- made Furthermore, admissions prejudicially received exculpatory are not tempted statement substantially the at the trial testifies to defendant when the Hillery supra, (People (1965) 62 Cal.2d v. admissions. same long adaptation held of a 712.) This rule is modern a subsequently of evidence admission doctrine that erroneous (See People v. is harmless. by defendant himself testified to People 769]; P.2d v. Ketchem (1955) 166 Sykes 44 Cal.2d [280 People 353]; (1886) Daniels 70 635 P. v. (1887) Cal. 73 [15 People (1886) 70 98 655]; v. Marseiler (1949) Cal. 521 P. Cal. [11 Cal.App.2d People 503]; v. Cohen P. [210 [11 Cal.App.2d People (1947) Pratt 911]; P.2d Cal.App. P. People (1925) Booth 888]; difference between the the essential In this instance appellant’s was his shift original statement person a reliance implication of third from greater Thus, trial he conceded at the theory of self-defense. original in his state- personal than he admitted involvement ment. appellant’s de- to conclude no reasonable basis There is “impelled” introduction stand was to take the cision of this At time he made exculpatory attempted statement. already example, following evidence, that decision the against (1) codefendant Still him: properly admitted been had testified robbery- plotted and executed that Mathis that Mathis tele- had testified victim’s wife murder; (2) the presence at the fatal requesting his phoned her husband that the victim expert witness testified rendezvous; (3) an police supine; investi- brutally beaten after hat at the scene of finding appellant’s gator had testified had testified that he girl friend crime; (5) morning early hours on the in the to their domicile returned cash, large amount possession night murder had testified that witnesses other suddenly acquired; *15 person, cash on his usually carried considerable the victim murdered. found when he was but had none ap- under the evidence felony-murder case, This is a The robbery incontrovertible. in the participation pellant’s 434 jury, responsive evidence, to this returned dual verdicts find-

ing guilty robbery both defendants as well as the mur- In attempted der. these circumstances exculpatory merely statement was prominently in effect, cumulative and was no more featured the trial than other evidence that properly damaging. admitted and far more After an examination of the cause, including entire a care ful evidence, opinion review of the we are of the that there is possibility no complained might reasonable that errors have conviction, contributed to the riage and there has been no miscar justice. (Cal. Const., VI, 4½; People art. v. Watson § 818, 46 243]; Fahy Cal.2d 836 P.2d Con v. [299 necticut U.S. S.Ct. 11 L.Ed.2d [84 171]. )) judgments The are affirmed.

Traynor, J., McComb, J., Peek, C. J., Burke, J., con curred.

PETERS, J. I dissent. majority

The admit error, this death case error, committed, constitutional but conclude that such prejudicial require error was not so as to reversal. With this agree. admitting conclusion I cannot The error consisted of evidence, prosecution's chief, into case in recorded statement taken from defendant after he had twice asked for warning right attorney, his silent and his and without him of his to remain right majority counsel. The concede taking of such statement under circumstances vio such Illinois, lated the rule announced Escobedo v. 378 U.S. 478 agree. 977], S.Ct. I ma L.Ed.2d With this The [84 jority correctly also rule that was no waiver these there rights. majority improperly then hold that because the exculpatory secured statement was not a confession but an People Hillery, statement the rule of 62 Cal.2d Cal. agree. Rptr. 30, applies. I But 382], 401 P.2d With this also prejudicial majority then the hold that such error was not meaning 4½, within VI, section of the state article interpreted Watson, People Constitution as Cal.2d 243], disagree. With I majority imply that the error prejudicial was not be- cause, after the recorded statement was read to the part prosecution’s in chief, case the defendant volun- tarily took the facts stand and testified to the same contained *16 a misinter- This is improperly admitted statement. in the misinterpretation, upon this Based pretation of the record. errone- rely rule that the on the well-settled majority then the to subsequently testified as to facts admission evidence ous waiver, principles rule, based sound That is harmless. Obviously, applicable. good proper rule where and is improperly incompetent is hearsay evidence irrelevant or or and the stand elects defendant takes introduced, and then the preju- facts, has not been the identical he testify to same to if it. Even the record were error and has waived diced the majority that rule it is doubtful whether interpreted the as applicable The instant case tried before here. was would be thing one to hold case, supra, was decided. It is Escobedo improper evi- person should know that knows or that where voluntarily but then takes stand has been admitted dence and quite facts, waives the error. It to the same he testifies person or con- hold that rights knows should know his another to To the courts have announced them. before stitutional impute appellant. How hold would to omniscience to so could rights he he waive that he and this court did not know had? important given by appel- But the fact is that the version lant on stand was not the that in the the witness same as stand to explain fact, recorded In he took statement. give entirely to contradict statement and to an different explanation presence crime. the scene of improperly prosecu- admitted statement introduced chief, if true, tion’s case would have exonerated Mathis robbery testimony given of both murder. The on his implicated own behalf an extent that it Mathis such showed guilty manslaughter perhaps degree was he second mur- degree But he convicted of first murder. If der. was either testimony or the recorded statement were true Mathis was degree guilty Mathis, on murder. the witness not first giving stand, police, recorded to the admitted statement explain why untrue, attempted to admitted it was he police. to the lied ’ mainly was used to discredit Mathis recorded statement certainly just credibility, and did that. Had it been it appellant it is have taken the introduced doubtful that would impelled because, must stand. He have been take stand improper and with the with statement before the it, impeached properly before stood admitted he police—i.e., told as a liar. Of one who false stories right a constitutional take course, he had not to the stand. (Griffin California, 380 U.S. 609 S.Ct. 14 L.Ed.2d Malloy Hogan, 106]; 378 U.S. 1 S.Ct. 12 L.Ed.2d practically forced to take But he was the stand because improperly officialshad the law enforcement secured from him and introduced into evidence the statement that he knew and prosecution proven Obviously, false. had the state introduced, necessary ment not been it would not have been explain deny Obviously, or to it. he took the stand because practical compulsion explain deny under or gave statement, support argu because otherwise it false very falsity guilt. ment that its showed a consciousness of *17 circumstances, testimony, very in sense, Under such a real taking poisoned by was the “fruit of the tree.” To hold that ignore the stand he waived the error is to realities and to con very thing prohibit. tried done the Escobedo Dorado (See People Davis, Cal.Rptr. 454, v. 791 402 Cal.2d This we should not do. my opinion In the admission into of this recorded evidence prejudicial sense, statement in was the reversible and this is prejudice so whether the test for such is that used in Watson or a more liberal one. majority People Watson, supra,

The cited both have v. 818, 836, Fahy Connecticut, Cal.2d v. 375 U.S. 91 [84 171], applying in L.Ed.2d a of re- S.Ct. standard thereby implied error and both versible have that cases estab- disagree. lish I the same criteria. clearly The federal standard reversible stated error Fahy Connecticut, supra, (at p. 86): as follows question possibility “The is whether there is a reasonable that might complained the evidence have contributed to the con- ” Requiring finding a viction. that there is a “reasonable possibility” erroneously that the secured admitted evi- “might dence have contributed to conviction” is far differ- requiring finding ent from a that the error is harmless unless affirmatively that, required by Watson, the court finds “it reasonably probable” is that without the “a result more error favorable” to the defendant would have been reached. The language simply not difference is one of semantics. The may reversed, a an requires, state rule before case be affirma- reasonably finding probable without it tive that the error that different result would have been reached. The federal simply requires possibility there be a reasonable rule might the error have contributed to verdict. part But this of the discussion is academic. error here requires involved is so serious that it a reversal whether the stringent Fahy rule of or Watson the more rule of liberal be applied. judgments For this reason the should reversed. error, Another serious and one that cannot but confuse the law, by majority discussing was committed the admis- sibility testimony given by Mathis, Mrs. the wife of the appellant, as a prosecution. called witness On the penalty permitted testify trial she was to various vicious assaults committed her appellant, which assaults were way in no prosecuted. being connected with the crime for which was testimony This was to the effect Mathis had several times and cut knife, her with attacked another strangled time had into her with an unconsciousness electric highly cord. This if testimony, inadmissible, prejudicial, particularly pictured on the trial. It Mathis as a cruel beast, sadistic and jury could well have been decisive factor convincing impose penalty. the death majority first hold that when his wife was called aas object witness testimony, Mathis did not to her and that this implied testimony constituted an consent to her within the meaning of “consent” as used in section 1322 the Penal In majority probably Code. this determination the are correct. (People Singh, 987], 182 Cal. and cases fol P. lowing it.) sufficiently disposes point. This of this But majority stop They do there. state: “We fur- ther hold that the would have admissible even been ’’ *18 appellant objection. had ing timely Then after entered labor- point majority this the conclude discussion of this the point with the statement: hold, therefore, spouse penalty “We trial at a the of testify against may compelled the defendant the not be to yet latter, may voluntarily do so in the absence of the even testimony prior defendant’s consent when the relates to acts by upon witness-spouse de- violence committed the fendant.” very most dicta dicta and like sheerest is the This discussion particularly vicious because it is is It mischievous indeed. relating help but confuse the law clearly wrong cannot applies penalty privilege as it wife the husband and dicta must there- erroneous penalty cases. in death trials be fore discussed. the testimonv of wife The conclusion directly objection made, had been flies if an

admissible, even This applicable code sections. cavalier treat- of the in the face provisions on several statutory is rationalized ment of argued relevant, that such It is first grounds. trial, on the before the should be it therefore This is a clear non be and is admissible. should and therefore sequitur. forth in two code sections. involved is set privilege here provides: the Penal Code 1322 of Section competent witness for or nor is a husband wife “Neither proceeding action or to which a criminal against the other in except both, or in parties, with the consent or both are one proceedings for a crime committed actions or criminal case of other, property whether person or against the by one upon marriage of criminal violence or in eases after before or by or children of one or the child by other, one proceedings bigamy, or for criminal actions in cases of other or proceedings criminal actions or adultery, or cases or and 270a of provisions section brought under the [s] provisions of the ‘Juvenile any Court or under code ’’ law.’ provides: Procedure the Code of Civil 1881 of Section policy it is particular relations in which “There are inviolate; preserve it there- encourage confidence law to fore, person a witness the follow- cannot be examined ing eases: against cannot examined for husband or his wife “1. A against consent; husband, nor a wife for or her her

without during marriage consent; either, nor can or without other, the consent of the afterward, be, without examined as by during one to other any made communication exception apply does not to a civil marriage; but this action nor to a criminal action against other, by proceeding one or by against other, committed one proceeding for crime or against person by another a husband crime committed or for a committing engaged in with connected while or wife against other; in an action of a crime one or commission person adultery damages against for committed another hearing wife; or or in a held to deter- husband either competency or condition of either hus- mental mine the ’ ’ or wife. band appearing Penal 1881 not Portions of section Code (People applicable trials. held criminal have been section Cal.App.2d Pittullo, *19 to be mis- language too clear statutes, quoted The two spouse’s admissibility of one the interpreted, limit spouse, when by other witness against the to violence for a proceedings or made, to “actions objection is proper property of person against or by one committed crime expressed in section §1322), or as (Pen. Code, other” pro- or criminal action “to a Procedure of Civil of the Code ceeding other, or for against the by one a crime committed or person by a husband against another committed a crime committing with and connected engaged in wife while privi- The against the other.” one of a crime commission proceedings where criminal lege clearly applies to all civil or spouse about testify against other attempts spouse one way with no connected against witness in violence except very limited situations proceeding before the court disregarded and over- majority have involved. The not here dealing or with statute fact that we are here looked the problem the law should be that is not what statutes, and prescribed. agree I could with Legislature but what the has being majority they arguments were many of the made change. legislative But support made a recommended reading they being support out of the law are made to here legislatively prescribed privilege. function of a That is of a court. pend penalty certainly proceeding trial is an action or integral ing part of the court. In fact it is an before trial criminal trial. the bifurcated and trifurcated Otherwise Troche, (People would be unconstitutional. Cal. 767]; app. P. 74 L.Ed. dism. 280 S.Ct. U.S. govern guilt statutory both the Thus the same rules penalty expressly pro except trials where the statutes they only phase applicable vide are to one or the other of the trial. majority 190.1 of the Penal Code hold section impliedly modifies, repeals, that it amends statute,

such It that the enumera- 1322. is contended and controls section may type 190.1 of the of evidence tion in section brought indicates, in some on the trial before abrogate hus- fashion, an and abolish the undisclosed intent privilege kinds of band and wife insofar as the enumerated sequitur. obvious non are concerned. This is an evidence of “the provides that evidence 190.1 section Penal Code crime, defendant’s back- surrounding circumstances aggravation or miti- any facts in history, ground *20 presented penalty” may factors be to the as gation of the or This in determination of life death. be its to considered relevancy not statute, one that makes otherwise simple ais only purpose for the evidence admissible. inadmissible relevancy in the is to broaden the enumeration on the statute because rules trial, much penalty of the enumerated evidence guilt relevancy reasons, on admissible, for the not be would opinion majority necessarily holds that phase of the trial. The broadening general relevancy the rule must affect a statute specific privilege found in a and wife statute. the husband types all of the enumerated In other words relevant specific providing con- admissible, spite statute is of recog- fallacy reasoning that it to trary. The of this is fails cases, situations, the in all and in all husband nize that meaningful only presupposed that privilege when it is wife is very witness-spouse will relate relevant evidence. The the purpose privilege otherwise rele- of the statute to exclude if testimony. privilege be no for the There would need vant the grounds witness-spouse’s testimony excluded could be irrelevancy. of argue majority length purposes for the hus- at that the privilege not outgrown, have been and would band and wife witness-spouse the testified be served in the situation where against defendant-spouse penalty phase the at the of the trial. arguments support legislative good repeal of These are of privilege. They nothing than indict- the constitute more an theory privilege. They appli- of the ment the behind are not statutory privilege. interpretation of the These cable to an judicial arguments They amount to an abuse of the function. States, answered Bassett v. United were 137 U.S. all pp. (at 762]) as follows: 505-506 S.Ct. L.Ed. “It of the common law a well-known rule that neither competent husband nor wife was a witness a criminal action against other, except personal in eases of violence, the one the justice upon other, compelled in which the the necessities power do relaxation of the rule. ... We not doubt the of the change well-supported legislature rule; to ancient this change lightly an intention to make such should be but imputed. It cannot be assumed it is indifferent to sacred things, holy the or that it means to lower relations of husband plane simple So, and wife to the material contract. before any through departure ages from rule the affirmed having law,—a rule its foundation common solid in the best society,—can declaring adjudged, language be interests of prevent doubt clear as to as should be so legislative will ’’ and limit. intent its 858], Commonwealth, S.E.2d 186 Va. 775 [43 In Meade v. Virginia following Appeals of Supreme Court Wigmore in S.E.2d]): (at p. 862 “Professor say page Ed., VIII, 221 et 3rd Evidence, work on Vol. excellent granted by common vigorously privileges attacks seq., upon rule is based. We which the law rule and reasons pass upon for however, the reasons not, are called may good A lack of wisdom the law. reason rule, or the legislature change ground law; we must for the but law as it is.” construe ‘‘ majority claimed basis is that Since second rule A testimony of would Mrs. Mathis have been admissible provisions 1322 at a of section trial for the acts under the testified, it admissible trial.” which she pointed holding, already out, This flies the face *21 language of the section. very have been few cases discovered where There the witness-

spouse testify amounting asked to acts to crimes com is by defendant-spouse against her the at a trial other mitted those crimes. In than for the commission of the cases found involving situation courts have held the that such testi improper. Texas mony be Court of would Criminal (Brock held on different v. Appeals State, has so two occasions Tex.Crim.Rep. Am.St.Rep. 100 335 S.W. [71 Rogers 465]; (Tex.Crim.Rep.) 368 L.R.A. State v. S.W.2d only cut back on the rule when clear 772) has dictates (Newman State, necessity 151 Tex. so demanded Crim. (Cf. People 171]). S.W.2d Rep. McCormack, 628 [210 139], App.Div. N.Y.S.2d affd. without opn., N.E.2d 303 N.Y. by recognized its likewise, provisions, has code California circumstances, not present, testimony under certain here against spouse may compelled a be at of crimes committed a Specifically, than for that crime. evidence of trial other upon spouse by child or children of committed a one crimes upon Code, (Pen. 1322) and crimes committed the the other § defendant-spouse course of witness-spouse the the party (Code against Proc., Civ. a third committed crime witness-spouse by the at the may de- 1881) be testified § against crime committed child fendant-spouse’s trial for Legislature provided words, has In person. other or third that most necessity exists sense it thinks that where important (and only) witness would otherwise sometimes be by operation privilege, of the husband and wife unavailable the liberalizing will be relaxed. But the of the rule under rule specific statutory authority under these circumstances is exceptions. not create other the court should already power privilege alter the As noted the statute Legislature. urged by majority solely with the lies power by Quite recently Legislature has exercised adoption The new Evidence Code of the Evidence Code. witness-spouse may be up question as to clears compelled testify against defendant-spouse. The new may compelled witness-spouse provides that the be code spouse proceeding in which one testify charged “A criminal (italics added) and then follows the same with” existing contained statutes. of crimes as is enumeration defendant, the instant (Evid. (e).) The Code, subd. § upon rather charged his wife but with assault case, was Ray. of Vernon for the murder tried majority opinion that the defendant- holding in the may witness-spouse be testified to upon the spouse’s acts undercutting this effect of witness-spouse will have the the specific prior to the effective legislative at a time even intent legislation. of the date judgments. reverse I would majority opinion as to in the I concur TOBRINER, J. penalty trial I dissent as guilt but trial Peters. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice in the grounds stated rehearing denied November petition for Appellant’s opinion Tobriner, J., were J., and Peters, 10, 1965. granted. petition should

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Mathis
Court Name: California Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 1, 1965
Citation: 406 P.2d 65
Docket Number: Crim. 8143
Court Abbreviation: Cal.
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